Force Design 2030
Annual Update
June 2023
“War is both timeless and ever changing. While the basic nature of war is constant, the
means and methods we use evolve continuously.”
- Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warghting
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
1
INTRODUCTION
Today, the Marine Corps is better prepared to serve as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and operate inside
actively contested maritime spaces in support of joint campaigns. While our continued experimentation and
learning will undoubtedly uncover additional renements to improve our force, we are condent our collective
efforts will result in a Marine Corps organized, trained, and equipped to meet the global challenges of the 21st
century.
In last year’s Force Design 2030 Annual Update, we traced the genesis of Force Design 2030 (FD2030) from
its roots in the 31st Commandant’s Hunter Warrior (1997) and Urban Warrior (1999) experiments, to the 33rd
Commandant’s Concept for Distributed Operations (2005), to the 37th Commandant’s testimony (2019) about
our need for modernization. In addition to the observations of previous Commandants, FD2030 was informed by
numerous wargames and the directions contained in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which were reinforced
and expanded in the 2022 National Defense Strategy. These milestones shaped our approach to keeping pace
with the changing character of the operating environment.
This report describes FD2030’s progress to date and directs follow-on actions for the next 12-24 months. We have
made signicant progress in both the design and delivery of the future force since initiating action in 2019 and
are seeing tangible results from our modernization efforts today. The collective efforts of thousands of Marines
across the combat development enterprise and Fleet Marine Force (FMF) have resulted in a Marine Corps that
remains the premiere expeditionary, combined arms, and global crisis-response force. The Marine Corps, today,
is capable of standing-in, alongside allies and partners, within reach of adversary weapon systems; denying the
land, air, or maritime domains to an adversary; expanding maritime domain awareness for the eet and combatant
commanders; and seizing and defending key maritime terrain globally. We can now sense, makes sense, and act
more rapidly than before, further expanding our advantage with maneuver warfare.
SITUATION
To be clear, there is much to be done, especially with our installations, logistics, and sustainment efforts to
ensure we deliver the force needed to prevail on a modern battleeld. Our experimentation will continue with
new concepts and emerging technology in a longer-term modernization effort that will sustain the advantages
we are creating today over the coming decades.
As always, we must maintain the right balance between the enduring and innovative parts of our organization.
As a result, this report contains additional directed actions, many of which will have more aggressive timelines as
our understanding of the threat demands. As the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacic Command (USINDOPACOM)
testied, the Marine Corps’ current sight picture is correct, should remain on track, and would be better delivered
sooner than later.
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
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Marine Corps, naval, joint, ally, and partner forces. This
expeditionary capability is a transformational step in
xed aviation C2. Recent exercises in USINDOPACOM
demonstrated the MAOC’s ability to improve the
common tactical picture for a carrier strike group
and provided visible evidence of Combined Joint All
Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) in practice.
Building upon the success of TF 61/2, in October 2022,
the 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and Naval
Task Force 76 staffs merged into a completely integrated
naval task force (TF 76/3) in the Indo-Pacic. Once
established, TF 76/3 embarked upon an 18-month-
long period of experimentation, conducting active
campaigning inside a contested space. This integrated
task force has demonstrated the ability to create robust
information webs to support maritime domain awareness
across the theater, especially in the western Pacic.
In October 2022, the Service activated the Marine
Corps Information Command (MCIC). This command
streamlines and simplies much of the coordination
required for information, intelligence, space, and
cyberspace operations, by realigning current relationships
and structure at Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC)
from a staff ofcer to an operational commander.
We recently began receiving MQ-9s and activated
Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR) 153
in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. This additional squadron will
substantially increase the organic mobility of Marines in
the Pacic theater. We are also approaching one year
since the CH-53K program achieved initial operating
capability (IOC) and are well underway to transitioning
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461 into our
rst fully operational CH-53K squadron.
The Marine Corps achieved its 2023 milestones with
the establishment of 3d Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR),
which recently completed the rst Service-level force-
on-force training exercise designed to assess its ability
to operate as a distributed naval expeditionary force.
Upon completion of this exercise, 3d MLR deployed
again on short notice to the Republic of the Philippines
to participate in Exercise BALIKATAN with joint and
multi-lateral forces. MLR experimentation continues,
and with it, learning and adapting to new and emerging
capabilities such as support for anti-submarine warfare
as part of the stand-in force (SiF).
Perhaps most consequential, during the past year,
Congress demonstrated its support for the Marine
Corps’ continued role in crisis response and counter-
maritime-gray-zone warfare by establishing a minimum
amphibious warfare ship requirement of 10 LHA/LHDs
YEAR IN REVIEW
While this report primarily outlines the work ahead of
us, we are far enough into FD2030 that our operating
forces are beginning to use many of the capabilities it
describes. Due to the incredible efforts of our Marines,
the critical capabilities imagined for the future force are
starting to be delivered today.
The most recent deployment of the USS Tripoli (LHA-7)
demonstrated the strategic and operational advantage
that amphibious ships create. In early 2022, Tripoli set
sail as an independent deployment, in part to test our
F-35B “Lightning Carrier / Assault Carrier” concept
where 16-24 F-35Bs are embarked and act in concert
with a traditional carrier strike group. Not only did the
deployment illustrate the potency of the Lightning
Carrier in support of carrier strike group operations,
it also demonstrated the versatility and value of the
concept for the Navy-Marine Corps team.
In March 2022, Sixth Fleet partnered with II Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) to create Task Force (TF)
61/2. Building on years of experimentation in the FMF,
TF 61/2 was designed to provide a joint task force crisis
response capability through command and control (C2)
of naval forces supporting contingencies in Europe
and Africa — to include ongoing responses to the
Russian invasion of Ukraine. Upon creation, TF 61/2
was task-organized to conduct reconnaissance and
counter-reconnaissance (RXR) and delegated tactical
control of allocated amphibious forces (ARG/MEU)
and rotational Marine forces (Marine Rotational Force
– Europe) by Commander, U.S. European Command
(USEUCOM), Commander, Naval Forces Europe/Africa
and Commander, Sixth Fleet. It was so successful, the
previous Commander, USEUCOM testied before
Congress that distributed Marine Corps forces operating
as a brown water force dramatically enhance options
and are priceless for 21
st
century security. Today, TF
61/2 continues to operate in theater.
