DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-COUNTER-SMALL-UNMANNED-AIRCRAFT-SYSTEMS-STRATEGY

U.S. Department of Defense

Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Strategy

MESSAGE FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY

Challenges to the Joint Force are more complex and varied than at any other time. Rapid technological change

has aided in disrupting the international rules-based order. Small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) were

previously viewed as hobbyist toys, but today it is evident that the potential for hazards or threats has the ability

to impact the Joint Force.

Our initial efforts were intended to meet the immediate needs of Services and combatant commanders.

However, as technology and proliferation of sUAS continue to advance at a pace that challenges the Department’s

ability to respond effectively within current paradigms, it is evident that we cannot rely on materiel solutions

alone. Instead, we must re-examine how to counter the growing challenges sUAS present to the Joint Force by

considering and developing solutions that span the entirety of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,

Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities—Policy (DOTMLPF-P) spectrum.

This strategy provides the framework for addressing sUAS across the spectrum from hazard to threat in the

homeland, host nations, and contingency locations. As technology and systems evolve, this strategy will require

ongoing assessments to ensure the Department keeps pace. Success will require unity of effort across all of DoD’s

stakeholders. The Military Departments, combatant commands, Joint Staff, and other DoD Components will

maintain constant vigilance of sUAS and ensure the United States and its allies and partner nations maintain the

most effective response.

Christopher C. Miller

Acting Secretary of Defense

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 3

INTRODUCTION � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 4

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 6

A NEW STRATEGIC APPROACH � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 10

Line of Effort 1: READY THE FORCE � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 12

Line of Effort 2: DEFEND THE FORCE � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 14

Line of Effort 3: BUILD THE TEAM � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 16

CONCLUSION � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 18

Annex A� Glossary � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 21

Annex B� Governance � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 28

Annex C� Unmanned Aircraft System Categorization � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 29

Annex D� References � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 30

U.S. Department of Defense

Counter-sUAS Strategy

FRONT COVER

Marine Corps 1st Lt. Taylor Barefoot programs a counter-unmanned aircraft system on a Marine defense

vehicle during a training exercise at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif.,

Nov. 13, 2018. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Dalton Swanbeck)

BACK COVER

U.S. Army Soldier assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry

Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), launches the RQ-11 Raven

during platoon live re exercise at Fort Campbell, Ky., Jan. 25, 2018. (U.S. Army Photo by Capt. Justin Wright)

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

The exponential growth of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) creates new risks for the Department

of Defense (DoD). Technology trends are dramatically transforming legitimate applications of sUAS while

simultaneously making them increasingly capable weapons in the hands of state actors, non-state actors, and

criminals. Small UAS may also pose hazards to DoD operations in the air, land, and maritime domains when

controlled by negligent or reckless operators. The Department must protect and defend personnel, facilities,

and assets in an environment where increasing numbers of sUAS will share the skies with DoD aircraft,

operate in the airspace over DoD installations, and be employed by our Nation’s adversaries.

In response to this challenge, the Department initially emphasized the deployment and employment of

government and commercially-built materiel to address the immediate risks posed by sUAS; however, it

resulted in many non-integrated, redundant solutions. Although the initial approach addressed near-term

requirements, it also introduced challenges that complicated the Department’s ability to keep pace with

a constantly evolving problem. To address these challenges, the DoD requires a Department-wide holistic

strategy for countering sUAS hazards and threats.

In November 2019, the Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) as the DoD

Executive Agent (EA) for Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS, unmanned aircraft groups 1,

2, and 3). In his capacity as EA, the SECARMY established the Joint C-sUAS Ofce (JCO), which will lead,

synchronize, and direct C-sUAS activities to facilitate unity of effort across the Department.

The DoD C-sUAS strategy provides the framework for addressing sUAS across the spectrum from hazard

to threat in the homeland, host nations, and contingency locations. Department stakeholders will work

collaboratively to achieve three strategic objectives: (1) enhance the Joint Force through innovation and

collaboration to protect DoD personnel, assets, and facilities in the homeland, host nations, and contingency

locations; (2) develop materiel and non-materiel solutions that facilitate the safe and secure execution of

DoD missions and deny adversaries the ability to impede our objectives; and (3) build and broaden our

relationships with allies and partners to protect our interests at home and abroad.

The Department will address these objectives by focusing on three lines of effort: Ready the Force; Defend

the Force; and Build the Team. To Ready the Force, DoD will maximize current C-sUAS capabilities and use a

risk-based approach to guide efcient and rapid development of a suite of materiel and non-materiel solutions

to address emerging requirements. To Defend the Force, DoD will coordinate the delivery of joint capabilities

underpinned by DOTMLPF-P consideration and synchronize the development of operational concepts and

doctrine. Finally, as the global military partner of choice, DoD will Build the Team by leveraging its existing

relationships, create new partnerships, and expand information sharing to meet emerging challenges.

Through the implementation of this strategy, the Department will successfully address the challenges posed

by both hazard and threat sUAS operating within the U.S. homeland, in host nations, and in contingency

locations. Commanders in each of these varied operating environments will have the solutions they need to

protect DoD personnel, facilities, assets, and missions from both current and future sUAS threats.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

The United States faces threats from a variety of actors including strategic competitors, regional powers,

weak or failed states, and non-state actors. Competitors are challenging U.S. interests across all domains

and geographic regions by leveraging advances in technology such as sUAS to achieve their objectives.

Although the most common use of sUAS in the homeland is for legitimate purposes such as entertainment,

protection of commercial facilities, law enforcement, or reghting, these systems may inadvertently place

DoD personnel, facilities, and assets at risk through careless behavior within an already congested airspace.

Even at the lower end of the conict spectrum, malicious actors can adapt this technology to create more

robust capability.

As the sUAS problem expanded across multiple areas of responsibility, the Department adopted an approach

that pursued immediate C-sUAS materiel solutions to address the rapidly evolving challenge for U.S. forces

at home and abroad. This approach emphasized the deployment and employment of government and

commercially-built materiel to address the immediate risks posed by sUAS; however, it resulted in many

non-integrated, redundant solutions. Although the initial approach addressed near-term requirements, it

also introduced challenges that complicated the Department’s ability to keep pace with a constantly evolving

problem. To address these challenges, the DoD requires a holistic strategy for countering sUAS hazards and

threats.

Materiel solutions alone cannot counter threat sUAS or mitigate hazards. Protecting U.S. forces, allies, and

partners requires that we examine our existing doctrine, training, equipment, and policy to identify any

potential shortfalls to countering present and future sUAS threats. This means we must work horizontally

across the Department to ensure that the perspectives and requirements of the many stakeholders

(Joint Force,

allies, partners, etc.) are considered across the DOTMLPF-P spectrum while also working

with other federal agencies and domestic entities to improve interoperability and integration of capabilities.

