141
CONSTITUTION
OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
*The superscript numbers and asterisks appearing throughout the Constitution of the State of Connecticut and the
Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut indicate annotations which may be found, in sequence,
immediately following the article or section to which they apply.
All material printed in bold type and enclosed within parentheses did not form part of the original document con-
cerned but has been incorporated in this publication to assist the user.
Adopted December 14, 1965. Proclaimed by governor as adopted December 30, 1965.
PREAMBLE.*
*This constitution is a grant and not a limitation of power. 85 C. 319; 96 C. 192. Rights and privileges protected;
equality of rights. 65 C. 489. History of the growth of our constitution; 68 C. 164; 69 C. 586; what made constitution
prior to 1820. 3 Dal. 395. Local self-government as a part of our constitutional system; towns have no inherent rights
which the legislature may not control. 67 C. 236; 69 C. 149, 160; 10 How. 511; 170 U.S. 309. State can recognize an
honorary obligation; 76 C. 567; can accept gift in trust for institution for idiots; 67 C. 245; 69 C. 73; but cannot provide
a pension for veterans of the civil war here resident. 85 C. 344. All legislation not contrary to state or U.S. Constitution,
or to republican form of government is valid; Bible as rule of government; principles of morality as a restriction; 81 C.
534; law may be unconstitutional as against principles of free government and natural justice. 73 C. 283; 85 C. 347; 3
Dal. 388. Nature and denition of constitutions. 67 C. 305; 69 C. 127; Id., 583. When question of constitutionality is
raised, court presumes validity and sustains legislation unless it clearly violates constitutional principles. 146 C. 720.
To successfully challenge constitutionality of legislation, challenger must show his interests are adversely affected. Id.
Courts cannot, by process of construction, abrogate a clear expression of legislative intent, especially when unambiguous
language is fortied by refusal of legislature, in light of judicial interpretation, to change it. 147 C. 48. In case of real
doubt constitutionality of a law must be sustained. Id., 374. Towns and local boards of education are creatures of state,
and though they may question interpretation, they cannot challenge legality, of legislation enacted by their creator. 148
C. 238. Power of courts to declare law unconstitutional; in general; 73 C. 259; they look at its essence, not its form. 65
C. 484; 79 C. 444. State and federal constitutions are to be regarded together. 73 C. 259. Part only of a statute may be
declared unconstitutional. 73 C. 30; Id., 505; 75 C. 319; 77 C. 333; 78 C. 53; 82 C. 352; 85 C. 344. Laws are presumed,
and if possible, construed, to be valid; 64 C. 457; 73 C. 25; Id., 505; 76 C. 441; 78 C. 564; 79 C. 441; 86 C. 141; thus if
a law is only valid if notice is given of certain proceedings, a requirement of such notice may be implied. 88 C. 81; 90 C.
584. A law must be clearly unconstitutional, to be held so. 73 C. 18; 83 C. 4; 85 C. 344; 89 C. 394; 104 C. 205. Quaere,
whether presumption of validity extends to act of Congress claimed to invade sovereignty of state. 82 C. 352. Court
should question constitutionality of statute only in behalf of party in interest. 73 C. 546. Construction of the constitution.
*
142 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
Limits of power of court. Id., 259. Should be construed as whole. 78 C. 551. Words presumed to have ordinary meaning.
64 C. 450. Contemporaneous or established usage. Id., 453; 65 C. 146; 68 C. 150; 77 C. 257; 87 C. 506; Id., 554. Words
to be given meaning they had when used. 86 C. 627. Considerations proper in general. Id., 625. Constitution should be
construed to uphold its spirit; division into departments; 78 C. 565; in view of evils to be remedied. Id., 554. Power to
“dene” is not power to grant or apportion. 64 C. 452. Power once granted not to be later cut down except expressly or
by necessary implication. 78 C. 564. Neither preamble nor Art. I, Sec. 1 imposes on government an afrmative consti-
tutional obligation to provide minimum subsistence to the poor. 233 C. 557. Unenumerated constitutional obligation to
provide subsistence benets to those in need cited. Id. Cited. Id., 701. Unenumerated right to shelter implicit in consti-
tution as evidenced by its preamble cited. Id.
Benet of claim of unconstitutionality may be waived if claim is not seasonably made. 20 CS 503. Cited. 40 CS 394.
The People of Connecticut acknowledging with gratitude, the good providence of
God, in having permitted them to enjoy a free government; do, in order more effec-
tually to dene, secure, and perpetuate the liberties, rights and privileges which they
have derived from their ancestors; hereby, after a careful consideration and revision,
ordain and establish the following constitution and form of civil government.
ARTICLE FIRST.*
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.
*All protections contained in this article are fundamental civil liberties as to which Connecticut Supreme Court sits
as court of last resort, except that it may not restrict federal constitutional rights; rst referent is Connecticut law and full
panoply of rights Connecticut residents expect; decisions of U.S. Supreme Court are persuasive authority to be afforded
respectful consideration, but will be followed only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed
by Connecticut law. 172 C. 615. Cited. 192 C. 48; 199 C. 88. Federal constitutional right to liberty cited. 201 C. 605.
Cited. 209 C. 219; 216 C. 150, see also 26 CA 423, 27 CA 291, 223 C. 902 and 225 C. 10, reversing judgment in State
v. Marsala; 224 C. 627; 227 C. 363; 232 C. 740. State has no obligation under the constitution to provide subsistence
benets including obligation to provide shelter. 233 C. 701. Cited. 240 C. 489.
Fundamental right to liberty cited. 24 CA 612. Cited. 29 CA 207; 33 CA 603. Violation of state constitution cited.
Id. Cited. 37 CA 561; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 216; 38 CA 198. Jury instruction in which the phrases “reasonable
doubt” and “the benet of the doubt” are included does not suggest that jury could only acquit in a close case if it could
give defendant “the benet of the doubt” and therefore does not impinge on defendant’s right to due process. 62 CA 625.
Cited. 37 CS 90; 41 CS 525.
1
That the great and essential principles of liberty and free government may be rec-
ognized and established,
WE DECLARE:
(Equality of rights.)
Sec. 1.
2
All men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man
or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the
community.
1
State constitutional rights cited. 209 C. 679. Cited. 216 C. 85. Equal protection of the laws cited. Id. Cited. 224 C.
915; 228 C. 699; 230 C. 183; 231 C. 918; Id., 919; 232 C. 707; 233 C. 701. Unenumerated right to shelter implicit in
preamble to Art. I cited. Id. 1997 amendment to Sec. 22a-208a prohibiting establishment or construction of new plant
or station within 1/4 mile of day care center operating as of July 8, 1997, in municipality with population greater than
100,000 persons violates right to equal protection guaranteed by Connecticut Constitution, Art. I, Secs. 1 and 20 by
creating classications unrelated to legitimate state interest. 257 C. 429.
Cited. 26 CA 785. Sec. 52-584 is constitutional as applied to plaintiff because although classication under repose
section of statute of limitations under said Sec. results in disparate treatment for those who do not discover their injury
within three-year limitations period, the classication bears a reasonable relationship to legislative goal of said repose
section. 66 CA 518.
Cited. 40 CS 394; 41 CS 48. Violation of constitutional rights cited. Id. Right to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. 42 CS 227.
Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 143
2
This article is a limitation on legislative power. 85 C. 348. Not intended to affect practice of requiring candidates for
admission to the bar to be approved by it; 79 C. 55; nor to forbid licensing of sale of intoxicating liquors. 81 C. 534. The
language of this section, although broad in its scope, is limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed,
and does not include slaves. 12 C. 42, 43. A grant of the exclusive right to use streets for laying gas pipes is void as being
a monopoly. 25 C. 38. But such right, if acquired by contract, is protected by Art. I, Sec. 10 of the U.S. Constitution,
forbidding any state from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. 55 C. 9–15. Statute authorizing town
agents only to sell liquor does not create a monopoly. 25 C. 288. An act prohibiting the exercise of a lawful and harmless
business, unless a license therefor is rst obtained, is in violation of the restrictions on legislative power contained in the
rst article. 65 C. 483–492; 67 C. 550; but see 77 C. 328. Discrimination among classes for taxation purposes valid. 74
C. 450; 76 C. 242; 104 C. 195, 200; limitations on right to discriminate. 107 C. 708.
Act authorizing city to sell land to a named person held valid. 75 C. 103. Provision in law authorizing cities to estab-
lish lighting plants by which private plants may be purchased not invalid. 76 C. 572. So act authorizing cemetery asso-
ciation to condemn land of another similar association. 77 C. 90. Law authorizing railroad companies to condemn shares
of stock in certain cases upheld. Id., 422; 203 U.S. 372. This section does not prevent legislature forbidding epileptics to
marry; 78 C. 243; or discriminating between various classes of money lenders in usury statute. 82 C. 233; 218 U.S. 563,
572; 125 C. 320. Statute forbidding keeping of house reputed to be house of ill-fame does not violate this section. 82 C.
112; 83 C. 56; Id., 551. Ordinance prohibiting making speeches in public parks or on streets or sidewalks without permit
from chief of police, and providing no guide for his decision is void; 96 C. 193; and this regardless of whether the chief
of police used proper judgment and discretion. Id., 196. This section and Sec. 10 of this article are coextensive with 14th
amendment of U.S. Constitution. 104 C. 195. Special act providing that particular lessee pay taxes held to deny equal
protection. 109 C. 388. Ordinance restricting use of public market to growers only held not discriminatory. 110 C. 293.