In summer 2022, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) stood-
up the Service’s rst multi-function air operations center
(MAOC) in Lithuania under the command of U.S. Air
Forces Europe to conduct air surveillance and multi-
domain awareness in support of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) operations. The MAOC’s mission
is to generate an integrated tactical picture of the
operating environment to control aircraft and missiles,
enable decision superiority, gain and maintain custody
of adversary targets, hold targets at risk, and enable
engagement of targets in all domains in support of
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
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the conditions and threats they will experience on
tomorrow’s battleelds. The rst iteration of the LVC-TE
will deploy to Twentynine Palms, CA in Fiscal Year 2023
(FY23). By FY25, the LVC-TE will be deployed to ve
Marine Corps installations, establishing an enterprise-
level capability. Eventually, we want to migrate this
initiative to coalition exercises to gain more command-
and-control repetitions.
INSTALLATION AND LOGISTICS 2030
In February, we published I&L2030, which charts the
way ahead for our Marine Corps Installations and
Logistics Enterprise: the organizations that support
force generation, power projection, employment,
and sustainment of ready Marine forces. Like other
FD2030 efforts, it is based on iterative planning
and experimentation from our campaign of learning
and serves as the primary reference for how we will
logistically support the future force. I&L2030 captures
the capabilities required to support naval expeditionary
forces in the future operating environment and
directs change across the spectrum of doctrine,
organization, training/education, materiel, leadership/
communications synchronization, personnel, and
facilities (DOTMLPF).
TALENT MANAGEMENT 2030
In March, we published an update to TM2030, which
directed accelerated personnel reforms and oriented
the Service toward retaining more experienced Marines.
More experienced Marines does not necessarily mean
older Marines, but rather Marines with more repetitions.
In February 2022, the Assistant Commandant of the
Marine Corps (ACMC) established a Talent Management
Strategy Group to align and harmonize Service-wide
talent management efforts. This group focuses on future
demographic, economic, and human capital trends,
while working with academic and research organizations
to identify initiatives that will better align individual
abilities, skills, and desires with the warghting needs
of the Service. Since the release of TM2030, we have
better aligned departments and organizations and have
dened interdependencies of total force personnel
policies.
and 21 LPDs/LSDs. Congress similarly recognized
the trends emerging from the conict in Ukraine,
which provide evidence to support our close-combat
lethality initiatives, focus on counter-UAS and air and
missile defense, and investments in precision res to
support distributed operations and maneuver.
However, we should not lose sight of the fact that the
Ukrainians succeeded in the early phases of the conict
not because of superior equipment, but because their
people were adaptable — especially at the tactical level
— and rapidly innovated new concepts of employment
to address specic areas where the Russians maintained
an advantage. The lethality of Ukraine’s infantry was
fortied by their mindset, unit cohesion, and method
of command and control. These observations only
strengthen our continued adherence to maneuver
warfare, talent management, and training and education
modernization.
Finally, FD2030 is manifesting across the supporting
establishment. This year we released Training & Education
2030 (T&E2030), Installations & Logistics 2030 (I&L2030),
and an update to Talent Management 2030 (TM2030).
Collectively, these efforts will ensure we maintain balance
across the Service’s Title 10 responsibilities and an
integrated, single-battle approach to modernization
across the enterprise.
TRAINING AND EDUCATION 2030
To fully realize the warghting advantage of our combined
arms teams, we must make a similar commitment to
modernizing our training and education system. To that
end, we published T&E2030 — a pillar of Force Design
modernization. It builds upon three years of exercises,
wargames, and operating force experiments (sometimes
in intense force-on-force competitions) that established
a foundation for organizational learning and informed
how our training and education continuum must evolve.
It also identies areas requiring further study, so we can
broaden the scope of our organizational learning across
the entire training and education enterprise.
Project Tripoli is a training initiative that will enable
greater experimentation with FD2030 concepts and
capabilities. It is not a specic system or program of
record, nor exclusively a Marine Corps training solution,
but rather a live, virtual, and constructive training
environment (LVC-TE) that allows the simultaneous
training of geographically dispersed units and/or training
on cost-prohibitive or sensitive capabilities. This will
allow units to replicate, to the greatest extent possible,
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
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Amphibious warfare ships are the cornerstone of
maritime crisis response, deterring adversaries, and
building partnerships. They persist forward, are
globally deployable, and offer eet and joint force
commanders exible and tailorable force options
in competition and conict. Amphibious forces are
complementary to stand-in forces in a variety of ways.
They coordinate their actions directly with stand-in
forces to control maritime terrain, integrate with
allies and partners, and, as a result, can play an out-
sized role in competition. In the future, amphibious
warfare ships will offer even more capability, serving
as “motherships” for a variety of manned, unmanned,
and human-machine teamed systems.
RESOURCING MODERNIZATION
To date, we have self-funded FD2030 within our budget
topline. This approach succeeded with the support of
civilian leaders in Congress, the Ofce of the Secretary
of Defense, and the Department of the Navy. Self-
funding required hard, sometimes unpopular decisions,
but it allowed us to trade lower priority capabilities
for approximately $15.8 billion worth of high priority
investments that create advantage on increasingly
complex battleelds. However, further meaningful
divestment is not possible without negative impacts
on near-term mission requirements and modernization
efforts. Our barracks, family housing, and base
infrastructure need major sustained investments if they
are to be capable of supporting Marines, Sailors, and
their families. Therefore, to accelerate the delivery of
critical joint warghting capabilities, while maintaining
and expanding force readiness and resiliency, we will
seek additional budgetary resources.
ACCELERATING MODERNIZATION
Modernization is a process without a beginning or
end. It is continuous and based on our understanding
of emerging and evolving threats, the trajectory of
technology, and the missions we may be asked to
undertake. Our continuous efforts to create and sustain
warghting advantage over the longer term will ensure
Marine forces remain organized, trained, and equipped
to succeed in an ever-evolving operational environment
— regardless of clime or place.
Marines today are employing many of the elements of
Force Design, but if we are to stay ahead of our peer
competitors, we need to accelerate modernization,
continuously assess our efforts, and make course
corrections and adjustments as required. One critical
WHERE WE ARE GOING
Emerging capabilities will enable us to fully realize our
operating concepts and maintain a relative warghting
advantage over peer threats. Those capabilities span
all warghting functions and include the Unmanned
Logistics System-Aerial/Tactical Resupply Unmanned
Aircraft System, the Marine Air Defense Integrated
System (MADIS), and the Navy-Marine Expeditionary
Ship Interdiction System.
