Kassas v. State Bar of California

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTHONY J. KASSAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 21-55900

D.C. Nos.

2:19-bk-24457-ER

2:21-ap-01021-ER

OPINION

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Ernest M. Robles, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 12, 2022

San Francisco, California

Filed August 1, 2022

Before: Jay S. Bybee and Ryan D. Nelson, Circuit Judges,

and Jed S. Rakoff,

District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Bybee

The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA2

SUMMARY

Bankruptcy

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the

bankruptcy court’s judgment in an adversary proceeding in

which the bankruptcy court found nondischargeable

(1) indebtedness arising from a disbarred attorney’s

obligation to reimburse the State Bar for payments made by

the Bar’s Client Security Fund to victims of his misconduct

and (2) the costs for the disciplinary proceedings conducted

against the attorney, a Chapter 7 debtor.

Reversing in part, the panel held that the indebtedness

arising from the attorney’s obligation to reimburse the State

Bar for the payments made to victims of his misconduct was

not excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7),

which provides that a debtor is not discharged from any debt

that “is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the

benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for

actual pecuniary loss.” Considering the totality of the Client

Security Fund program, the panel concluded that any

reimbursement to the Fund was payable to and for the benefit

of the State Bar and was compensation for the Fund’s actual

pecuniary loss in compensating the victims for their actual

pecuniary losses.

Affirming in part, the panel held that, pursuant to In re

Findley, 593 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2010), the costs associated

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 3

with the attorney’s disciplinary proceedings were

nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7).

COUNSEL

Matthew D. Resnik (argued) and M. Jonathan Hayes, Resnik

Hayes Moradi LLP, Encino, California, for Plaintiff-

Appellant.

Suzanne C. Grandt (argued), Vanessa L. Holton, and Robert

G. Retana, Office of General Counsel, State Bar of

California, San Francisco, California, for Defendant-

Appellee.

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Anthony J. Kassas, a Chapter 7 debtor, was

disbarred by the California Supreme Court in 2014 for

violations of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct and

the California Business and Professions Code. The California

Supreme Court ordered Kassas to pay restitution to 56 former

clients, costs for his disciplinary proceedings, and any funds

that would eventually be paid out by the State Bar’s Client

Security Fund (CSF) to victims of his conduct. Kassas

subsequently filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and received a

discharge.

Kassas sought a declaration that all of his debts to the

State Bar were discharged in the bankruptcy. The State Bar

argued that Kassas’s disciplinary costs and reimbursements

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA4

to the CSF were excepted from discharge pursuant to

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) as “a fine, penalty, or forfeiture

payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and . . .

not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.” The bankruptcy

court granted summary judgment for the State Bar. In re

Kassas, 631 B.R. 469 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2021). The court

concluded that while the restitution payments were

discharged, the disciplinary costs and reimbursements paid

from the CSF were not. Finding that the dischargeability of

reimbursements from the CSF is a matter of public

importance, the bankruptcy court certified the following

question to us: “Is indebtedness arising from a disbarred

attorney’s obligation to reimburse the State Bar for payments

made by the CSF to victims of that attorney’s misconduct

while practicing law non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C.

§ 523(a)(7)?” In re Kassas, 2021 WL 2446270, at *2 (Bankr.

C.D. Cal. June 15, 2021). We answer that such indebtedness

is dischargeable, and we reverse the judgment in part.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS

A. Background

1. The Statutory Framework

In 1971, the California Assembly created a CSF “to

relieve or mitigate pecuniary losses caused by the dishonest

conduct of licensees of the State Bar . . . arising from or

connected with the practice of law.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 6140.5(a) (West 2011). Under the California State Bar’s

CSF Rules, “[t]o qualify for reimbursement, an applicant

must establish a loss of money or property that was received

by an active attorney who was acting as an attorney or in a

fiduciary capacity customary to the practice of law.” Cal.

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 5

State Bar Rule 3.430(A). “The loss must have been caused

by dishonest conduct” and the attorney must have “been

disbarred, disciplined, or voluntarily resigned from the State

Bar; died or been adjudicated mentally incompetent; or . . .

become a judgment debtor of the applicant in a contested

proceeding or been convicted of a crime.” Id. at 3.430(B),

(C), 3.432(A). Decisions “to deny or limit reimbursement”

are ultimately made by the CSF Commission, a five-member

body. Id. at 3.421(A), 3.430(D).