The Department must provide commanders with the right equipment and with ready forces which are

supported by appropriate training and doctrine in order to enable the Joint Force to collectively meet the sUAS

challenge. Finally, we must integrate active defenses, passive defenses, or a combination along with materiel and

non-materiel solutions using a risk-informed, tiered approach to ensure the protection and defense of our

personnel, assets, and facilities.

When all of these elements are synchronized, our forces will be prepared to

detect, identify, deter, and, if necessary, defeat threat sUAS.

 While the term “Joint Force” traditionally refers to the doctrinal denition from JP 3-0 (A force composed of elements,

assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander), its use in this

strategy is intended to be inclusive of all DoD Components that have C-sUAS equities and/or conduct C-sUAS operations.

 Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Guidance for Use of Counter-UnmannedAircraft

Technology Outside the United States to Protect DoD Personnel, Installations, Facilities, and Assets,” 7 May 2020.

INTRODUCTION

Central Challenge

The exponential growth of sUAS creates new risks for the Department� Technology trends are

dramatically transforming legitimate applications of sUAS while simultaneously making them

increasingly capable weapons in the hands of state actors, non-state actors, and criminals� Small UAS

may also pose hazards to DoD operations in the air, land, and maritime domains when controlled by

negligent or reckless operators� The Department must protect and defend personnel, facilities, and

assets in an environment where increasing numbers of sUAS will share the skies with DoD aircraft,

operate in the airspace over DoD installations, and be employed by our Nation’s adversaries�

INTRODUCTION

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

To successfully address the sUAS challenge, stakeholders across the Department will pursue three strategic

objectives:

• Enhance the Joint Force through innovation and collaboration to protect DoD personnel, assets, and

facilities in the homeland, host nations, and contingency locations;

• Develop materiel and non-materiel solutions that facilitate the safe execution of DoD missions and

deny adversaries the ability to impede our objectives; and

• Build and broaden our relationships with allies and partners to protect our interests at home and abroad.

Meeting these objectives will require emphasis on rapid innovation, synchronization of materiel and

non-materiel solutions across the Joint Force, and partnerships that are underpinned by interoperability,

integration, and information sharing.

Jerome Ramirez and U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Michael Ingold brief Maj. Gen. Robert D. McMurry, AirForce Research

Laboratory commander, on his teams’ counter unmanned aerial system solution, Dec. 14, 2016, during the AFRL

Commanders Challenge at the Nevada National Security Site, Las Vegas, NV., Dec. 13, 2016.

(U.S. Air Force photo by Wesley Farnsworth)

INTRODUCTION

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

Around the world, competitors are rapidly adopting

sUAS into their military, civil, and commercial

inventories. Both state and non-state actors are

increasingly employing purpose-built military and

consumer-grade sUAS to attack a range of targets

including leadership, military facilities and forces,

and critical infrastructure. As this pattern continues

to evolve, the Joint Force will see these systems

employed in more novel ways to contest U.S. military

advantage. In addition to changes in the operating

environment, three primary drivers have created the

imperative for the Department to address sUAS: (1)

the changing character of warfare; (2) emergent

strategic competition; and (3) challenges to the U.S.

military advantage.

Changing Character of Warfare

Commercial manufacturers and nation states are improving performance, reliability, and survivability of sUAS.

Low cost systems are increasingly available around the world. These more capable systems have extended

range, payload, and employment options. Some of these systems can t in the palm of a hand, perform

military missions, and conduct novel offensive or defensive operations not traditionally associated with the

platform. Swarms of sUAS operating independently or augmented with manned systems, facial recognition

algorithms, and high-speed digital communication networks, such as fth generation cellular networks, will

create new levels of complexity. The impending integration of articial intelligence with autonomous sUAS

will introduce yet another dramatic change to the character of warfare.

Emergent Strategic Competition

Hostile nation states have learned from the successes of non-state actors and the United States in the employment

of sUAS. Some of these nations have become beneciaries in this rapidly expanding market. Others are elding

purpose-built military and consumer-grade sUAS in large numbers, which provide scalable options for

defensive and offensive operations. For China, the development of sUAS generates both an economic incentive

and a military benet. As a major producer of commercial and consumer sUAS, China is estimated to have 70

percent of the global market share.

Militarily, China’s capabilities and reach will continue to grow as it invests

heavily in developing and elding advanced weapons. Russia is making sUAS platforms an integral part of its

future warfare capabilities by improving its reconnaissance-res complex and elding reconnaissance and

attack UAS.

Iranian proxies are actively conducting kinetic operations with sUAS. The 2019 attacks on key

Saudi Arabian oil facilities demonstrated how sUAS can be used to attack and disrupt critical infrastructure.

 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy 2018, p.3.

 Patrick McGee, “How the commercial drone market became big business,” Financial Times, November 26, 2019.

 Senate Intelligence Committee, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-worldwide-threats#,

January 29, 2019.

An unmanned aerial system (UAS), operated by U.S. Air Force

Academy cadets and Johns Hopkins University engineers, ies

near the guided-missile destroyer USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109)

during exercise Black Dart, Sept. 20, 2016. (U.S. Navy photo by

Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Maddelin Angebrand)

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

Even if the U.S. military does not engage in direct conict with Russia, China, or Iran, U.S. forces will likely

encounter advanced sUAS equipment, concepts, doctrine, and tactics used by their surrogates in locations

around the globe.

Challenges to the U.S. Military Advantage

Both at home and abroad, sUAS affect the operations of ground, naval, air, and space forces. With enhanced

surveillance capability, malicious actors can collect critical intelligence on a unit’s location, composition, and

activity. This level of situational awareness can enable an adversary to degrade the Joint Force’s freedom of

maneuver. When these systems are weaponized, sUAS can present a precision strike capability; direct attacks

using small munitions; provide laser designation for indirect res or remote engagement by manned platforms;

or deploy chemical, biological, and radiological agents.

Small UAS can provide the adversary exibility by

extending sensor coverage and communications over the horizon—increasing warning time and extending

effective weapons range. They can also enable adversaries to conduct operations with greater presence while

remaining at a distance. Small UAS not only create effects against U.S. forces within a single domain, but are

able to operate across multiple domains—transitioning from the air to the land or sea and back again. Finally,

sensitive data on unsecured systems are targets for a variety of sUAS cyberattacks, and adversaries can use

sUAS to collect information, deliver malicious content, or enable kinetic attacks.

Domestically, the most likely use of adversarial sUAS will be the collection of intelligence against U.S. forces and

facilities. The physical danger posed by sUAS strikes remains present as the result of malicious and intentional

attacks or accidental damage caused by careless use. The 2015 incident with a commercial drone crashing on

the White House lawn, unauthorized overights of sensitive facilities, and the disruption of airport operations

provide insight into potential attacks by a determined and capable adversary. A single successful strike on a

high-value asset could affect Joint Force readiness by degrading the ability to project power and employ forces

as needed. In locations where the Department does not control the airspace, the Joint Force is presented with

additional challenges that require coordination with national airspace managers in a balanced approach to

protect the safety and security of military operations.