We are investing heavily in the next generation of
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
efforts for the Marine Corps, placing emphasis on
resilience, the future of contested logistics, Marine
aviation, CJADC2, and persistent sensing. In fact, with
the support of the Ofce of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering, we will begin
the Long-Range Attack Munition project to rapidly
develop and eld a low-cost, air launched family of
loitering, swarming munitions.
Our capstone research and development project
is a family of integrated targeting cells. This effort
accelerates the evolution of combined arms and
multi-domain formations. We can do this by fusing
operations, intelligence, and res functions together in
a single center, creating the means for Marine units to
participate in and control joint res, while also gaining
and maintaining persistent custody of adversary targets.
Other projects include developing a common launcher
for the family of ground launched loitering munitions
and testing a low-cost, hypersonic booster in a form
factor the Marine Corps can logistically support in a
contested environment. We are also investing in our
rst Stern Landing Vessel prototypes to bridge the
gap until additional resources are applied to Medium
Landing Ship (LSM) procurement.
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS
Since 2019, three Department of the Navy studies have
conrmed a requirement for 28-31 L-class amphibious
warfare ships and 35 LSMs for maritime mobility.
These are necessary for naval expeditionary forces
to sustain consistent, forward-deployed, sea-based
campaigning forces that can also respond to unforeseen
contingencies. However, combining these ndings with
readiness trends over the past 10 years and projected
ship availability rates demonstrates the need for no
fewer than 31 traditional L-class ships to ensure the
warghting readiness and global responsiveness of
amphibious naval forces.
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
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The changing character of war demands we educate
and train our Marines with the most relevant and
contemporary doctrine. As the pace of change in
the information domain accelerates, we cannot
afford to allow our doctrinal efforts to languish. We
must keep pace with the emerging and evolving
operational environment, as well as with the agencies
and organizations that will be essential to our success.
In May 2022, we published Marine Corps Doctrinal
Publication (MCDP) 8, Information. This March, we
issued a revision of MCDP 4, Logistics, to account for
changes in the operating environment since its original
publication in 1997. We are currently drafting Marine
Corps Warghting Publication 8-10, Information in
Marine Corps Operations, which we intend to publish
this calendar year. We will also release a revised version
of MCDP 1-0, Operations, in the near future.
Between July 2019 and December 2022, we executed 25
wargames and 42 integrated planning teams (IPTs) with
subject matter experts from across the Marine Corps.
These teams grappled with an immense challenge,
as they sought to modernize the Marine Corps as a
naval expeditionary force that effectively deters our
competitors, while remaining ready to respond to a range
of crises. This calendar year, we will conduct another
nine wargames, primarily focused on reconnaissance
and counter-reconnaissance, as well as deploying and
sustaining a MEF in support of major combat operations.
To support our wargaming efforts, we anticipate
the opening of the Marine Corps Wargaming and
Analysis Center next year. This state-of-the-art facility
will signicantly enhance our capability development,
concept development, operational plan assessment,
training, and advanced technology evaluation. The
facility will be the largest secure access program facility
in the National Capital Region, encompassing more
than 100,000 square feet. It will support up to 250
participants, link to remote sites, and employ advanced
modeling and simulation systems to facilitate rigorous
analysis aimed at yielding deep understanding of
requirements and risk. We look forward to welcoming
participation by our sister services, joint and interagency
organizations, and allies and partners.
lesson identied in numerous congressional hearings
has been to be precise when dening “acceleration.”
We must clearly identify situations when additional
funding can deliver an initial capability sooner, and
how earlier elding would help ensure we maintain a
relative advantage.
To fully realize the objectives of FD2030, we will also
need to work with the other services to integrate our
modernization into the overall design of the joint force.
Deeper integration and synchronization with our sister
services will signicantly increase the capability, lethality,
and effectiveness of the joint force. Combined with
additional wargames and enhancing exercises with
allies and partners, we are on a path to maximize the
utility of the total force.
KEY FINDINGS FROM THE
CAMPAIGN OF LEARNING
CONCEPTS, DOCTRINE,
WARGAMING, AND STUDIES
Warghting concepts serve as the foundation for our
modernization work. Most recently, we added Global
Positioning Network to Distributed Maritime Operations,
Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment,
Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base
Operations, A Concept for Stand-in Forces, and
Reconnaissance and Counter-Reconnaissance. To ensure
our amphibious operations concepts remain current,
together with the Navy, we are also developing a new
concept for 21
st
Century Amphibious Operations. It will
describe how we will execute amphibious operations
against future adversaries in this evolving and complex
operational environment. It will also articulate the
future role of amphibious operations in support of
maritime campaigns and will describe new operating
methods that incorporate agile platforms to supplement
traditional amphibious ships. Examples include long-
range, unmanned systems that inltrate the adversary’s
weapon engagement zone; dispersed formations of
manned and unmanned ships that challenge adversary
targeting; and the adoption of disruptive technologies.
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
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To address these challenges, the Marine Corps is
conducting spiral development, leveraging the
innovative spirit of our Marines to achieve an all-domain
C2 capability.
Directed Actions
1. No later than (NLT) 1 August 2023, Deputy
Commandant (DC), Combat Development
and Integration (CD&I) will conduct a scoped
approved acquisition objective (AAO) review
for systems critical to enabling multi-domain
C2 to provide near-term multi-domain
capability solutions for the MAGTF. This
review will identify which systems to retain
or eliminate.
2. NLT 1 September 2023, DC, CD&I will
develop a minimum viable product that
combines the capabilities of the family of
integrated targeting cells, air C2 family of
systems (FoS), and ground C2 FoS. These
products will deliberately integrate into
USINDOPACOM’s joint res network for
immediate experimentation. The bridging
solution must drive convergence of currently
disparate air-land centric C2 programs of
record to a singular, all-domain MAGTF C2
capability.
3. NLT 1 March 2024, DC, CD&I (Marine
Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL))
in coordination with the MEFs, will lead
experimentation on all-domain operations
centers and multi-domain operations
centers to inform institutional level change
to MAGTF formations. The Service-level
Experimentation Campaign Plan will include
the framework for this effort with an objective
to demonstrate a MEF-level, all-domain
operations center capability in Project
Convergence Next in March and April 2024.
4. NLT 1 September 2024, DC, CD&I in
coordination with DC, Aviation (DC, A) will
institutionalize the MAOC via the DOTMLPF
Working Group.
5. NLT 1 September 2024, DC, CD&I will
conduct an all domain C2 wargame, to
include modeling and simulation, using
the outputs of the 2022 DC Aviation/DC
Information multi-domain C2 operational
planning team.
