OregonHealthPolicyBoard
Officefor
OregonHealthPolicyandResearch
OregonMedicalLiabilityTaskForce
ReportandRecommendations
SubmittedtotheOregonHealthPolicyBoard:
December2010
2
TableofContents
Page
MedicalLiabilityTaskForceMembership............................................................................... 3
ExecutiveSummary.................................................................................................................. 4
I. ChargetotheTaskForce.............................................................................................. 6
II. FrameworkforDeliberations....................................................................................... 6
III. Background.................................................................................................................. 7
IV. ReformConceptsSelectedforConsideration ........................................................... 14
V. RecommendationstoSupportandEncourage“DisclosureandOffer”Programs .. 15
VI. GranttoExploreEvidenceBasedGuidelineSafeHarborApproach........................ 20
VII. AnAdministrativeSystemforCompensatingPatientInjuries................................. 21
VIII. Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 24
Appendix1.LiabilityCostTrends ......................................................................................... 26
Appendix2.TrendsinPhysicianPremiumsforMedicalLiabilityInsurance ...................... 28
Appendix3.TestimonyConcerningtheMedicalLiabilityPremiumSubsidy……..................30
Appendix4.ProposedadditiontoOregon’sInsuranceCode……………………………...34
Appendix5.Statemedicalerrordisclosurelaws................................................................. 35
Appendix6.RecommendedStudy. ...................................................................................... 38
Appendix7.MajorSourcesConsulted. ................................................................................. 41
3
MedicalLiabilityTaskForceMembership
CoChairs:
J.MichaelAlexander,JD
Swanson,Lathen,Alexander,
McCann&Prestwich,PC
JosephSiemienczuk,MD
ChiefMedicalOfficer
ProvidenceMedicalGroupNorth
ProvidenceHealth&Services
Members:
RickBennett
GovernmentRelations
AARP
PeterBernardo,MD
GeneralSurgeon,PrivatePractice
JeffreyBildstein,JD
VicePresident
WesternLitigation,Inc
JanetBillups,JD
OHSULegalCounsel
JimDameron
ExecutiveDirector
OregonPatientSafetyCommission
CraigFausel,MD
Physician/President&CEO
TheOregonClinic
ScottGallant
SelfEmployed
GallantPolicy
Advisors,Inc.
Members(cont.)
RobertHolland,MD
Physician&MedicalExaminer
GrantCounty
JodieMooney,JD
DirectorofRiskManagement&
OrganizationalIntegrity
PeaceHealthOregonRegion
LauraPotter
DistrictExecutiveDirector
AmericanCancerSociety
ChristofferPoulsen,DO
EmergencyMedicinePhysician
EugeneEmergencyPhysicians
SacredHeartMedicalCenter
MarkStevenson
PresidentandCEO
CapitalPacificBank
LawrenceWobbrock,JD
TrialLawyer,PC
Staff:
JeaneneSmith,MD,MPH
Administrator
OregonHealthPolicyand
Research
LynnMarieCrider,JD
PolicyAnalyst
OregonHealthPolicyand
Research
4
ExecutiveSummary
TheMedicalLiabilityTaskForcewasappointedbytheOregonHealthPolicyBoardinMarch
2010todevelopmedicalliabilityreformproposalsforconsiderationbythePolicyBoardand
theLegislature.
TheTaskForceidentifiedthreepatientcenteredgoalsforsystemimprovementandagreed
thatsuccessfulmedicalliability
reformshouldfurtherthosegoals.Theyare:
1. Themedicalliabilitysystembecomesamoreeffectivetoolforimproving
patientsafety;
2. Themedicalliabilitysystemmoreeffectivelycompensatesindividualswho
areinjuredasaresultofmedicalerrors;and
3. Thecollateralcostsassociatedwiththemedicalliabilitysystem
(including
costsassociatedwithinsuranceadministration,litigation,anddefensive
medicine)arereduced.
TheTaskForceprioritizedthreereformconceptsforconsiderationbecausetheyseemedto
holdsomepromiseforhelpingachievethegoalsforsystemimprovement:Disclosureand
offerprograms,evidencebasedguidelinesafeharbors,andhealthcourts.
TheTaskForcechosenottolookforwaystoreduceindemnitypayments(thatis,payments
toinjuredpatients)primarilybecausenoneconomicdamagecaps—whichhavebeen
imposedinsomestatestoreduceindemnitypayments‐‐cannotbeimposedinOregon
withoutaconstitutionalchangethatthestate’svotershaverejectedtwice.Inaddition,
manymembersoftheTaskForcebelievethatthesystemshouldcompensatemore,not
fewer,individualsharmedbymedicalerrors.
TheTaskForcemakesthefollowingrecommendationsdesignedtospurprovidersand
facilitiestodisclosemedicalerrorstotheirpatientsand,wherepossible,tooffer
compensationtopatientsharmedbythoseerrors:
Thelegislatureshouldenactastatuteexplicitlyprovidingthatahealthcare
facilityorprovider’sdutytocooperatewithaninsurerdoesnotpreclude
disclosureofanadverseeventorthereasonsunderlyingittoapatientorthe
patient’sfamilyandthatsuchdisclosuremaynotbethegroundsforrefusalto
defendorforcancellationornonrenewalofcoverage.Thisshouldremove
insuranceconcernsasabarriertofulldisclosure.
ThelegislatureshouldconsideramendingOregon’s“apology”law,which
precludesuseofstatementsmadetoapatientthatexpress“regretorapology”
forharmthatoccurredduringtreatmenttoproveliabilityinanegligencecaseso
thatthelawclearlyprotectsfacilitiesinadditiontophysiciansandmoreclearly
describeswhatstatementsareincludedinitsprotection.
5
Thelegislatureshouldconsiderrequiringprofessionalsandfacilitiestodisclose
topatientsadverseeventsoccurringasaconsequenceoftheirtreatmentandto
provideexplanationsforthem.
TheOregonPatientSafetyCommissionshouldworkwithhealthcarefacilities
thatparticipateinitsvoluntaryerrorreportingprogramtoexperimentwith
disclosureprotocolsthatspecifywhattheyshoulddisclosetopatientsunderthe
reportingprogram.
ThelegislatureshouldconsiderexpandingOregon’svoluntaryreportingprogram
topermitphysicianpracticestoparticipate,recognizingthatconfidential
reportingofmedicalerrorsservesadifferentalthoughcomplementarypurpose
thandisclosureoferrorstopatients.
TheTaskForcemakesthefollowingrecommendationconcerningtheworkthathasbeen
fundedbyagrantfromtheAgencyforHealthcareResearchandQualitytodevelopa“safe
harbor”programthatchangesmedicalliabilityrulestoencouragephysicianstouse
evidencebasedpracticeguidelines:
Toexplorethepotentialvalueofusingevidencebasedguidelinesasthelegal
standardofcare,policymakersshouldsupportthecompletionofthegrant
activity.
Asthegrantmovesforward,abroadlyrepresentativesetofindividualsshould
beincludedintheplanningprocess.
TheTaskForceconsideredproposalstoreplacetheexistingmedicalliabilitysystemwitha
newsystemforcompensatingpatientsharmedbymedicaltreatment,eveniftheircarewas
notnegligent.Itisassumedthatsuchaprogramwouldcompensatemoreindividualsthan
thecurrentsystemandwouldinvolveanadministrativeratherthanacourtbasedsystem
foradjudicatingclaims.TheTaskForcereachedthisconclusion:
ItwouldbeworthwhilefortheLegislatureortheOregonHealthAuthorityto
sponsorastudytodeterminewhetherornotanadministrativesystemcouldbe
designedthatwouldachievethereformobjectivestheTaskForcehas
enunciatedandifso,whetherimplementationisfinancially,legally,
and
politicallyfeasible.Thestudyshouldbeoverseenbyanunbiasedentitythathas
nottakenapositionfororagainstthehealthcourtsconcept.Itshouldbe
conductedbyawellqualifiedteamwithknowledgeoftheexistingmedical
liabilitysystem,knowledgeofadministrativecompensationsystemsinthe
United
Statesandelsewhere,skillineconomicandsocialresearchandmodeling,
legalandactuarialexpertise,andfundingsufficienttodoathoroughjob.
TheTaskForceappreciatestheopportunitytostudytheseissuesandencouragestheboard
tocontinuethiswork.
6
I. ChargetotheTaskForce
TheMedicalLiabilityTaskForcewasappointedbytheOregonHealthPolicyBoardinMarch
2010todevelopmedicalliabilityreformproposalsforconsiderationbythePolicyBoardand
theLegislature.
TheBoardinstructedtheTaskForcetobeguidedbytheTripleAim,seekingtoimprove
populationhealthby“improvingaccesstocare;”improveaccesstoandexperienceofcare
by“assuringhealthcareprovidersdonotceasetoprovidespecificservicesinresponseto
liabilityconcerns;”andreducepercapitacostsby“reducingthecostsassociatedwith
defensivemedicine.”
Thecharterread:
“TheMedicalLiabilityTaskForcewillinvestigatethecurrentmedicalliabilitysystem
andsuggestopportunitiesforreforminOregonincluding,butnotlimitedto,capson
noneconomicdamageawards,disclosureandofferprograms,shiftingthe
adjudicationofmedicalmalpracticeclaimstoadministrativepanelsorspecialized
judicialcourts,andthecreationof“safeharbors”wherephysiciansareinsulated
fromliabilityiftheyadheretoevidencebasedpracticesorpracticeaccordingto
findingsfromcrediblecomparativeeffectivenessresearch(CER).
***
“Recommendationsshouldprioritizepatientsafetyandthereductionofmedical
errors,encouragebettercommunicationbetweenphysiciansandpatients,reduce
theoccurrenceoffrivolouslawsuits,andreduceliabilitypremiums,whilealso
ensuringthatpatientsarecompensatedinanequitableandtimelywayformedical
injuries.”
II. FrameworkforDeliberations
TheTaskForcechosetofocusitsattentiononfindingwaystofurtherthreegoalsforsystem
improvement.Thegoalswereidentified
withthePolicyBoard’spatientcentricfocusin
mind.Successfulreformwillmean
1. Themedicalliabilitysystembecomesamoreeffectivetoolforimproving
patientsafety;
2. Themedicalliabilitysystemmoreeffectivelycompensatesindividualswho
areinjuredasaresultofmedicalerrors;and
3. Thecollateralcostsassociatedwiththemedicalliabilitysystem(including
costsassociatedwithinsuranceadministration,litigation,anddefensive
medicine)arereduced.
7
TheTaskForceidentifiedfivequestionsthatshouldbeaskedaboutanyproposaltochange
themedicalliabilitysystem.Theyare:
1. Whatisthelikelyeffectoftheproposalonpatientsafety?
2. Whatisthelikelyeffectoftheproposalonaccesstocompensationfor
patientinjury?
3. Whatisthelikelyeffectoftheproposalonhealthcarecosts?
4. Istheproposalfeasible?
5. Cantheproposalbeimplementedwithoutstatutoryorconstitutional
changes?Ifnot,whatchangesarenecessary?
III.Background
TheTaskForcewouldhavepreferredtobeginitsworkwithacompleteunderstandingof
theproblemofmedicalerrorsinOregon,theperformanceandcostsofthemedicalliability
systeminOregon,andthecollateralcostsofthemedicalliabilitysystem,includingcostsof
administration,litigation,anddefensivemedicine.
Unfortunately,theTaskForcefoundthatinformationisnotavailabletosupportathorough
understandingofthesystemswehavetoday—whichmaybeonereasonthereisno
consensusaroundproposalsforchange.Oregondoesnottrackmedicalerrorsina
comprehensiveway.TheOregonMedicalBoardtrackspaymentsinclaimsagainst
physicians,butthestatedoesnottrackpaymentsinclaimsagainstinstitutionsorother
licensedprofessionals.Oregonknowssomethingaboutthecosttophysiciansoftheliability
systembecausemedicalliabilityinsurerslicensedinOregonmustfilepremiumratesand
totalpremiumwritten;butincreasingnumbersofphysiciansareemployedbyselfinsured
healthcareinstitutions.Thisconfoundseffortstotrendcostorgenerateaggregatecost
figures.
TheTaskForceproceededwithitsworkbasedonthepersonalknowledgeofparticipants,
nationalestimatesoferrorsandliabilitysystemcosts,andpreliminaryinformationsupplied
bystafffrompublicandinsurer
sources.Weofferthefollowingparagraphstohelpinform
ourreaders.
A.PatientSafety
Theseminalauthorityontheissueofmedicalerrorsremainsthe1999Instituteof
Medicine'slandmarkreportentitled"ToErrIsHuman".RelyingontheHarvardMedical
8
PracticeStudy’sreviewofarandomsampleof1984hospitalrecordsinNewYorkState,
1
theIOMestimatedthatasmanyas98,000individualsdieeveryyearfrompreventable
medicalerrorsinAmericanhospitals.
2
TheHarvardMedicalPracticeStudycountincluded
patientswhodiedinhospitalsduetodiagnosticandothererrorsthatoccurredonan
outpatientbasis.
TheHarvardresearchteamestimatedthenationaleconomicburdenof1984medicalerrors
at$50billionin1989dollars.Abouthalfthecostwasforadditional
healthservices;about
halfforlostearningsandhouseholdproductivity.
3
Asimilarstudywasdoneusing1992
hospitalrecordsfromColoradoandUtah.Anarticledescribingthestudyestimatedthe
nationalburdenof1992medicalerrorsin1996dollarsat$37.6billionforalladverseevents
and$17billionforpreventableones.Again,abouthalfofthecostswereforadditional
healthservicesandhalfforlostearningsandproductivity.
4