The emergence of sUAS as both hazard and threat has complicated an already complex and challenging security

environment. While fundamentally aircraft, sUAS exist in the gap between air defense, force protection, and

airspace control across the operating environment continuum. The continued proliferation of these systems

will challenge DoD’s existing paradigm for how it addresses emergent technologies that may pose a threat to

the force. The solution to countering sUAS in or around DoD facilities, missions, or personnel will vary based

on where the incursion occurs along the spectrum of operations (see Figure 1).

The increased availability of inexpensive, capable sUAS is allowing government, industry, and the public to

employ what was once available only to the military and a small number of dedicated hobbyists. These systems

are the fastest growing segment of the aviation industry, and this growth has dramatically increased the risk of

sUAS hazards for the military. Improvements in sensor miniaturization, battery technology, ight performance,

and control mechanisms, along with reductions in price and regulations, have led to increased interest in

 Lt Col Jeffrey Lamport, COL (R) Anthony Scotto, “Countering the UAS Threat from a Joint Perspective,” Joint Deployable

Analysis Team, February 09, 2017.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

their commercial utility. As new technology continues to

improve capabilities, commercial applications will also

expand. Large commercial entities are pursuing UAS

operations, resulting in a dramatic proliferation of highly

capable drones occupying U.S. airspace and overying

DoD installations in the United States and around the

world. To adapt to these changes in the air domain, the

DoD must adopt a posture of anomaly detection by

seeking ways to highlight abnormal behavior and focus

attention on those sUAS identied as potential threats

and hazards. As the Department’s policies and capabilities

evolve in response to the technological changes, it must

also address how these systems enable adversaries to

project power in a variety of new ways. In the hands of

non-state actors, sUAS can be adapted into a surveillance

or weapons system that poses a security threat to the

force. When own by well-intentioned hobbyists and

commercial operators, they can unintentionally pose a

safety hazard to DoD installations and assets. Despite the

fundamental differences between these two uses, both

create risk for DoD.

Three Operating Environments: Homeland, Host Nation, and Contingency Locations

Homeland. As the National Defense Strategy (NDS) recognized, the homeland is no longer a sanctuary.

Though presence alone is not a threat, the ubiquity of sUAS operating within the United States presents a

unique set of challenges. In the context of airspace management, commanders are challenged to determine

the intent of sUAS operations through procedural and positive airspace control measures. The widespread

use of sUAS as legitimate commercial platforms and hobbyist toys has resulted in efforts to integrate sUAS

into the National Airspace System (NAS). However, the ability to effectively manage and track those platforms

within the NAS has been slow to develop. These changes in both the security environment and the commercial

sector have challenged our ability to adapt capabilities, authorities, and policies. Ongoing initiatives by the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to implement technologies like UAS Remote Identication as part of

an effective Unmanned Aircraft System Trafc Management System are promising. However, until they are

implemented, the burden of tactically detecting and identifying anomalous systems in the vicinity of U.S. forces

and facilities remains the responsibility of installation commanders. The DoD conducts military operations,

including C-sUAS activities, in the homeland amidst a complex environment. A framework of federal laws

and regulations affects the C-sUAS actions DoD may take to protect domestic facilities and assets and requires

coordination with other federal agencies. DoD installations are often surrounded by civilian populations and

private property, and any harmful radio frequency, laser, microwave, or other energy directed outward from

the installation has the potential to affect civilians or their property. Through its risk-based assessment, the

Department must account for potential collateral effects of C-sUAS capabilities employed to protect its facilities.

Furthermore, many existing laws and federal regulations were not designed to address sUAS as threats, and

Figure 1: C-sUAS Spectrum of Operations

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

the continued rate of technological change makes it difcult for the legal authorities to keep pace. This has

inhibited our ability to employ effective defenses against these potential threats. The continued growth in

commercial and hobbyist sUAS in the NAS will fundamentally alter the way airspace is managed, and the

Department must work with relevant civil authorities to ensure the domestic use of C-sUAS systems adapts

to this changing reality.

Host nations. Similar to the restrictions in the Homeland, host nation environments have a diverse array of

statutes and regulations that could inhibit effective force protection efforts. Our bases and operations in host

nations must work with local airspace control authorities while complying with local laws and obligations

of treaties or other agreements.

As our allies and partners integrate sUAS into their national airspace systems,

commanders abroad will need to adapt to the reality of increasing numbers of sUAS operating in the vicinity of

U.S. forces. This creates a challenging operating environment where local commanders have varying authorities

to take action to protect U.S. interests.

Contingency locations. Contingency locations are generally the least restrictive operating environment

but potentially carry the highest risk. Even at the lower end of the spectrum of conict, adversaries can

adapt commercial sUAS for the accomplishment of military objectives such as intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance and kinetic strike. These adversaries may be able to adapt this technology to create more robust

capability for cyber, electromagnetic warfare, or other effects. In this environment, the United States and its

coalition partners will employ sUAS and manned aircraft to achieve military objectives, creating a highly

congested but lesser controlled air domain.

 Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Guidance for Use of Counter-Unmanned Aircraft

Technology Outside the United States to Protect DoD Personnel, Installations, Facilities, and Assets,” 7 May 2020.

U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Briar Purty, an infantryman with 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment,1st Marine Division tests Drone

Killer Counter-UAS Technology during Urban Advanced Naval Technology Exercise 2018 (ANTX-18) at Marine Corps Base Camp

Pendleton, California, March 21, 2018. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Rhita Daniel)

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

A NEW STRATEGIC APPROACH

To address the central challenge, the Department must rst evaluate the solutions in which we currently

invest and the processes we leverage to eld them. Part of that evaluation may require us to improve current

capabilities and add layered defenses with new capabilities to address both sUAS adversarial threats and the

hazards encountered from legitimate users. We must leverage the research, development, test and evaluation

(RDT&E) centers of excellence to pursue the next generation of C-sUAS capabilities that will position the Joint

Force for the future. We will rapidly develop innovative solutions while leveraging a risk-based assessment

process.

This approach will enable us to make better-informed decisions that balance the effectiveness

and efciency of systems within budgetary realities. These actions will maximize our ability to provide

the Joint Force with the most effective capabilities for use in the homeland, host nations, and contingency

locations. We must also continuously evaluate the efciency of our processes to provide effective materiel and

non-materiel solutions to the Joint Force. Transformational processes, such as the Adaptive Acquisition

Framework, can streamline efforts to meet the unique requirements of the C-sUAS problem set. However,

some of our acquisition processes are optimized to support conventional operations with long-lead times for

capability development. As the NDS states, “[t]he Department’s management structure and processes are not

written in stone, they are a means to an end–empowering the warghter with the knowledge, equipment

and support systems to ght and win.”

If our processes do not adequately respond to the needs of a rapidly

changing security environment, we must take a new approach.