DIRECTED ACTIONS AND
ISSUES REQUIRING FURTHER
ANALYSIS IN 2023-2024
COMMAND AND CONTROL,
INTELLIGENCE, AND INFORMATION
MAGTF COMMAND AND CONTROL
The Marine Corps must be organized, trained, and
resourced to effectively conduct C2 at echelon and
rapidly transition across the competition continuum to
enable all-domain joint and combined kill webs. To do
this, we must transition from a legacy, air-land battle
paradigm to a 21st century, all-domain, joint, single
battle mindset. We can no longer accept multiple,
disparate C2 systems optimized for single-domain
awareness bound by analog/human-speed processing.
There are a variety of ongoing efforts to evolve the
Service’s C2 capability to conduct all domain operations,
enable kill webs, and further expand our value to the
joint and combined force.
Our Marine Air Command and Control System remains
the exemplar for the Service’s evolving C2 ecosystem
and has showcased an innovative capability to enable
kill webs across multiple domains via the MAOC. We
are also on track to create the rst cadre of kill web
subject matter experts through the creation of a C2
Interface Control Ofcer Military Occupational Specialty
(MOS) in 2025.
The successful integration of intelligence, res, and C2
is the heart of the targeting cycle and is required to
enable and conduct kill webs across multiple domains.
The need to expand traditional Marine Air-Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) operations to address all-domain
activities is compelling and requires us to address
multiple challenges, including:
• The lack of established multi-domain
agencies able to facilitate task force/task
group target engagement authority;
• The lack of a common, fully informed MAGTF
C2 system able to unlock the potential of
advanced technology; and
• A C2 framework (people, process,
technology, and function) that is still bound
to unique warfare domains, a restrictive
classication bureaucracy, and the MAGTF.
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
7
in development of a draft table of organization, table
of equipment, and mission essential task list (METL).
The proposal, consisting of maritime reconnaissance
(waterborne) companies, light mobile companies,
and light armored companies, all with greater reach
and lethality, promises to effectively address the
requirement for multi-domain reconnaissance. With
this framework, MCWL and the FMF will experiment
and rene organizational and equipping constructs to
inform requirements.
Directed Actions
8. NLT 1 September 2023, DC, CD&I will rene
the draft MRB table of organization, table
of equipment, and METL to accelerate the
transition from LAR to MRB.
a. Be prepared to present refined
products to the fall 2023 Ground Board
and the DOTMLPF Working Group.
b. 1st LAR Bn is the ofce of primary
responsibility (OPR) for the Maritime
Reconnaissance Company design;
c. 2nd LAR Bn is OPR for the Light Mobile
Company design;
d. 3rd LAR Bn is OPR for the Light
Armored Company design; and
e. 4th LAR Bn will make recommendations
for a Reserve MRB table of organization
and table of equipment that optimize
integration with the active component
for training and employment.
9. NLT 1 September 2023, DC, CD&I in
coordination with Marine Corps Systems
Command (MCSC) will provide the ACMC
a plan for the establishment of a Program
Manager (PM) for Mobile Reconnaissance
to execute acquisition activities in support
of the transition of LAR battalions to MRBs.
The PM for Mobile Reconnaissance will be
responsible for executing a synchronized
sun-down of the family of light armored
vehicles, while simultaneously developing,
integrating, and fielding new ground,
surface, and aerial systems.
6. NLT 1 September 2024, DC, CD&I will
conduct a C2 formations IPT to address
inefciencies in the multiple occupational
elds that perform critical C2 functions in
a multi-domain environment. This IPT will
re-evaluate legacy formations, structure,
and training across tables of organization
to ensure the right Marine is in the right
place with the right qualications to enable
all-domain joint and combined kill webs.
7. NLT 1 September 2024, Commanding General
(CG), Training and Education Command
(TECOM) will build upon the command,
control, computing, communications, cyber,
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
and targeting (C5ISR-T) leader’s course
proof of concept to expand the breadth
of exposure and expertise across the total
force to support multi-domain operations.
Issues Requiring Further Analysis
A. Headquarters roles & functions: What are
the roles and responsibilities of the Service
Component Commands (MARFORs),
MEFs, and major subordinate commands
in enabling multi-domain MAGTF C2 in
support of kill webs?
B. Enable joint and combined C2/kill webs:
How do we organize, train, and resource
to effectively conduct C2 to enable and
close all-domain, MAGTF, naval, joint, and
combined kill webs?
MULTI-DOMAIN RECONNAISSANCE
Our wargames, modeling and simulation, experiments,
and exercises, along with evidence from the Western
Pacic to Ukraine conrm the requirement for littoral,
multi-domain reconnaissance capabilities that our light
armored reconnaissance (LAR) battalions do not currently
provide. Our Ground Combat Element (GCE), therefore,
requires organizational and equipment changes to meet
requirements for lighter, more expeditionary capabilities
to operate as part of a stand-in force, and to contribute
to all-domain reconnaissance.
In accordance with the 2022 Annual Report,
experimentation and operations within the LAR
community showed steady progress toward the transition
to mobile reconnaissance battalions (MRB), culminating
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
8
from our current framework of siloed data management
to an integrated environment that converges data across
the FMF and supporting establishment. Establishing a
data collection plan with measurable objectives will be
critical to this effort. Developing more open information
architectures that foster a culture of collaboration with
robust knowledge management practices will assist in
creating measurable objectives and honest assessments
of the data we do collect. Beyond data collection, we
will also need to ensure Service leaders are properly
educated and trained to understand the opportunities,
challenges, and limitations of utilizing data to support
decision-making.
Over the past few years, the Marine Corps has made
progress in its strategic investments in data science,
but there is much more to do. We must embrace the
relevance of data as a critical element in collaboration,
performance enhancement, training, talent management,
and shared understanding amongst commanders for
decision-making in the 21st century. By focusing on data
and advanced computing power, combined with leader
experience, we will foster a cultural shift to achieve fully
effective decision-making.
Directed Actions
12. NLT 1 October 2023, DC, I will publish
a comprehensive Marine Corps Data
Implementation Plan that supports the
Department of Defense (DoD) Data Strategy.
13. NLT 31 December 2023, DC, I will develop
and implement data governance policy and
procedures applicable to the total force.
Issues Requiring Further Analysis
F. Articial intelligence: What are the potential
approaches to deploy and sustain articial
intelligence models with Marines as the
primary maintainer, like coding at the edge,
in accordance with the DoD Data Strategy?