NostudycomparabletotheNewYorkorColorado/Utahstudieshasbeendonetomeasure
thefrequencyorcostofmedicalerrorsinOregon.TheOregonPatientSafetyCommission
(OPSC)operatesmedicalerrorreportingprograms.Whiletheprogramsprovideimportant
informationtosupportfacilityimprovementprograms,theycannotyetgeneratea
comprehensivepictureofthemedicalerrorsthatoccur.Hospitals,nursinghomes,
ambulatorysurgerycenters,andpharmaciesmayparticipateintheOPSCprograms,but
physicianpracticesmaynot.In2009,thePatientSafetyCommissionreceivedreportsof32
medicalerrorsresultinginpatientdeath.
5
RelyingondatafromPennsylvania,wherea
mandatoryhospitalerrorreportingsystemhasbeeninplacesince2004,Oregon’sPublic
HealthOfficerestimatedthat1600seriousadverseeventsresultinginpatientharm
occurredin2008inOregonhospitalsalone.
6
Manyoftheseinjuriescanandshouldbe
prevented.
1
Brennan,T.A.,Leape,L.L.,Laird,N.M.,Hebert,L.,Localio,A.R.,Lawthers,A.G.,Newhouse,J.P.,Weiler,P.C.,&
Hiatt,H.H.(1991,February7).Incidenceofadverseeventsandnegligenceinhospitalizedpatients:results
oftheHarvardMedicalPracticeStudyI.NewEnglandJournalofMedicine,324(6):3706.
2
Kohn,L.T.,Corrigan,J.M.,&Donaldson,M.S.(1999).ToErrIsHuman:BuildingaSaferHealthSystem.
InstituteofMedicine.Washington,DC:NationalAcademyPress.
3
Johnson,W.G.,Brennan,T.A.,Newhouse,J.P.,Leape,L.L.,Lawthers,A.G.,Hiatt,H.H.,&Weiler,P.C.(1992,
May13).TheEconomicConsequencesofMedicalInjuries.TheJournaloftheAmericanMedical
Association.267(18):2487–2492.
4
Thomas,E.J.,Studdert,D.M.,Newhouse,J.P.,Zbar,B.I.W.,Howard,K.M.,Williams,E.J.,&Brennan,T.A.
(1999,Fall).CostsofMedicalInjuriesinUtahandColorado.Inquiry.
5
In2009,Oregonhospitalsreported127seriousadverseevents,32ofwhichresultedindeath.Oregon
PatientSafetyCommission.(2010,August).HospitalReport.Available:
http://oregon.gov/OPSC/docs/Reports/HospitalReport081910.pdf
[2010,October14]
6
OregonDepartmentofHumanServices,PublicHealthDivision.(2009,August).PublicHealthOfficer
CertificationReport2008OregonPatientSafetyCommissionAdverseEventReportingPrograms.
Available:http://oregon.gov/PHOCertificationReport2008_Final_1.pdf
[2010,October14]
9
B.AccesstoCompensation
Ourcurrenttortsystem’sprincipalpurposeistoprovidecompensationtovictimsof
negligence.Asitappliestomedicalclaims,itisafaultbasedsystem,meaningthat
compensationmaybeawardedonlyifthemedicalproviderisshowntohaverendered
unreasonablecare.Becausethereisnocomprehensivedataonthenumbersofnegligent
medicalerrorsoccurringinOregoneachyear,itisimpossibletocalculatethedegreeto
whichthetortsystemaccomplishesitsgoal.
Thereisnoquestion,however,thatmanypeoplewhoareharmedbymedicalnegligencedo
notreceivecompensationthroughthetortsystem.Severalstudiesusingdatafromother
stateshavebeenconducted.Foreach,physiciansexaminedhospitalrecordstoidentify
adverseeventscausedbymedicalnegligence.Researchersthenmaptheeventsagainst
recordsofmalpracticeclaims.Thestudieshavefoundthat97.598%ofpatientsinjuredby
medicalnegligencedidnotfileclaims.
7
Thissuggeststhatthesystemasitnowfunctionsisalessthanperfectvehiclefor
compensatingvictimsofmedicalnegligenceandprobablyanevenlesssatisfactoryvehicle
forcompensationvictimsofpreventablemedicalerrors—thatis,errorsthatcouldhave
beenpreventedhadbestpracticesbeenfollowed.Thereasonswhysofeware
compensated,however,isanissuerequiringfurtherstudy.
C.CollateralCosts
1.Totalsystemcosts
Thecostsofthemedicalliabilitysystem(asopposedtoeconomicburdenofthetreatment
relatedinjuriesthemselves)includebothcompensationpaidforinjuryandthesystem’s
collateralcosts—primarilythecostsof
insuranceadministrationandlitigationandcosts
associatedwithdiagnosticandtreatmentactivitiesundertakenprimarilytoavoid
malpracticeliabilityorclaims(thatis,“defensivemedicine”).
Atleastthreeestimatesofthenationalcostofthemedicalliabilitysystemhavebeen
publishedrecently.Theestimatesof“directcost”rangefrom.43%to2%ofnationalhealth
carespending.PublicCitizen,relyingonestimatesofmalpracticepremiumsalone,
estimateddirectcostsat0.46%ofhealthcarespending.
8
MichelleMelloandcolleaguesat
theHarvardSchoolofPublicHealthestimatedtotaldirectcosts(thatis,indemnity
7
Localio,A.R.,Lawthers,A.G.,Brennan,T.A.,Laird,N.M.,Hebert,L.E.,Peterson,L.M.,Newhouse,J.P.,Weiler,
P.C.,&Hiatt,H.H.(1991,July25).RelationBetweenMalpracticeClaimsandAdverseEventsDueto
Negligence.NewEnglandJournalofMedicine.325(4):245251.Studdert,D.M.,Thomas,E.J.,Burstin,H.R.,
Zbar,B.I.W.,Orav,E.J.,&
Brennan,T.A.(2000,March).NegligentCareandMalpracticeClaimingBehavior
inUtahandColorado.MedicalCare.38(3):25060.
8
PublicCitizen.(2010,March3).MedicalMalpracticePaymentsFallAgainin2009.Available:
www.citizen.org/documents/NPDBFinal.pdf
[2010,October14]
10
paymentsplusadministrativecosts)at$9.85billionin2008—or0.43%oftotalhealthcare
spending.Theirestimatewasbasedondataonpayments,studiesofdefensecosts,and
studiesofinsuranceoverheadcosts—allcitedinapaperpublishedinHealthAffairs.
9
The
CongressionalBudgetOfficeofferedamuchlargerestimateofdirectcostinaletter
concerningthepotentialsavingsfromspecifictortreformproposals.ThemethodCBOused
togenerateitsestimateof$35billion—orabout2%ofhealthcarespending—isnot
explainedindetail.
10