Special act validating decient notice to city of defective sidewalk held constitutional. 124 C. 183. Common control
provision of unemployment compensation act is valid. 128 C. 213. Restriction of funeral directors’ licenses to relatives
of deceased or disabled directors held void. 129 C. 133. Requirement that liquor permittee be elector is not discrimina-
tory. Id., 619. State veterans’ bonus sustained. 133 C. 511. Act to provide housing for veterans is proper class legislation.
Id., 544. Cited. 134 C. 15 (Diss. Op.). Tax exemptions to veterans under Secs. 12-81(19), (20), (22), (27) and 12-82 held
valid. 135 C. 210. Statute held not to grant exclusive public emoluments. 136 C. 49. Zoning ordinance prohibiting sale
or display of new or used cars in any open lot in any zone is an unwarranted interference with the constitutional right to
carry on a lawful business. 137 C. 701. An appropriation may be proper provided it is for a public purpose, even though
the disbursement of it is not restricted to ofcers or agencies of the state itself. 138 C. 134. Special act granting prefer-
ential treatment to veterans taking civil service examinations either for original employment or for promotion does not
violate this section. 139 C. 102. Special act which did not benet veterans generally, but only a very small group, held
unconstitutional. Id., 310. An act which serves no other purpose than individual gain is invalid. If the act serves a proper
public purpose, the fact that it incidentally confers a direct benet upon some individual does not render it invalid. 140
C. 8. Neither the federal government nor the state is under any constitutional obligation to allow a deduction for a tax
imposed by the other. 141 C. 257. Does not require that taxation be equal and uniform. Id., 266. Substantially same as
the fourteenth amendment to U.S. Constitution. 143 C. 9. One cannot question the constitutional validity of a legislative
enactment on the ground that it is class legislation unless he is one of the class which is claimed to suffer from discrim-
ination. Id., 405. The discriminations which are open to objection are those where persons engaged in the same business
are subjected to different restrictions, or are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions. Id., 502.
Cited. Id., 698. A permit to sell liquor is a matter of privilege and not of right. By engaging in the liquor business the
permittee assumes the risk of a variety of situations which could impose liability on him. It is not an unconstitutional
exercise of the police power for a permittee who sells in violation of the law to be prevented from defending on the
ground that the particular drink which he sold did not cause or contribute to the buyer’s intoxication. 144 C. 241. Regu-
lation of ordinary businesses and those by nature dangerous to the public, distinguished. 145 C. 490. Allowance of sale
of antiques on Sunday held not a denial of equal protection of the laws. Id., 554. Ordinance licensing and regulating
trailer and mobile home parks held constitutional except for two provisions. 146 C. 720. Providing of school transporta-
tion to nonprot private schools by towns under Sec. 10-281 held constitutional. 147 C. 374. Substantially the same as
the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. Id. A statute which serves a public purpose is not unconstitutional
merely because it incidentally benets a limited number of persons. Id. Defendant charged a denial of equal protection
since other persons, similarly circumstanced, were not sentenced as third offenders, held not a valid defense unless there
is a showing of intentional or arbitrary action amounting to discrimination. Id., 506. Ordinance requiring the attendance
of a police ofcer, at the expense of the theater owner, at each theater performance to see that safety precautions were
observed, held to be a valid exercise of police power by the city. Id., 546. In order to hold zoning regulation unconstitu-
tional as violative of equal protection, it must appear that provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Art. I, Sec. 1 has never been held to prevent leg-
islative bodies from dealing differently with different classes of persons, provided there is some natural and substantial
difference germane to the subject and purposes of the legislation between those within the class included and those
whom it leaves untouched. 149 C. 712. The delegation of legislative power in chapter 579 to a private corporation is not
a violation of the constitution. Chapter 579 serves a public purpose and it is not rendered unconstitutional by the fact that
it might incidentally benet particular industries or lending institutions. The act sufciently states a public purpose
though not spelled out with specicity. 150 C. 333. That some persons may derive a private advantage from an enterprise
designed to serve a public purpose does not defeat the public purpose of the enterprise. Id., 366. Clause in Sec. 10-6
exempting schools in existence before 1942 from its operation held discriminatory and unconstitutional. 151 C. 631.
Court cannot strike down as unconstitutional a legislative enactment merely because it contains technical words the ex-
act meaning of which is not evident, without explanation, to other persons disassociated from the technical eld. 153 C.
465. Since disability pay to a former Hartford employee is actually a form of pension for services rendered to the city,
said payments must be based on income received from the city alone, not including income received from other sources
or employers. 154 C. 1, 8. Gravel removal ordinance enacted by planning and zoning commission was valid exercise of
police power and not discriminatory as to plaintiff who had previously sold gravel from his property. Id., 650. Special
144 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
zoning regulation to assist relocation of businesses on property condemned by redevelopment acts is not unreasonable
classication of beneciaries of police power of local governments. 156 C. 287. Cited. 157 C. 179. Constitutionality of
chapter 581 (Secs. 32-32–32-46, 1972 public act 248, the “Connecticut Product Development Corporation Act”) upheld.
167 C. 111. When thrust of challenge is that act violates this article and section, plaintiffs have demonstrated such inva-
lidity if they can show beyond a reasonable doubt that legislation “directs the granting of an emolument or privilege to
an individual or class without any purpose, expressed or apparent, to serve the public welfare thereby.” Id. “Public pur-
pose” discussed. Id. In deciding whether an act serves such a purpose the court has traditionally vested the legislature
with wide discretion and suggests that the latter’s determination should not be reversed unless “manifestly and palpably
incorrect.” Id. When plaintiffs claim ultimate benets to be realized by the state are “remote,” they are merely disputing
business judgment of legislature. Id. The strong presumption of act’s constitutionality will not be overcome simply be-
cause plaintiffs’ economic forecasts differ from those of the legislature. Id. Chapter 581 (Secs. 32-32–32-46, 1972 public
act 248, the “Connecticut Product Development Corporation Act”) contains provisions which in their totality comprise
a system of barriers preventing any automatic ow of public funds to preferred persons or groups. Id. Plaintiffs failed to
sustain burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of the act’s (1972 public act 248) constitutionality by showing
beyond a reasonable doubt that it entitles successful applicants to exclusive public welfare thereby. Id. Sec. 14-66 is a
proper exercise of the police power of the state and hence not a denial of equal protection of the laws. Id., 304. As Sec.
7-433c was enacted for a proper public purpose, direct benet incidentally conferred on a certain class of citizens does
not render it invalid as a class preference. 168 C. 84. Equal protection not violated by Sec. 14-111(c). Legislature reason-
ably decided public safety is ensured by removing from the highway by license suspensions that class of drivers respon-
sible for accidents that cause death. Id., 94. Cited. Id., 212; 169 C. 454, 471 (Diss. Op.). Present system of public school
nancing, relying principally on local taxes, violates this section; meaning and application of section and relationship to
federal equal protection clause. 172 C. 615. Even a privilege may not be bestowed in an unconstitutional manner. Id.,
615, 656 (Diss. Op.). Cited. 173 C. 220; Id., 473. Section does not require taxation to be equal and uniform. 174 C. 556.
Exercise of judicial power by a retired judge who has been designated a referee is not unconstitutional. 177 C. 173. Cited.
Id., 304; 178 C. 664; 179 C. 311; Id., 627; 188 C. 98, 100; 189 C. 550. Sec. 29-45 held to be constitutional. 192 C. 127.
Cited. Id., 207. Inapplicable to case on its face. 193 C. 506. Cited. Id., 670. Legislative provisions for nancing education
violated provisions of Connecticut Constitution (Horton v. Meskill, 172 C. 615). Id. Cited. 194 C. 165; 195 C. 24. Equal
rights cited. Id. Cited. 196 C. 623; 201 C. 421. Provision of collective bargaining agreement not in violation of equal
protection policy. Id., 577. Cited. 203 C. 624; 204 C. 17; Id., 746. Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. 205 C. 17. Equal
protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 27. Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 495. Deprivation of fundamental constitutional
rights cited. Id. Cited. 207 C. 496. Special act held unconstitutional where it constitutes award of exclusive public emol-
ument or privilege not available to other persons and without a public purpose. 211 C. 199. Sec. 31-291 not in violation
of this section. 212 C. 427. Cited. 213 C. 13; 217 C. 164. Equal protection of laws cited. Id. Cited. Id., 404. Equal pro-
tection provisions cited. Id. Cited. Id., 689; 228 C. 79; 229 C. 1. Equal rights provisions cited. Id. Cited. Id., 312. Rights
to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 801; 232 C. 901; Id., 902; 233 C. 437; Id., 460. Neither preamble nor this section
imposes on government an afrmative constitutional obligation to provide minimum subsistence to the poor. Id., 557.