MANEUVER AND MOBILITY
SEA-BASED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
The Navy and Marine Corps will continue to prioritize
our sea-based expeditionary forces to maximize their
forward presence as a keystone of our contribution to
integrated deterrence. To deter or respond, we must
be postured forward, operating from the sea.
10. NLT 1 October 2023, CG, MCWL will
develop a MRB experimentation plan to
test and rene the proposed MRB table of
organization, table of equipment, and METL.
11. NLT 1 January 2024, DC, CD&I will publish
an updated Ground Combat Tactical Vehicle
Strategy (GCTVS), Intelligent Robotics and
Autonomous Systems (IRAS) Strategy, and
related references to reect changes derived
from the Infantry Battalion Experimentation
(IBX) effort and the MRB table of organization
and table of equipment.
a. NLT 1 March 2024, DC, Programs and
Resources (P&R) will provide a total-
cost-of-ownership of the GCTVS per
vehicle, suitable for informing future
planning and resource decisions.
Issues Requiring Further Analysis
C. Experimentation: Evaluate options and
outcomes resulting from the integration of
the Maritime Recon Company into the FY23-
25 Littoral Maneuver Experimentation Plan
to inform future capability requirements.
D. Conduct multi-domain reconnaissance: How
do we develop capabilities for operations in
the littoral security area to gain and maintain
custody of adversary targets and frustrate
adversary reconnaissance capabilities?
E. Employ multi-domain counter-reconnaissance/
deception: How do we organize, train, and
resource so that the ability to plan and
implement deception becomes an integral
part of each unit, training event, and materiel
solution?
INFORMATION
Data is a strategic asset and a critical component of
both creating warghting advantage and improving
enterprise management and efciency. Possessing
an information advantage over competitors enables
effective and timely decisions, encouraging greater
success across the competition continuum. This includes
the ability to sense and make sense of the battlespace
across all domains, and to translate that heightened
understanding into decisive actions. To achieve this
in both warghting and the execution of our Title
10 responsibilities, we must change our approach to
gathering, curating, and leveraging data. We must evolve
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
9
LITTORAL MOBILITY
After extensive analysis, we determined a need for
nine LSMs to support littoral maneuver of a single
regimental sized unit. The Department of the Navy’s
Amphibious Force Requirements Study over the last two
years validated this number. Given that current force
structure plans call for three MLRs, we will ultimately
require 35 LSMs to account for operational availability
and mobility for those units. However, current plans
for LSM funding (beginning in FY25) limits our ability
to bring this capability online within an operationally
relevant timeframe. We have adapted to this challenge
and are developing bridging solutions: Landing Craft
Utility vessels, Expeditionary Fast Transports, and
commercial Stern Landing Vessels, along with other
vessels of opportunity. While these platforms will inform
the eventual employment of the LSM, they will fall short
of desired capabilities if called upon in an operational
setting. Our modernized expeditionary forces need a
comparably modern mobility platform to bring the full
weight of their capability to bear on competitors or
adversaries, particularly in littoral regions.
Directed Actions
14. NLT 1 September 2023, DC, CD&I will
establish a general officer-led cross
functional team to drive a plan of action
and milestones that achieve the ARG/MEU
guidance outlined in this document.
15. NLT 1 October 2023, CG, MCWL will develop
a holistic mothership experimentation
campaign plan that addresses surface,
subsurface, airborne, and manned/
unmanned teaming systems designed to
accelerate modernization.
16. NLT 1 January 2024, DC, CD&I will publish
an “ARG/MEU Next” concept with an aim
point of 2040 to inform future requirements
development.
17. NLT 1 January 2024, DC, Plan, Policies,
and Operations (PP&O) will propose Global
Force Management (GFM) modications
that prioritize forward-deployed, scalable
MAGTFs as part of flexible sea-based
constructs that include integration with
allies and partners.
Over the course of decades, we have made incremental
improvements to nearly every piece of equipment in
the Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary
Unit (ARG/MEU) but we have not modernized the ARG/
MEU construct as a whole. The joint force needs sea-
based expeditionary forces that can provide immediate
crisis response, exible and platform-agnostic naval C2
capable of executing a joint/naval campaign with allies
and partners, contributing to the joint force’s ability to
sense and make sense of the operational environment
and, when necessary, enabling and contributing to
joint kill webs. Traditional amphibious warfare ships
remain central to these missions, but we must expand
our thinking to include exible task organizations able
to employ a variety of mobility platforms to optimize
our presence forward.
As I previously described, our campaign of learning
activities regarding Task Force 76/3 and Task Force
61/2 are showing promising results, but there is still
work to be done. We need to formalize the process
for establishing integrated Navy-Marine Corps staffs
with numbered eets while giving the MEF CGs the
ability to adapt organizations to the specic needs
of their partner numbered eets. Whenever feasible,
and in coordination with the efforts of the appropriate
combatant commanders, these integrated staffs should
also include key ally and partner representation to
strengthen our integrated deterrence, offering a mature
approach to campaigning.
Given the exponential growth of anti-access and area-
denial capabilities, coupled with the increasing range of
sensors, and expanding weapons-engagement zones,
we will begin experimenting with amphibious platforms
as motherships to distribute and extend the range of
our capabilities. These platforms will host a variety of
manned, minimally-manned, and unmanned systems
— air, surface, and subsurface — to sense and enable
our forces with the aim of confounding adversaries
and complicating their ability to target the joint force.
We must also look ahead to 2040 and beyond, to
explore future requirements for amphibious platforms
and initiate design and procurement decisions now.
Through this approach, we will have an opportunity to
impose costs on our adversaries by countering their
investments, which were optimized to ght against our
traditional naval formations. By focusing on volume
and diversity, likely with lower cost alternatives, we will
complicate the ability of our adversaries to nd and
target our sea-based expeditionary forces.
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
10
Directed Actions
20. NLT 1 September 2023, DC, M&RA will
implement the 811 Marine battalion structure
across all Active infantry units.
21. NLT 1 September 2023, DC, P&R, DC, CD&I
and CG, TECOM will identify options to
accelerate the procurement and training of
organic precision res – infantry (OPF-I) and
organic precision res – mounted (OPF-M)
(loitering munitions). We are moving too
slow in OPF.
Issues Requiring Further Analysis
I. Along with conducting Phase II of IBX,
examine the organization of persistent
all-weather surveillance capabilities in the
infantry battalion. What are the appropriate
capabilities and composition required to
execute multi-domain surveillance and strike
in a distributed environment? What is the
best method to formalize training for this
added capability?