Second, we must develop common materiel and non-materiel solutions. Those solutions must be supported

by, and incorporated into, joint and Service doctrine and training standards that contribute to joint and

combined arms operations.

Finally, we cannot rely on materiel and non-materiel solutions alone to protect our interests. We must leverage

one of our biggest competitive advantages—being the partner of choice. With long-standing relationships

across the globe, we can protect the United States and its interests and assist our allies and partner nations by

prioritizing interoperability and information sharing.

This new approach will require all Department stakeholders to work collaboratively to achieve our strategic

objectives: (1) enhance the Joint Force through innovation and collaboration to protect DoD personnel, assets,

and facilities in the homeland, host nations, and contingency locations; (2) develop materiel and non-materiel

solutions that facilitate the safe and secure execution of DoD missions and deny adversaries the ability to

impede our objectives; and (3) build and broaden our relationships with allies and partners to protect our

interests at home and abroad. As a Department we will address those objectives by focusing on three lines of

effort (LOEs): Ready the Force; Defend the Force; and Build the Team.

 Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Risk-Based Assessment in Support of Counter-Unmanned

Aircraft Activities to Protect DOD Facilities and Assets,” 7 May 2020.

 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy 2018, p. 10.

A NEW STRATEGIC APPROACH

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

Joint Counter-sUAS Ofce

In 2019, the Joint C-sUAS Ofce (JCO) was established to lead, synchronize, and direct C-sUAS activities.

In this role, the JCO will support the development and oversight of joint C-sUAS doctrine, requirements,

materiel, training standards, and capabilities to establish joint solutions with a common architecture to address

current and future emerging sUAS threats. Through the JCO, the Department will ensure there is consistency

of approach, technology, operational constructs, and developmental intent for joint C-sUAS solutions. In

the Department’s ongoing effort to reduce unnecessary redundancy, this ofce will coordinate across many

organizations to ensure we avoid duplication of effort and maximize efciencies and effectiveness of program

activities and developmental efforts.

Ibid., p. 9-10. Services will develop and provide Service-unique requirements to the DOD EA for C-sUAS to support materiel,

doctrine, and training. The Secretary of the Army, as the EA, will provide oversight of unique C-sUAS requirements developed by

the Military Departments/Services, Defense Agencies, and DoD Field Activities.

A NEW STRATEGIC APPROACH

Figure 2: C-sUAS Unity of Effort

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

Line of Effort 1: READY THE FORCE

We will maximize our current C-sUAS capabilities and use a

risk-based approach to guide the efcient and rapid development

of a suite of solutions to address emerging requirements.

Across the Department, we will remain responsive to the needs

of combatant commands by benchmarking and improving

existing joint capabilities against the current worldwide sUAS

threat. To protect our forces, facilities, and assets, our C-sUAS

systems will enable actionable UAS reporting, identication,

and dissemination to the appropriate authorities to support

attribution and law enforcement efforts.

As technological

advancements and emergent threats continue to evolve, we

will position ourselves for the future by focusing on systems

with a common architecture. Informed by acquisition and

operationally-relevant threat assessments, we will synchronize

Science & Technology (S&T) strategies and investments across

the Department. Our developmental efforts will consider current

and projected needs, have application across the operating

environments, and deploy upgrades or new systems to the Joint

Force at the speed of relevance.

1.1 Coordinate development of threat assessments that can inform current and future joint capability

requirements. We will establish enduring intelligence requirements and priorities that will support the

development of threat analysis-informed capabilities. The Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) will cooperate

with the larger intelligence community to provide timely and informative threat assessments for a range

of stakeholders across the Department. Specically, the DIE will make the unique C-sUAS requirements of

combatant commanders and Services a priority. These assessments will be both descriptive and predictive and

cover the range of threats from violent extremist organizations and criminal elements to near-peer adversaries

targeting U.S. personnel, assets, and facilities at home and abroad. Finally, intelligence subject matter experts

will provide proactive and reactive support to combatant commanders and Services to identify and address

adversarial threat sUAS capabilities.

Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Guidance for Employing Non-technical solutions for

prevention and reducing the risk of unmanned aircraft incidents,” May 7, 2020.

Sharing intercepted or acquired UAS communication with law enforcement agencies (and with Federal regulatory agencies

undertaking enforcement activities) is permitted under 10 U.S.C. 130i if it would fulll a function of the Department of

Defense, if it is required by law or regulation, or if it would support a criminal or civil investigation of illicit UAS actors,

including identifying illicit UAS actors as part of such an investigation. Information acquired outside the United States may be

shared with host country authorities in accordance with applicable U.S. and international law, including treaties and agreements.

READY THE FORCE

Figure 3: Line of Effort 1

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

1.2 Synchronize DoD S&T investments and accelerate

development of key joint C-sUAS technologies.

Guided by sUAS threat assessments, the Department

will identify acceptable levels of risk based on threat

level, vulnerability, and consequence across the three

distinct operating environments.

We must improve

our ability to respond to emergent threat sUAS and

reduce tactical and operational surprise in contingency

locations. Further, we must prioritize the development

of technology that provides reliable detection, tracking,

and identication capability in the homeland and host

nations where the vast majority of our forces operate.

The expertise, guidance, and recommendations from

Defense Agencies, DoD Field Activities, and Military

Departments will inform investment to promising

joint C-sUAS technologies and innovative commercial

solutions.

1.3 Develop common information sharing architecture solutions to address current and future threat

sUAS. The materiel component of our layered defense must be adaptable, integrated, and interoperable. The

need to develop standalone C-sUAS systems to counter immediate, narrow, singular sUAS threats evolved into

a requirement for more exible, multi-threat C-sUAS solutions. As we upgrade current C-sUAS capabilities

and develop future solutions that will be employed across all operating environments, our systems must share

a common architecture and be both complementary and interoperable. Our materiel solutions must draw

from standardized interfaces that enable joint and multilateral information sharing that is interoperable and

capable of plug-and-play. Additionally, we will develop a centralized sUAS threat data architecture to inform

the Department’s work in developing and validating C-sUAS requirements. With a common architecture and

a common threat picture, we will increase agility and responsiveness in addressing emergent threat sUAS.

1.4 Establish joint C-sUAS Test and Evaluation (T&E) protocols, standards, and methodologies. The

Department will leverage its threat assessments and centralized data repositories to enable joint solutions

capable of countering current and future sUAS threats. The DoD will ensure these systems are capable of

integrating into a layered defense by establishing appropriate testing standards that evaluate capabilities

in operationally relevant conditions and environments, against operationally relevant threats. Through T&E,

experiments, assessments, and testing protocols, these solutions will be validated and integrated as part of

the layered defense.

Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Risk-Based Assessment in Support of

Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Activities to Protect DOD Facilities and Assets,” May 7, 2020.

Amphibious transport dock ship USS Portland (LPD 27)

successfully disabled an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with

a Solid State Laser - Technology Maturation Laser Weapon

System Demonstrator (LWSD) MK 2 MOD 0.

