sion. (See § 43.03[9][b].)
Ch. 44, The Causation Question in
Property Insurance. In Ideaitalia Con-
temporary Furniture Corp. v. Selective Ins.
Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172909, at *12
(W.D.N.C. Dec. 14, 2016), in which storm
water entered a warehouse on the insured
property and damaged goods stored inside,
the plain language of the policy excluded
flood or surface water damage, even if
another covered peril, such as water from
below the surface, concurrently contributed
to the damage, and North Carolina recog-
nizes and regularly enforces anti-
concurrent causation clauses. (See
§ 44.04[6][c].)
Ch. 45, Additional and Supplemental
Property Insurance Coverages. In
AMTRAK v. Aspen Specialty Insurance
Co., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16074 (2d Cir.
Aug. 31, 2016), the definitions of “flood” in
the policies at issue were not ambiguous as
the first two definitions of flood were suf-
ficiently broad to include an inundation of
seawater driven by storm surge or a wind
storm under their plain meaning; the third
definition explicitly included sea surge and
wind driven water. (See § 45.08[2][a].)
Ch. 46, Time Element (Business Inter-
ruption) Insurance. In Ochsner Clinic
Foundation v. Lexington Insurance Co.,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198, at *31–32
(E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2017), applying Louisiana
law, the insured provided sufficient evi-
dence, including expert testimony, projec-
tions, industry surveys, and actual financial
data, to establish “with reasonable cer-
tainty” its claim for business interruption
damages and thus to preclude summary
judgment on this issue; while the insurer
alleged several flaws in the insured’s meth-
odology and calculations, those factual dis-
putes were suitable issues for trial and more
properly addressed through cross-
examination. (See § 46.09.)
Ch. 48, Property Insurance Dispute
Resolution. In Noa v. Florida Ins. Guar-
anty Ass’n, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 3787, at
*1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2017), a
post-appraisal submission of higher costs
was not a basis for a new appraisal because
the appraisers indicated awareness of the
ordinance and law coverage; a notation on
the award that there was no allowance for
effects of law and ordinance indicated that
the panel found building code requirements
did not require replacement of the whole
roof. (See § 48.03[3][a].)
Ch. 49, The Right of Subrogation. In
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Deming, 828 F.3d
19, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2016), an insurer was
not subject to a waiver of subrogation and
could pursue claims against the tenant who
damaged the insured condo because allow-
ing the insurer to recover from the tenant
after its insured breached his obligation to
obtain insurance containing a waiver of
subrogation was entirely consistent with
the plain language of both the insurance
policy and condo bylaws. (See 49.04[5].)
Ch. 50, Builder’s Risk Insurance. In
Fontana Builders, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of
America, 882 N.W.2d 398, 400–401 (Wis.
2016), the homeowner’s policy issued to
the purchasers of the home, who happened
to be the builder and his wife, did not apply
so as to terminate a builder’s risk policy
from the insurer; legally distinct entities
had different interests in the property. (See
§ 50.01[4][e].)
Ch. 51, Boiler and Machinery Insur-
ance. In Wisconsin Local Government
Property Insurance Fund v. Lexington In-
surance Co., 840 F.3d 411, 418 (7th Cir.
2016), applying Wisconsin law, after a fire
at a courthouse, the primary insurer for the
courthouse and the insurer providing cov-
erage for machinery and equipment at the
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