AVIATION
Our campaign of learning indicates Marine aviation
must also continue to evolve to meet the demands
of the future operating environment. Doing so will
require developing capabilities and concepts to enable
persistent distributed aviation operations (DAO) across
extended distances, with minimal sustainment from
well-established rear-areas, and integrated with SiF C2.
Transforming Marine aviation to meet these objectives
will mean overcoming the unique challenges associated
with littoral geography, especially in contested areas.
We have made great strides establishing capabilities
required to function as a SiF, while remaining postured
as a force-in-readiness capable of responding to global
crisis. We have elded transformational capabilities like
the MAGTF Unmanned Expeditionary (MUX) Medium
Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) platform to enhance
joint maritime domain awareness (MDA). We have
also invested in the development and acquisition of
low-cost, long-range, modular, net-enabled weapons
for vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft, which
complement our future long-range tactical aircraft
(TACAIR) weapons portfolio. Continued efforts across
Marine aviation seek to optimize its capabilities to
address future challenges and threats.
18. NLT 1 September 2024, Commander, Marine
Corps Forces Pacic (COMMARFORPAC)
and Commander, Marine Corps Forces
Europe and Africa (COMMARFOREUR/
AF) will formalize the establishment of
O-7 staffs within Sixth and Seventh Fleet
headquarters.
19. NLT 1 September 2024, DC, Manpower
and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) will increase
ARG/MEU subject matter expertise and
currency within HQMC, the Department
of the Navy, and the joint force to expand
understanding of the capability. Explore
options to improve our task organization
to improve synchronization of efforts.
Issues Requiring Further Analysis
G. “Mothership” capabilities: What are the
possible capabilities (current and future)
that could be deployed from the existing
inventory of L-Class ships? How could those
capabilities create warghting advantage
across the competition continuum?
H. ARG/MEU training: Analyze the composition
and length of the ARG/MEU FRTP/PTP
between U.S.-based units and the forward
deployed naval force to recommend potential
changes to the FRTP/PTP.
INFANTRY BATTALIONS
The 2020 Annual Update directed additional live force
experimentation to nalize a design that will result in
formations more capable of distributed operations.
The resulting effort, known as IBX, provided a sound
foundation to make informed decisions about the future
of Marine infantry battalions. For example, during Phase
I, we held 13 live-force experiments in environments
ranging from Appalachian Mountain winters to Okinawan
jungle summers. These experiments demonstrated
that a battalion of 735 Marines — the initial planning
factor — was not operationally suitable. We have since
adjusted the size of our battalions to 811 Marines. The
most recent update to the infantry battalion includes the
addition of persistent all-weather surveillance, additional
capacity to conduct anti-armor and indirect re, as well
as organic support and services.
Phase II will be characterized by further renements
following a series of experiments at the company and
battalion levels. These experiments will primarily focus
on C5ISRT, sustainment, sensing, and lethality.
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
11
which is part of a larger effort being developed under
the VTOL FoS. Other CBAs focused on both manned
and unmanned capabilities will enable the aviation
enterprise to realize signicant enhancements due
to ongoing synchronization between requirements,
resources, and acquisitions entities.
Directed Actions
22. NLT 1 September 2023, DC, CD&I will
develop a functional concept prospectus
for DAO that describes how Marine aviation
will operate in support of EABO, SiF, and
broader modernization efforts.
23. NLT 1 September 2023, DC, A will determine
if the 6 functions of aviation are still valid
and if not, provide recommendations for
change or expansion along with initial
DOTMLPF implications to DC, CD&I.
24. NLT 1 March 2024, DC, CD&I will analyze
future requirements for aviation digital
interoperability and integrated re control
capability with the joint force to inform force
development.
25. NLT 1 July 2024, DC, CDI in coordination
with DC, A will identify ways to increase
and maintain a persistent Marine aviation
presence across the physical expanses of
littoral geography and inside an adversary’s
weapons engagement zone.
26. NLT 1 July 2024, DC, A will analyze the
requirements for aviation sustainment given
the impacts of littoral geography, including
the requirements for expeditionary forward
arming and refueling and hasty runway
repair.
27. NLT 1 September 2024, DC, CD&I will
develop a roadmap for a future ground-
based air defense weapons system to
incorporate lasers, high power microwave,
and other capabilities to enhance MAGTF
survivability.
Marine aviation is exploring future requirements for
common carriage expendables to enhance survivability
and operational exibility. Meanwhile, the uncrewed/
remotely piloted portfolio continues to expand. While
we explore additional advanced capabilities in the Group
5 realm, smaller systems (Group 3 and below) are being
integrated into other MAGTF elements to enhance
their warghting capabilities, including logistics. In
addition to tactical resupply unmanned aerial systems
(UAS), we are currently elding thousands of small
UAS in the GCE to provide small unit leaders with an
organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) capability. The establishment of a formal UAS
operator curriculum at the School of Infantry–East
was a critical component to operationalizing small
UAS capabilities.
Along with the MAOC, we are exploring the idea of
other multi-domain C2 capabilities that will be rened in
exercises and experimentation throughout the year. The
MADIS, which will signicantly enhance the air defense
of the MAGTF, is entering low-rate initial production and
is scheduled for elding in FY24. The Light-MADIS, an
MV-22 transportable version, will also reach IOC in FY24,
with 12 already elded. The Medium Range Intercept
Capability (MRIC), intended to provide cruise missile
defense, has now completed two successful tests. We
intend to eld three batteries by FY28; a prototype
platoon will be elded in FY25.
New expeditionary aireld matting and air-transportable
reghting vehicles are being developed to enable
persistent DAO. Marine aviation continues to enhance
our ability to sense and make sense, and to participate
in the naval integrated re control networks. The
premier Marine aviation C2 system — the Common
Aviation Command and Control System — is evolving
into a small form factor capability that is MV-22
transportable and could revolutionize C2 for forward
deployed expeditionary forces.
Through multiple ongoing analytical activities with
government research agencies and academic institutions,
Marine aviation is improving our understanding of
lethality, interoperability, survivability, mobility, and
sustainability needs. One such effort is a HQMC
sponsored study to assess sustainability gaps for Marine
aviation units conducting expeditionary advance basing
operations (EABO). We will use the results of this study
to augment the capabilities-based assessment (CBA)
and rene sustainability requirements for future aircraft,
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
12
• Installations resilience. From competition
to conict, our bases and stations are the
platforms from which we project power and
support integrated deterrence alongside
allies and partners. Our forward installations
are akin to advanced bases and must
be prepared to ght in a multi-domain
contested environment while serving as
operational hubs in support of maritime
and joint/combined campaigning.