When an application is received, the CSF Commission

can investigate the application “as it deems appropriate,”

including requiring the submission of declarations, holding

evidentiary hearings, and compelling witnesses and

documents by subpoena. Id. at 3.441(A), (C). The

Commission’s decision to reimburse an applicant “must be

based on a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 3.441(I).

The maximum reimbursement allowed per applicant is

$100,000. Id. at 3.434(A).

The CSF Commission must serve a Notice of Intention to

Pay on the attorney responsible for the conduct in an

application. Id. at 3.442(C), 3.445(A). The attorney has

thirty days to submit an objection. Id. at 3.442(D). If an

objection is received, the Commission will conduct further

review, and if no objection is received, the CSF may pay the

applicant. Id. The CSF Commission must also serve a notice

of its Tentative Decision, which includes a statement of the

findings or reasons on which the decision is based, to the

attorney and applicant, who have thirty days to lodge a

written objection. Id. at 3.443(A), (B), 3.445(B). Only after

the parties have an opportunity to submit objections, requests,

or declarations in response to the Tentative Decision can the

CSF Commission issue a Final Decision. Id. at 3.444(A). An

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA6

attorney or applicant can petition for review of the CSF’s

Final Decision in California Superior Court. Cal. State Bar

Rule 3.450; see also State Bar of Cal. v. Statile, 86 Cal. Rptr.

3d 72, 81 (Ct. App. 2008).

Pursuant to the statute creating the CSF, once the CSF

makes a payment, “the State Bar is subrogated, to the extent

of that payment, to the rights of the applicant against any

person or persons who . . . caused the pecuniary loss.” Cal.

Bus. & Prof. Code § 6140.5(b). The statute further provides

that

[a]ny attorney whose actions have caused the

payment of funds to a claimant from the

Client Security Fund shall reimburse the fund

for all moneys paid out as a result of his or her

conduct with interest, in addition to payment

of the assessment for the procedural costs of

processing the claim, as a condition of

continued practice.

Id. § 6140.5(c).

For an attorney who is disbarred “the

reimbursed amount, plus applicable interest and costs, shall

be paid as a condition of reinstatement of membership.” Id.

And “[a]ny assessment against an attorney . . . that is part of

an order imposing a public reproval on a member or is part of

an order imposing discipline or accepting a resignation with

a disciplinary matter pending, may also be enforced as a

money judgment.” Id. § 6140.5(d).

The cited version was in effect from January 2, 2012, until

December 31, 2018, the time period covering Kassas’s disciplinary

proceedings. All subsequent citations are to this version of the statute.

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 7

2. The Facts

Kassas committed numerous violations of the State Bar

Rules of Professional Conduct and California’s Business and

Professions Code. In January 2014, the California Supreme

Court disbarred Kassas. As part of its disciplinary order, the

Supreme Court ordered Kassas to make restitution payments

to 56 individuals for a total of $201,706, plus ten percent

interest per year. The California Supreme Court also awarded

costs to the State Bar for the disciplinary proceedings in the

amount of $61,122.27. Finally, the California Supreme Court

also specified that “[a]ny restitution owed [by Kassas] to the

Client Security Fund is enforceable as provided in Business

and Professions Code section 6140.5, subdivisions (c) and

(d).”

The CSF made 51 payments to individuals named as

restitution recipients in the CSC’s order and 305 payments to

individuals not named in the order.

In total, the CSF paid

$1,367,978.12 to Kassas’s victims. The typical victim

received between $3,000 and $6,000. As of April 2021,

including interest and processing costs, Kassas owes the CSF

$2,090,096.32.

The California Supreme Court named 56 victims in Kassas’s

disbarrment order. The State concedes that the restitution owed directly

to these individuals is dischargeable. Kassas did not reimburse those

former clients, and 51 of the 56 filed for compensation from the CSF. See

In re Kassas, 631 B.R. at 470. The amount Kassas owed to 51 of those

individuals is subsumed within the money paid to the 356 claimants. The

State’s restitution order remained binding until the debt was discharged.

Discharge voids the restitution order and prevents a double recovery by

the 51 individuals who obtained reimbursement through the CSF.

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA8

B. The Proceedings Below

In December 2019, Kassas filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

He received a discharge in March 2020. In January 2021,

Kassas filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court

seeking a declaration that all debts listed in his complaint

were discharged in the bankruptcy. The State Bar moved to

dismiss the complaint, but the bankruptcy judge converted the

motion into a motion for summary judgment and ordered

supplemental briefing.