Preserving unenumerated rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 701. Unencumbered right to shelter implicit in the term “social
compact” in Connecticut Constitution Art. I, Sec. 1 cited. Id. Cited. 234 C. 217; 235 C. 637; 238 C. 1. Equal opportunity
to a free public education cited; fundamental right to education cited. Id. “Neither the social compact clause nor its
counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.” Id., 389. Social
compact clause cited. Id. Cited. Id., 809. Equal protection of the laws cited. Id. Cited. 239 C. 168; Id., 708. Equal pro-
tection cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 246; 243 C. 205. Statute that grants prosecutor discretion to recommend transfer of some
juveniles from criminal docket to juvenile docket does not violate right to equal protection of the law. 245 C. 93. Town’s
conveyance of public park land was not an exclusive public emolument. 285 C. 309. Trial court properly determined that
a special act allowing plaintiff, and only plaintiff, to present his claim against the state to the Claims Commissioner,
despite his initial untimely ling of such complaint, was unconstitutional as an exclusive public emolument. 290 C. 245.
Trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction in concluding that Sec. 31-294c(d) constitutes a public emolument in
violation of section. 299 C. 800. Plaintiffs failed to establish that the educational system in this state violates the equal
protection provisions of the state constitution by failing to ensure that the poorer school districts had funding that is
substantially equal to the wealthier school districts. 327 C. 650.
Cited. 8 CA 50; 12 CA 455; 14 CA 77; 27 CA 495; judgment reversed, see 225 C. 499; 34 CA 833; 37 CA 801.
Rights to a fair cross-section jury panel cited. Id. Cited. 39 CA 384. Denial of equal protection cited. Id. Cited. 45 CA
110. Equal protection cited. Id. A statute serves a public purpose when it benets all state taxpayers; relevant test is
not whether it adversely affects some persons but whether it promotes a public purpose more generally. 53 CA 438.
Resolution authorizing plaintiff to commence lawsuit against the state for his alleged injuries violated provision against
public emoluments because resolution contained no declaration as to public purpose served, nor could the court discern
such public purpose. 150 CA 237. Resolution passed by the General Assembly that authorizes a plaintiff, and only the
plaintiff, to commence a lawsuit against the state for alleged injuries and does not declare how it serves a public purpose
violates the prohibition against public emoluments. 152 CA 177.
Legislature may grant right of eminent domain to but one county. 5 CS 251. Applied to use of drugs to prevent
conception. 7 CS 277. Applied to right of appeal. 8 CS 75. State entered special defense questioning constitutionality
of special act giving plaintiff permission to sue state for negligence. Demurrer to defense overruled. 20 CS 496. Zoning
ordinance limiting occupancy to elderly persons did not so serve the public welfare as to be within the police power.
26 CS 127. Zoning ordinance limiting occupancy to elderly persons did not so serve public welfare as to be within police
power. Id. Sec. 52-159a not in violation of this section as it is a reasonable classication of persons protected pretrial.
28 CS 52. Cited. 32 CS 502; 37 CS 515; 38 CS 426; 40 CS 365; Id., 381. State regulation on Medicaid abortion funding
is unconstitutional. Id., 394. Cited. 42 CS 172; Id., 526; 43 CS 470; 44 CS 34.
Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 674, 679. Sunday law (Sec. 53-300) not a violation. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 493.
Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 145
(Source of political power. Right to alter form of government.)
Sec. 2.
1
All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are
founded on their authority, and instituted for their benet; and they have at all times
an undeniable and indefeasible right to alter their form of government in such manner
as they may think expedient.
1
Does not apply to aliens. 96 C. 611. Cited. 195 C. 524; 197 C. 554; 216 C. 253; 232 C. 345. Possibility alleged
taking might be temporary because of favorable resolution of administrative appeal does not preclude inverse condem-
nation action. 247 C. 196.
Cited. 37 CS 515.
(Right of religious liberty.)
Sec. 3.
1
The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination, shall forever be free to all persons in the state; provided, that the right
hereby declared and established, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licen-
tiousness, or to justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.
1
Cited. 7 C. 77; 16 C. 516. Statute restricting solicitation of funds for religious or charitable causes upheld. 126 C.
4; but see 310 U.S. 296. A condition in a custody action that minor attend school afliated with his religious faith does
not violate guarantee of freedom of religion. 141 C. 235. Reasonable regulation of location of churches and schools for
religious education does not violate constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion. 149 C. 712. Continued connement
in a state hospital of a dementia praecox patient who mutilated himself under inuence of religious delusions held not
violation of this section. 157 C. 56. Cited. 172 C. 496; 177 C. 440; 199 C. 496. Right to freedom of religion cited. 205
C. 723. Right of religious liberty cited. 231 C. 944. Cited. 233 C. 557; 234 C. 324. Right to religious freedom cited. Id.
Cited. 234 C. 455. Free exercise of religion cited. Id. Cited. 236 C. 646. State constitutional right of religious liberty
cited. Id. Cited. 239 C. 356. Enumerated constitutional rights cited. Id. In zoning appeal, section applies to rights of
religious institutions and is not limited to rights of individuals. 285 C. 381.
Cited. 7 CA 745; 17 CA 53. Free exercise of religion clauses cited. Id.
Cited. 29 CS 407; 37 CS 515; 39 CS 142; 42 CS 256. Free exercise of religion and freedom of religion cited. Id.
(Liberty of speech and the press.)
Sec. 4.
1
Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.
1
This section and the following do not confer the right to publish matter injurious to the public morals or such as
endangers the vital interest of society. 73 C. 27–29. Cited. 27 C. 27. Of freedom of the speech and of the press in general.
73 C. 18. Statements before investigating board of city council; 64 C. 223; petition to police commissioners for removal
of ofcer; express malice; 66 C. 175; statements of district superintendent to board of school visitors; 81 C. 293; of
pastor of church in criticism of member; 85 C. 23; statements to police ofcer as to loss of money and suspicion of theft;
87 C. 220; of military ofcer to his superior as to tness of candidate for promotion. 88 C. 247. Right of newspaper to
criticize public ofcer. 90 C. 98. Ordinance prohibiting making of speeches in public parks or on streets or sidewalks
without obtaining permit from chief of police, and prescribing no uniform rule to be followed in issuing permits is void.
96 C. 194. Act prohibiting publishing disloyal matter concerning the U.S. government held constitutional. Id., 607. This
section does not apply to aliens, when. Id., 614. Court’s charge on freedom of the press approved. 113 C. 580. Statute
restricting solicitation of funds for religious or charitable causes upheld. 126 C. 4; but see 310 U.S. 296. The issuance of
an injunction to restrain picketing for an unlawful purpose does not violate guarantee of free speech. 139 C. 95; 146 C.
93. Since our antiobscenity statute (Sec. 52-243) has been construed as including scienter requirement by implication,
constitutionality of statute is not open to attack on ground that it lacks such a requirement. Test of whether material
can be adjudged obscene is whether, to the average person applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. Question of suppressibility under constitutional
standards is one of law. 150 C. 92. Freedom of commercial speech discussed. 192 C. 15. Commercial speech discussed.
Id., 27. Both Connecticut Constitution Art. I, Sec. 14 and this section are designed as a safeguard against acts of the state
and do not limit the private conduct of individuals or persons. Id., 48. Cited. 193 C. 612. Right of free speech cited. 197
C. 141. Until defendants have exhausted administrative remedies they cannot claim denial of right of free speech under
state constitution. 199 C. 575. Cited. 203 C. 624. Rights to free speech cited. Id. Cited. 204 C. 551; Id., 683; 205 C. 495.
Deprivation of fundamental state constitutional rights cited. Id. Cited. 208 C. 146. Free expression cited. Id. Cited. 212
C. 176; 215 C. 590. Right to free speech and protection of commercial speech cited. Id. Unconstitutionally over broad
cited. Id. Freedom of the press cited; constitutional rights cited. 221 C. 166. Free speech clauses cited. 222 C. 672. Cited.
226 C. 773. Free speech clauses cited. 229 C. 10. Cited. 230 C. 525; 232 C. 65; Id., 345. Free speech provisions cited;
void for overbreadth cited; free speech and vagueness test cited. Id. Cited. 233 C. 557; 234 C. 455. Right to freedom
of speech under state constitution cited. 236 C. 781. Cited. 239 C. 356. Enumerated constitutional rights; freedom of
speech cited. Id. In order to prevail on claim that municipal ordinance violates state constitution plaintiff must identify
the specic additional expressive rights recognized under state constitution and describe how such rights are infringed
upon by the ordinance. 254 C. 799. Town ordinance restricting park access to residents and their guests violates freedom
of speech guarantee. 257 C. 318. Minimal state involvement present in private shopping mall does not constitute state
146 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
action. 270 C. 261. Speech rights may be waived by contract. 292 C. 187. Under the state constitution, employee speech
pursuant to ofcial job duties on certain matters of signicant public interest is protected from employer discipline in
a public workplace; modied balancing test in 391 U.S. 563 and 461 U.S. 138 applies to speech by a public employee
pursuant to the employee’s ofcial duties. 319 C. 175.
Constitutionally protected free speech cited. 6 CA 407. Cited. 7 CA 418. Protected speech and conduct cited. 12 CA
258. Cited. Id., 455. Right to free speech cited. Id. Constitutionally protected speech cited. Id., 481. Free speech guaranty
cited. 18 CA 316. Constitutional guarantee of free speech cited. 25 CA 16. Cited. 27 CA 103; 32 CA 656; judgment
reversed in part, see 232 C. 345. Right of free speech cited. Id. Over breadth or vagueness cited. Id. Cited. 38 CA 306.