• Integration of logistics into MAGTF C2.
Integrating logistics requirements into our
overall MAGTF C2 framework will require
modernization of our data environment,
logistics information technology (IT) systems,
logistics intelligence collections, logistics
organizations, and command relationships.
The 2022 Annual Report directed further analysis on
whether the proposed Marine Logistics Group re-
organization and multi-functional combat logistics
battalions were sufficient to meet operational
requirements. Planning and feedback from the FMF
indicate that while the re-organization and new concepts
better meet future force requirements, there is a need to
provide additional capacity in specic functional areas.
Specically, providing greater engineering capability to
SiF would increase their ability to conduct condition-
setting activities, enable mobility, and contribute to
sea denial and sea control, and support advanced
expeditionary bases.
Directed Actions
28. NLT 30 September 2023, DC, Installations
and Logistics (I&L), DC, PP&O, DC,
CD&I, MEFs, and MARFORs provide
representatives to a governing body chaired
by DC, PP&O to provide equipment sourcing
recommendations to DC, PP&O in support
of the GPN.
29. NLT 1 January 2024, DC, CD&I will
implement the Commandant-approved
Marine Logistics Group and multi-functional
combat logistics battalion refinements
recommended by the Enterprise Logistic
II IPT.
30. NLT 1 March 2024, DC, CD&I will identify
a combination of crewed and un-crewed
air, surface, and subsurface logistics and
sustainment platforms capable of operating
alongside and from naval platforms.
Issues Requiring Further Analysis
J. AI-enabled systems: What is the maturity
level of autonomous and articial intelligence
systems capable of being introduced into the
MAGTF now? What is a viable timeline for
the integration of systems and manpower
requirements?
K. Survivability: What are the options to increase
survivability of ground-based sensors?
L. Sustainability: Are our existing aircraft
maintenance and supply processes and
procedures sustainable in near peer conict?
M. UAS Training Institution: Does the Department
of the Navy need a Departmental-wide UAS
certifying school to increase throughput
given the expansion of UAS programs? If
so, what is the size, scope, and cost of this
effort?
LOGISTICS
Installations and Logistics 2030 builds upon our
experimentation and learning over the past few years
and identies capabilities necessary for sustaining the
future force. Our campaign of learning continues to
reinforce the need for an agile, resilient, and integrated
sustainment network capable of generating multiple
logistics webs that provide options to commanders.
Achieving this network requires a range of new
capabilities and operational concepts, four of which
are critical requirements:
• Multi-capable distribution platforms.
Commanders will need a combination of
crewed and un-crewed air, surface, and
subsurface platforms operating alongside
and from naval platforms to ensure
continuous distribution mechanisms in the
face of adversary threat systems.
• Increased forward positioning of sustainment.
The 2022 Annual Report directed planning
for the Global Positioning Network
(GPN). The results of that work include an
implementation plan with near term actions
to support day-to-day campaigning and
response to crisis or conict. While we
continue to mature this critical capability,
initial analysis has provided the information
we need to move out now.
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
13
31. NLT 1 April 2024, DC, CD&I in coordination
with DC I&L and CG MCICOM will identify
Marine Corps requirements to connect
our installations in the Indo-Pacific to
the joint petroleum enterprise and make
recommendations for their placement
within the FMF.
32. NLT 1 July 2024, DC, CD&I in coordination
with MARFORPAC will increase the
logistics staff section within Headquarters,
MARFORPAC by FY26.
33. NLT 1 August 2024, DC, CD&I will develop A
Functional Concept for Advanced Bases and
conduct necessary wargaming to rene the
concept to better understand installations
in a multi-domain contested environment.
34. NLT 1 July 2025, DC, CD&I will establish
an additional engineer company within
7th Engineer Support Battalion to
provide increased rotational engineering
capacity to the USINDOPACOM area of
responsibility (AOR).
35. NLT 1 July 2025, DC, CD&I will establish
a littoral engineer reconnaissance team
capability within 9th Engineer Support
Battalion.
36. NLT 1 September 2025, DC, PP&O in
coordination with COMMARFORPAC will
establish three GPN ashore sites in the
USINDOPACOM AOR.
37. NLT 1 July 2028, DC, CD&I will develop an
expeditionary initial operational capability
to conduct assault bridging and the standoff
detection of explosive hazards in support
of stand-in force maneuver and mobility.
Issues Requiring Further Analysis
N. Engineers and MRB: What are the required
capabilities of the direct support combat
engineering unit of employment to enhance
multi-domain reconnaissance?
O. Future bases and stations: What are
the appropriate levels of multi-domain
protection, MAGTF C2 integration, and U.S.
Naval Construction Force integration for our
logistics formations and advanced bases?
P. Fight from bases and stations/critical
infrastructure: How do we modernize
infrastructure across the Marine Corps so
that it directly contributes to generating
the future force, and so that it can prepare
for, respond to, and recover from all types
of hazards and threats?
Q. Installations resilience: How do we develop
sufcient understanding of Marine Corps
installation vulnerabilities to extreme
environmental conditions, and integrate
climate requirements into operations,
planning, and decision-making processes?
R. Sustainment governance: How do we employ
a force sustainment governance framework
focused on materiel, equipment, capability
and/or program investment and divestment
risk decisions, to optimize the logistics/
supply chain management objectives for
achieving force readiness goals?
INTELLIGENT ROBOTICS AND
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS
Adversaries present new operational and tactical
problems that disrupt our current military efforts. Lethal,
low-cost, highly proliferated technology provides a
reverse offset that can potentially generate an outsized
warghting advantage. Simply put, platforms that
cost thousands of dollars can defeat platforms that
cost millions of dollars. As demonstrated in the 2020
Nagorno-Karabakh conict and presently in the Russia-
Ukraine conict, UAS platforms and loitering munitions
routinely defeat armor and ghting positions with top-
down attacks. To succeed in future conict, the Marine
Corps must nd ways to operate in contested areas
in a cost-effective, risk-worthy manner, while placing
adversary capabilities at risk. Formations across the
total force must capitalize on technological advances to
evolve from a “platform-centric” to a “capability-centric”
approach, where intelligent robotics and autonomous
systems (IRAS) are employed by trained specialists who
contribute to all-domain operations.
