UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

AMERICAN SENIOR COMMUNITIES, L.L.C.,

Plaintiff,

JAMES BURKHART,

DANIEL BENSON,

ROGER WERNER,

et al.

Defendants.

________________________________________

JAMES BURKHART,

Counter-Claimant,

AMERICAN SENIOR COMMUNITIES, L.L.C.,

Counter-Defendant.

)

Case No. 1:17-cv-03273-TWP-DML

)

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by Defendant Roger Werner (“Werner”) (Filing No. 75), and a Motion

to Dismiss filed by Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant American Senior Communities, L.L.C. (“ASC”)

(

Filing No. 100). ASC initiated this action in August 2018, alleging that from approximately 2008

through 2015, executive officers and vendors of ASC systematically looted it through a pattern of

racketeering activity. The Complaint alleges violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (“RICO”) and the Indiana RICO statute, fraud, breach of contract, tort claims,

and other state statutory claims. In response to the Complaint, Werner filed a Motion to Dismiss.

Defendant James Burkhart (“Burkhart”) filed an Answer to the Complaint and also asserted

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affirmative defenses and counterclaims.

Thereafter, ASC filed a Motion to Dismiss Burkhart’s

counterclaims. For the following reasons, the Court denies as moot without prejudice Werner’s

Motion to Dismiss and grants ASC’s Motion to Dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are not necessarily objectively true, but as required when reviewing a

motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint (or the

counterclaim), thus the Court draws all inferences in favor of ASC (or Burkhart) as the non-moving

party. See Bielanski v. County of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008) (standard for dismissal

of a complaint); Cozzi Iron & Metal, Inc. v. U.S. Office Equip., Inc., 250 F.3d 570, 574 (7th Cir.

2001) (similar standard for dismissal of a counterclaim). This background section is not intended

to be a comprehensive presentation of the facts of the case.

ASC is a privately-owned Indiana company headquartered in Indianapolis. It owns,

operates, and manages a variety of extended care facilities, including assisted and independent

senior living communities, nursing homes, and skilled living facilities throughout Indiana. The

Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County (“HHC”) holds the health care operating

licenses for most of the facilities that ASC manages, and as a result, bears the sole financial and

regulatory responsibilities for each of ASC’s facilities. ASC manages seventy-eight skilled

nursing homes, four assisted living facilities, and numerous independent housing units on behalf

of HHC. ASC and its affiliates employ over 10,000 employees in providing care to residents and

management of its facilities and ASC cares for over 9,000 residents (Filing No. 1 at 3, 7–8).

Co-defendants ACCD LLC d/b/a Crusader Healthcare Services III, American Senior Care LLC, JACCD LLC d/b/a

Crusader IV, 105214 Investments LLC d/b/a Crusader Healthcare Services, and 105210 Investments LLC d/b/a

Crusader Healthcare Services II each joined in Burkhart’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims and are

collectively referred to as “Burkhart” or the “Burkhart Defendants” in that filing (Filing No. 83 at 1

–2).

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Burkhart was an Indiana resident, and is ASC’s former chief executive officer (“CEO”).

He operated ASC from approximately 2000 through September 15, 2015, when the Federal Bureau

of Investigation executed search warrants at numerous sites, including Burkhart’s principal

residence and his primary office at ASC. Burkhart currently resides at the Federal Prison Camp

Montgomery, Maxwell Airforce Base, in Montgomery, Alabama (Filing No. 1 at 3; Filing No. 83

at 30). Werner is an Indiana resident and ASC’s former chief financial officer who worked closely

with both Burkhart and co-defendant Daniel Benson (“Benson”), ASC’s former chief operating

officer, beginning in 2002. Werner became ASC’s chief financial officer in 2007 (Filing No. 1 at

4). Burkhart, Benson, and Werner never had an ownership interest in ASC and were never on

ASC’s board of managers. Id. at 3, 8.

Burkhart received a salary for his work as ASC’s chief executive officer pursuant to a

compensation agreement dated October 10, 2000. The agreement was later restated and further

explained in a letter dated October 6, 2003, which was then amended on two subsequent occasions

on November 24, 2009 and August 31, 2012 (the “Compensation Agreements”). The November

24, 2009 addendum amended the severance provision to entitle Burkhart to two times, instead of

one times, his base salary upon termination and added a “retention bonus,” to be paid to Burkhart

in the event he was terminated “without Cause” or if he resigned. (Filing No. 83 at 30

–32). The

Compensation Agreements were entered into between Burkhart, ASC, and its owners (the Jackson

and Justice families, and their affiliates). The Compensation Agreements define “Cause” as

termination due to (i) felony conviction or (ii) misuse of alcohol or drugs which interferes with

employment performance. Id.