Involved right to free speech cited; “ghting words” limitation cited. Id. Free speech cited. 44 CA 611. Cited. 46 CA 559.
Prohibition of harassing telephone calls under Sec. 53-183(a)(3) is not unconstitutionally overbroad; the statute prohibits
purposeful harassment by use of telephone and does not prohibit speech on public concerns. 55 CA 475. Ordinance did
not violate free speech guarantee as it contained no restriction on content and merely regulated size of residential signs.
60 CA 376. Protection of citizen complaints of police misconduct from threat of defamation actions for statements made
during a quasi-judicial proceeding serves public policy of protecting free speech that furthers the interests of a demo-
cratic society. 78 CA 549.
Private property owners rights are subordinate to rights under this section and Sec. 14 of this article. 37 CS 90. Cited.
Id., 515; 38 CS 349; 41 CS 31. Constitutional right to freedom of speech cited. Id. Opinions protection by state consti-
tution cited. Id. Civil union legislation does not deny plaintiffs, eight same sex couples, the right of free expression and
association because civil union and marriage in Connecticut now share same benets, protections and responsibilities
under law; Connecticut Constitution requires that there be equal protection and due process of law, not that there be
equivalent nomenclature for such protection and process. 49 CS 644.
(Prohibiting laws limiting liberty of speech or press.)
Sec. 5.
1
No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of
the press.
1
A statute forbidding the publication of proposals for selling lottery tickets does not infringe the liberty of the press.
28 C. 228. State may dene criminal libel and make press subject thereto. 90 C. 98. The issuance of an injunction to re-
strain picketing for an unlawful purpose does not violate guarantee of free speech. 139 C. 95; 146 C. 93. Obscenity is not
protected by this section; constitutionality of Sec. 53-243, making it a crime to possess obscene literature, upheld. Id., 78.
Since our antiobscenity statute (Sec. 53-243) has been construed as including a scienter requirement by implication, con-
stitutionality of statute is not open to attack on ground that it lacks such a requirement; the test of whether material can be
adjudged obscene is whether, to the average person applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; the question of suppressibility under constitutional
standards is one of law. 150 C. 92. Freedom of commercial speech discussed. 192 C. 15. Cited. Id., 48. Until defendants
have exhausted administrative remedies, they cannot claim denial of right of free speech under state constitution. 199
C. 575. Rights to free speech cited. Id. Cited. 203 C. 624. Rights to free speech cited. Id. Cited. 204 C. 683; 205 C. 456.
Right to free speech cited. Id. Cited. Id., 495. Deprivation of fundamental state constitutional rights cited. Id. Cited. 212
C. 176; 215 C. 590. Right to free speech and protection of commercial speech; unconstitutionally overbroad cited. Id.
State right to privacy cited; plaintiff did not establish standing to assert constitutional rights of individual permit (to carry
pistols or revolvers) holders not properly before the court. 222 C. 621. Free speech clauses cited. Id., 672. Cited. 226 C.
773. Free speech clauses cited. 229 C. 10. Cited. 230 C. 525; 232 C. 345. Free speech provisions; void for overbreadth;
free speech and vagueness test cited. Id. Cited. 233 C. 557. In order to prevail on claim that municipal ordinance violates
state constitution, plaintiff must identify the specic additional expressive rights recognized under state constitution and
describe how such rights are infringed upon by the ordinance. 254 C. 799. Town ordinance restricting park access to res-
idents and their guests violates freedom of speech guarantee. 257 C. 318. Minimal state involvement present in private
shopping mall does not constitute state action. 270 C. 261. Speech rights may be waived by contract. 292 C. 187. Under
the state constitution, employee speech pursuant to ofcial job duties on certain matters of signicant public interest is
protected from employer discipline in a public workplace; modied balancing test in 391 U.S. 563 and 461 U.S. 138
applies to speech by a public employee pursuant to the employee’s ofcial duties. 319 C. 175.
Guarantee of freedom of speech requires that part of the breach of peace statute (Sec. 53a-181) prohibiting use of
abusive language be conned to language which constitutes “ghting” words. 1 CA 669. Protected speech and conduct
cited. 12 CA 258. Cited. Id., 455. Free speech provisions cited. Id. Cited. 32 CA 656; judgment reversed in part, see
232 C. 345. Right of free speech; overbreadth or vagueness cited. Id. Cited. 38 CA 306. Involved right to free speech;
“ghting words” limitation cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 559. Prohibition of harassing telephone calls under Sec. 53-183(a)(3)
is not unconstitutionally overbroad; the statute prohibits purposeful harassment by use of telephone and does not prohibit
speech on public concerns. 55 CA 475.
Applied to use of drugs to prevent conception. 7 CS 277. Discussion of protected and unprotected speech. 35 CS
587. Cited. 37 CS 90; Id., 515; 41 CS 31. Constitutional rights of freedom of press; opinions protected by state consti-
tution cited. Id. Cited. Id., 66. Civil union legislation does not deny plaintiffs, eight same sex couples, the right of free
expression and association because civil union and marriage in Connecticut now share same benets, protections and
responsibilities under law; Connecticut Constitution requires that there be equal protection and due process of law, not
that there be equivalent nomenclature for such protection and process. 49 CS 644.
Obscenity is not protected by the language of this section. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 441. Criteria for determining obscenity
discussed. Id., 442.
Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 147
(Prosecutions for libel; defenses.)
Sec. 6.
1
In all prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evi-
dence, and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the
direction of the court.
1
See 75 C. 232. Applies only to criminal prosecutions. 91 C. 442. In slander plea in justication must be as broad
as the charge complained of. 117 C. 601. Object of provision is to put libel cases on same footing as other criminal
prosecutions, but it does not curtail right of court to determine law to be applied by jury in rendition of general verdict
in prosecution for libel. 148 C. 208.
(Security from searches and seizures.)
Sec. 7.
1
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions
from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize
any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause supported by oath or afrmation.
1
Evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of federal constitution inadmissible in state court. 367 U.S.
643. Applicable to search warrants only. 4 C. 118. Form of oath required to procure warrant to seize liquors. 30 C. 458.
Separate search warrant for each suspected place not required. 27 C. 455. Search for and seizure of photographs by police
ofcers, held not to be in violation of this section. 67 C. 304, 305. Cited. 12 C. 43. Requires written charge and notice,
before justice of the peace can punish for contempt not committed in his presence. 75 C. 355. Right of legislature to au-
thorize ofcer to seize shing tackle being unlawfully used without warrant; 90 C. 584; so to seize liquor unlawfully kept.
29 C. 478. Policemen’s entrance into burning house and seizure of still and liquors without warrant held legal. 97 C. 545.
When search of person of a suspect without warrant held valid. 101 C. 228. Reasonableness of search or seizure is for
court to determine from the circumstances. 112 C. 173. Articles offered in evidence, relevant to issue of guilt of accused
person, will not be excluded because seized in violation of this provision. 120 C. 573. Cited. 126 C. 434. If search and
seizure were incidental to lawful arrest, they were not unreasonable. 149 C. 567. Cited. Id., 572, 583, 586. If one consents
to a search of his person, possessions or living quarters, he waives his constitutional protection. 150 C. 457. Where infor-
mation obtained from search prompted arrest, held state could not claim search was incidental to lawful arrest. Id., 488.
Whether a search is reasonable and the evidence seized therefore admissible is a question for the court in light of the
circumstances of the case and constitutional guarantees. 152 C. 93. Bases for nding of probable cause for issuance of a
search warrant discussed. 153 C. 8. Hearsay information from informer may enter into determination of probable cause
so long as a substantial basis is shown for crediting the hearsay. Id., 9. Search by police ofcer, not made as an incident
to a lawful arrest, if otherwise reasonable, could be justied under this section, and the fourth amendment and fourteenth
amendment, Sec. 1 of the U.S. Constitution only on proof that protection afforded by these provisions had been waived.
Id., 70, 71. Cited. Id., 133, see 198 C. 255; Id., 151. 3-week delay in arresting defendant not an unreasonable seizure of
his person where purpose of delay was to protect identity of undercover agent and no prejudice to defendant appeared.
Id., 564. Illegal arrest, under federal constitution, cannot be objected to during habeas corpus proceeding when no timely
objection is made at trial. 155 C. 627. Motion for suppression of evidence obtained by search under warrant was properly
denied where items seized were reasonably related to crime charged of rape and kidnapping; items seized under warrant
on prior circuit court arraignment not returnable because Superior Court asserted jurisdiction. 157 C. 198. Search of de-
fendant’s car without warrant permissible when he was being arrested while seated therein for commission of misde-
meanor a short time before. Id., 222. Verdict and judgment of guilty reversed where arrest of defendant for trial for per-
jury was based on an invalid warrant. 159 C. 96. Judge who issued search warrant is not required to cross-examine the
ofcers concerning the facts which they had submitted to him under oath. Id., 521. Cited. 162 C. 440. Police have the
right to stop for investigation short of arrest where a police ofcer observes unusual conduct which leads him to conclude
criminal activity may be afoot. 165 C. 577. Cited. 169 C. 322; 170 C. 85. Warrantless search of motor van, with probable
cause, upheld; knowledge of entire organization imputed to police ofcer. 171 C. 119. Cited. 175 C. 614; 176 C. 17; Id.,
75; 179 C. 46; Id., 522. Blood test constitutes a search and seizure. 180 C. 290. Court’s construction of Sec. 54-41c(8) in
accord with standards for protection of privacy. Id., 345. Cited. 181 C. 151; Id., 172; Id., 299; 183 C. 394. Unidentied
informant and probable cause discussed. 185 C. 104. Any such “search” in case is lawful as incident to a lawful arrest.
