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undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client’s informed
written consent.* Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one
matter against a person* the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the
matters are wholly unrelated. (See Flatt v. Superior Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275 [36
Cal.Rptr.2d 537].) A directly adverse conflict under paragraph (a) can arise in a number
of ways, for example, when: (i) a lawyer accepts representation of more than one client
in a matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflict; (ii) a lawyer, while
representing a client, accepts in another matter the representation of a person* who, in
the first matter, is directly adverse to the lawyer’s client; or (iii) a lawyer accepts
representation of a person* in a matter in which an opposing party is a client of the
lawyer or the lawyer’s law firm.* Similarly, direct adversity can arise when a lawyer
cross-examines a non-party witness who is the lawyer’s client in another matter, if the
examination is likely to harm or embarrass the witness. On the other hand,
simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only
economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in
unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not
require informed written consent* of the respective clients.
[2] Paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all types of legal representations, including the
concurrent representation of multiple parties in litigation or in a single transaction or in
some other common enterprise or legal relationship. Examples of the latter include the
formation of a partnership for several partners* or a corporation for several
shareholders, the preparation of a pre-nuptial agreement, or joint or reciprocal wills for a
husband and wife, or the resolution of an “uncontested” marital dissolution. If a lawyer
initially represents multiple clients with the informed written consent* as required under
paragraph (b), and circumstances later develop indicating that direct adversity exists
between the clients, the lawyer must obtain further informed written consent* of the
clients under paragraph (a).
[3] In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Federal Insurance
Company (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1422 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 20], the court held that paragraph
(C)(3) of predecessor rule 3-310 was violated when a lawyer, retained by an insurer to
defend one suit, and while that suit was still pending, filed a direct action against the
same insurer in an unrelated action without securing the insurer’s consent.
Notwithstanding State Farm, paragraph (a) does not apply with respect to the
relationship between an insurer and a lawyer when, in each matter, the insurer’s interest
is only as an indemnity provider and not as a direct party to the action.
[4] Even where there is no direct adversity, a conflict of interest requiring informed
written consent* under paragraph (b) exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s
ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client
will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s other responsibilities, interests, or
relationships, whether legal, business, financial, professional, or personal. For
example, a lawyer’s obligations to two or more clients in the same matter, such as
several individuals seeking to form a joint venture, may materially limit the lawyer’s
ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of
the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the other clients. The risk is that the lawyer may not be