Following the September 2015 FBI raid—the execution of search warrants at Burkhart’s

principal residence and his primary office at ASC—Burkhart was terminated from his position as

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ASC’s chief executive officer and on October 4, 2016 he was indicted for several counts relating

to fraud, money laundering and violation of the anti-kickback statute. At the time of his termination

in 2015, Burkhart had not been convicted of a felony, and he had not been accused of misusing

alcohol or drugs, so under his compensation agreements, his termination was without cause. Id.

at 32. Pursuant to Burkhart’s Compensation Agreements, he should have been paid various

benefits totaling approximately $2,466,713.46 at the time of his September 2015 termination.

However, ASC and the Jackson and Justice families failed to make these payments to Burkhart at

the time of his termination or any time thereafter. Id.

Burkhart and Benson were the highest-ranking executives at ASC, and they used their

positions of trust to limit the number of people who had access to the financial details of their

operation. They enlisted their associates to assist them in constructing a racketeering enterprise

and executing a series of mail and wire frauds and other racketeering activities. These activities

were ongoing over an extended period of time beginning in 2008 and continuing through at least

September 15, 2015. Their activities included frauds that required ASC to pay inflated prices for

products and services or to pay unnecessary fees to companies secretly owned or controlled by

Burkhart, Benson, or their associates and to companies that remitted kickbacks to them; frauds that

caused ASC to pay inflated salaries and bonuses to Burkhart, Benson, and Werner and that

provided lavish benefits including skyboxes for sporting events, private jets, golf trips, and

expensive meals for themselves and their associates at the expense of ASC; fraudulent misdirection

of ASC’s corporate opportunities for the benefit of Burkhart, Benson, and their associates; and

activities designed to conceal their fraudulent activities (Filing No. 1 at 1–3). These activities were

undertaken to defraud ASC continually until the FBI raided ASC’s offices and the homes of several

defendants in September 2015. Id. at 14.

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On September 15, 2017, ASC filed this lawsuit against Burkhart, Benson, Werner, and

others asserting claims for violations of the federal RICO and Indiana RICO statutes as well as

other Indiana statutes. ASC also asserted claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence,

breach of contract, and unjust enrichment among other claims. On January 10, 2018, Burkhart

pled guilty, and provided a factual basis under oath, to knowingly engaging in a conspiracy to

commit mail, wire, and healthcare fraud “with an intent to advance the conspiracy,” as well as

conspiracy to violate the anti-kickback statute and money laundering. (Filing No. 96-1). While

under oath, Burkhart stated that the factual basis was the truth and he had nothing to change or

correct regarding the factual basis. Id. at 10.

On December 10, 2018, Werner filed a Motion to Dismiss, asking the Court to dismiss the

civil RICO and Indiana RICO claims against him as well as the fraud claim. On December 20,

2018, Burkhart filed an Answer and asserted two counterclaims against ASC for breach of contract

and unjust enrichment. On January 22, 2019, ASC filed a Motion to Dismiss Burkhart’s

counterclaims.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint

that has failed to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When

deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all factual allegations

in the complaint and draws all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Bielanski, 550 F.3d at 633; Cozzi

Iron & Metal, 250 F.3d at 574 (similar standard for dismissal of a counterclaim). However, courts

“are not obliged to accept as true legal conclusions or unsupported conclusions of fact.” Hickey v.

O’Bannon, 287 F.3d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 2002).

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The complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the United

States Supreme Court explained that the complaint must allege facts that are “enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although “detailed factual

allegations” are not required, mere “labels,” “conclusions,” or “formulaic recitation[s] of the

elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. Id.; see also Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581

F.3d 599, 603 (7th

Cir. 2009) (“it is not enough to give a threadbare recitation of the elements of

a claim without factual support”). The allegations must “give the defendant fair notice of what the

. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Stated differently,

the complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

To be facially plausible, the complaint must allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

When considering a motion to dismiss, “a court may consider, in addition to the allegations

set forth in the complaint itself, documents that are attached to the complaint, documents that are

central to the complaint and are referred to in it, and information that is properly subject to judicial

notice.” Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2013).

III. DISCUSSION

Werner seeks dismissal of four claims in ASC’s original Complaint. ASC seeks dismissal

of Burkhart’s counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Court will first

address Werner’s Motion to Dismiss and then turn to the Motion filed by ASC.