186 C. 45. Defendant was “seized” within meaning of constitutional provisions so as to invoke its protection. Id., 287.
Cited. 187 C. 647; 189 C. 228; Id., 461. Warrantless search and seizure at premises destroyed by re discussed. Id., 752.
Cited. 190 C. 440; 191 C. 360; 193 C. 70; Id., 612; Id., 695; 194 C. 331; Id., 530; 195 C. 668; 196 C. 685. Provides more
substantive protection than does the fourth amendment to the federal constitution in determination of probable cause. 197
C. 219. Court held an illegal arrest imposes no jurisdictional barrier to a defendant’s subsequent prosecution and over-
ruled 153 C. 127 to the extent that it holds to the contrary. 198 C. 255. Illegal search cited. Id., 348. Cited. 199 C. 399;
Id., 718; 200 C. 82; Id., 151. Unconstitutional arrest; fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial cited. 201 C. 559.
Cited. 202 C. 385. Constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure cited. Id. Cited. 204 C. 187; Id., 259; 205
C. 298; Id., 456; Id., 560; Id., 638. Illegal searches and seizures cited. 207 C. 152. Cited. Id., 565; 209 C. 1; Id., 98; 211
C. 258; 212 C. 223; Id., 821. Unconstitutional search cited. 214 C. 752. Probable cause discussed. 215 C. 667. Good faith
exception to exclusionary rule incompatible with this section of the Connecticut Constitution. 216 C. 150, see also 26 CA
423, 27 CA 291, 223 C. 902 and 225 C. 10, reversing judgment in State v. Marsala. Good faith exception to exclusionary
rule; required suppression; costs of exclusionary rule cited. Id. Cited. Id., 172. Constitution does not authorize good faith
exception to exclusionary rule. Id., 185. Cited. Id., 402; Id., 514. Search and seizure; constitutionally protected interests
in human dignity and privacy cited. Id. Cited. 217 C. 73; 218 C. 85. “Totality of circumstances” analysis of probable
cause discussed. 219 C. 529. Cited. Id., 557; 220 C. 920. Illegal search and seizure cited. 222 C. 254. Cited. Id., 910.
Applicability of emergency doctrine is analyzed by de novo review of subordinate facts found by trial court to determine
148 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
justication of warrantless entry. Id., 672. State constitutional grounds; state search and seizure clause cited. Id. Cited.
223 C. 127. Constitutional requirement of probable cause; “totality of circumstances” test cited. Id. Cited. Id., 207; Id.,
283; Id., 635; Id., 903; 224 C. 593. Constitutional rights cited. Id. Search and seizure by police of garbage placed at curb
for collection did not violate this constitutional provision. Id., 627. Constitutional right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures cited. Id. Cited. Id., 914; Id., 915. Held, good faith exception to exclusionary rule is incompatible
with Connecticut Constitution Art. I, Sec. 7, 216 C. 150; judgment of Appellate Court in 26 CA 423, 27 CA 291, 223 C.
902 reversed. 225 C. 10. Cited. Id., 55. Unconstitutional seizure cited. Id. Cited. Id., 609. Emergency exception to warrant
requirements of state constitution cited. Id. Does not entitle defendant to de novo review of issue of probable cause. 226
C. 514. Cited. 227 C. 1; Id., 101. Unlawful, forcible detention of a person and “seizure” cited. Id. Cited. Id., 207. Autho-
rized search cited. Id. Warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause conducted after automobile has been
impounded at police station violates this section. Id., 363. Constitutional preference for warrants cited. Id. Cited. Id., 456.
Illegal arrest cited. Id., 534. Cited. 228 C. 62. Seizure and unlawful seizure cited. Id. Cited. Id., 281; Id., 610. Chemical
test on clothing constituted an unreasonable search under this article; judgment of Appellate Court in 30 CA 164 reversed.
229 C. 10. Search and seizure warrant requirements cited. Id. Cited. Id., 125; Id., 164. Violation of seizure rights cited.
Id. Cited. 230 C. 24. Reasonable and articulable suspicion standard discussed; canine sniff as a “search” discussed. Id.,
372. Unconstitutional search cited. Id. Cited. 231 C. 43. Search and seizure; exigent circumstances cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
115. Right of privacy under state constitution cited. Id. Detention for investigative purposes cited. 232 C. 455. Cited. 233
C. 557; 234 C. 903. Sec. 7 does not categorically bar the seizure of non-threatening contraband detected through sense of
touch during a lawful patdown search; judgment of Appellate Court in 37 CA 561 reversed. 236 C. 216. Unconstitutional
search cited. Id. Cited. 237 C. 81. Challenge to warrantless entry; evidence obtained in violation of rights cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 390. Illegal seizure cited. Id. Department regulations pertaining to nonprivileged inmate telephone calls are consistent
with Connecticut Constitution Art. I, Sec. 7. 238 C. 692. Privacy right to telephone calls cited. Id. Illegal, unreasonable
search; unconstitutional intervening search cited. 239 C. 235. Taking of property in violation of Connecticut Constitution
cited. Id., 515. “Probable cause” and “reasonable and articulable suspicion” standards discussed. 240 C. 365. Prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures cited. Id. Cited. Id., 489. State violated rights of search cited. Id. Cited. 241
C. 650. Violation gives rise to a private cause of action for money damages. 244 C. 23. Defendant did not have a reason-
able expectation of privacy in charred wood ooring samples that had been lawfully seized from his home pursuant to a
re investigation and therefore search warrant was not required to conduct tests on the samples. 246 C. 63. Trial court
reversed; warrantless search and seizure was conducted incident to an arrest that was lawful and evidence was incorrectly
suppressed. 248 C. 183. State constitutional standard for subfacial challenge to a warrant is the same as federal standard.
251 C. 567. Police violated defendant’s rights by detaining defendant because his vehicle was located in an area of in-
creased criminal activity at an early hour of the morning. Id., 636. A sobriety checkpoint operated under neutral criteria
found to be constitutionally permissible in light of the state’s signicant interest in preventing motorists from driving
under the inuence of alcohol. 256 C. 543. Trial court reversed; informant’s basis of knowledge giving rise to warrantless
search of automobile by police does not require that informant have rsthand visual knowledge of illegal activity; war-
rantless on the scene search of an automobile permitted only because obtaining warrant would be impracticable in light
of the inherent mobility of automobiles and the latent exigency that mobility creates. 257 C. 216. Exclusionary rule did
not apply in probation violation hearing in present case, where search made pursuant to search warrant, case did not
present itself as one of egregious, shocking or harassing police misconduct, search warrant obtained after police observed
defendant engaged in drug transaction, defendant did not contest legality of that search warrant and defendant made no
offer of proof that that police executing search warrant knew he was on probation at the time. 258 C. 501. Unnecessary
for court to decide whether search warrant was required to conduct a thermal imaging scan to detect heat emanating from
the articial lighting system used to cultivate marijuana within commercial premises; afdavit supporting search warrant
application for defendant’s commercial premises contained sufcient other facts to establish probable cause for issuance
of the warrant without the results of the thermal imaging scan. 259 C. 94. On appeal of trial court’s dismissal of criminal
count due to lack of probable cause, Supreme Court, having jurisdiction to consider the question, determined that proba-
ble cause did exist for the arrest. 261 C. 395. Voluntary statement not attenuated from taint of unlawful arrest and admis-
sible based on totality of circumstances, including passage of eleven hours between arrest and statement and the facts that
defendant had been given Miranda warnings twice and that unlawfulness was not purposeful or agrant. 262 C. 179.