Melloandcolleaguessoughttoestimatetheindirectaswellasthedirectcostsofthe
medicalliabilitysystem.Todothat,theyaddedestimatesoflostphysicianproductivityand
defensivemedicinetotheirestimatesfordirectcosts.Theypeggedtotalcostat$55.6
billionayear—withalmost80%ofitresultingfromdefensivemedicine.Iftheirestimateis
correct,thedirectandindirectcostsoftheliabilitysystemare2.4%oftotalhealthcare
spending.
Theproblemwithalloftheseestimatesisthattheyincludebothcompensationand
collateralcost;sowhiletheyareagoodmeasureofthe
burdenofthesystemonhealthcare
practitioners,theyarenotparticularlyusefulinidentifyingthecollateralcoststhattheTask
Forceseekstoreduce.Therefore,weturntostudiesthatseektoparsethesecosts.
2.Costofindemnitypayments
Melloetalestimatedthetotalnationalcostof
indemnitypayments—thatispaymentsto
compensatefortheeconomicandnoneconomicconsequencesofpatientinjuries‐‐at$5.7
billionayearor0.25%ofnationalhealthcarespending.Thecalculationstartedwiththe
totalindemnitypaymentsreportedtotheNationalPractitionerDataBankandamultiplier
developedfromtheliteratureandinsurerrecordstoaccountforindemnitypaymentson
behalfofinstitutions(whicharenotreportedtothedatabank).
UsingMello’smethodologyandNationalPractitionerDataBankfiguresforOregon,the
OfficeforOregonHealthPolicy&Researchestimatesthatindemnitypaymentspaidin
claimsagainstprofessionalsandfacilitiesinOregon
totaledabout$46.4millionin2008 ‐‐
thatis,0.24%ofestimatedOregonhealthcarespending.
11

TotalindemnitypaymentsmadeforincidentsinvolvingclaimsagainstOregonphysicians
appearstohavetrendedupwardoverthelastdecadeaccordingtodatareportedtothe
OregonMedicalBoard.Whetherthistrulyreflectsagrowingcostburden,however,would
requireadjustingthesepaymentsforinflationandforgrowthinpopulationorinvolumeof
9
Mello,M.M.,Chandra,A.,Gawande,A.A.,&Studdert,D.M.(2010,September.)NationalCostsoftheMedical
LiabilitySystem.HealthAffairs.29(9):156977.
10
CongressionalBudgetOffice.(2009,October9).LettertoHonorableOrrinG.Hatch.Available:
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10641/1009Tort_Reform.pdf
[2010,October14]
11
TheOfficeforOregonHealthPolicyandResearchhasestimatedtotalhealthcarespendingfor2008at$19.3
billion.
11
healthservicesprovided—anexercisetheTaskForcedidnotundertake.Formoredetailon
trendsinclaimfrequencyandindemnitypayments,seeAppendix1.
3.Costsofinsuranceadministrationandlitigation
Melloetalestimatedthetotalnationalcostofinsuranceadministrationanddefendant
legalexpensesat$4.13billionin2008—withanadditional$2.0billioninlegalcostsborne
byinjuredpatientsoutoftheirrecoveries.
12

Iftherelationshipbetweenindemnitycostandadministrationandlitigationcostsinthe
MelloestimatesholdstrueforOregon,malpracticeinsuranceadministrationanddefense
litigationcostswouldhaveconsumedabout$33.6millioninOregonin2008.
4.Costsofdefensivemedicine
Increasedhealthcarecostsassociatedwithdefensivemedicineare
notoriouslydifficultto
measure.Estimatesofshareofhealthcarespendingattributabletodefensivemedicine
rangefromabout0.3%tomorethan7%.
Defensivemedicineresultsinperformanceoftestsandproceduresprimarilytoavoid
malpracticeliability.Measuringitrequiresassessingwhyphysiciansmakethediagnostic
andtreatmentdecisionstheymake.Itwouldbedifficultenoughtodetermineinany
particularcasewhetheradecisiontoorderaparticulardiagnosticimagingstudywasmade
primarilybecausethephysicianbelievedittobenecessaryforthepatient’scareor
primarilytoensurethathisdiagnosiswouldnotbequestionedinamalpracticesuit.The
analysisisyetmoredifficultbecausegoodpatientcareandfearofmalpracticesuitsarenot
theonlyfactorsaffectingphysiciandecisionmaking.Forexample,feeforservicepayment
incentivescanreinforcemedicalmalpracticeincentivestoorderunnecessaryservices.
Becauseofthedifficultyofmeasuringtheextentof
defensivemedicine,membersofthe
TaskForceagreednottoattempttoagreeonitsprevalence.Nevertheless,because
defensivemedicineisalargecomponentofmostestimatesoftotalmedicalliabilitycost,we
addressitbrieflyhere.
Ina2006paperpublishedbytheRobertWoodJohnsonFoundation,MichelleMello,wrote:
“Therearenoreliableestimatesofthenationalcostsofdefensivemedicine.Many
analystshaveattemptedtoestimatethesecosts;allhavefailedtodosoreliably.All
oftheavailablemeasurementmethodologieshaveseriousshortcomings(10,18).
Forexample,somenationalestimatesarebasedontheincrementalcost
increases
associatedwithjusttwoorthreemedicalproceduresordiagnoses.Itissimplynot
possibletoextrapolatesowidelytootherprocedures,becausesomearemore
amenabletodefensivemedicalpracticethanothers.TheOfficeofTechnology
12
Seefootnote9.
12
Assessmentconductedacomprehensivereviewoftheevidenceaboutdefensive
medicinecostsin1994andconcludedthatnoneofavailableestimateswerereliable
(32).Muchadditionalresearchhasbeenconductedsincethen,buttheconclusion
remainsthesame.”
13
Nevertheless,anumberofattemptshavebeenmadetoquantifythedefensivemedicine
phenomenon.Wementionseveralbelow.
OneofthelargerestimatesisdescribedbytheStuartL.Weinstein,pastpresidentofthe
AmericanSocietyofOrthopedists,inapostingonthesociety’swebsite.Hewrites:
“Thestudyquoted
mostoftenisbyDanielP.KesslerandMarkB.McClellan.To
reallyunderstandactualcosts,KesslerandMcClellananalyzedtheeffectsof
malpracticeliabilityreformsusingdataonMedicarebeneficiarieswhoweretreated
forseriousheartdisease.Theyfoundthatliabilityreformscouldreducedefensive
medicinepractices,leadingtoa5percentto9percentreductioninmedical
expenditureswithoutanyeffectonmortalityormedicalcomplications.
“IftheKesslerandMcClellanestimateswereappliedtototalU.S.healthcare
spendingin2005,thedefensivemedicinecostswouldtotalbetween$100billion
and$178billionperyear.”
14

MostexpertswouldconcedethatWeinstein’sisahighestimate,builtonanassumption
thatfindingsofKesslerandMcClellanwithrespecttoasmallclassofcasescanbe
extrapolatedtothesystemasawhole.
MoreconservativeestimateshavebeenauthoredbytheCongressionalBudgetOfficeandJ.
WilliamThomasandcolleaguesattheCutlerInstituteforHealthandSocialPolicy.The
CongressionalBudgetOffice,basedonareviewofpublishedresearch,estimatedthat
enactmentofapackageoftraditionaltortreforms—includingcapsondamages—would
reducetotalhealthspendingby0.3%.
15
Thomasetal,basedonanextensiveanalysisof
healthinsuranceclaimsdata,predictedthatwhilereductionsinmedicalliabilitypremiums
wouldresultinasignificantreductionincostsfor2%ofconditions,“acrossallthirtyfive
specialties[studied],savingsassociatedwitha10%percentreductioninmedical
malpracticepremiums
wouldbejust0.132percent.”
16

13
Mello,M.M.(2006,January).UnderstandingMalpracticeInsurance:APrimer.RobertWoodJohnson
Foundation.Available:www.rwjf.org/pr/synthesis/reports_and_briefs/pdf/no10_primer.pdf
[2010,October
14]
14
Weinstein,S.L.,TheCostofDefensiveMedicine.Available:
http://www.aaos.org/news/aaosnow/nov08/managing7.asp
[October21,2010]
15
Seefootnote10.
16
Thomas,J.W.,Ziller,E.C.,andThayer,D.A.(2010,September).LowCostsofDefensiveMedicine,Small
SavingsFromTortReform.HealthAffairs29(9):15781584.
13
Aspartoftheir2010studyofthecostsofthemedicalliabilitysystem,Melloandcolleagues
alsoattemptedtoestimatethecostofdefensivemedicine.RelyingontheKesslerstudy
andothers,theypeggedannualdefensivemedicinecostsforhospitalsandphysiciansat
$45.49billion—orabout1.97%oftotal
healthcarecosts.Theywarned,however,that
“Althoughourfigurewasbasedonmethodologicallystrongstudies,becausethehospital
spendingestimateswerederivedfromanarrowrangeofdiagnoses,thequalityofevidence
supportingoursystemwideestimateisbestcharacterizedaslow.”
17