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A. Werner’s Motion to Dismiss

On September 15, 2017, ASC filed a 79-page Complaint, asserting sixteen different claims

against twenty-one defendants. These claims included fact-intensive claims for fraud, RICO

conspiracy, RICO violation, and Indiana RICO violation. More than a year later, on December

10, 2018, Werner filed his Motion to Dismiss. Werner asks the Court to dismiss the fraud, RICO,

RICO conspiracy, and Indiana RICO claims pending against him. He argues that dismissal of

these four claims is appropriate because the Complaint’s factual allegations against him are

insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The status of this case has changed considerably since the filing of the original Complaint.

By the end of February 2019, the parties briefed Werner’s Motion to Dismiss. Numerous

discovery disputes have ensued since that time. One defendant was voluntarily dismissed with

prejudice, and other defendants had a clerk’s entry of default entered against them. Importantly,

on September 13, 2019, ASC filed an Amended Complaint, which in now the operative complaint

in this case. The 85-page Amended Complaint asserts sixteen claims against fifteen defendants

(Filing No. 218). Because Werner’s Motion to Dismiss challenges the factual sufficiency of the

original Complaint and ASC has since filed an Amended Complaint, the Court denies as moot

without prejudice to refile Werner’s Motion to Dismiss.

B. ASC’s Motion to Dismiss

After ASC filed its Complaint against Burkhart and numerous other defendants, Burkhart

filed an Answer and asserted counterclaims against ASC for breach of contract and unjust

enrichment. Burkhart based his counterclaims against ASC on the non-payment of certain benefits

provided for by his Compensation Agreements.

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ASC argues that Burkhart’s counterclaims fail to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted and asserts that Burkhart’s claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands because he

defrauded ASC out of millions of dollars. ASC contends the breach of contract claim should be

dismissed because Burkhart committed the first breach and cannot complain of an alleged

subsequent breach by ASC. It also argues that Burkhart’s unjust enrichment claim should be

dismissed because an action for unjust enrichment cannot lie where there is a valid and enforceable

agreement, which is what Burkhart has alleged.

The doctrine of unclean hands bars a plaintiff’s claim where: (1) the plaintiff’s misconduct

was intentional, (2) the plaintiff’s wrongdoing concerned the defendant and had an immediate and

necessary relation to the matter in litigation, and (3) the defendant was injured by the plaintiff’s

conduct. Barrett v. Grow, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92445, at *15 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 13, 2008).

ASC argues that the doctrine easily applies to Burkhart’s counterclaims. Burkhart’s

misconduct was intentional; he pled guilty to knowingly engaging in a conspiracy to commit mail,

wire, and healthcare fraud with an intent to advance the conspiracy. Burkhart’s wrongful conduct

is immediately and necessarily related to his counterclaims; his counterclaims relate to his

employment relationship with ASC as its CEO, and his criminal convictions arose out the fraud

he committed in his employment relationship with ASC as its CEO. Finally, ASC asserts it was

injured when Burkhart defrauded it out of millions of dollars for which ASC was entitled to

restitution as a crime victim. Thus, Burkhart’s counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust

enrichment are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

As an additional basis for dismissal, ASC argues the breach of contract counterclaim is

barred because Burkhart materially breached the agreement prior to any alleged breach by ASC.

By committing fraud against ASC, Burkhart knowingly breached the implied covenant of good

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faith and fair dealing owed to ASC as its CEO. This covenant is implied in all employment

agreements in Indiana. See Coates v. Heat Wagons, Inc., 942 N.E.2d 905, 918 (Ind. Ct. App.

2011). (“A party first guilty of a material breach of contract may not maintain an action against

the other party or seek to enforce the contract against the other party should that party subsequently

breach the contract.”) Liocci v. Cardinal Assocs., Inc., 492 N.E.2d 48, 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); see

also Felker v. Sw. Emergency Med. Serv., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 857, 869 (S.D. Ind. 2007). Thus,

when Burkhart materially breached the Compensation Agreements by committing fraud against

ASC, he lost any claim he might have had for ASC’s alleged subsequent non-performance.

As to Burkhart’s unjust enrichment claim, ASC argues it is not viable because such a claim

cannot survive when a valid and enforceable contract exists, and Burkhart alleged the existence of

such a contract. According to ASC, it is well-established under Indiana law that unjust enrichment

is an equitable remedy that permits recovery only in the absence of an express contract. See

CoMentis, Inc. v. Purdue Res. Found., 765 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1102 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (“where an

express contract governs the parties’ behavior, a claim for unjust enrichment is not cognizable”).