(U.S. Navy video from U.S. Pacic Fleet Public Affairs)

READY THE FORCE

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

Line of Effort 2: DEFEND THE FORCE

Our commanders must have mission-ready forces that are able to

deter and defeat sUAS threats. Combatant commanders must be

prepared to win in future conicts against the full range of threats,

from non-state actors to near-peer adversaries. Commanders

of DoD installations and missions must be prepared to protect

their critical assets on a daily basis, whether from the hazards

posed by negligent operators or actual threats from malicious

actors. We will develop common, integrated C-sUAS materiel and

non-materiel solutions that will strengthen active and passive

defenses across all three operating environments. Non-materiel

solutions will span across the DOT_LPF-P spectrum, with priority

given to non-technical solutions such as concepts, doctrine, and

training that are effective in preventing and reducing risks from

sUAS. Combatant commanders will develop regional concepts

of operations, providing specic guidance on the integration of

C-sUAS across air defense, force protection, and airspace control

functions that are appropriate for each of the three operating

environments. Through Service coordination and in conjunction

with the Military Training Capabilities Group (MTCG), we will create common training guidelines and

qualication standards that are responsive to emerging threat sUAS and evolving C-sUAS capabilities. However,

the scope and scale of sUAS proliferation cannot be addressed through these solutions alone. Countering

threat sUAS demands greater interoperability with existing organic capabilities of the Joint Force. Through

combined arms operations, the Joint Force will employ effects from all domains to degrade, disrupt, or

destroy adversary’s capabilities.

2.1 Deliver joint capabilities that are synchronized across DOTMLPF-P. Strengthening our defenses against

sUAS will require additional risk-based investment across the Services.

To achieve the greatest possible buying

power, we will develop and deliver a family of capabilities based on approved joint requirements documents.

To maximize our investments, the new suite of capabilities will be underpinned by synchronized DOTMLPF-P

efforts. To do otherwise creates the unacceptable risk of exacerbating shortfalls that already exist. DOTMLPF-P

synchronization must also be applied to the integration of defensive and offensive capabilities. Non-materiel

solutions such as common tactics, techniques, and procedures; training; and education will enable better

integration of existing capabilities of the Joint Force. A synchronized C-sUAS multi-domain approach must

leverage space, air, maritime, land, cyber, and electromagnetic capabilities simultaneously to yield operational

advantages. This will enable us to leverage prior investments in offensive capabilities that can be employed to

degrade, disrupt, or destroy sUAS. As a result, Joint Force commanders will have expanded options to deter,

deny, and defeat through the use of layered active and passive defense in concert with offensive operations.

2.2 Develop operational concepts and doctrine to improve the Joint Force’s competitive edge. New joint

operational concepts will identify required non-materiel capabilities for the Joint Force. These concepts will

Ibid.

DEFEND THE FORCE

Figure 4: Line of Effort 2

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

cover the spectrum of operations, from peacetime to large scale combat operations, and address each of the

three operating environments. Joint operational concepts for C-sUAS will emphasize the value of employing

a combined arms team approach in appropriate circumstances and the value of utilizing cross-domain effects.

Additionally, the concepts will identify ways to mitigate hazards during peacetime and counter the challenges

that adversaries will create with sUAS. Joint concepts will also identify required capabilities for the Joint

Force that will improve freedom of action and control of the air domain in contingency locations through

synchronization of air defense, force protection, and airspace control. Once developed and approved, they

will be incorporated into Service and joint doctrine.

2.3 Establish joint training standards, rene existing training content, and transition to Service training

systems. Training is the cornerstone of readiness, whether for combat or for daily protection of critical DoD

missions. To ensure training is responsive to emerging threat sUAS and evolving C-sUAS capabilities, we will

create common training guidelines and qualication standards in conjunction with the MTCG and the Secretary

of Defense’s directed Joint Operational Training Infrastructure strategy. Simultaneous with the development

of standards, we will improve the quality of training, develop sUAS awareness training for all members of

the Department, and develop content applicable across the Joint Force. Services will use their expertise in

training development to increase the quality and rigor of individual and unit training. This effort will build

upon existing investments in training that were developed to support rapid materiel elding. As common

C-sUAS training functions transition to joint management, all Department agencies and Services will ensure

training activities continue to meet combatant commander needs. The Services will also ensure they continue

to meet their Service-specic training responsibilities and common training needs.

Troopers assigned to 1st Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, operate the Drone Defender during a counter-unmanned aerial system

drill while deployed to Iraq, Oct. 30, 2018. (U.S. Army photo by MAJ Jason Welch)

DEFEND THE FORCE

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

Line of Effort 3: BUILD THE TEAM

One of our biggest competitive advantages militarily is being the

partner of choice and a global leader. We will leverage existing

relationships, create new partnerships, and expand information

and data sharing. The Department will partner closely with the FAA

in the homeland and with national airspace managers abroad to

support the integration of sUAS into the future aviation ecosystem.

We will advocate the development of sUAS identication

technologies that will facilitate anomaly detection and improve

air safety. When necessary, the Joint Force must have the capability

to conduct C-sUAS joint and combined arms operations where

appropriate in multi-national operations to identify, facilitate

attribution, deter threats, and in all instances protect identied

DoD facilities and assets in the homeland, in host nations, and

in contingency locations.

The Joint Force will advocate for

mutually benecial policies, authorities, and agreements that

enable international cooperation and partnering. To do so, we will

improve partnerships at home and abroad; sustain and strengthen

allies and partner nations; and rapidly develop and deploy C-sUAS

innovative and interoperable solutions faster than our adversaries through advocacy and collaboration with

allies, partner nations, national security innovation base (NSIB), domestic entities, federal agencies, and other

non-federal entities (NFE). By developing adaptive agreements with our allies and partner nations as well

as federal and domestic law enforcement agencies to streamline the approval processes, the Department can

enable collaborative technology development that keeps pace with the rapidly changing nature of the threat.

We will clarify roles and missions in support of C-sUAS activities and where feasible, invest in systems that

enable interoperability with domestic entities and integration with other federal agencies.

3.1 Partner with the national security innovation base (NSIB) and other non-federal entities (NFE) to

facilitate rapid development of joint capabilities to mitigate hazardous sUAS and deter and defeat threat

sUAS. The Joint Force must attract new partners and engage with rising technology leaders to defend against

evolving threats from non-state actors to near-peer competitors. We will collaborate and harness the NSIB and

NFE partnerships to rapidly develop C-sUAS capabilities to reduce gaps and rapidly expand manufacturing

throughput to exploit new technological advancements. Establishing a strong partnership between the DoD

and the NSIB will ensure a healthy U.S. commercial innovation base for the future. These partnerships will

enable us to accelerate the development of solutions and provide the Joint Force and DoD Components with

effective countermeasures for sUAS hazards and threats. We will also seek to establish new agreements with

civilian organizations and expand multilateral collaboration.