D.MedicalLiabilityPremiumsinOregon
Medicalliabilitypremiumlevelsaresetbyinsurers.Ratesdiffergreatlybyprovider
specialty.WeexaminedpremiumtrendandOregonpremiumscomparedwithpremiumsin
neighboringstates.
TheMedicalLiabilityMonitorreportspremiumratesformajorcarriersbystateforthree
specialties—internalmedicine,obstetricsandgynecology,andgeneralsurgery.Comparing
averageratesforthesespecialtiesinOregon,Washington,andCaliforniashowspremiums
havebeenlowerinOregonthaninneighboringstatesforeveryyearofthelasttwodecades
withtheexceptionofthreeyears,whenaverageOregonratesforobstetricsandgynecology
exceededCaliforniarates,andoneyear,whenaverageOregonratesforgeneralsurgery
werethesameasCalifornia’s.Toillustrate,seethechartbelow.Foradditionalchartsand
anexplanationoftheMonitor’sreporting,seeAppendix2.
Internal Medicine
Average Premium Rates (CA, OR & WA)
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2
006
2
008
2010
Year
Average Premium Rate ($)
CA
OR
WA
AlthoughOregonmedicalliabilitypremiumratesarelowrelativetoratesinneighboring
states,premiumratestendtobevolatile,reflectingwhatisknownastheinsurancecycle.
Thisvolatilitymakesitdifficultforphysicianstopredicttheircosts.During“soft”phasesof
17
Seefootnote9.
14
thecycle,insurerskeeppremiumslowinanefforttobuildmarketshare.During“hard”
phasesofthecycle,premiumsriseasinsurersprotecttheirprofitability,oftenduring
periodswhereinvestmentreturnsarelow.
18
Oregoniscurrentlyinthesoftphaseofthe
cycle.Somenationalcommentatorsarepredictingincreasesinclaimsfrequencyandcosts,
however,whichcouldpresageareturntothehardphaseofthecycle.
AccordingtotheDepartmentofConsumerandBusinessServices,Oregon’sinsurance
regulator,Oregon’stwodominantmedical
liabilitycarriers,representing57%ofthe
professionalliabilitymarketinOregon,havedroppedtheirpremiumsanaverageof20%
overthepastfiveyears.
19
ThechartbelowistakenfromaDCBSpressrelease:
MedicalLiabilityPremiumRateTrendsinOregon
Year NPIC/Doctors Company* CNA
2006‐8.3% +1.9%
2007‐10.2%‐3.2%
2008‐8.9%‐7.6%
2009 0%‐2.5%
2010‐5.1% 0%
Duringthelasthardphaseofthecycle,OregonphysiciansdeliveringbabiesinruralOregon
reportedsoaringpremiums.Thelegislaturerespondedbycreatingamalpracticepremium
subsidyprogramforruralphysiciansin2003.Theprogramisscheduledtoexpirein2011.
Formoredetailabouttheprogram,seeAppendix3.
IV. ReformConceptsSelectedforConsideration
TheTaskForceprioritizedthreereformconceptsforconsideration.Theyweredisclosure
andofferprograms;evidencebasedguidelinesafeharbors;andhealthcourts.These
conceptsarediscussedindetailbelow.
TheTaskForcechosenottolookforwaystoreduceindemnitypayments(that
is,payments
toinjuredpatients)foratleastthreereasons:Firstandmostimportantly,noneconomic
damagecaps—althoughfavoredbysomegroupsnationally‐‐cannotbeimposedinOregon
withoutaconstitutionalchangethatthestate’svotershaverejectedtwice.Therefore,all
membersoftheTaskForceagreedthatpursuingacaps
strategywouldnotbefruitful.
Second,whilesomeTaskForcemembersaremorecomfortablethanotherswithwhogets
compensatedandhowmuchintoday’sliabilityenvironment,mostmembersofthegroup
18
Mello,M.M.(2006,January).UnderstandingMalpracticeInsurance:APrimer.RobertWoodJohnson
Foundation.Available:www.rwjf.org/pr/synthesis/reports_and_briefs/pdf/no10_primer.pdf
[2010,October
14]
19
OregonDepartmentofConsumer&BusinessServices(2010,April15).Pressrelease:Oregonmedical
malpracticeratescontinuetodecrease.Available:
http://egov.oregon.gov/DCBS/docs/news_releases/2010/nr_ins_04_15_10.pdf
[2010,October14]
15
donotbelievethetotalamountofmoneyspenttocompensatevictimsofmedical
negligenceisexcessive.Mostbelievethatmorepeopleshouldbecompensated.Third,
somephysicianmembersoftheTaskForcenotedthatwhilethevolatilityofmedicalliability
premiumsistroublesomeforhealthcareprofessionals,mosthave
beenabletomanagethe
currentpremiumlevels.AccordingtotheDepartmentofConsumerandBusinessServices,
mostphysiciansandsurgeonsinOregonhaveseendeclinesornochangeinmedical
professionalliabilityinsuranceratesforthelastfouryears.
20

TheTaskForcealsochosenottoaddresstheimminentexpirationofOr egon’spremium
subsidyprogramforruralphysicians.Theissueisbeingstudiedbyalegislativecommittee.
RatherthanattemptingtoweighinonasubjecttheTaskForcehasnotthoroughlystudied,
theTaskForcechosetodefertothatcommittee.
ThefollowingsectionsofthereportsummarizetheTaskForce’srecommendations,the
thinkingbehindthem,anddifferencesofopinionamongmembersoftheTaskForce.
Recommendationsareshowninboldfacetype.
V. RecommendationstoSupportandEncourage“DisclosureandOffer”Programs
A.DiscussionofDisclosureand“DisclosureandOfferPrograms”
Healthcareprovidersaretrainedtotellpatientsaboutunanticipatedoutcomesthatoccur
inthecourseoftheirmedicalcare.Thatmeanstheyshouldexplaineventsthatcausetheir
patientsharm—includingthetreatingprofessionals’understandingaboutthecauseofthe
event:Wasitoccasionedbyprogressionoftheunderlyingdiseaseprocessorbythe
treatmentitself?Ifbymedicaltreatment,wasitananticipatedriskoftreatment—thatis,
somethingthatisexpectedtohappeninsomebutnotallcases?Orwasitaresultofa
defectinthecarethatwasprovided?Couldithavebeen
prevented?
Nevertheless,historically,medicalculturecoupledwithproviderfearofmedicalliability
lawsuitshasmeantthatmostprovidershavebeenreluctanttodiscusstheseissuesopenly
withpatients.Thiscultureofnondisclosurehasbeenreinforcedbyliabilityinsurers,some
ofwhosepersonnelinstructproviderstheyinsurenottodiscussadverseeventswith
patientsorothers.
Thereisincreasinginterest,however,infosteringdisclosurebecauseitisconsistentwitha
transparent,patientcenteredapproachtohealthcare.Disclosureisusefulwhetherornotit
isrequired.Itfacilitatespatientparticipationindecisionmakingabouttheircareand
enablesinformedconsent.Inaddition,organizationswithaculturethatfostersdiscussion
ofmishapsarebetterpositionedtoexplorethecausesofpatientinjuriesandprevent
avoidablerecurrences.
20
Ibid.
16
Disclosuremaybeagoodbusinesspracticeaswell:Researchsuggeststhatdisclosureof
errorstopatientsmayreduceratherthanincreasetheincidenceoflawsuits;and,when
disclosureiscoupledwithearlyoffersofcompensation,itmayreducelitigationcostsand
thesizeofindemnitypayments.AnarticlepublishedintheSeptemberissueofAnnalsof
InternalMedicineexaminedtheexperienceoftheUniversityofMichiganHealthSystems,
findingthatthenumberofclaimsresultinginlawsuits,thecostofcompensation,andtotal
programcostsdeclinedsignificantlyafteradoptionofadisclosureandofferprogram.
21

Finally,disclosureofsomeadverseeventsisrequiredbyagenciesliketheJointCommission,
whichaccreditshospitals,andtheOregonPatientSafetyCommission,whichoperatesa
voluntaryerrorreportingprogramforhealthcarefacilities.
22

TheTaskForceconcludesthatprovidersandfacilitiesshouldbeencouragedtodisclose
adversetreatmenteventsanddiscussthemopenlywithpatients.Theyshouldfurtherbe
encouragedtoofferfaircompensationassoonaspossibletopatientswhohaveclearly
beeninjuredduetomedicalnegligence.Whenpatientsareasked
togiveuptheirrightto
sueinexchangeforanofferofcompensation,providersshouldencouragepatientsto
consultalawyertoassisttheminnegotiatingafairagreement.This“disclosureandoffer”
approachhasbeenadoptedbysomeselfinsuredhospitalsandintegratedhealthsystemsin
Oregon.Providersand
facilitiesthatdonotselfinsure,however,willneedthecooperation
oftheirinsurerstoadoptthisapproach.
Statepolicymakersshouldremoveobstaclestodisclosureandconsiderrequiringitinsome
circumstances.Thechoicetomakeearlyoffersofcompensationwillnecessarilyremain
withindividualselfinsuredentitiesandinsurers.
21
Kachalia,A.,Kaufman,S.R.,Boothman,R.,Anderson,S.,Welch,K.,Saint,S.,&Rogers,M.A.M.(2010,August
17).LiabilityClaimsandCostsBeforeandAfterImplementationofaMedicalErrorDisclosureProgram.
AnnalsofInternalMedicine.153(4):213221.Kraman,S.S.,&Hamm,G.(1999,December21).Risk
Management:ExtremeHonesty
MayBetheBestPolicy.AnnalsofInternalMedicine.131(12):963967.
22
JointCommissionaccreditingstandardsprovidethathospitalsmustinformpatientsof“unanticipated
outcomesofcare,treatment,andservicesthatrelatetosentineleventsconsideredreviewablebythe
Commission.”Licensedpractitionersresponsibleformanagingapatient’scare(ortheirdesignee)must
inform“thepatientaboutunanticipatedoutcomesofcare,treatment,and
servicesrelatedtosentinel
eventswhenthepatientisnotalreadyawareoftheoccurrenceorwhenfurtherdiscussionisneeded.”
JointCommissionStandard:RI.01.02.0121.Oregonstatuteprovidesthat“Afteraseriousadverseevent
occurs,aparticipant[inthePatientSafetyCommission’sreportingprogram]mustprovidewritten
notificationina
timelymannertoeachpatientservedbytheparticipantwhoisaffectedbytheevent.
Noticeprovidedunderthissubsectionmaynotbeconstruedasanadmissionofliabilityinacivilaction.”
ORS442.837(4).
17
B.SpecificRecommendationstoRemoveBarrierstoDisclosure
TheTaskForceconsideredthreepolicyconceptsforincreasingdisclosuretopatientsand
therebyfacilitatingearlyresolutionofmalpracticeclaims.Eachwouldbuildonthe
“apology”lawenactedin2003.Thatlawprovidesthatexpressionsofregretorapology
madebyphysiciansorothersontheirbehalfcannotbeusedtoestablishliabilityina
negligencelawsuitagainstaphysician.
23
Theapologystatute,whileuseful,hasprovedinsufficienttoeliminateliabilitysystem
barrierstodisclosure.Somephysiciansreportthatmalpracticeinsurerscontinuetoinstruct
physiciansnottodiscusseventsthatcouldleadtolawsuits.Thesephysiciansfearthatif
theydiscloseerrorstheywillbeguiltyof“noncooperation”andtheirinsurersmaybe
entitledtorefusetodefendthemincourt.
Toremoveinsuranceconcerns asabarriertofulldisclosure,thelegislatureshouldenacta
statuteexplicitlyprovidingthatahealthcarefacilityorprovider’sdutytocooperatewith
aninsurerdoesnotprecludedisclosureofanadverseeventor
thereasonsunderlyingit
toapatientorthepatient’sfamilyandthatsuchdisclosuremaynotbethegroundsfor
refusaltodefendorforcancellationornonrenewalofcoverage.(Forlanguagethatcould
beused,seeAppendix4.)
Thelegislatureshouldalsoconsideramendingthe“apology”lawto
expresslyprotect
facilitiesaswellasphysiciansandtomoreclearlydescribewhatstatementsmadetoa
patientareinadmissibleexpressionsof“regretorapology”.
24