Where anonymous tip was corroborated by two separate observations by investigating ofcer, it was held that probable
cause existed to search or arrest defendant and subsequent search of defendant’s person and vehicle incident to such arrest
was therefore lawful. Id., 686. Police detained suspect without reasonable and articulable basis to suspect criminal activ-
ity had occurred or was about to occur where defendant was detained by state trooper who had noticed vehicle parked at
night in parking lot of publicly owned athletic elds that were known for criminal activity. 267 C. 495. Both present joint
occupants must consent to search of jointly controlled property for the search to be valid. 276 C. 40. Art. I, Sec. 7 of state
constitution does not embody automatic standing doctrine. 283 C. 280. Municipal police ofcers were entitled to quali-
ed immunity under common law for plaintiff’s claims that ofcers’ discretionary actions in removing her from dwelling
in which she had valid possessory interest violated her rights under this section because nothing made it apparent to of-
cers that plaintiff would have been subject to any harm by their actions and there was no evidence that the ofcers acted
with any improper motive. 284 C. 502. Defendant was not in possession or control of box that was partially opened by
private shipping company employee and was later completely opened in presence of police and, therefore, defendant was
not a bailee of the box; defendant lacked standing to challenge alleged warrantless search of box. 285 C. 367. The mere
presence of two uniformed ofcers, unaccompanied by any aggressive or coercive conduct, is not a show of authority that
constitutes a seizure; it serves law enforcement purposes for the ofcers to make a brief inquiry of the defendant to de-
termine whether assistance is required. 288 C. 836. Defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of cell
phone, including his subscriber number, however search and seizure by New York town’s police was valid under auto-
mobile exception to warrant requirement; where search was made by New York town’s police, there was no evidence that
Norwalk police intended to violate Connecticut Constitution by circuitous and indirect methods, and it was clear that
New York town’s police were not acting as agents for Norwalk police, therefore, legality of search must be determined
under New York constitutional law. 295 C. 707. Police ofcers were justied in concluding that an emergency situation
Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 149
existed within residence that necessitated a warrantless entry to search for possible victims given defendant’s history with
weapons and drugs, his extreme attempt to avoid arrest and his lack of any apparent connection with house or its resi-
dents. Id., 785. When the police are familiar with the informant and his credibility has been established, and the police
are able to corroborate several aspects of a tip by personal observation, the fact that the tip did not state the informant’s
basis of knowledge does not preclude the ofcers from having a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity
warranting an investigative stop. 297 C. 1. State constitution does not provide increased protection beyond the federal
constitution with respect to nontrafc-related questioning and requests for consent to search automobile during routine
trafc stops. 298 C. 209. Transfer of defendant’s personal effects from New York City police to New Haven police with-
out a search warrant did not violate defendant’s right to be secure from unreasonable searches or seizures when New York
City police lawfully seized the items and the subsequent seizure by New Haven police did not involve a greater intrusion
into defendant’s privacy interests than the initial one. 304 C. 383. Defendant’s Internet conversation expressing interest
in and requesting pornographic image of children establishes probable cause to support the issuance of warrant to search
defendant’s residence for evidence of the crime of possession of child pornography. 308 C. 678. It is reasonable and
permissible for ofcers to briey detain a suspect’s companion incident to the lawful stop of the suspect when the ofcers
reasonably believe that the suspect presents a threat to their safety. 313 C. 1. Warrantless recording of a telephone con-
versation that has the consent of one party to the conversation, but not defendant’s consent, does not violate the prohibi-
tion on unreasonable searches and seizures because defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such
telephone conversation. 318 C. 699. This section does not afford greater protection than the fourth amendment to the
federal constitution regarding the issue of an administrative search warrant during an ex parte proceeding; an adversarial
hearing is not required prior to the issuance of a judicial order authorizing an administrative search; a property owner or
occupant is not constitutionally required to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard in court before judicial authori-
zation for an administrative search may be granted. 322 C. 80. Defendant was seized no later than when one of the police
ofcers commanded him to stop and such seizure was not supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal
activity to justify a warrantless seizure. 323 C. 34. A canine sniff directed toward a home, whether freestanding or part of
a multitenant structure, is a search under this section and requires a warrant issued upon a court’s nding of probable
cause. 324 C. 80. Granting of motion for testing pursuant to Sec. 54-102a based solely on nding that defendant has been
charged with offense enumerated in a statute that proscribes a sexual act violates defendant’s right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches under this section, and before ordering such testing, a court must rst make a nding that such testing
would provide useful, practical information to victim that cannot reasonably be obtained otherwise. 339 C. 528. A war-
rantless canine sniff of the exterior door to a motel room by the police for the purpose of detecting the presence of illegal
drugs inside the room violates article rst, section 7 of the state constitution because its use for that purpose constitutes a
search subject to the warrant requirement of that state constitutional provision. 340 C. 619.
Cited. 3 CA 359. Constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure cited. 5 CA 586. Right to be free from un-
reasonable search and seizure cited. 6 CA 124. Cited. Id., 394. Warrantless search under state constitution cited. Id. Cited.
7 CA 46. Investigative stop; seizure and search and seizure cited. Id. Standard for measurement of probable cause more
strict than that used under federal constitution. Id., 354. Cited. Id., 550; 8 CA 13; Id., 125; 10 CA 7. Defective warrant
cited. Id., 103. Cited. Id., 217. “Sensible threshold” standard discussed; search and seizure cited. Id., 561. Cited. 11 CA
11; 13 CA 69; Id., 139. Unreasonable warrantless search cited. Id., 413. Cited. 14 CA 134. Unreasonable searches and
seizures cited. Id. Fourth amendment and state constitutional rights cited. Id., 574. Evidence obtained pursuant to objec-
tively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant is admissible. Id., 605. Search violated rights
cited. 15 CA 161. Cited. Id., 416. Right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures cited. Id. Cited. Id., 519. Denial
of motion to suppress cited. Id., 539. Cited. Id., 589; 16 CA 223. Exigent circumstances discussed. 17 CA 142. Unreason-
able warrantless searches of private property cited. Id. Cited. Id., 556; Id., 635. Granting of motion to suppress on state
constitutional grounds cited. Id. Prohibition of unreasonable warrantless searches cited. 18 CA 32. Cited. Id., 104. Uncon-
stitutional entry cited. Id. Cited. Id., 423; Id., 658; judgment reversed, see 216 C. 185. Prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures cited. Id., 694. Cited. 19 CA 265. Constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures cited. Id., 296. Good faith exception to exclusionary rule cited. Id., 478; judgment reversed, see 216 C. 150, see also
26 CA 423, 27 CA 291, 223 C. 902 and 225 C. 10, reversing judgment in State v. Marsala. Cited. Id., 594. Right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures cited. 20 CA 168; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 667. Constitutional questions
not properly raised at a nonadjudicatory preliminary hearing. Id., 321. Unconstitutionally seized; illegal entry and search
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 336. State constitution cited. Id. Cited. 21 CA 162. Warrantless search cited. Id., 506. Cited. 22 CA
10; Id., 40. Good faith exception to exclusionary rule discussed. Id., 62. Cited. Id., 118; 23 CA 50. No unreasonable search
and seizure cited. Id. Failure to suppress evidence in violation of state constitutional rights cited. Id., 602. Warrantless
search per se unreasonable cited. 24 CA 259. Illegal seizure cited. Id., 300. Right against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures cited. Id., 347. Unconditional plea under Alford doctrine constitutes waiver of right to challenge constitutionality of
arrest and subsequent search. Id., 408. Illegal search and seizure; right not be arrested without probable cause cited. Id.
Attenuation of taint discussed. 25 CA 282. State constitutional claim cited. Id. “Totality of circumstances” test discussed.
Id., 428. Exclusionary rule and “totality of circumstances” cited. Id. State constitution construed to allow warrantless
searches incident to lawful arrests. Id., 575. Cited. 26 CA 423, see also 27 CA 291, 223 C. 902 and 225 C. 10, reversing
judgment in State v. Marsala. Cited. Id., 481; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 494. Cited. Id., 667. Seizure and detention in
violation of constitutional rights cited. 27 CA 49. Cited. Id., 128. Does not protect defendant from warrantless search of
garbage left in public place for disposal; “totality of circumstances” analysis discussed. Id., 248. Search and seizure cited.
Id. Cited. Id., 307; Id., 370. “Exigent circumstances” discussed in connection with warrantless searches and seizures. Id.,
403. Cited. Id., 741. Warrantless search per se unreasonable cited. Id. Cited. 28 CA 508. Violation of fundamental right
cited. Id. “Probable cause” and existence of “exigent circumstances” and inevitable discovery exception to exclusion rule
discussed. 29 CA 207. Search violative of Connecticut Constitution cited. Id. Cited. Id., 843. Unreasonable searches and
seizures cited. Id. Cited. 30 CA 164; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10. Illegal search and seizure; expectation of privacy
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 249. Connecticut Constitution requires “inadvertence” for plain view seizure cited. Id. Cited. Id., 550;
Id., 712. Evidence seized in violation of constitutional rights; searches and seizures cited. 31 CA 178. Cited. Id., 443.
Constitutes search under state constitution cited. Id. Cited. Id., 548. State constitutional rights cited. Id. Cited. 32 CA 84.
150 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
Rights to be free from unreasonable searches cited. Id. Cited. Id., 267; Id., 402. Freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure; fundamental constitutional right to liberty cited. Id. Cited. Id., 505. Not seized within meaning of state constitu-
tion cited. Id. Cited. 33 CA 409. Constitutional rights violation cited. Id. Cited. Id., 590; 34 CA 492; 35 CA 279; Id., 781.
Illegal arrest under state constitution cited. 36 CA 161. Cited. Id., 401. Illegal arrest and right to fair trial; unconstitutional
arrest and seizure cited. Id. Cited. Id., 488; 37 CA 40. Motion to suppress evidence cited. Id. Cited. Id., 276. Provisions of
Sec. 7 do not permit expansions recognized under the federal constitution. 37 CA 561; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 216.
Cited. 38 CA 29; Id., 588; Id., 750; 39 CA 11. Right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
224; Id., 369; Id., 579. Constitutionality of search of defendant’s pockets cited. Id. Cited. 40 CA 420; Id., 544; Id., 762.
Custodial arrest cited. Id. Entry of insurance company agents in defendant’s business premises does not constitute illegal
search under constitutional provisions. Id., 789. Cited. 41 CA 772. Rights against unreasonable seizures; inevitable dis-
covery doctrine cited. Id. Cited. 42 CA 1. Warrantless and illegal searches, constitutional prohibitions in stop and seizure
and “plain feel” doctrine cited. 43 CA 448. Warrantless search cited. 44 CA 6. Unlawful seizure cited. 45 CA 148. Cited.