Sharing with law enforcement agencies is permitted under 10 U.S.C. 130i if it would fulll a function of the Department of

Defense, if it is required by law or regulation, or if it would support a criminal or civil investigation of illicit UAS actors,

including identifying illicit UAS actors as part of such an investigation. Information acquired outside the United States may be

shared with host country authorities in accordance with applicable U.S. and international law, including treaties and agreements.

BUILD THE TEAM

Figure 5: Line of Effort 3

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

3.2 Sustain, strengthen, and maximize interoperability with allies and partner nations. To protect our shared

interests, the Joint Force must be interoperable with its allies and partner nations. We will continue to build

partner C-sUAS capacity and capability. Through the development of mutually benecial local policies and by

leveraging programs with key partner nations, the Department will improve its ability to protect U.S. personnel,

assets, and facilities in host nations. Cooperative efforts with allies and partners will include opportunities

for technology exchanges, shared investments, and common system standards. We will proactively support

the Joint Force to enhance C-sUAS information sharing and synchronization efforts with host nations to

inuence unimpeded approval and authorities for access to the electromagnetic spectrum. We will expedite

the elding of C-sUAS solutions through early acquisition planning with appropriate safeguards to prevent

the loss of technological advantages to our adversaries. Additionally, the Department will establish adaptive

agreements, rene the approval process and the procurement mechanisms to expedite the standard channels,

and abbreviate the processes to facilitate rapid acquisition and distribution by leveraging existing tools.

We will proactively engage partner nations and allies to conduct combined C-sUAS RDT&E efforts and expand

experimentation opportunities to conduct demonstrations and testing of new technology advancements. We

will integrate export requirements early into the development of C-sUAS systems in order to compress the

timeline to share technology. Finally, we will advance foreign military sales and direct commercial sales of

C-sUAS equipment to bolster a competitive U.S. commercial market and strengthen our collective defense.

3.3 Coordinate with domestic entities to enable interoperability and maximize integration with our

federal agencies to protect DoD facilities and assets in the homeland. The Joint Force must enhance C-sUAS

information sharing and synchronize actions with our federal and domestic law enforcement agencies and

other partners, as required by law, to improve predictive analytics, actionable sUAS reporting, identication,

and dissemination to the appropriate authorities to support attribution and prosecution of illicit and reckless

sUAS actors. We will work with our federal partners to establish adaptive agreements that improve airspace

management and enhance their ability to execute C-sUAS authorities and missions independently and jointly.

We will coordinate our C-sUAS investments leveraging rapid manufacturing and prototyping authorities and

adapt existing federal agency acquisition authorities as necessary to leverage the combined buying power of the

U.S. Government. We will also improve coordination and shared strategic awareness by enhancing information

and data sharing to increase our airspace control, air defense, and overall force protection.

U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Joseph Howell conducts operation checks on a C-UAS system in Southwest Asia, April 22, 2019.

(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Alina Thackray)

BUILD THE TEAM

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

At home and abroad, U.S. forces will increasingly encounter sUAS and must be able to detect, track, identify,

and, if necessary, deter, deny, or defeat them. Even legitimate but reckless use of these systems in the vicinity of

DoD forces and facilities can impede our operations. Addressing the range of actors and operating environments

will require us to align training, doctrine, materiel, policies, and authorities.

To keep pace with rapidly evolving technology, the Department will evaluate its current processes and make

deliberate risk-based investment choices while providing the Joint Force with the range of support required

across the DOTMLPF-P spectrum. This evaluation will drive investments in systems that are interoperable, share

a common and secure architecture, and are able to counter multiple threats. If our processes do not enable

us to effectively provide the Joint Force with “the knowledge, equipment and support systems to ght and

win,” then we must reimagine how to better support them in a rapidly changing technology and security

environment.

Guided by our Strategic Objectives, we will develop and deploy effective systems, complemented with doctrine

and training products, that provide the Joint Force with capabilities to successfully counter current and future

sUAS threats and hazards as part of a layered defense. As we leverage our RDT&E and intelligence assets, we

will expand the competitive space to protect our interests across the globe. Finally, we will work with our

allies and partners to develop a shared understanding of threats, vulnerabilities, and interoperability needs.

Through this holistic approach, the Department will ensure the Joint Force is both ready to meet today’s

challenges and prepared for the future.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy 2018, p. 10.

CONCLUSION

A view of Travis Air Force Base, Calif.’s Intel Shooting Star Drone light show where Travis families were shown the choreographed

capabilities of over 500 drones during an Independence Day celebration, July 5, 2018.

(U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Christian Conrad)

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

ANNEX A. GLOSSARY

C-sUAS counter-small unmanned aircraft systems

DIE Defense Intelligence Enterprise

DoD Department of Defense

DOTMLPF-P doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,

facilities, and policy

EA Executive Agent

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

JCO Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Ofce

LOE Line of Effort

MTCG Military Training Capabilities Group

NAS National Airspace System

NDS National Defense Strategy

NFE non-federal entity

NSIB National Security Innovation Base

OSD Ofce of the Secretary of Defense

RDT&E research, development, test, and evaluation

S&T science and technology

SECARMY Secretary of the Army

sUAS small unmanned aircraft systems

T&E test and evaluation

UAS unmanned aircraft systems

USD(A&S) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment

Terms and Denitions

adversary. A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force

may be envisaged. (JP 3-0)

air defense. Defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or aerodynamic missiles, or to

nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. Also called AD. (JP 3-01)

air domain. The atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its effects

upon operations become negligible. (JP 3-30)

ANNEX A. GLOSSARY

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

airspace control. Capabilities and procedures used to increase operational effectiveness by promoting the

safe, efcient, and exible use of airspace. (JP 3-52)

articial intelligence. the ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence –

for example, recognizing patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions, or

taking action – whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems. (2018 DoD

Articial Intelligence Strategy)

assessment. 1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during

military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition,

or achieving an objective. 3. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned

intelligence activity. 4. Judgment of the motives, qualications, and characteristics of present or prospective

employees or “agents.” (JP 3-0)

attribution. 1. Labeling some entity as either the cause or effect of another item. (Black’s Law Dictionary)

2. The linkage of events, locations, items, signatures, nefarious intent, and persons of interest. (derived from

forensic-enabled intelligence denition in JP 2-0

combatant command. A unied or specied command with a broad continuing mission under a single

commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the

advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unied or specied combatant commands established

by the President. (JP 3-0)

combined. A term identifying two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies operating together.

(JP 3-16)

contingency location. A non-enduring location outside of the United States that supports and sustains

operations during contingencies or other operations and is categorized by mission life-cycle requirements

as initial, temporary, or semi-permanent. (JP 4-04)

countermeasures. That form of military science that, by the employment of devices and/or techniques, has

as its objective the impairment of the operational effectiveness of enemy activity. (JP 3-13.1)

critical infrastructure. The infrastructure and assets vital to a nation’s security, governance, public health

and safety, economy, and public condence. (JP 3-27)

critical intelligence. Intelligence that is crucial and requires the immediate attention of the commander. (JP

2-0)

defense intelligence enterprise. The collection of (the) Department of Defense intelligence, counterintelligence

and security communities.