TheTaskForcebelievesthelegislatureshouldalsoconsiderrequiringprofessionalsand
facilitiestodisclosetopatientsadverseeventsoccurringasaconsequenceoftheir
treatmentandtoprovideexplanationsforthem.
25
Ifamandatorydisclosurelawwere
23
Thelawreads:
ORS677.082(1)ForthepurposesofanycivilactionagainstapersonlicensedbytheOregonMedical
Board,anyexpressionofregretorapologymadebyoronbehalfoftheperson,includinganexpressionof
regretorapologythatismadeinwriting,orallyor
byconduct,doesnotconstituteanadmissionofliability
foranypurpose.
(2)ApersonwhoislicensedbytheOregonMedicalBoard,oranyotherpersonwhomakesan
expressionofregretorapologyonbehalfofapersonwhoislicensedbytheOregonMedicalBoard,may
not
beexaminedbydepositionorotherwiseinanyciviloradministrativeproceeding,includingany
arbitrationormediationproceeding,withrespecttoanexpressionofregretorapologymadebyoron
behalfoftheperson,includingexpressionsofregretorapologythataremadeinwriting,orallyorby
conduct.
24
ThegeneralconceptofofferingbroadprotectionappearsinMastroianni,A.C.,Mello,M.M,Sommer,S.,
Hardy,M.,&Gallagher,T.H.(2010,September).TheFlawsinState‘Apology’and‘Disclosure’LawsDilute
TheirIntendedImpactonMalpracticeSuits.HealthAffairs.29(9):16111619.
25
Onememberexpressedtheview,however,thatmandatorydisclosureshouldnotbeconsideredbecause
thevoluntaryreportinganddisclosurelawisworkingwellnow.
18
enacted,Oregonwouldjoinsevenotherstates—amongthemCalifornia,Florida,Nevada,
NewJersey,Pennsylvania,andVermont.
26

Atpresent,OregonfacilitiesthatchoosetoparticipateintheOregonPatientSafety
Commission’serrorreportingprogramarerequiredtodisclosereportableadverseeventsto
thepatient.ORS442.837(4).Neitherhealthcarefacilitiesdecliningtoparticipateinthe
commission’svoluntaryprogramnorindividualhealthcareprofessionalshaveanylegal
obligation
tomakeanydisclosure.Moreover,thecommissionhasnotspelledoutwhatisto
beincludedinthedisclosure.
Finally,theTaskForcerecommendsthattheOregonPatientSafetyCommissionworkwith
healthcarefacilitiestoexperimentwithdisclosureprotocolsthatspecifytheelementsof
therequireddisclosuretopatients.
C.RecommendationsRelatingtoReportingLaws
MembersoftheTaskForcedebatedthevalueofstrengtheningOregon’sreporting
programsasastrategyforencouragingdisclosure.
Oregonlawpermitsbutdoesnotrequirehospitals,ambulatorysurgerycenters,longterm
carefacilities,outpatientrenaldialysisfacilities,freestandingbirthingcenters,and
pharmaciestoparticipateinthePatientSafetyCommission’sreportingprogram.Physician
practices—regardlessofsize—maynotparticipateintheprogram.
27

Moststatesnowrequirehealthcarefacilitiestoreportmedicalerrorstoapatientsafety
organizationwhichusesthedatatomeasuretheprevalenceandtypeoferrorsanddevelop
preventionstrategies.Moststatesmakethereportsconfidentialtoencouragecandor.
Somereportingprograms,likeOregon’svoluntaryprogram,requiretheerrortobe
disclosedtothepatientwhileprotectingthereportsthemselvesfromdisclosuretoeither
thepatientorthepublic.
ExpandingparticipationinOregon’sreportingprogrammightresultinincreaseddisclosure
becausethereportingprogramincludesarequirementthatfacilitiesnotifypatientsin
writingwhenaseriousadverseeventoccurs.
Nevertheless,adisclosurerequirementcould
beenactedindependentofthereportingprogram.Therefore,theTaskForcediscussed
whetheranexpandedreportingprogramwouldhaveanyvalueasatooltoencourage
disclosureapartfromtheprogram’snoticerequirement.
Thevaluesandobjectivessupportedbyreporting,disclosure,anddisclosureandoffer
programsaresummarizedinthetablebelow.(An“x”suggeststheprogramwillfurtherthe
valueorobjectivelistedintheleftcolumn.Thetabledoesnotreflectvariationinthe
26
Forasummaryofdisclosurelaws,seeAppendix5.
27
ORS 442.837.
19
degreetowhichaprogramfurthersaparticularobjective.Forexample,whiledisclosureby
itselfmayreducelitigationcost,savingsarepresumablygreaterifanofferandsettlement
occuraswell.)

Reporting Disclosure Disclosure/offer
Patientrightto
know
X X
Improvedaccessto
compensation
X X
Reducedlitigation
cost
X X
Supportforculture
ofsafety
X X X
Supportforcross
institutional
preventionefforts
X
SomemembersoftheTaskForcebelievethatreportingrequirementshavesupported
developmentofacultureofopennessaboutmedicalerrorsthatfostersdevelopmentof
disclosureprogramsinparticipatinginstitutions.Someofthemareopentothepossibility
thatmandatoryreportinglawswouldincreasethepracticeofdisclosurethattheTaskForce
supports.
Othersmembersarereluctanttoviewreportinglawsastoolsforencouragingdisclosure.
Manyofthemopposeexpansionofreportingrequirementseitherbymakingreporting
mandatoryoropeningtheexistingvoluntaryprogramtoparticipationbyadditional
providers.
TheTaskForcerecommendsthatthelegislatureconsiderexpandingOregon’s
voluntary
reportingprogramtopermitphysicianpracticestoparticipate,recognizingthatthiswould
involvedevelopingapproachestoreportingthatfitthisnewsiteofcareanddealingwith
alargenumberofseparateentities.Itwouldalsobeamajorworkloadincreaseforthe
Commission.Twomembersexpressedreservations,althoughfordifferingreasons.
28
D.Othermeasurestoencouragedisclosure
Somenationallyrecognizedadvocatesforearlydisclosureandofferprogramshave
suggestedthatstatesofferstatefundedfinancialincentivestofacilitiesadoptingthe
programs.Somesuggestcreatingstatereinsuranceorexcessliabilityfundsforproviders
24
Severalmembersofthetaskforcebelievethatchangesinthereportinglawshouldnotbeconsidered.One
believesachangewouldbeunwise,theotherthatitisbeyondthescopeofthetaskforce’scharge.