Id., 679; Id., 804. Unreasonable search and seizure cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 350. “Totality of the circumstances” test dis-
cussed; because probable cause for warrantless arrest was established based on Aguilar-Spinelli factors, trial court im-
properly introduced a second level of review under the “totality of the circumstances” analysis. 47 CA 424. Search in
violation of state constitution; constitutional protections against unwarranted search and seizure cited. Id. Franks analysis
applied under the federal constitution to challenge the veracity of statements made in a warrant afdavit also applies under
the state constitution. Id., 706. Voluntary consent to warrantless search or entry into a house discussed; police investiga-
tor’s statement that he would “apply for a warrant” was not inherently coercive when viewed as one factor in the totality
of circumstances and was not sufcient to render consent to warrantless search involuntary. 49 CA 738. Entry into prem-
ises by police in community caretaking role to protect or preserve human life deemed a reasonable search. 50 CA 77.
Urinalysis found to be a reasonable condition of defendant’s probation and suppression of evidence related thereto held
to be improper. Id., 187. Police may detain an individual for investigative purposes if there is a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the individual is engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity. 56 CA 181. Detention at roadside sobri-
ety checkpoint conducted pursuant to practice embodying neutral criteria did not constitute an unreasonable seizure. Id.,
252. Provides same protection as fourth amendment. 57 CA 202. Whether state constitution embraces the principle of
automatic standing with regard to defendant seeking to suppress evidence as the fruit of an illegal search remains an open
but important question. Id., 396. Drugs were properly seized after ofcer’s plain view of defendant’s disposal of the drugs
in a garbage can in a public area. 58 CA 136. Ofcer’s suspicion that vehicle occupant was a prostitute did not constitute
valid reason for search and subsequent arrest. Id., 267. Evidence sufcient to constitute probable cause to arrest defendant
and therefore search of defendant and vehicle incident to that arrest was permissible even though search preceded arrest.
59 CA 272. “Reasonable and articulable suspicion that person is engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity” war-
ranted by specic and identiable facts. 62 CA 376. Motion to suppress properly denied despite scrivener’s error in af-
davit for search warrant since the afdavit presented a substantial factual basis for magistrate’s conclusion that probable
cause existed to issue warrant and warrant itself was accurate as to place and persons to which it applied. 63 CA 263.
Weapons and narcotics were properly seized in search incident to a lawful arrest notwithstanding that such items were
seized from beneath a oorboard in a closet while defendant was handcuffed and four feet away from the closet. Id., 476.
Court concluded that defendant’s fenced backyard and driveway of his single family, private home constitute the consti-
tutionally protected curtilage of his house and that defendant therefore had an expectation of privacy in the fenced area
equal to that of the house itself. 64 CA 93. Defendant’s constitutional rights not violated by seizure of items in defendant’s
apartment that were in ofcers’ plain view when ofcers entered the apartment to arrest defendant pursuant to an arrest
warrant. 70 CA 160. Investigatory stop by extraterritorial police ofcer did not violate defendant’s right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures; a seizure may be constitutionally reasonable even if it is not specically authorized
by statute. Id., 297. Trial court’s determination that evidence established that victim and defendant lived together in the
apartment and that victim, as an occupant, was lawfully entitled to give police permission to search her home and seize
items from it to be used in prosecution of defendant, that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to items
in the apartment and that victim voluntarily consented to the search when she signed the consent to search form and that
there was no indication that her will was overborne or that her consent was the result of promises, force, threats or other
coercion was not clearly erroneous, and its denial of defendant’s motion to suppress was legally correct and supported by
the facts. Id., 594. Reiterated previous holdings that even if there was no probable cause for arrest, police ofcer could
detain individual based on reasonable suspicion and totality of evidence, even if defendant wore different clothing than
suspect. 74 CA 248. Warrantless search of defendant’s person was incident to lawful arrest for possession of narcotics
with intent to sell, for which there was probable cause for the arrest, independent of search of the premises. Id., 693.
Corroborated information from informant, detective’s independent observations of three drug transactions and crack co-
caine found in plain view clearly established probable cause to search and arrest. 81 CA 361. Terry stop of defendant and
resulting admission of evidence was permissible because of the circumstances including defendant’s apparent use of force
to enter a building that was prone to drug activity, apparent commission of criminal trespass and inability to present key
or name those he was visiting. 83 CA 377. Police action of moving defendant three hundred feet from residence for secu-
rity reasons and purpose of a show-up identication that provided probable cause for arrest was permissible investigative
detention and not impermissible arrest. 85 CA 329. Because police ofcer’s initial encounter with defendant was to assist
him as a distressed motorist, ofcer’s conduct did not constitute illegal seizure, except that a seizure under these facts later
arose once additional cruisers arrived at which time a reasonable person in defendant’s position would not have felt free
to leave; defendant’s erratic behavior including jumping into vehicle and trying to drive off, nervous demeanor and rock-
ing back and forth, and inability to produce license or registration, provided reasonable and articulable suspicion of
criminal activity, that is, of presence of contraband in vehicle. Id., 356. Reafrmed previous holdings that police must
have specic, articulable facts for search and seizure, such as unusual conduct; size and manner of clothing are not crim-
inal behavior. Id., 755. Terry stop was not more intrusive than necessary to complete the investigation for which the stop
was made. 87 CA 464. Since decision by police to detain defendant was predicated on reasonable and articulable suspi-
cion that defendant was involved in drug activity and likely was transporting drugs in his vehicle at the time in light of
information given by informant and their own independent observations of defendant, it was constitutionally permissible
Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 151
for police to stop defendant and further investigate whether he was transporting narcotics at that time. 89 CA 241. Trial
court properly granted motion to suppress evidence that was fruit of the poisonous tree; police ofcer who conducted
investigatory stop did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop–defendant had
not been operating his vehicle in an erratic or illegal manner, police ofcer cited no facts to indicate that defendant was
operating his vehicle while under the inuence of intoxicating liquor or that he was otherwise engaged in, or about to
engage in, criminal behavior, and such ofcer had a suspicion that defendant wanted to avoid her but lacked a specic and
articulable basis necessary to conclude reasonably that an investigatory stop was justied. 95 CA 616. Under totality of
circumstances test, ofcer had no probable cause to arrest defendant for operating a motor vehicle under the inuence of
drugs. 96 CA 515. Seizure occurs where police, driving patrol car, approach and park behind suspect’s vehicle, are dressed
in police uniforms, carry guns and approach vehicle on both sides. 99 CA 413. Evidence of cash recovered from car of
defendant at arrest scene without a warrant was admissible even though defendant had not reached for weapons or to
destroy evidence. 108 CA 533. A person is seized when his freedom of movement is restrained by physical force or show
of authority, and the key consideration is whether, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have be-
lieved he was not free to leave, under objective standard focusing on reasonable person’s probable reaction to ofcer’s
conduct, and in present case, defendant was under seizure once ofcer had approached his vehicle and asked him to pro-
duce his documents. 113 CA 250. In light of the totality of circumstances, including ofcer’s experience, information
available to ofcer and rational inferences derived from such information, ofcer had a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting defendant was involved in criminal activity and therefore investigatory stop was reasonable and 15 minute
detention while ofcer further investigated suspected crime was appropriate under the circumstances. 120 CA 497. War-
rantless entry into defendant’s apartment was not unreasonable where consent of defendant was implied from his conduct,
and consent of his wife was not also required. Id., 512. In light of the detailed information provided by the informant,
which was corroborated by the police, the informant’s basis of knowledge regarding the information and the fact that the
ofcer had worked with the informant in the past, there was probable cause to believe that contraband would be found in
defendant’s vehicle and search of defendant’s vehicle was constitutionally permissible under the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement. 125 CA 17. Defendant was seized when police ofcers displayed their badges and stated “come
to the vehicle”, but seizure was not unconstitutional because the interest in the police ofcers’ safety during investigatory
stop outweighed defendant’s personal liberty interest in not being inconvenienced, as the risk was signicant and the in-
cremental intrusion was minimal. 129 CA 109; judgment afrmed, see 313 C. 1. Subpoena issued by prosecutor for access
to defendant’s medical records was reasonable because court properly balanced needs of the state with privacy interests
of defendant, gave defendant an opportunity to raise objections, and limited disclosure of records. Id., 239. Apparent au-
thority doctrine does not violate right of state citizens to be free from unreasonable searches; under apparent authority
doctrine, warrantless entry into defendant’s apartment was not unreasonable where girlfriend of defendant told police she
lived in the apartment and invited police into the apartment and defendant did not object. Id., 777; judgment afrmed, see
312 C. 574. No reasonable expectation of privacy in open attic space of 3-story rooming house. 139 CA 116; judgment
afrmed, see 311 C. 507. 11-day gap between execution of search warrant and last purchase of illegal drugs in protracted
series of drug transactions not so unreasonable as to defeat probable cause of warrant on grounds facts were stale. 144 CA
308; judgment afrmed, see 319 C. 218. Right of privacy is personal to party seeking to invoke it and cannot be left to
court’s speculation, and any expectation of privacy of defendant in evidence consisting of victim’s clothing was legiti-
mately breached once police lawfully took possession of it with ex-wife’s consent. 153 CA 296. Defendant did not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy on public walkway outside door to motel room, thus case is distinguishable from State
v. Kono, 324 C. 80, and canine sniff conducted from such walkway did not require warrant. 185 CA 308; judgment re-
versed, see 340 C. 619.