In a published order, the bankruptcy court held that some

debts associated with his disciplinary proceedings were

dischargeable, while others were not. Three separate debts

were the subject of the bankruptcy court’s order. 631 B.R.

469. First, the bankruptcy court held that the restitution the

California Supreme Court ordered Kassas to pay 56 former

clients—totaling $201,706 plus interest—was discharged as

debt. Id. at 471. The bankruptcy court reasoned that the

restitution payments were not a debt “payable to and for the

benefit of a government unit,” and thus did not come within

§ 523(a)(7). Id. at 472. The State Bar did not dispute this

ruling. Id. at 471 & n.5; see supra n.2. Second, the court

held that the $61,112 in disciplinary costs was not discharged

under our decision in In re Findley, 593 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th

Cir. 2010). 631 B.R. at 471. Kassas acknowledged that the

bankruptcy court’s judgment on those costs was proper under

Findley, although he preserved his option to challenge

Findley in en banc proceedings. Id. at 471 & n.6. Third, the

bankruptcy court determined that Kassas’s debts owed to the

State Bar for restitution to persons not named in the Supreme

Court’s order—more than $2 million—were

nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). The court

reasoned that the latter payments to the CSF are “a penalty

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 9

imposed in furtherance of the State’s interest in punishing and

rehabilitating errant attorneys, rather than compensation for

actual pecuniary loss.” Id. at 474. At the same time, the

bankruptcy court recognized that the “[t]he Ninth Circuit has

not determined whether debt owed to the Client Security

Fund is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7).” Id. at 472

(citing In re Albert-Sheridan, 960 F.3d 1188, 1194 n.5 (9th

Cir. 2020) (stating that the issue of the dischargeability of

reimbursements to the CSF was not before the court)). But

the court determined that the primary purpose of making

attorneys reimburse the CSF is rehabilitative not

compensatory. Id. at 474. The bankruptcy court certified a

direct appeal to this court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 158(d)(2)(A), because the judgment “involves a matter of

public importance” and “involves a question of law as to

which there is no controlling decision of the court of appeals

for the circuit.” In re Kassas, 2021 WL 2446270, at *2

(Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 15, 2021) (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 158(d)(2)(A)(i)). We granted permission to appeal pursuant

to § 158(a).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the bankruptcy court’s decision

regarding dischargeability of a debt. See In re Scheer,

819 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2016). “Because a

fundamental policy of the Bankruptcy Code is to afford

debtors a fresh start, ‘exceptions to discharge should be

strictly construed against an objecting creditor and in favor of

the debtor.’” Id. (quoting In re Riso, 978 F.2d 1151, 1154

(9th Cir. 1992)).

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA10

III. ANALYSIS

We have two issues before us. The first issue is the

question certified by the bankruptcy court regarding the

dischargeability of reimbursement owed the CSF for

payments to Kassas’s former clients. The second issue relates

to the dischargeability of the costs of the proceedings, which

we held nondischargeable in In re Findley, 593 F.3d at 1054.

A. Payments From the CSF Are Dischargeable Under

§ 523(a)(7)

A discharge in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 releases the

debtor from personal liability for pre-bankruptcy debts.

Section § 523 of Title 11 exempts certain debts from

discharge. In this case, the State Bar claims that Kassas’s

obligation to reimburse the CSF is exempt from discharge

under § 523(a)(7). That section provides:

an individual debtor [is not discharged] from

any debt—

to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or

forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a

governmental unit, and is not compensation

for actual pecuniary loss . . . .

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). We have understood § 523(a)(7) to

encompass three separate elements, each of which must be

satisfied before a debt is nondischargeable. That is, the

nondischargeable debt “must (1) be a fine, penalty, or

forfeiture; (2) be payable to and for the benefit of a

governmental unit; and (3) not constitute compensation for

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 11

actual pecuniary costs.” In re Albert-Sheridan, 960 F.3d at

1193; see also Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 51 (1986).

Only two of the three elements are in play here. Neither

party disputes that the State Bar is a governmental entity. See

Cal. Const. art. VI, § 9 (“The State Bar of California is a

public corporation.”); see also Keller v. State Bar of Calif.,

496 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1990); Hirsh v. Justices of the Sup. Ct.,

67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, we need only

determine whether reimbursement to the CSF is “a fine,

penalty, or forfeiture” and not “compensation for actual

pecuniary loss.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). The question of

when restitution may be considered a fine or penalty has been

a difficult question. See Kelly, 479 U.S. at 52 (holding “a

criminal judgment that takes the form of restitution” is within

“the penal goals of the State” and is nondischargeable).