Because Burkhart has alleged that the Compensation Agreements “constitute fully binding and

enforceable agreements, supported by mutual consideration,” (Filing No. 83 at 33), without

alternatively alleging that the agreements were invalid or unenforceable, his unjust enrichment

claim should be dismissed.

In response, Burkhart acknowledges that the Court can take judicial notice of his and his

co-defendants’ criminal pleas. He asserts that the Court also “should concurrently take judicial

notice of his Section 2255 filing, which calls into question the factual circumstances surrounding

his plea.” (Filing No. 112 at 1, n.1.) Burkhart argues that ASC implicitly recognizes that he has

sufficiently pled all the required elements of a breach of contract claim: (1) the Compensation

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Agreements are contracts that exist between ASC and Burkhart, (2) ASC breached the

Compensation Agreements by not compensating Burkhart upon terminating him without cause in

September 2015, and (3) Burkhart has been damaged by ASC’s non-payment of his approximately

$2,466,713.46 of contractually defined compensation. Because he has sufficiently pled a breach

of contract claim, Burkhart asserts that ASC’s Motion to Dismiss should be denied.

Burkhart asserts ASC premises its Motion to Dismiss on a factual argument that ASC had

a good faith basis to terminate Burkhart’s employment in September 2015, and these questions of

fact are not appropriate for disposition on a motion to dismiss. See Magnesita Refractories Co. v.

Mishra, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206856, at *23 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 2018) (“Questions of good faith

should generally be left for the trier of fact because they concern a party’s state of mind.”)

Furthermore, the “implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to trump an

explicit contractual provision,” and thus, ASC’s compensatory obligations to Burkhart “cannot be

converted into a termination for cause by invoking the covenant of good faith.” Keeney v. Kemper

Nat. Ins. Companies, 960 F. Supp. 617, 624–25 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Thus, Burkhart argues, ASC’s

non-performance of its obligations under the Compensation Agreements is not excused by

information ASC did not know, and could not have known, at the time of its wrongful action.

Burkhart also argues that “bad faith actions,” such as those raised in ASC’s affirmative

unclean hands defense, “present a question of fact that cannot be determined at the pleading stage.”

In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 811 (7th Cir. 2003). The doctrine of

unclean hands is not favored under Indiana law, and “must be applied with reluctance and

scrutiny.” Wedgewood Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Nash, 781 N.E.2d 1172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). He

argues that he adequately pled a breach of contract claim where his contract called for specific

compensation if he was terminated without cause, which has been alleged, and ASC has failed to

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pay him that severance compensation, thus he was damaged. Burkhart contends the events that

occurred after the termination are unrelated to ASC’s decision not to compensate him, as it was

contractually obligated to do, when it chose to terminate him without cause in 2015. Burkhart

asserts, “The question as to whether Mr. Burkhart’s conduct constituted a breach is a purely factual

matter which cannot and should not be determined at this stage of the litigation. Dismissal of Mr.

Burkhart’s sufficiently-pled breach of contract claim would therefore be improper.” (Filing No.

112 at 5.)

Regarding the claim for unjust enrichment, Burkhart argues that he is allowed to bring an

unjust enrichment claim as an alternative claim to the breach of contract claim. “A plaintiff

seeking recovery for breach of contract may plead unjust enrichment in the alternative because

this theory allows for the possibility of recovery even if the court finds that no contract existed or

that a contract existed but was unenforceable.” NIBCO Inc. v. Arthur J. Gallagher Risk Mgmt.

Servs., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40744, at *40 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2016) (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted). Burkhart asserts that, if the Court determines that the Compensation

Agreements are unenforceable, he is permitted to seek quasi-contractual relief under the unjust

enrichment claim.

ASC replies,

[R]ather than address any of his wrongful conduct or his admissions, Burkhart

merely asserts that ASC’s arguments regarding his unclean hands are premature

and that issues surrounding his wrongdoing must be addressed by the trier of fact.

Contrary to Burkhart’s assertions, however, there are no factual disputes to address

because his prior admissions establish that he is not entitled to the relief he seeks.

This is the quintessential case for taking judicial notice of facts admitted in a guilty

plea when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Such notice allows courts to dispose

of meritless claims like Burkhart’s at the dismissal stage.

