14
all the steps and mis-steps of the social learning trajectory that had occurred in the country
that pioneered the application of the technology in question.
Thus a second point brought out by this comparative approach to the subject is that the
pace of GPT diffusion may be very different in leader and follower nations, a consideration
that GPT theorists have thus far largely overlooked.
7
This observation, of course, can be read
as lying squarely within the tradition of historical analysis springing from Thorstein Veblen’s
(1915) remarks on ‘the penalties of taking the lead’, and made familiar in the literature of
development economics by Alexander Gerschenkron’s (1962) more elaborate formulation of
‘the advantages of economic backwardness’.
8
On the other hand, it does not follow that the
faster diffusion of a GPT automatically translates into a higher average rate of growth of labor
productivity or total factor productivity. Even during the interval 1929-1937, the trend
growth rate of manufacturing TFP in Britain remained far below the spectacular pace of
advance (averaging more than 5 percentage points per annum) that was recorded for the
sector in the US during the 1920’s.
9
A proximate explanation of this quantitative divergence
may be found in the much faster growth rate of average manhour productivity that established
itself in the US following World War I, and this directs our notice to another, underlying
aspect of difference between the two industrial economies’ experiences.
Where the records of the US and Britain diverged most sharply was in the labor
market. The upward jump in the real hourly wage between 1913 and 1924 was in fact
common to both countries, and indeed to many other countries at that time, being occasioned
in a proximate sense by inflation of 1915-20 and the subsequent deflation of 1920-21, i.e., by
global economic forces. In Britain, however, the increase in labor costs was accentuated by
the one-time national reduction in hours of work, enacted in 1919, a development that had no
counterpart in the U.S. prior to the 1930s. But whereas in the U.S., this wage increase
appears to have precipitated a spectacular burst of growth in labor productivity at better than
5 percent per year, in Britain the acceleration was far less robust, amounting to a rise of less
than 2 percentage points in the annual growth rate. Thus, during the decade of the 1920s, the
7
We hasten to add that the U.S. was by no means an across-the-board technological leader relative to the U.K.
in the 1920s, especially if that concept is defined in terms of scientific and engineering sophistication. But in
the specific historical case of large-scale electric power generation and delivery, the U.S. was undeniably the
pioneer nation
8
This point may be further illustrated by reference to the historical record of factory electrification in Japan.
Minami (1987) points out that in comparison with the US, and a fortiori with Britain, the Japanese ‘age of
steam power’ was very much ‘compressed’ -- or, we might say, ‘abridged’ by the precocious rise of the fraction
of primary horsepower capacity in manufacturing industries that was electrified. The electric power diffusion
measures for individual industries, like that for the whole manufacturing sector in Japan closely parallel those
for the US from the mid-1920s onwards. Further examination of this and other cross-national comparisons,
however, cannot be pursued here.
9
Nor was the acceleration of the British TFP growth rate for manufacturing (between the pre-1914 and 1924-
1937 periods) as marked, in either absolute or relative terms, as that which has been estimated for the US. The
TFP calculations for US. manufacturing without allowance for purchased energy inputs are perhaps those most
directly comparable with the estimates for Britain by MFO (1982) , which were cited in the text above; for the
1889-1909 interval the average annual growth rate of 0.7 percentage points corresponds closely to the 0.6
percentage point pre-1914 trend rate in Britain. The same productivity growth series for the US shows a rise to
5.3 percentage point per annum during 1919-1929, before falling back to the 2 percentage point per annum
level during 1929-1937 (see David 1991: Table 2, Cols. 4, 7). A comparison of the US multifactor productivity
growth rates in the manufacturing sector (making adjusted for inputs of purchased energy) finds a still bigger
jump of approximately 5.1 percentage points per annum between the decades 1909-1919 and 1919-1929.