Page 76 ► Protecting the right tofreedom of expression
In this respect, the Court has stated that Article 10 protects not only:
the “information” or “ideas that are favourably received or regarded as inoen-
sive or as a matter of indierence, but also those that oend, shock or disturb
[…] such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness
without which there is no democratic society”.
186
The use of vulgar phrases in itself is not decisive in the assessment of an
oensive expression as it may well serve merely stylistic purposes. For the
Court, style constitutes part of the communication as the form of expression
and is as such protected together with the content of the expression.
187
Opinions expressed in strong or exaggerated language are also protected;
the extent of protection depends on the context and the aim of the criti-
cism. In matters of public controversy or public interest, during political
debate, in electoral campaigns or where the criticism is levelled at govern-
ment, politicians or public authorities, strong words and harsh criticism
may be expected and will be tolerated to a greater degree by the Court.
188
In Thorgeirson v. Iceland,
189
for instance, the Court found that although the
articles contained very strong terms -the police ocers were characterised
as “beasts in uniform”, “individuals reduced to a mental age of a new-born
child as a result of strangle-holds that policemen and bouncers learn and
use with brutal spontaneity” and the references to the police force were “bul-
lying, forgery, unlawful actions, superstitions, rashness and ineptitude”- the
language could not be viewed as excessive having in view their aim of urg-
ing reform of police. Equally, in Jersild v. Denmark,
190
the fact that an inter-
view containing racist statements was carried in a serious news programme
was signicant since the programme was designed to inform a serious audi-
tory about events in the community or from abroad. In Dalban v. Romania,
where a journalist accused a politician of corruption and of mismanagement
of state’s assets, the Court held that “journalistic freedom also covers pos-
sible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation”.
191
In Arslan
v. Turkey, the applicant criticised the action of the Turkish authorities in the
south-east of the country using a wording described by the Court as of an
186. Handyside v.the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, paragraph 49; Thorgeir Thorgeirson
v.Iceland, 25June 1992; Jersild v.Denmark, 23 September 1994 (GC); Goodwin v.the United
Kingdom, 27March1996; De Haes and Gijels v.Belgium, 24February 1997.
187. Uj v.Hungary, 19 July 2011, paragraph 20.
188. Freedom of expression should be particularly granted during a pre-election period when
voters should be informed about the candidates. Kwiecień v.Poland, 9 January 2007.
189. Thorgeir Thorgeirson v.Iceland, 25 June 1992.
190. Jersild v.Denmark, 23 September 1994.
191. Dalban v.Romania, 28 September 1999 (GC), paragraph 49. Similar in Prager and Oberschlick
v.Austria, 26April 1995 and Dichand and Others v.Austria, 26 February 2002.