We have had our own back-and-forth over the nature of

costs imposed in attorney disciplinary matters. In In re

Taggart, 249 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2001), we held that the costs

of attorney disciplinary proceedings in California were “not

penal in nature.” Id. at 994. In response to Taggart,

California amended the statute requiring the payment of such

costs and specified that such costs are “penalties . . . to

promote rehabilitation and to protect the public.” Cal. Bus.

& Prof. Code § 6086.10(e). In In re Findley, we revisited the

question of disciplinary costs. 593 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2010).

We concluded that the amendment made clear that California

“enacted attorney disciplinary costs to serve penal and

rehabilitative ends [and] thus undermines the result in

Taggart.” Id. at 1054. After Findley, such costs are

nondischargeable in bankruptcy. See also In re Scheer,

819 F.3d at 1211(holding that the State Bar’s attempt to

enforce an arbitration award in favor of Scheer’s former

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA12

client was “not a fine or penalty” but “purely compensatory”

and not subject to § 523(a)(7)).

We do not need to reach the question whether the

California Supreme Court’s order that Kassas repay the CSF

is a fine or penalty, because we conclude that the restitution

payments at issue here are “compensation for actual

pecuniary loss.” In re Albert-Sheridan, 960 F.3d at 1193 n.3

(“Because the discovery sanctions do not meet the

governmental unit or non-compensatory elements, we need

not address whether they are also fines, penalties, or

forfeitures under the Code.”). As we discuss below, at every

step of the CSF process, the State Bar is focused on

compensating victims for their actual pecuniary losses or

seeking compensation for the CSF’s actual payments.

First, the stated purpose of the CSF is “to relieve or

mitigate pecuniary losses caused by the dishonest conduct of

active members of the State Bar.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 6140.5(a) (emphasis added). The CSF has all the hallmarks

of a secondary, public insurance program overseen by an

administrative agency. See State Bar Rule 3.434(B)(2)

(excluding reimbursement for “a loss covered by any

indemnity, such as insurance, fidelity guarantee, or bond”).

The State Bar’s rules limit reimbursement to “loss of money

or property that was received by an active attorney” and

excludes other damages, including interest and consequential

losses. Id. at 3.430(A), 3.434(B). The amount of pecuniary

loss is determined after a deliberative process overseen by the

CSF Commission. Id. at 3.421(A). Upon application by a

putative victim, the Commission makes an initial

determination, called a Notice of Intention to Pay. Id.

at 3.442(A). The attorney must be served with the Notice and

given an opportunity to contest the claim, including at an oral

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 13

hearing. Id. at 3.442(D), 3.443(B). Counsel to the CSF issues

a tentative decision, which may be appealed to the CSF

Commission. Any final decision of the Commission must be

in writing. Id. at 3.444(B)(1). That decision may be appealed

to California Superior Court. Id. at 3.450.

Second, once the CSF has made payment to a victim, the

attorney’s obligation is to “reimburse the fund for all moneys

paid out.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6140.5(c) (emphasis

added). That obligation distinguishes these payments from

fines and penalties because they are reimbursement for

victims’ actual pecuniary loss. Although fines and penalties

such as restitution to crime victims “may be calculated by

reference to the amount of harm the offender has caused,”

Kelly, 479 U.S. at 52, criminal restitution does not necessarily

demand the precision imposed by California’s CSF scheme.

As the Supreme Court in Kelly observed, some states “do[]

not require imposition of restitution in the amount of the

harm caused. Instead [they may] provide[] for a flexible

remedy tailored to the defendant’s situation.” Id. at 53. The

CSF, by contrast, requires attorneys to reimburse the CSF

only for the amount the CSF paid the attorney’s clients, an

amount limited to actual “pecuniary loss.” Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code § 6140.5(b). That makes the reimbursements—whether

by the CSF to the client, or by the attorney to the CSF—more

in the nature of the arbitration fee award at issue in In re

Scheer—an award we described as “purely compensatory.”

In re Scheer, 819 F.3d at 1211.

Finally, reinforcing the idea that the CSF is a form of

public insurance, the statute enforces the State Bar’s right to

reimbursement by granting the State Bar a right of

“subrogat[ion], to the extent of that payment, to the rights of

the applicant.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6140.5(b).

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA14

Subrogation is “the substitution of another person in place of

the creditor or claimant to whose rights he or she succeeds in

relation to the debt or claim.” Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v.