ANNEX A. GLOSSARY

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

Department of the Army. The executive part of the Department of the Army at the seat of government and

all eld headquarters, forces, Reserve Component, installations, activities, and functions under the control or

supervision of the Secretary of the Army. (JP 1)

Department of Defense Components. The Ofce of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the Ofce of the Inspector

General of the Department of Defense, the Department of Defense agencies, Department of Defense eld

activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense. Also called DoD Components.

(JP 1)

deter. To prevent action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that

the cost of action outweighs the perceived benets. (Derived from JP 3-0)

DoD Executive Agent. The Head of a DoD Component to whom the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy

Secretary of Defense has assigned specic responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide dened levels

of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more

of the DoD Components. (DoDD 5101.1)

effect. 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another

effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree

of freedom. (JP 3-0)

exploitation. 1. Taking full advantage of success in military operations, following up initial gains, and making

permanent the temporary effects already created. 2. Taking full advantage of any information that has come to

hand for tactical, operational, or strategic purposes. 3. An offensive operation that usually follows a successful

attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. (JP 2-01.3)

force. 1. An aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and necessary support, or

combination thereof. 2. A major subdivision of a eet. (JP 1)

force protection. Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense

personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. (JP 3-0)

hazards. 1. A danger or risk. 2. A condition that could foreseeably cause or contribute to an accident,

unintentionally or by otherwise careless manner creates a danger. (derived from OSD Policy)

homeland. The physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, United States

territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace. (JP 3-28)

host nation. A nation which receives forces and/or supplies from allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty

Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 3-57)

ANNEX A. GLOSSARY

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

identication. 1. The process of determining the friendly or hostile character of an unknown detected

contact. 2. In arms control, the process of determining which nation is responsible for the detected violations

of any arms control measure. 3. In ground combat operations, discrimination between recognizable objects

as being friendly or enemy, or the name that belongs to the object as a member of a class. Also called ID.

(JP 3-01)

intelligence. 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis,

and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces

or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. 2. The activities that result in the product. 3. The

organizations engaged in such activities. (JP 2-0)

intelligence requirement. 1. Any subject, general or specic, upon which there is a need for the collection

of information, or the production of intelligence. 2. A requirement for intelligence to ll a gap in the

command’s knowledge or understanding of the operational environment or threat forces. (JP 2-0)

integration. 1. In force protection, the synchronized transfer of units into an operational commander’s

force prior to mission execution. (JP 1) 2. The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a

force that operates by engaging as a whole. (JP 1) 3. In photography, a process by which the average radar

picture seen on several scans of the time base may be obtained on a print, or the process by which several

photographic images are combined into a single image. (JP 1) 4. In intelligence usage, the application of the

intelligence to appropriate missions, tasks, and functions. See also force protection. (JP 2-01)

interoperability. 1. The ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efciently to achieve tactical,

operational, and strategic objectives. (JP 3-0) 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics

systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged

directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. (JP 6-0)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military

Departments participate. (JP 1)

joint force. A force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments

operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 3-0)

joint staff. 1. The staff of a commander of a unied or specied command, subordinate unied command,

joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ

forces from more than one Military Department), that includes members from the several Services comprising

the force. 2. (capitalized as Joint Staff) The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that assists

the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities. (JP 1)

leverage. In the context of planning, a relative advantage in combat power and/or other circumstances against

the enemy or adversary across any variable within or impacting the operational environment sufcient to

exploit that advantage. (JP 5-0)

ANNEX A. GLOSSARY

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

line of effort. In the context of planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward

establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions. Also called LOE

(JP 5-0)

maritime domain. The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these,

including the littorals. (JP 3-32)

materiel. All items necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction

as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. (JP 4-0)

Military Department. One of the departments within the Department of Defense created by the National

Security Act of 1947, which are the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department

of the Air Force. (JP1)

mission. 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason,

therefore. (JP 3-0) 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to

an individual or unit; a task. (JP 3-0) 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular

task. (JP 3-30)

national security innovation base. The American network of knowledge, capabilities, and people-including

academia, National Laboratories, and the private sector that turns ideas into innovations, transforms

discoveries into successful commercial products and companies, and protects and enhances the American

way of life. (2017 NSS, page 21)

non-federal entity. Any private entity, commercial industry, non-federal government and domestic entity,

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), or International Organizations (IOs). (Derived from 6 USC 1501

and 25APR2013 OSD/VCJCS “Public Private Partnerships Supporting the DoD Mission Memo”)

-private entities includes any corporate social foundations, academia, think-tanks, professional

associations.

-non-federal government and domestic entities includes any state, tribal, or local government and

any political subdivision, agency, department, or component thereof of the District of Columbia, the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern

Mariana Islands, and any other territory or possession of the United States.

-excludes any entities afliated with or sponsored by any component of a foreign power as dened

in section 1801 of title 50.

objective. 1. The clearly dened, decisive, and attainable goal toward which an operation is directed. 2. The

specic goal of the action taken which is essential to the commander’s plan. (JP 5-0)

ANNEX A. GLOSSARY

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

operation. 1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1) 2. A military

action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military

mission. (JP 3-0)

partner nation. 1. A nation that the United States works with in a specic situation or operation. (JP 1)

2. In security cooperation, a nation with which the Department of Defense conducts security cooperation

activities. (JP 3-20)

personnel. Individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the assigned mission.

(JP 1-0)

procedures. Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specic tasks. (CJCSM 5120.01)

protection. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary

personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the

boundaries of a given operational area. (JP 3-0)

reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods,

information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the

meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 2-0)

Service. A branch of the Armed Forces of the United States, established by act of Congress, which are: the

Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Space Force, and Coast Guard. (JP 1)

small unmanned aircraft system. The system, within UA Groups 1-3, whose components include the

necessary equipment, network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft. Also called sUAS. (Derived

from JP 3-30 and DoDD 3800.01)

strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized

and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 3-0)

strike. An attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. (JP 3-0)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance

with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command

that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1)

surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, cyberspace, surface, or subsurface areas, places,

persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 3-0)

ANNEX A. GLOSSARY

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

synchronization. 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum

relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence

sources and methods in concert with the operation plan to answer intelligence requirements in time to

inuence the decisions they support. (JP 2-0)

tactics. The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. (CJCSM 5120.01)

techniques. Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks. (CJCSM

5120.01)

threat analysis. In antiterrorism, a continual process of compiling and examining all available information

concerning potential terrorist activities by terrorist groups which could target a facility. (JP 3-07.2)

threat assessment. An intelligence assessment that details the threat, capabilities, and intentions of adversaries’