20
andfacilitiesthatimplementmodelearlydisclosureandofferprograms.
29
Suchafund
wouldbedesignedtoprotectfacilitiesfromtheriskthatdisclosingmoreerrorswould
increasetheirmedicalliabilitycosts.TheTaskForcedoesnotrecommendpursuingthis
option,primarilybecausecreatinganewsourceofpaymentforclaimswouldnotseemto
furtherthepriorityobjectivesadoptedasaframeworkfortheTaskForce’swork.In
addition,theevidencetodatesuggeststhatdisclosureandofferprogramsmaymake
businesssenseandexpenditureofpublicdollarsmaynotbeneededtoencouragethem.
VI.EvidenceBasedGuidelineSafeHarborApproach
Oregonhealthcareleadersandpolicymakershavealonghistoryofcommitmentto
evidencebasedapproachestohealthcarepolicymaking.Thishasincludeduseof
evidencebasedpracticeguidelinestoimpr ovethequal ityofcareandreduce costsinthe
healthcaredeliverysy ste m.ThelegislaturehasinstructedtheHealth Re sources
Commission,Oreg on’ smedicaltechnologya ssessmen tentity,todevelopevidencebased
guidelinesfor usebyproviders,consumers,andpurchasersinOregonanddirectedthe
healthauthoritytouse theguidelinesinpurchasing forcareinallofthe programsit
manages.Webelievethatincreaseduseof evidencebasedclinicalpracticeguideline s
andproce ssstandardsbyprovidersmayim provequalityandreduceme dical errors.
OregonhasbeenawardedanAgencyforHealthcareResearchandQualityplanninggrantto
exploreevidencebasedguidelinesasasafeharbor.Thegrantsupportsdevelopmentofa
proposalforaspecificmedicalliabilityreformthatisdesignedtoimprovepatientsafety.
Overthecourseofthenextyear,theOfficeforOregonHealthPolicyandResearchwith
assistancefromthePatientSafetyCommissionandtheCenterforEvidencebasedPolicyat
OregonHealth&SciencesUniversitywillleadtheplanningprocess.
Thepurposeoftheplanninggrantisto
craftabroadlysupportedlegislativeproposalthat
willencourageuseofguidelinesbyofferingasafeharborfrommedicalliabilitywhenthey
actinrelianceonstateendorsedevidencebasedguidelines.Theprojectwillexplorea
methodforadoptingguidelinestoaddresstheclinicalsituationsthatresultinsignificant
numbersof
patientinjuriesormedicalliabilityclaims.Theprojectwillalsoexplorelinking
thelegalstandardofcaretocompliancewiththeguidelinesto:
providephysicianswithgreaterclarityaboutthestandardofcareexpectedofthem
andassurethemthat,iftheyadheretotheguidelines,theywillnotbefoundliable
forharmresultingfromfailuretodosomethingthatisinconsistentwiththe
guidelines,
givepatientsgreaterprotectionfromsubstandardcare,and
29
Winter,A.(2010,April1).TheMedicalMalpracticeSystem:AReviewoftheEvidence.Presentationtothe
MedicarePaymentAdvisoryCommission.Available:
http://www.medpac.gov/transcripts/medical%20malpractice%20April%202010_public.pdf
[2010,October
14].ConversationbetweentheMedicalLiabilityTaskForceandAllenKachalia,MD,HarvardSchoolofPublic
Health(2010,September8).
21
reducethefrequencyofmedicalliabilityclaims.
Toexplorethepotentialvalueofusingevidencebasedguidelinesasthelegalstandardof
care,theTaskForcerecommendsthatpolicymakerssupportthecompletionofthegrant
activity.
Asthegrantprojectmovesforward,theTaskForcerecommendsthatabroadly
representativesetofindividualsbeincludedintheplanningprocess.
TheTaskForcehasraisedsomespecificquestionsitexpectsthegrantteamtoaddress:
Aretherecollectionsofsimilaradverseeventsthatcouldbepreventedifasingle
evidencebasedguidelinewasconsistentlyfollowed?Havethoseadverseevents
historicallyresultedinsignificantmalpracticecost?
Wouldtreatingaguidelineasthestandardofcarebelikelytoincreasecompliance
withtheguideline?Reduceadverseevents?Reducelitigationcost?
Howandbywhomshouldguidelinesbeselectedforspecialstatusinthemedical
liabilitysystem?Basedonwhatcriteria?
Althoughguidelinescouldnotapplytoallsituationsorsupplantthetraditional
standardofcareinallinstances,couldsuchguidelinesestablishthestandardofcare
inspecificsituations?Ifso,wouldco mpliancewithsuchstandardsinsulatea
physicianfromliabilityormerelybeevidenceofalackofnegligence?Conversely,
woulddeviationfromtheguidelineestablishliabilityormerelybeevidenceof
negligence?
Wouldguidelinesusedforsafeharborsneedtobeprotocolsinordertoplaytherole
ofsafeharborinthelegalsystem?
Howcanitbeassuredthattheguidelineswillremainuptodateandnotholdup
desirableinnovation?
VII.AnAdministrativeSystemforCompensatingPatientInjuries
A.Background
InOregonandaroundthecountry,criticsofthemedicalliabilitysystemareproposingto
replacethetortsystemforcompensatingvictimsofmedicalnegligenceandthemedical
liabilityinsurance
systemwithwhatsomecall“healthcourts.”Most“healthcourts”
proposalswouldcreateanadministrativesystemforcompensatinginjuriestopatientsfrom
someorallunanticipatedadverseoutcomesofmedicalcare—notjustmedicalnegligence.
TheTaskForcestudiedtheargumentsofferedbybothproponentsandopponentsofhealth
courtsproposals.
22
TheTaskForcerejectedtheconceptofcreatinganewcourtsystembutbelievestheremay
bevalueindevelopinganadministrativesystemforcompensatingpatientinjuries.Some
believethatthechangesinournation’shealthcareinsurancesystemoccasionedby
passageofthePatientProtectionandAccountableCareAct
canbeleveragedtoimprove
theliabilitysystemandreducecosts.
Proponentsofhealthcourtsbelieveimplementinganadministrativesystemislikelyto
significantlyimprovethecollectionofdataonunanticipatedadverseoutcomesthereby
supportingsafetyimprovementprograms;fosterdevelopmentofconsensusaroundbest
practicesforavoidingpatientinjury;increase
thenumberofindividualscompensatedby
loweringthebarforrecoverytosomethinglessthannegligence;reducethelegalcosts
incurredbypatientstoestablishtheirclaims;resultinspeedierresolutionofclaims;
producemoreconsistentdecisionsandawards;reduceadministrativecosts,including
defensecosts;andreduceoverutilizationofmedicalproceduresdrivenbythepracticeof
defensivemedicine.
30

Commentatorscriticalofhealthcourtssharetheproponents’desiretoimprovepatient
safetyprograms,improveaccesstocompensationforvictimsofmedicalerrors,andreduce
collateralcosts,includinginsurancerelatedcostsandthecostsofdefensivemedicine;but
theydoubtthatanadministrativecompensationsystemwillresultinthehopedfor
improvements.Theybelievethatestimatesofdefensivemedicinearegreatlyexaggerated.
Theypointoutthatbothdeeplyrootedmedicalcultureandpowerfulfeeforservice
paymentincentivesdriveoverutilizationofmedicalprocedures,confoundingeffortsto
measuretheeffectoffearoflawsuitsonutilization.Inaddition,theyareconcernedthat
administrativedecisionmakersmaydisplayprophysicianbiasandthatbenefitsavailablein
anadministrativesystemmaybeinadequate.
31

TaskForcemembers,forthemostpart,areneitherproponentsnoropponentsofreplacing
thetortsystemwithanadministrativecompensationsystem.Theyarepersuaded,
however,thatthemagnitudeofthebenefitsenvisionedbyadvocatesforreplacingthe
existingsystemaregreatandwarrantgivingtheconceptahardlook.
Theyalsobelievethat
theanticipatedbenefitsarenotcertaintomaterialize.Thedesignissuesaremanyand
complexandthepotentialpitfallsareserious.
Thevalueofreplacingtheexistingliabilitysystemisprobablynotsomethingthatcanbe
testedthroughpilotprojectsbecauseitinvolvesestablishinganewandelaboratedecision
makinginfrastructureandidentifyingnewsourcesofrevenuetofundtheprogram.
30
Mello,M.M.,&Kachalia,A.(2010,April).EvaluationofOptionsforMedicalMalpracticeSystemReform.
Medpac.Available:www.medpac.gov/documents/Apr10_MedicalMalpractice_CONTRACTOR.pdf
[2010,
October14].CommonGood.(2006).WindowsofOpportunity.Available:
http://commongood.org/assets/attachments/Windows_of_opportunity_web.pdf
[2010,October14]
31
PetersJr.,P.G.HealthCourts?BostonUniversityLawReview88:227286(2008)Available:
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/author/BostonUniversityLawReview
[2010,October27]
23
Additionally,experiencewithFlorida’sbirthinjurycompensationsystemsuggeststhat,ina
voluntarysystem,thosewhocannotestablishfaultwillelectanadministrativeremedy.
However,thosewhohavesufferedinjuriestheybelievemaystemfromnegligencemay
electthetortremedy,therebyunderminingthefinancialsustainabilityoftheprogram.
Finally,manymembersoftheTaskForcebelievethatthechangesinphysicianculture
necessarytosupportgreatincreasesinerrordisclosureandreductionindefensivemedicine
areunlikelytooccurinavoluntarysystem.Unlessfurtherstudysuggeststhatapilot
programwouldbeworkableandproductive,itappearsthat
replacingthemedicalliability
systemwithanadministrativesystemtocompensatepatientinjurieswillworkonlyifit
appliestoallpatientsstatewide.
B.Recommendation
TheTaskForce,withonememberindissent,concludesthatitwouldbeworthwhilefor
theLegislatureortheOregonHealthAuthoritytosponsora
studytodeterminewhether
ornotanadministrativesystemcouldbedesignedthatwouldachievethereform
objectivestheTaskForcehasenunciatedandifso,whetherimplementationisfinancially,
legally,andpoliticallyfeasible.
32