Maryland Casualty Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 302 (Ct. App.

1998). “In the insurance context, subrogation takes the form

of an insurer’s right to be put in the position of the insured for

loss that the insurer has both insured and paid.” State Farm

Gen. Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d

785, 790 (Ct. App. 2006). Thus, when an insurance company

is subrogated to the rights of its insured, it “step[s] into the

shoes of the insured and assert[s] the insured’s rights against

the third party.” Progressive West Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct.,

37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434, 441 (Ct. App. 2006). The insurer

“cannot acquire by subrogation anything to which the insured

has no rights, and may claim no rights which the insured does

not have.” Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of Penn., 56 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 491, 498 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). Although there are some technical

differences between subrogation and reimbursement, where

the statute creating the CSF uses both terms, we must

conclude that “both the subrogation rights and reimbursement

rights . . . fall within the rubric of subrogation.” 21st Cent.

Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct., 213 P.3d 972, 976 n.3 (Cal. 2009).

Accordingly, the CSF is limited—both by its organic statute

and by long-standing principles of subrogation—to

recovering the “actual pecuniary costs,” 11 U.S.C.

§ 523(a)(7), of the “pecuniary losses caused by the dishonest

conduct of licensees of the State Bar,” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 6140.5(a).

Considering the totality of the CSF program, even if

reimbursement serves some penal or rehabilitative purpose,

we conclude that any reimbursement to the CSF is payable to

and for the benefit of the State bar and is compensation for

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 15

the CSF’s actual pecuniary loss. There is a certain symmetry

in our conclusion. The State Bar did not object to the

bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the reimbursement Kassas

owed 56 of his former clients was subject to discharge. In re

Kassas, 631 B.R. at 470–71. The State Bar only objected to

discharge of Kassas’s debt to the CSF, which reimbursed an

additional 305 of Kassas’s clients. Id. Our conclusion means

that any debt that Kassas owes his clients and is obligated to

pay either (1) directly to them or (2) to the CSF because the

CSF has made payments to his clients is subject to discharge

in bankruptcy. In other words, the dischargeability of

Kassas’s debt does not turn on whether the CSF decides to

step in to compensate his former clients and then seek

subrogation against him. Were we to conclude otherwise,

Kassas could obtain a discharge for debts he owed directly to

56 of his clients but not for debts owed to the 305 of his

clients compensated by the CSF.

We in no way disparage the laudable and important

service performed by the CSF. Our decision does not relieve

Kassas of his failings as a member of the California Bar. See

In re Scheer, 819 F.3d at 1212. Our conclusion is controlled

by § 523(a)(7).

In sum, we answer the question certified by the

bankruptcy court: Indebtedness arising from a disbarred

attorneys’ obligation to reimburse the State Bar for payments

made by the CSF to victims of that attorney’s misconduct are

not excluded from discharge under§ 523(a)(7). The judgment

of the bankruptcy court will be reversed on this issue.

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA16

B. Disciplinary Costs Are Nondischargeable Under

§ 523(a)(7)

Kassas also appeals the bankruptcy court’s judgment

holding the costs associated with his disciplinary proceedings

nondischargeable. Kassas acknowledges that the bankruptcy

court was bound by our decision in In re Findley. We are

also bound by that decision. A panel can only depart from

our own precedent “if a subsequent Supreme Court opinion

‘undercut[s] the theory or reasoning underlying the prior

circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly

irreconcilable.’” In re Nichols, 10 F.4th 956, 961 (9th Cir.

2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Gammie,

335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). No such

intervening precedent or change to the statute exists here.

Thus, we have no occasion to reconsider In re Findley. See

In re Albert-Sheridan, 960 F.3d at 1192 (refusing to

reconsider In re Findley in holding that debt to the State Bar

for the costs of attorney discipline proceedings is

nondischargeable). As a result, in accordance with the clear

directive of In re Findley, we affirm the bankruptcy court’s

finding that Kassas’s disciplinary costs of $61,122.27 were

not discharged in his bankruptcy. See 593 F.3d at 1054. If

Kassas wishes to pursue this issue, he must do so through a

petition for rehearing en banc.

IV. CONCLUSION

We reverse the bankruptcy court’s judgment that an

obligation to reimburse the State Bar for payments by the

CSF is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). We

KASSAS V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 17

affirm the bankruptcy court’s judgment, holding that

Kassas’s disciplinary costs were not discharged.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.