CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Page 2 of 5
Conflict of Interest Policy – Effective 2.24.2020
(1985) 164 Cal. App. 3d 685, 688.) The consent and waiver must be a knowing and intelligent act
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences, and it must
be informed, written consent. (CA RPC 1.7.) The court must assure itself that the defendant
understands the potential drawbacks, dangers, adverse consequences, and disadvantages of waiving
the conflict, after having thoroughly discussed it with counsel sufficient for consent, and
voluntarily wishes to waive. If the court finds the waiver inadequate, it may reject the waiver.
(People v. Baylis (2006) 139 Cal. App. 4
th
1054, 1067-1068.) Considerations for an informed
waiver shall include the District Attorney’s commitment that recusal, ethical walls, and the
protection of confidential information (See infra) pursuant to this policy shall apply to all
prosecutions where a defendant waives the conflict of interest.
Even in the absence of a waiver, courts have long considered the recusal of an entire prosecutorial
office a disfavored remedy that should not be applied unless justified by a substantial reason
related to the proper administration of justice. (People v. Hernandez (1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 674,
679; Millsap v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal. App. 4
th
196, 201.) Recusal of the entire district
attorney’s office was error and an abuse of discretion when less drastic alternatives such as walling
off the conflicted employee would suffice under the circumstances to prevent any actual conflict of
interest that would rise to the level of being so grave as to render it unlikely that defendant would
receive fair treatment. (People v. Cannedy (2009) 176 Cal. App. 4
th
1474, 1491.)
In most circumstances, the fact that one or two employees of a large district attorney’s office have
a personal interest in a case would not warrant disqualifying the entire office. (People v. Vasquez
(2006) 39 Cal. 4th 47, 57.) In denying the recusal of the office where an assistant district attorney
was the victim and witness to assault and escape charges, the court recognized that the San
Francisco District Attorney’s Office was a large office that had minimal communications about the
event. (Trujillo v. Superior Court (1983) 148 Cal. App. 3d 368, 373.)
Where the conflict of interest exists because a prosecutor learned confidential information during
the representation of former clients, recusal of the individual prosecutor is required. (People v.
Lopez (1984) 155 Cal. App. 3d 813, 819-828.) It is undisputed that the presumption of imputed
knowledge is uniformly rebuttable and may be overcome by a proper ethical screen when the issue
arises in the context of government attorneys. (Kirk v. First American Title Insurance Company
(2010) 183 Cal. App. 4
th
776, 805-806.) The specific elements of an effective screen or ethical wall
will vary from case to case, but two elements are necessary: first, the screen must be timely
imposed when the conflict first arises or is discovered; and second, an effective wall involves
imposition of preventive measures to guarantee that information will not be conveyed. Other
relevant elements of an ethical wall include physical, geographic, and departmental separation of
attorneys; prohibitions against and sanctions for discussing confidential matters; established rules
and procedures preventing access to confidential information and files; and continuing education in
professional responsibility. (Id. at 810-811.) The case-by-case inquiry focuses not on whether all
the prescribed elements have been established but on whether the court is satisfied that the tainted
attorney has not had and will not have any improper communication with others at the firm
concerning the litigation. (Id. at 811.) Isolation of a prosecutor from the prosecution of his former
clients was sufficient protection for the defendants and the imputed knowledge theory did not