(Filing No. 118 at 1.) ASC asserts the facts establishing Burkhart’s unclean hands are apparent

from his guilty plea, and he conceded that his guilty plea is subject to judicial notice.

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In considering this Motion to Dismiss, the Court takes judicial notice of the criminal

proceedings that were before this Court in United States v. Burkhart et al., Case No. 1:16-cr-212-

TWP-TAB (S.D. Ind.), involving this same defendant—Burkhart.

And those criminal

proceedings establish that Burkhart defrauded ASC out of millions of dollars. Burkhart pled guilty

and admitted under oath to knowingly engaging in a conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and

healthcare fraud with an intent to advance the conspiracy—Burkhart’s misconduct was intentional.

Burkhart’s counterclaims relate to his employment relationship with ASC as its CEO, and his

criminal convictions arose out the fraud he committed in his employment relationship with ASC

as its CEO—Burkhart’s wrongful conduct is immediately and necessarily related to his

counterclaims. ASC was injured by Burkhart defrauding it out of millions of dollars for which

ASC was entitled to restitution as a crime victim.

As argued by ASC, “[c]ontrary to Burkhart’s assertion, courts within the Seventh Circuit

consider an unclean hands defense ‘on a motion to dismiss if, as herein, the facts giving rise to the

defense are apparent.” (Filing No. 118 at 2) (quoting Cunningham v. EquiCredit Corp., 256 F.

Supp. 2d 785, 797 n.12 (N.D. Ill. 2003). The doctrine of unclean hands bars a party’s claim when

the party’s misconduct was intentional, its wrongdoing concerned the opposing party and had an

immediate and necessary relation to the matter in litigation, and the opposing party was injured by

the misconduct. Barrett, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92445, at *15. This is the quintessential case for

taking judicial notice of facts admitted in a guilty plea and applying the doctrine of unclean hands

to bar a party’s claims. At his change of plea hearing, Burkhart swore under oath to the factual

The Court also takes judicial notice that Burkhart has filed a Section 2255 petition, which “calls into question the

factual circumstances surrounding his plea.” (Filing No. 112 at 1

, n.1.) However, as the Court already has explained

in an earlier Order, “The issues in the two proceedings are not the same. Burkhart’s § 2255 petition alleges ineffective

assistance of trial counsel and the issue in the civil case is whether Burkhart defrauded ASC.” (

Filing No. 111 at 5.)

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basis underlying his plea of guilty. Despite his pending Motion to Vacate or Set Aside Sentence

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,

Burkhart is estopped from contesting these facts because “[i]n this

Circuit, a criminal conviction based upon a guilty plea conclusively establishes for purposes of a

subsequent civil proceeding that the defendant engaged in the criminal act for which he was

convicted.” Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1026 (7th Cir. 1987).

In the exercise of its rightful discretion to “refus[e] to aid the unclean litigant,” see

Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945), the Court

grants ASC’s Motion to Dismiss Burkhart’s counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust

enrichment based upon the doctrine of unclean hands. Because the Court grants the Motion on

this basis, further discussion concerning ASC’s alternative arguments is unnecessary

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES as moot without prejudice to refile

Werner’s Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 75) and GRANTS ASC’s Motion to Dismiss (

Filing No.

100). Burkhart’s counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment are dismissed with

prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

Date: _____________

In a footnote, Burkhart asks that this Court take judicial notice of his Section 2255 filing. See United States of

America v. James Burkhart, Case No. 1:16-cr-00212-TWP-TAB-01.” (Filing No. 112 at 1

). The Court takes judicial

notice of this civil filing in both the criminal case and Case No. 1:18-cv-4013-TWP-DLP, Filing No. 1, in which

Burkhart alleges violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.

Although the Court has not provided analysis on ASC’s alternative argument; dismissal is also warranted on

Burkhart’s breach of contract claim for the independent reason that Burkhart committed the first breach, and therefore,

may not complain of an alleged subsequent breach by ASC. “A party first guilty of a material breach of contract may

not maintain an action against the other party or seek to enforce the contract against the other party should that party

subsequently breach the contract.” Liocci v. Cardinal Assocs., Inc., 492 N.E.2d 48, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). See also

Felker v. Sw. Emergency Med. Serv., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 857, 869 (S.D. Ind. 2007).

9/26/2019

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DISTRIBUTION:

Daniel Benson

Montgomery B Wing

MONTGOMERY FEDERAL PRISON CAMP

Inmate Mail/Parcels

Maxwell Air Force Base

Montgomery, Alabama 36112

Eli J. Litoff