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
14
Directed Actions
38. NLT 1 July 2023, DC, CD&I in coordination
with DC, PP&O will identify a MEF to assign
the appropriate subordinate regiment,
Marine aircraft group, and combat
logistics regiment to consolidate IRAS
experimentation, develop doctrine, and to
conduct limited assessment.
39. NLT 1 September 2023, CG, TECOM will
conduct external outreach to academia,
industry, independent research institutions,
joint, coalition, and allied forces to
synchronize and disseminate emerging
IRAS concepts to the total force.
40. NLT 1 September 2023, CG, TECOM will
incorporate IRAS concepts and employment
methods into formal learning centers and
professional military education institutions.
41. NLT 1 September 2023, DC, CD&I will
establish a process for external outreach
to integrate joint force, ally, and partner
IRAS initiatives.
42. NLT 1 January 2024, DC, CD&I will
incorporate IRAS into the Service-Level
Experimentation Plan.
43. NLT 1 April 2024, DC, CD&I will develop
a strategy for integration with joint forces,
allies, and partners.
44. NLT 1 April 2024, Commander, MCSC will
develop a strategy to categorize IRAS to
allow for more rapid acquisition of high
demand, low cost, risk-worthy systems.
45. NLT 1 April 2024, Commander, MCSC
will develop a strategy to consolidate
responsibilities associated with land and
surface IRAS materiel solutions.
46. NLT 1 April 2024, DC, I will develop a
strategy to meet the data and spectrum
requirements of IRAS in training and
operational environments.
47. NLT 1 October 2024, DC, CD&I in
coordination with Commander, Marine
Corps Forces Reserve will develop a
strategy to integrate robotics specialties
throughout the total force.
IRAS can greatly multiply a military force’s capabilities
across the competition continuum by reducing risk
to human operators, accelerating task execution,
and providing decisive effects.To fully leverage
these effects and capitalize on the advantages IRAS
brings to modern warfare, the Service must recruit,
manage, professionalize, and retain Marines that
are experts in the employment of IRAS. We must
leverage efciencies in our acquisition processes to
deliver mature technology to the Service at the speed
of relevance. We must organize our force to break
down stovepipes and coordinate IRAS implementation
and experimentation, so the total force benets
from a common understanding of our concepts and
capabilities. Finally, we must treat data as a resource
and ensure distribution of real-time intelligence and
targeting data, prioritizing interoperability with the
joint and coalition force.
PRINCIPLES OF MARTIAL ROBOTICS
• The human element of armed conflict
remains central in the use of IRAS.
• IRAS augment and enhance human
processes, without replacing the warghter.
• Marines must ght at machine speed or face
defeat at machine speed.
TENETS TO INFORM IRAS STRATEGIES
• Develop a lethal, agile, mobile, and resilient
force.
• Deliver performance to the warghter at the
speed of relevance.
• Increase interoperability and all domain
awareness across the joint force.
• Recognize and treat data as a strategic
resource.
• Increase transparency and cooperation with
international, government, industry, and
academic partners.
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
15
48. NLT 1 October 2024, DC, M&RA will
develop a strategy to recruit and retain
personnel with IRAS knowledge that
leverages alternate recruiting pathways
including military and civilian sector, direct
accession, and lateral entry.
49. NLT 1 January 2025, CG, TECOM will review
doctrine to incorporate IRAS employment.
Issues Requiring Further Analysis
S. IRAS MOS: We need to consider an IRAS
occupational eld and a strategy to integrate
robotics specialties in the total force, as well
as a talent management strategy focused on
recruiting and retaining qualied personnel.
T. Robotics: What is the feasibility of establishing
robotics competitions to promulgate
awareness and recruit qualied personnel?
U. IRAS: What are the strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and risks associated with
consolidating responsibilities among air and
subsurface IRAS materiel solutions?
V. Acquisition: What are the existing policies
and regulations that govern acquisition
and sustainment of IRAS? How do we build
efciencies into the IRAS implementation
enterprise, allowing for input from FMF,
including the purchase of commercial off-
the-shelf solutions?
W. UAS: Which MAGTF element should manage
each group of UAS, considering emerging,
multi-domain IRAS and systems that operate
in similar parts of the battlespace (i.e., small
UAS and loitering munitions)? What are the
DOTMLPF implications?
X. Sustainment: We need to examine the
research and state of maturity of concepts and
capabilities for enabling the development
of a service-level logistics and sustainment
strategy and roadmap for incorporating
IRAS.
Y. Integrate IRAS: How do we capitalize on
technological advances to grow from a
platform-centric approach to a capabilities-
centric approach in which IRAS are employed
by trained specialists?
Force Design 2030 Annual Update
June 2023
16
CONCLUSION
Force Design 2030 is a Service-wide modernization effort to make the Marine Corps lighter, more naval, more
versatile, and more lethal. Modernizing the Corps in this way improves our ability to deter potential adversaries
by providing credible support to naval campaigns and expanding integration with the naval and joint force, as
well as our allies and partners. Today, Marines are standing-in across multiple theaters to disrupt adversary plans
and prevent conict. If necessary, they are prepared to seize and defend key maritime terrain. While still being
rened, the concepts and capabilities stemming from Force Design are being used today across the globe, from
Lithuania to the western Pacic and beyond.
Although many elements of FD2030 are already in use, our modernization has only just begun. We must
capitalize on our momentum and accelerate modernization so that we stay ahead of competitors. To accelerate
most effectively, we will put capabilities as rapidly as possible into the hands of tactical commanders who are
campaigning every day. Time is not on our side, and we must work at a tempo greater than our competitors. We
owe the MEF CGs integrated warghting solutions placed in the hands of their Marines as quickly as possible.
Outside the Marine Corps, we must work with our sister services and industry partners to improve the design of
the joint force so that we can optimize our ability to enable and leverage it. While accelerating modernization is
essential, our warghting capabilities are only as effective as the Marines employing them. Our Marines remain
the key to sustaining and improving our competitive advantages.
Finally, we must continue to improve our ability to implement our modernization successes to date. The conduct
of our campaign of learning and the way in which we organize to design and develop the future force have grown
in recent years. This improvement must continue. We must build on our ability to innovate for the future while
delivering capabilities to the warghter today. For the Marine Corps to remain “most ready, when the Nation is
least ready,” we must remain vigilant and ready to create new advantages whenever we sense changes in our
operating environment.
Semper Fidelis,
David H. Berger
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps
“Thus, we see that force planning itself is a competitive act, and the Marine Corps must
retain the ability to recongure the force when necessary to sustain its competitive
advantage, or to develop new ones.”
- Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-4, Competing