Thestudyshouldbeoverseenbyanunbiasedentitythathasnottakenapositionforor
againstthehealthcourtsconcept.Itshouldbeconductedbyawellqualifiedteamwith
knowledgeoftheexistingmedicalliabilitysystem,knowledgeofadministrative
compensationsystemsintheUnitedStatesandelsewhere,skillineconomicandsocial
researchandmodeling,legalandactuarialexpertise,andfundingsufficienttodoa
thoroughjob.
C.Scopeoftherecommendedstudy
Theprimarycomponentofthestudyshouldassumethatanadministrativecompensation
systemwouldincludethefollowingbasicfeaturesandbeimplementedstatewide:
Compensableeventswouldembraceadefinedclassofpatientinjuriesbroader
thantheclassofinjuriescausedbymedicalnegligence.Whileitmaybeunlikely
thatapure“nofault”systemiseconomicallyfeasible,a“lowfault”threshold
couldmakemorepeopleeligibleforbenefits.Compensableeventsmightinclude
averybroadclassofeventsarisingoutofencounterswithmedicalprofessionals
orfacilitiessuchas“treatmentinjuries”(asinNewZealand),“undesired”or
“unexpected”outcomes,”or“avoidable”injuries(asinSweden).
33
32
OnememberoftheTaskForcedissentsfromthisrecommendation.Hebelievesthattheeliminationofthe
jurysystemforadjudicatingclaimsofmedicalnegligenceshouldnotbeconsidered— nomatterwhatthe
tradeoffs.
33
OnememberoftheTaskForcesuggeststhatinsteadofchangingthedefinitionoftheharmorwrongfor
whichtheadministrativesystemprovidesaremedy,themedicalnegligencestandardcouldberetained
whilereducingtheburdenofprooffromthe“preponderanceoftheevidence”tosomethinglesssuchas
24
Thesystemwouldcompensatevictimsforbotheconomicdamagesandnon
economicdamagescausedbytheinjury.
Theadministrativesystemwouldbetheexclusiveremedyforeventsthatare
compensableundertheadministrativescheme.Individualsinjuredasaresultof
medicalnegligencecouldnolongerbringasuitfornegligenceincourt.
Thestudyshouldalsoexaminewhetheravoluntaryprogramcanbedesignedthatallows
individualstooptintooroutofanadministrativeadjudicationsystemwhileachievingthe
systemchangeobjectivesoftheproposalandmanagingcosts.
Ahostofsystemdesignissueswouldneedtobeconsideredinboththeprimarystudyand
considerationofvoluntaryprogramoptions.(Foralistofsomeofthedesignissuesthat
shouldbestudied,seeAppendix6.)
Thestudyshouldaddress,firstandforemost,theimpactofeachdesignchoiceonthevalue
oftheadministrativesystemforachievingthegoalsforsystemimprovementandthekey
questionsidentifiedbytheTaskForceattheoutsetofitsworkandwhetherthecostofsuch
asystemissustainable.
D.Timingofthestudy
Foryears,Oregonianshavediscussedthemeritsanddemeritsofthemedicalliabilitysystem
inthecontextofproposedlegislationandproposedballotmeasurestochangethesystem.
Itiscriticallyimportanttogroundthisdiscussioninfact.Aprofessionalstudyofthe
feasibilityofestablishinganadministrativecompensationsystemandtheeffectivenessof
suchasystemascomparedwiththeexistingoneforimprovingpatientsafety,improving
accesstocompensationforinjuredpatients,andreducingcollateralcostsofthemedical
liabilitysystemwillbechallengingbut,ifwelldone,itwillservethestatewell.Thestudy
shouldbefundedassoonaspossible—eitherbytheLegislatureorbyotherpartieswhose
funding
wouldnotbiastheproject.
VIII. Conclusion
“substantialevidence.”Note,however,thattheburdenofproofapplicabletolawsuitsfornegligenceis
thesame“preponderanceoftheevidence”standardthatisgenerallyemployedbyfindersoffactin
Oregon’sadministrativeagencies;the“substantialevidence”standardisusedbyreviewingcourtsto
determinewhetherornottheevidenceis
sufficienttosustainthedecisionofanadministrativefinderof
fact.SeeArmstrongv.AstenHillCo.,90OrApp200(1988)(definingsubstantialevidence)andGallantv.
BoardofMedicalExaminers,159OrApp175(1999)(discussingtheconceptsofburdenofproofand
standardofreview).
25
TheTaskForceappreciatestheopportunitytostudythisissue.Therecommendationsare
designedtofurtherthegoalsofimprovingpatientsafety,improvingthesystemfor
compensatinginjuriessustainedasaresultofmedicalerrors,andreducinginsurance
administration,litigation,anddefensivemedicinecostsassociatedwiththemedicalliability
system.
TheTaskForcehopesthattheefforttoachievethesegoalswillcontinuebyadoptionof
theserecommendations,includingthedevelopmentoflegislativeproposalsrelatingto
disclosure,fullexplorationoftheevidencebasedguidelinesafeharborconcept,and
commissioningofastudyofthedesignandfeasibilityofanadministrativesubstituteforthe
medicalliabilitysystem.
26
Appendix1.LiabilityCostTrends
Thecostofindemnitypaymentsisafunctionofthefrequencyofclaimsandaverage
paymentamounts.InOregon,thefrequency ofclaimsfiledagainstphysiciansincourtthat
havebeenreportedtotheOregonMedicalBoardhasbeensomewhatvolatileinthelast
fewyears;onbalance,however,althoughOregon’spopulationhasgrown,therehasbeen
noapparentupwardtrend.(Seechartbelow.)
Frequency of Reported Claims Against Physicians
2002-2009
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Number of Claims
Total Number of Claims
Reported
# of Claims with Court
Proceedings
# of Claims without Court
Proceedings
Source: Oregon Medical Board data, 2002-2009.
Note: In 2007, changes were made in recording requirements. Starting July 17,
2007, only claims with lawsuits were required to be reported.
ThenumberofpaidclaimsagainstprofessionalsreportedtotheNationalPractitionerData
Banksurgedin2008;butuntildataisinfor2009and2010,longtermtrendswillnotbe
clear.(Seechartbelow)
Oregon Professional Liability Claims Paid
2004-2008
150
160
170
180
190
200
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year
Number of claims paid
Source: National Practitioner Data Bank.
27
Thetrendisnotclearwithrespecttodollaramountofpayments.Inareportissuedin
February2008,theOregonMedicalAssociationandCNAHealthProreportedthatthe
averageindemnityamountpaidinphysicianclaimsdeclinedmorethan7.5percentfrom
July1,1999October10,2005toOctober11,2005October10,2007.Thereissome
indicationintheOregonMedicalBoarddata,however,thattotalpaymentsmadeincases
filedincourtagainstphysicians(andothers)isrising.Seechartbelow.
Total Indemnity Paid on Behalf of All Defendants in
Lawsuits Against Physicians 2002-2009
$0
$20,000,000
$40,000,000
$60,000,000
$80,000,000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Payment
Source: Oregon Medical Board Malpractice Report Dataset.
28
Appendix2.TrendsinPhysicianPremiumsforMedicalLiabilityInsurance
MedicalliabilitypremiumsforthethreephysicianspecialtiesarereportedintheMedical
LiabilityMonitor,thepreeminentindustrypublication.OHPRstaffaveragedthereported
premiumratesforeachstatebyyearandpreparedthegraphsbelow.
General Surgery
Average Premium Rates (CA, OR & WA)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2
006
2
008
2010
Year
Average Premium Rate ($)
CA
OR
WA
OB/Gyn Average Premium Rates (CA, OR & WA)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2
006
2
008
2010
Year
Average Premium Rate
CA
OR
WA
Notes:TheMedicalLiabilityMonitorsurveysmajorwritersofprofessionalliability
insuranceforphysicianseachyear.Thesurveyincludesmanualratesforspecificmature
claimsmadespecialtieswithlimitsof$1million/$3million(themostcommonlimits).The
Monitorreportsonthreespecialtiesonlytoreflectthewiderangeof
ratescharged:internal
medicine,generalsurgeryandobstetrics/gynecology.Theratesarethereportedrates
unlessotherwisenotedandshouldnotbeinterpretedastheactualpremiumsanindividual
29
physicianpaysforcoverage.Theydonotreflectcredits,debitsdividendsorotherfactors
thatmayreduceorincreasepremiums.Ratesreportedalsodonotincludeother
underwritingfactorsthatcanincreasepremiums.Itisestimatedthatthesurveyrepresents
companiesthatcomprise65to75percentofthemarket
nationally.
30
Appendix3.TestimonyConcerningtheMedicalLiabilityPremiumSubsidyProgram
Beforethe
SenateandHouseInterimCommitteesonJudiciary
May24,2010
Testimonyof
CoryStresinger,Director
DepartmentofConsumerBusinessServices
MynameisCoryStresinger.IamtheDirectoroftheDepartmentofConsumerandBusiness
Services.IamheretodaytoupdatetheCommitteesontheprogramthatsubsidizesmedical
professionalliabilityinsurancecostsforruraldoctors.
TheprogrambeganwithenactmentofHouseBill3630in2003.Thegoalofthe
programwastoassistinattractingandretainingdoctorsinruralOregon,andparticularly
doctorswhoprovideobstetricservices.Thelegislationwastheresultofescalatingconcern
abouttheavailabilityandaffordabilityofmedicalprofessionalliabilityinsurance,
particularlyforruraldoctorswhoprovideobstetricservices.
HouseBill3630directedtheStateAccidentInsuranceFundCorporation(SAIF)to
establishareinsuranceprogramformedicalprofessionalliabilityinsurancepoliciesissued
toruraldoctors.Theprogramwassuccessfulinprovidingmedicalliabilityinsurancerate
relieftoruraldoctors,andin2007,thelegislatureenactedSenateBill183toextendand
modifytheprogramforanadditionalfouryears,through2011,butwithintheoriginal
fundinglimitsetin2003.
Inrecognitionoftheroleplayedbynursepractitionersinprovidingmedicalcarein
ruralOregon,theprogramwasexpandedtoincludesomenursepractitionerswhohavea
ruralpractice.Inaddition,thedefinitionofqualifying“rural”areawasmodifiedtoexclude
areasconsidered“urbanized”byU.S.Census
definitionssuchasAshland(exceptforthose
doctorsandnursepractitionerswhoprovideobstetriccare).Also,inordertobeeligiblefor
theprogram,doctorsandnursepractitionershadtobewillingtoserveMedicareand
Medicaidpatients.
Theprogramcontinuestoprioritizeobstetriccare,andthosewhopracticeobstetrics
continuetoreceivethehighestsubsidies80percentforobstetriciansandnurse
practitionerscertifiedforobstetriccareand60percentforfamilypractitionersorgeneral
practitionerswhosepracticeincludesobstetrics.Doctorsandnursepractitionersin
specifiedprimarycarefieldssuchaspediatricsandfamilypracticereceivesubsidiesupto40
percent,whilesubsidiesfordoctorsandnursepractitionersinnonprimarycarefields
declineoverthefouryearperiodfromnotmorethan35percentin2008,to25percentin
2009,andto15percentin2010and2011,basedonavailablefunds.
31
Attachedaretheexpendituresbyyearfortheprogram,aswellasdatashowingthe
totalnumberofmedicalprovidersparticipatingintheprogramsinceitsinceptionandthe
numberofprovidersparticipatingbycounty.Atotalofabout$29.1millionhasbeenspent
throughcalendaryear2009.Enrollment
during2009was881,consistingof827doctorsand
54nursepractitioners,andSAIFexpendedabout$3.7millionforcalendaryear2009.
Enrollmentforthefirstquarterof2010iscurrently753doctorsand48nursepractitioners.
Thenumberofdoctorsandnursepractitionersreceivingsubsidiesinagivenyearmay
not
equaltheenrollmentforthatyearforvariousreasons.Forexample,requestsforsubsidies
maynotoccurinthesamecalendaryearinwhichthesubsidywasprovided.
Thefundingfortheprogramcamefromcreditagainstworkers’compensation
assessmentspaidbySAIF.TheseassessmentsarecollectedfromOregonemployersfor
administrationofOregon’sworkerscompensationsystem.Underthelaw,theprogram
costswerecappedat$40million,basedonaonetimesurplusinthisworkers’
compensationaccount.However,thatsurplushaslongsincegoneandthisaccountisnota
sustainablesourceoffundingforthisprogram,althoughtherewillbesufficientfunds
availableforthelasttwoyears.
