7
To the extent the Court decides only some, but not all, pending claims in its
forthcoming ruling, Florida Intervenors respectfully urge the Court to direct entry
of final judgment as to those specific claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b). Given the consequences of such a ruling and the strong public
interest in this case, “no just reason for delay” of entry of final judgment would
exist. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 1 (1980).
Dkt. 160 at 2 n.1. In response, this Court denied “that request as premature” while expressly stating
that the Court “will permit the State to renew its request after the parties have reviewed this
decision and have decided whether to seek a limited stay of the Court’s vacatur of the assumption
decision, and, if they seek a limited stay, the Court has decided how to proceed.” Dkt. 163 at 97.
4
On March 8, 2024, one day after Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the limited stay motion,
the Court set a “status conference” for April 4, 2024 for the parties to discuss “next steps” in the
litigation. Given the urgency of the situation, and because it is plain that Plaintiffs have been
afforded complete relief, Florida Intervenors now renew their request for entry of judgment. And
with the benefit of knowing the Court’s views by virtue of the February 15 ruling, Florida
Intervenors clarify that this Court should enter final judgment directly (as a matter of Rule 58(d)’s
separate document requirement) or, in the alternative, based on Rule 54(b). Both are clear avenues
to the same basic outcome: final judgment that is immediately appealable.
5
4
This Court’s directive for Florida Intervenors to await a ruling on a limited stay request before
seeking entry of judgment is, at least arguably, in tension with cases suggesting that such
motions should be filed within 30 days of the ruling in question. See, e.g., U.S. Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Krawatsky, 610 F. Supp. 3d 745, 749 (D. Md. 2022).
5
Plaintiffs sought an injunction to block two specific projects; instead of granting that
injunction, this Court vacated the entire program and then found the injunction motion “moot.”
Obviously, an order by this Court granting the injunction would have been immediately
appealable under § 1292(a), but this Court’s approach also makes that path less clear. That said,
Florida expressly reserves the right to also seek appeal via § 1292(a) if necessary as this Court’s
order clearly has the effect of an injunction in this context.
Case 1:21-cv-00119-RDM Document 171 Filed 03/11/24 Page 7 of 21