8 RICKS (DO NOT DELETE) 7/10/2016 6:59 PM
356 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:2
Nor is Roberts a voting trust case. In a voting trust, the legal ownership
of the shares for purposes of voting is turned over to a trustee, who takes
possession of the shares.
The Roberts parties did no such thing. Even if
they had, another case prior to Roberts had approved voting trusts in
general, albeit in dicta, condemning only voting trusts that attempted to
usurp the management authority of the board of directors.
But Whitson
and Roberts merely entered a voting agreement.
Discomfort with the Roberts case was expressed by contemporaries,
including some who suggested that the case was wrong.
The Roberts
case was appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. The writ was nominally
refused “for want of merit,”
but a commentator reported in 1952 that
respondents on the writ had moved to dismiss on the ground that Whitson
had since sold all of his stock, thus rendering the case moot.
That is
commentary, however. The law could be clarified substantially, and made
better in almost every way, by a decision overruling Roberts.
See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 6.251 (West 2012).
Hamblen v. Horwitz-Texan Theatres Co., 162 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Galveston 1942, no writ); see Grogan v. Grogan, 315 S.W.2d 34, 38–39 (Tex. Civ. App.— 1958,
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (recounting the conflict in the case law).
See, e.g., 2 IRA P. HILDEBRAND, THE LAW OF TEXAS CORPORATIONS § 556 (1942 &
Supp. 1950) (“The reasoning of the court and the limits of the doctrine laid down are not entirely
clear.”); Edward O. Belsheim, The Need for Revising the Texas Corporation Statutes, 27 TEX. L.
REV. 659, 689–90 (1947) (recognizing the conflict created by Roberts and suggesting a statutory
authorization of voting trusts is in order); Sylvan Lang, The Proposed Texas Business Corporation
Act—Two Important Developments, 30 TEX. L. REV. 849, 858–59 (1952) (“Viewing all of the
Texas decisions and the decisions of the courts of other states, it is my opinion that, in spite of the
Whitson case, if a voting trust agreement were properly prepared for bona fide purposes—
legitimate business reasons—and these purposes were expressed in agreement, our supreme court
would sustain its validity. Therefore, I must respectfully disagree with the expressions of the court
in this most recent case.”); Leon Lebowitz, Book Review, 38 TEX. L. REV. 659, 667 (1960)
(reviewing RALPH J. BAKER & WILLIAM L. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
(1959)) (“[T]he unfortunate Roberts v. Whitson . . . .”); see also Note, Statutory Assistance for
Closely Held Corporations, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1503 (1958) (continually noting Roberts as
the unusual precedent other jurisdictions have not followed); Ben Lamar Reynolds, Note,
Corporations—Trusts—Agency—Transfer of Voting Control Converted Intended Voting
Agreement into a Voting Trust—Abercrombie v. Davies, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. 1957), 36 TEX. L.
REV. 508, 510–11 (1958).
Roberts v. Whitson, 188 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1945, writ ref’d w.o.m.).
Lang, supra note 100, at 858.