Theprogramcontinuestoprovidemedicalprofessionalliabilityinsuranceraterelief
forbothruraldoctorsandnursepractitioners.Itshouldbenotedthatthemedical
professionalliabilityinsurancemarkettendstobycyclical,andrateshavebeendecliningin
recentyears.RatesforOregon’stwolargestinsurershavegonedownanaverageof20
percentsince2006:
32
33
34
Appendix4.ProposedAdditiontoOregon’sInsuranceCode
(1)
(a) “Adverseevent”meansanegativeconsequenceofpatientcarethatis
unanticipated,isusuallypreventableandresultsinorpresentsasignificantriskof
patientinjury.
(b) “Claim”meansawrittendemandforrestitutionforaninjuryallegedtohavebeen
causedbythemedicalnegligenceofahealthpractitionerorlicensedhealthcare
facility.
(c) “Healthpractitioner”meansapersondescribedinORS31.740(1).
(2)Aninsurermaynotdeclineorrefusetodefendahealthpractitionerorahealthcare
facilityagainstaclaimarisingfromanadverseeventforanyreasonthatisbasedonthe
disclosuretothepatientorthepatient’sfamilybythehealthpractitionerorfacilityof
theadverseeventorinformationrelatingtothecauseoftheadverseevent.
35
Appendix5.StateMedicalErrorDisclosureLaws
State Oregon Pennsylvania
Covered
entities
hospitals, ASCs, dialysis centers, nursing
homes, and pharmacies (voluntary)
Hospitals, ASCs, and birth centers
(mandatory)
What must be
reported?
Serious adverse events specified by rule--
e.g., in the case of hospitals, "any
unanticipated, usually preventable
consequence of patient care that results in
patient death or serious physical injury,
including the events described in Appendix
A"
Serious events, incidents, and infrastructure
failures.
A serious event is "an event, occurrence or
situation involving the clinical care of a
patient…that results in death or
compromises patient safety and results in
an unanticipated injury requiring the
delivery of additional health care services to
the patient."
An incident--like a serious event--
compromises patient safety, but it does not
result in unanticipated injury or require the
delivery of additional health services.
An infrastructure failure is "an undesirable
or unintended event, occurrence or
situation involving the infrastructure of a
medical facility or the discontinuation or
significant disruption of a service which
could seriously compromise patient safety."
What must be
disclosed?
Reportable events [See reporting
requirement.]
Serious events [For definition see reporting
requirement.]
How? in writing In writing
When? in a timely way Within 7 days of the event
Who is
responsible?
the facility The facility is responsible for disclosure;
health care workers (includes facility
employees and physicians authorized to
practice in the facility) must report.
36
State New Jersey California Florida
Covered
entities
all health facilities including
outpatient clinics, labs, and
pharmacies
Hospitals (mandatory) Hospitals, ASCs, mobile
surgery facilities, and
licensed health care
practitioners (mandatory)
What must
be reported?
Serious preventable adverse
events.
A serious preventable
adverse events is "an event
that is a negative
consequence of care that
results in unintended injury
or illness" AND "could have
been anticipated and
prepared against, but occurs
because of an error or other
system failure" AND "results
in death or loss of a body
part, or disability of loss of
bodily function lasting more
than seven days or still
present at the time of
discharge from a health care
facility"
Adverse events (multipage
definition which tends
toward events resulting in
death or serious (but not
necessarily permanent)
disability.
"Adverse incidents that
result in serious harm to the
patient." Adverse incident
means "an event over which
health care personnel could
exercise control and which is
associated in whole or in
part with medical
intervention, rather than the
condition for which such
intervention occurred" AND
which had one of a laundry
list of rather serious
consequences.
What must
be
disclosed?
Serious preventable adverse
events and allergic
reactions. [For definition see
reporting requirement.]
OR
An adverse event defined as
"an event that is a negative
consequence of care that
results in unintended injury
or illness, which may or may
not have been preventable"
that involves an allergic
reaction.
Adverse events [For
definition see reporting
requirement.]
"Serious adverse incidents"
[Undefined, but see
definition of adverse incident
in reporting section.]
How? In person if patient in facility;
by telephone if patient is no
longer in the facility and a
face-to-face meeting cannot
be arranged; by certified
mail if facility cannot contact
the patient by phone.
Contents of the notification
must be documented in the
patient's medical record.
"inform" "inform"
When? No later than the end of the
episode of care
By the time the report is due
(within 5 days after the error
was detected)
"as soon as practicable"
Who is
responsible?
the facility The facility Facilities and licensed
providers
37
State Vermont Washington
Covered
entities
Hospitals (mandatory) Hospitals (mandatory)
What must
be reported?
"Adverse events" that by
rule must be reported.
(Rule adopts NQF list)
"Adverse event" is defined
as "any untoward incident,
therapeutic misadventure,
iatrogenic injury, or other
undesirable occurrence
directly associated with
care or services provided
by a health care provider or
health facility" ?
What must
be
disclosed?
"Adverse events" that
cause "death or serious
bodily injury."
Only requirement is for
hospital to have a policy in
place to assure that "when
appropriate, Information
about unanticipated
outcomes is provided"
How? "disclose" unspecified
When? unspecified unspecified
Who is
responsible? The hospital The hospital
38
Appendix6.RecommendedStudy.
Thefeasibilitystudyshouldaddressthefollowingdesignissues,amongothers.Itshould
identifyalternativedesignchoicesandevaluatetheirimpactonobjectivesidentifiedinthe
TaskForce’sframeworkformedicalliabilityreform:
Compensabilitystandard:Whatoptionsaretherefordefiningtheinjuriestobecovered
bythesystem?
Filingofclaims:Shouldclaimsbeconsideredonlyiffiledbytheinjuredpatientorher
representativeorfamily?Shouldprovidersberequiredtoaffirmativelyadvisethe
patientofanymedicaleventthatmeetsthethresholdforaclaimforbenefitsanddirect
hertotheagencythatprocessesclaimsasinothersystems?Shouldprovidersbe
requiredtofilesuchclaimsonbehalfoftheinjuredpatientasintheworkers
compensationsystem?
EconomicLosses:Whatlosseswillbereimbursed?
o MedicalCosts:Willcompensablelossesincludemedicalcostsastheydointhe
workers’compensationsystemorshouldallfinancialresponsibilityformedical
costsrelatedtotheinjurybebornebythehealthinsurerand/ortheinjured
patient?Ifmedicalcostsarecompensable,howwillresponsibilityforthose
costsbeapportionedanddetermined?Shouldresponsibilitybeapportionedin
theadministrativeproceeding,withthecollateralsourceruleabolished?Or
shoulditbetheresponsibilityofthefundtocollectfromahealthinsurerwithout
involvingtheinjuredpatient?
o Deathbenefits:Shoulddeathbenefitsbepayable?Istheworkerscompensation
systemagoodmodel?
o Lumpsumpaymentorongoingresponsibilityforlosses:Willlosses—suchas
predictedcostsofmedicalcare,nonmedicalcaresuchashomecareorskilled
nursingcare,andlostwages—bepaidinalumpsumorwilllossesbepaidbythe
administrativesystemonanongoingbasis?Ifonanongoingbasis,whowill
decidewhatneeds
arerelatedtotheinjuryanddeterminewhatservicesare
necessaryandwhatwillbepaidforthem?Willexpensesbereimbursedtothe
patientorpaiddirectlybythesystem?
NoneconomicLosses:Shouldnoneconomicdamagesbepaidaccordingtoaschedule?
Howwillschedulesbeestablishedandupdated?
Responsibility:Howwilltheadministrativesysteminterfacewiththetortsystemin
casesinwhichsomeoneotherthanaprofessionalorahealthcareinstitutionbearssome
responsibilityfortheinjury(e.g.,defectivemedicaldevice)?
39
Administration:Willtherestillbeinsurancecarriersthatacceptordenyandpayclaims?
Willtherebeasinglestatefundoutofwhichclaimsarepaid?
Financing:Whowillpayfortheadministrative/adjudicativeapparatus?Whowillpay
forthecostofclaims?
Attorneyfees:Howwillinjuredpatients’lawyersbepaid?(Bythesystem?Outofthe
injuredpatients’recovery?
Appeals:Whomayappealanadversedeterminationbytheadministrativeadjudicator?
Shouldtheappealbetakentothecourtofappealsinthesamemannerandreviewed
underthesamestandardasdecisionsincontestedcases?Whoshouldpaycostson
appeal?
I
Thestudyshouldaddressthespecificquestionslistedbelow:
PatientSafety
o Whatisthelikelyeffectofreplacingthemedicalliabilitysystemwithan
administrativecompensationsystemonpatientsafety?
o Willitcreatemoreorlessincentiveforhealthcareprovidersandfacilitiesto
investinpreventionofmedicalerrors?
o Willtheeffectonsafetyincentivesdependonhowthesystemisfinanced?
o Willtheproposedchangesupportthesafetyimprovementinfrastructuremore
orlesseffectively?
o Willsomeadministrativesystemdesignssupportpatientsafetyimprovement
moreeffectivelythanothers?
Accesstoandadequacyofpayment
o Whatisitslikelyeffectonaccesstoandamountsofcompensationforpatient
injury?
o Howwouldthechoiceofcompensabilitystandardandotherdesignchoices
affectnumbersofinjuredindividualscompensatedoramountsofrecovery?
o
Whowillsufferasaconsequenceofanypaymentreductions?
Relationshiptothehealthcaresystemandhealthinsurancecosts
o Howwillanadministrativeprogramaffecthealthinsurancecosts?
o Howwillitaffectthepracticeofdefensivemedicine?
Federalissues
o IsERISAimplicatedbyanadministrativeprogram?
o Howwouldfederalpayersinteractwithit?
o Wouldtheyhaveliensagainstrecoveries?
40
Stateconstitutionalissues(righttojurytrialandrighttoremedy)
o Cananadministrativeprogrambeimplementedtoreplacethetortsystem
withoutstatutoryorconstitutionalchanges?
o Ifnot,whatchangesarenecessary?
o Willsomesystemdesignspassconstitutionalmusterandothersnot?
Financialfeasibility
o Whataretheanticipatedtotalcostsoftheprogram?
o Howdothosecostscomparetothoseofthecurrentsystem?
Politicalfeasibility
o Arehealthcareprovidersandinstitutionsthatcurrentlytakedirectresponsibility
forpayingforthecurrentliabilitysystemintheformofpremiumswillingto
financethenewadministrativesystem?Ifnot,whois?
o Whocanbeexpectedtosupportoropposetheconcept?
34
34
Replacingthecurrentsystemwithanadministrativeonewouldbotheliminatejurytrialsandlimitdamages
totheextentthatcompensationisscheduledinsomeway.Althoughtheultimatereactionofanygroupto
theresultsofastudycannotbepredictedwithcertainty,itcanbeanticipatedthattrial
lawyerswho
representinjuredOregoniansandothergroupswhohaveopposedpreviouseffortstoimposecapson
damagesmayviewanadministrativesubstitutefortherighttoajurytrialfornegligenceasanassaulton
fundamentalrightsandvigorouslyopposeit.
41
Appendix7.MajorSourcesConsulted.
“AdjudicatingSevereBirthInjuryClaims,”AmericanJournalofLaw&Medicine,34,no.4,
2008,pages531533.
AlfonsoZaldivar,Ricardo.“LimitingMedicalLawsuitsCouldSave$41B,”SanFrancisco
Chronicle,10/1/09,http://sfchronicle.us/cgi
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