UAS capabilities (current and future). (Derived from JP 2-0)

unity of effort. Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not

necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unied action. (JP

unmanned aircraft. An aircraft that does not carry a human operator and is capable of ight with or without

human remote control. Also called UA. (JP 3-30)

unmanned aircraft system. That system whose components include the necessary equipment, network, and

personnel to control an unmanned aircraft. Also called UAS. (JP 3-30)

U.S. forces. All Armed Forces (including the Coast Guard) of the United States, any person in the Armed

Forces of the United States, and all equipment of any description that either belongs to the US Armed Forces

or is being used (including Type I and II Military Sealift Command vessels), escorted, or conveyed by the US

Armed Forces. (JP 1)

vulnerability. 1. The susceptibility of a nation or military force to any action by any means through which

its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to ght diminished. (JP 3-01) 2. The

characteristics of a system that can cause it to be degraded (incapability to perform the designated function

or mission) as a result of being subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (man-made) hostile

environment. (JP 3-60) 3. In information operations, a weakness in information system security design,

procedures, implementation, or internal controls that could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to

information or an information system. (JP 3-13)

working group. An enduring or ad hoc organization within a headquarters consisting of a core functional

group and other staff and component representatives whose purpose is to provide analysis on the specic

function to users. Also called WG. (JP 3-33)

ANNEX A. GLOSSARY

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

The Secretary of Defense designated the SECARMY as the DoD EA for C-sUAS. The Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD [A&S]) is the cognizant Ofce of the Secretary of Defense

(OSD) Principal Staff Assistant to oversee the designation. DoD Directive 3800.01E, “DoD Executive Agent

for Counter Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems for Unmanned Aircraft Groups 1, 2, and 3” prescribes

the governance structure for the C-sUAS effort. This annex provides an overview of the governance. The

stakeholders include: OSD, the Military Departments, the Ofce of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Ofce of the Inspector General of the Department of

Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within DoD.

Coordination with other federal partners and non-federal security, particularly in the Homeland, will be

necessary. An Executive Steering Committee, chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and co-chaired

by the USD(A&S), will assist the Secretary of Defense in assessing joint military C-sUAS military capabilities;

identifying, approving, and prioritizing gaps in such capabilities; reviewing and validating proposed C-sUAS

capabilities; and endorsing joint performance requirements.

The Joint C-sUAS Ofce has been established to lead, synchronize, and direct C-sUAS activities. The JCO

will lead and perform oversight of C-sUAS doctrine, requirements, materiel, and training standards and

capabilities to establish joint solutions with a common architecture to address current and future emerging

small UAS threats. It will coordinate development of joint operational concepts and joint doctrine for C-sUAS.

It will lead coordination among the stakeholders to avoid duplication of effort and maximize efciencies and

effectiveness of program activities and any developmental efforts, accepting environmental and operational

differences each service and agency faces. The JCO will lead development and coordination of common

C-sUAS requirements, core training objectives, and policy. Activities in the other domains will be the

responsibility of the individual services.

The JCO will establish and lead a General Ofcer Steering Committee which will have a representative

assigned by each service and will include representatives from other departments/ofces as designated in the

DoDD. Working groups will initially be established for doctrine, training, policy, and materiel. The working

groups will be led with O-6/GS-15 level personnel and composed of representatives of the services and

other stakeholders. Working groups will address current and emerging threats, materiel requirements, policy

issues, S&T, R&D, and doctrine and training. Coordination will be performed with all stakeholders.

The Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, with appropriate coordination, ensures that funds

and resources required to support C-sUAS capabilities are included in the DoD Planning, Programming,

Budgeting, and Execution process. The Secretaries of the Military Departments, in coordination with the EA,

will appropriately fund C-sUAS programs across the Future Years Defense Program during the budget process

to initiate research to explore and advance new and emergent C-sUAS technologies in alignment with this

strategy, and appropriately fund any research and development C-sUAS capability when identied as the lead

organization by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System or C-sUAS governance process.

The EA plans, programs, and budgets for the research and development of UAS Groups 1, 2, and 3 C-sUAS

capabilities with cost, funding, and expenses shared equitably among Military Services as appropriate to

address DoD and Military Service C-sUAS requirements. The EA will identify enduring funding requirements

to address joint C-sUAS capability needs.

ANNEX B. GOVERNANCE

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

ANNEX C. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM CATEGORIZATION

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B, “Standing Rules of

Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces,” June 13, 2005

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 5120.01A, “Joint Doctrine Development

Process,”29 December 2014

Department of Defense, Articial Intelligence Strategy, 2018

Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 2018

Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 16-003, “Interim Guidance for Countering

Unmanned Aircraft,” August 18, 2016

Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum “Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Policy

Memorandums,” Tab A “Guidance for Employing Non-technical solutions for prevention and

reducing the risk of unmanned aircraft incidents,” May 7, 2020

Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum “Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Policy

Memorandums,” Tab A “Guidance for Use of Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Technology Outside the

United States to Protect DoD Personnel, Installations, Facilities, and Assets,” May 7, 2020

Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum “Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Policy

Memorandums,” Tab A “Risk-Based Assessment in Support of Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Activities

to Protect DOD Facilities and Assets,” May 7, 2020

Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 17-00X, “Supplemental Guidance for

Countering Unmanned Aircraft,” July 5, 2017

Deputy Secretary of Defense/Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum,

“Public-Private Partnerships Supporting the DoD Mission,” April 25, 2013

DoD Directive 3800.01E, “DoD Executive Agent for Counter Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems

for Unmanned Aircraft Groups 1, 2, and 3,” February 21, 2020

DoD Directive 5101.01, “DoD Executive Agent,” September 3, 2002, as amended

DoD Instruction 3224.03, “Physical Security Equipment (PSE) Research, Development, Test,

and Evaluation (RDT&E),” October 1, 2007, as amended

DoD Instruction 5200.08, “Security of DoD Installations and Resources and the DoD Physical

Security Review Board (PSRB),” December 10, 2005, as amended

ANNEX D. REFERENCES

| Department of Defense | Counter - sUAS Strategy

Lt Col Jeffrey Lamport, COL (R) Anthony Scotto, “Countering the UAS Threat from a Joint

Perspective,” Joint Deployable Analysis Team, February 9, 2017

National Security Strategy, December 2017

National Strategy for Aviation Security of the United States of America, December 2018

Ofce of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms,” June 2020, as amended

Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Designation of the Secretary of the Army as the DoD

Executive Agent for Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems for Unmanned Aircraft Groups 1, 2,

and 3,” November 18, 2019

Senate Intelligence Committee,

https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-worldwide-threats#, January 29, 2019

United States Code, Title 6, Section 1501

United States Code, Title 10, Section 130i

ANNEX D. REFERENCES

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

“

The Department’s management structure and processes are not written in stone,

they are a means to an end–empowering the warghter with the knowledge,

equipment and support systems to ght and win. Department leaders will adapt

their organizational structures to best support the Joint Force.