4
-3-
3
.3
Destruction. For electronic records, destruction is deleting, overwriting,
or
degaussing in
compliance with CBP Information Systems Security Policies and Procedures Handbook, CIS HB
1400-0SC.
AUTHORITY/REFERENCES. 6 U.S.C.
§§
122, 202, 211; 8 U.S.C.
§§
1225, 1357,
and other pertinent provisions
of
the immigration laws and regulations; 19 U.S.C.
§§
482, 507,
1461, 1496, 1581, 1582, 1589a, 1595a(d), and other pertinent provisions
of
customs laws and
regulations;
31
U.S.C. § 5317 and other pertinent provisions relating to monetary instruments; 22
U.S.C.
§ 401 and other laws relating to exports; Guidelines for Detention and Seizures
of
Pornographic Materials, Directive 4410-001 B; Disclosure
of
Business Confidential Information
to Third Parties, Directive 1450-015; Accountability and Control
of
Custody Receipt for
Detained and Seized Property (CF6051 ), Directive 5240-005.
The plenary authority
of
the Federal Government to conduct searches and inspections
of
persons
and merchandise crossing our nation's borders is well-established and extensive; control
of
the
border is a fundamental principle
of
sovereignty. "[T]he United States, as sovereign, has the
inherent authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial integrity."
United States
v.
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149,
153
(2004). "The Government's interest in
preventing the entry
of
unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border.
Time and again, [the Supreme Court has] stated that 'searches made
at
the border, pursuant to the
longstanding right
of
the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and
property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue
of
the fact that they occur at
the border."'
Id.
at 152-53 (quoting United States
v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616
( 1977) ). "Routine searches
of
the persons and effects
of
entrants [into the United States] are not
subject to any requirement
of
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant." United States
v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985). Additionally, the authority to conduct border
searches extends not only to persons and merchandise entering the United States, but applies
equally to those departing the country.
See, e.g., United States
v.
Bourne/hem, 339 F.3d 414,
422-23 (6th Cir. 2003);
United States
v.
Odutayo, 406 F.3d 386, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2005); United
States
v.
Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1296-97 (4th Cir. 1995); United States
v.
Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d
136, 143 (3d Cir. 1991);
United States
v.
Cardona, 769 F.2d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 1985); United
States
v.
Udofot,
711
F.2d 831, 839-40 (8th Cir. 1983).
As a constitutional matter, border search authority is premised in part
on
a reduced expectation
of
privacy associated with international travel. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154 (noting that
"the expectation
of
privacy is less at the border than it is in the interior"). Persons and
merchandise encountered by CBP at the international border are not only subject to inspection
under U.S. law, they also have been
or
will be abroad and generally subject to the legal
authorities
of
at least one other sovereign. See Boumelhem, 339 F.3d at 423.
In addition to longstanding federal court precedent recognizing the constitutional authority
of
the
U.S. government to conduct border searches, numerous federal statutes and regulations also
authorize CBP to inspect and examine all individuals and merchandise entering
or
departing the
United States, including all types
of
personal property, such as electronic devices. See, e.g., 8
U.S.C.
§§
1225, 1357; 19 U.S.C.
§§
482, 507, 1461, 1496, 1581, 1582, 1589a, 1595a; see also
19
C.F.R. § 162.6 ("All persons, baggage, and merchandise arriving in the Customs territory
of