A search and seizure which, though warrantless, is consented to is not within the exclusionary rule but mere acquies-
cence in and peaceful submission to the demands of the searching ofcers is not to be construed as consent; defendant’s
application for an order to return articles illegally seized was denied. 22 CS 41. Cited. Id., 323, 510. Search and seizure may
lawfully be made without warrant when incident to a legal arrest and may, under appropriate circumstances, include prem-
ises under immediate control of person arrested. 24 CS 22. Even though evidence was obtained as result of illegal search
and seizure, defendant was not entitled to motion to suppress the evidence in advance of trial. Id., 36. That part of Sec. 6-70
attempting to empower coroner with unlimited access to private citizen’s home held violative of this section. 25 CS 153.
Search not unreasonable when incident to arrest for possession of burglars’ tools. Id., 217. Arrest for minor trafc violation
did not justify search of car without a warrant; if stolen goods were in plain sight, search might have been justied. Id., 229.
Where sample of blood was taken from defendant when he was unconscious in a hospital and could not give his consent,
without a search warrant and not as incident to a lawful arrest, such taking was in violation of his constitutional rights. 26
CS 41. Cited. 28 CS 239. Afdavit of ofcer seeking arrest warrant was not insufcient where he did not specically vouch
for trustworthiness of informants who were victims of car theft conspiracy. Id., 252. Where afdavits and warrant correctly
set forth defendant’s middle and last name, date of birth, physical description and address, the arrest was valid and the
search based on it. Id., 325. Cited. 30 CS 94. Warrant, based upon afdavit lacking credibility and reliable references, void.
Id., 584. Physical examination of properly arrested criminal defendant is not an unreasonable search and seizure. 32 CS
306. Substantially similar to fourth amendment to U.S. Constitution; warrantless searches, particularly incident to arrest,
discussed; permissible scope of search; purpose of exclusionary rule. 33 CS 129. Cited. 37 CS 515; Id., 901; 38 CS 570.
Noncompliance with “knock and announce” rule and standing to challenge search discussed. 40 CS 20. Cited. Id., 498; Id.,
547. Seizure within meaning of federal and state constitutions cited. 40 CS 306. Cited. 43 CS 441; 44 CS 223.
Properly conducted search incidental to lawful arrest not illegal though made without warrant. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 231.
Under circumstances, ofcers’ failure to announce their purpose before forcible entry did not constitute an unlawful sei-
zure. Id., 247. Unsigned and undated search warrant is fatally defective, invalid and void and confers no authority to act
thereunder. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 641, 644. Search of defendant under Sec. 54-33b was carried out as provided by the statute
and these provisions are reasonable, not unreasonable. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 637. Afdavit in support of a search warrant of
premises used for pool selling sufcient to support issuance of warrant where underlying circumstances, reasons for
reliability of informant and personal observations of betting transactions were sworn to by afdavit. Id., 669.
152 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
(Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions. What cases bailable. Speedy trial.
Due process. Excessive bail or fines. Presentment of grand jury, when necessary.)
Sec. 8.
1
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by
himself and by counsel; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted by the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process to obtain wit-
nesses in his behalf; to be released on bail upon sufcient security, except in capital
offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption great; and in all prosecutions
by indictment or information, to a speedy, public trial by an impartial jury. No person
shall be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall excessive bail be required nor exces-
sive nes imposed. No person shall be held to answer for any crime, punishable by
death or life imprisonment, unless on a presentment or an indictment of a grand jury,
except in the armed forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or
public danger.
1
Amended by Article XVII., and Article XXIX., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
A potential juror’s employment as a police ofcer, standing alone, is not a ground to remove that juror under a
principal challenge, however, if a defendant establishes that under the circumstances of a particular case, the specic
relationship between the challenged juror and the investigating authority is of so close a nature that it is likely to produce,
consciously or unconsciously, bias on the part of the juror, then the court should grant defendant’s motion to remove
that juror under a principal challenge. 323 C. 654. Defendant’s conditional and equivocal inquiry that reasonably can be
construed as a request for counsel requires an ofcer, under State v. Purcell, 331 C. 318, to stop the interview and clarify
whether the defendant desired the presence of counsel or, alternatively, to terminate the interview altogether. 340 C. 167.
(Right of personal liberty.)
Sec. 9.
1
No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly
warranted by law.
1
Law penalizing the keeping of a place where it is “reputed” that liquors are unlawfully sold upheld. 47 C. 550.
Original juvenile court act made no provision for detaining a child or admitting it to bail pending an appeal. Held, uncon-
stitutional to detain a child pending an appeal from judgment of a juvenile court. 99 C. 92. Arrest without a warrant. 115
C. 283; 131 C. 231. Does not require trial within territorial subdivision in which offense was committed. 129 C. 572. Il-
legal arrest and detention does not automatically render inadmissible confessions made after the arrest or during the pe-
riod of detention. 150 C. 169. Imposition of consecutive life sentences for two second degree murders not in violation of
this section. 152 C. 602. Cited. Id. Rule of evidence applicable at time of petitioner’s trial decides admissibility of any
evidence obtained during illegal arrest of petitioner used therein and cannot be disturbed by subsequent habeas corpus
action. 155 C. 316. Cited. 177 C. 677; 179 C. 46; 181 C. 151; 185 C. 63; Id., 402; 187 C. 109; 189 C. 550; 192 C. 704;
193 C. 270; 194 C. 416; 195 C. 421; 198 C. 92. Court held “an illegal arrest imposes no jurisdictional barrier to a defen-
dant’s subsequent prosecution” and overruled 153 C. 127 to the extent that it holds to the contrary. Id., 255. Cited. 199 C.
399; 200 C. 453. Unconstitutional arrest; fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial, cited. 201 C. 559. Cited. Id.,
675; 202 C. 509; 205 C. 638; 212 C. 820. Due process guarantees provided by section held to encompass protection
against double jeopardy; double jeopardy principles in same trial in contrast with subsequent prosecutions discussed. 213
C. 74. Double jeopardy cited. Id. Investigatory detention without probable cause can pass constitutional muster. 216 C.
172. Challenge to admissibility of evidence cited. Id. Guaranteeing due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 402, see also 234 C.
301; Id., 678. Right to counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Right to fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 699;
217 C. 498; 223 C. 635; 224 C. 627; Id., 915; 225 C. 450. Rights and provisions for due process cited. Id. Cited. 227 C.
363; Id., 534; 228 C. 62; Id., 393; Id., 582. Protection against double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. 229 C. 10; Id., 125. Right
not to be compelled to participate in police investigatory procedure unless clearly warranted by law cited. Id. Cited. 230
C. 183. State due process clauses cited; due process clauses implied by prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment cited.
Id. Cited. 231 C. 43; Id., 545; 232 C. 345. Due process provisions cited; vague in violation of due process cited. Id. Cited.
233 C. 557; Id., 813; 234 C. 683; 235 C. 206. Cruel and unusual punishment impliedly prohibited cited. Id. Cited. 236 C.
189; Id., 216; 237 C. 81. Seizures cited. Id. Cited. Id., 390. Illegal seizure without probable cause cited. Id. Cited. 238 C.
389. Prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment derived from due process clauses of state constitution cited. Id.
Due process clauses cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 317. Double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. Id., 489. State violated rights of search
cited. Id. Cited. 241 C. 322; 242 C. 125; Id., 296. Prohibition against double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. Id., 345. Prohibi-
tions against double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. Id., 648. Violation gives rise to a private cause of action for money dam-
ages. 244 C. 23. Police violated defendant’s rights by detaining defendant because his vehicle was located in an area of
increased criminal activity at an early hour of the morning. 251 C. 636. Section does not require municipal ordinances
that restrict personal liberty to be authorized by either statutory or common law authority in order to be valid. 254 C. 799.
Where the cause of a declared mistrial, the conict between trier of fact presiding over both motion to suppress and trial
itself, was brought to the attention of the court prior to trial, there was no surprise warranting declaration of a mistrial
based on manifest necessity and, therefore, subsequent reprosecution would constitute double jeopardy. 255 C. 186.
Court balanced interests of the state in keeping intoxicated drivers off the road and defendant’s interest in being free from
unreasonable police detention while driving a car and found that a brief investigatory detention at a sobriety checkpoint
Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 153
that is planned and operated under neutral criteria is consistent with constitutional due process provisions. 256 C. 543. Re
double jeopardy claim, defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that his conviction with regard to different injuries
arose out of the same act. 260 C. 93. In considering death sentence, application of reasonable doubt standard to measuring
balance between aggravating and mitigating factors is not constitutionally required. 266 C. 171. Police detained suspect
without reasonable and articulable basis to suspect criminal activity had occurred or was about to occur where defendant
was detained by state trooper who had noticed vehicle parked at night in parking lot of publicly owned athletic elds that
were known for criminal activity. 267 C. 495. Municipal police ofcers were entitled to qualied immunity under com-
mon law for plaintiff’s claims that ofcers’ discretionary actions in removing her from dwelling in which she had a valid
possessory interest violated her rights under this section because nothing made it apparent to ofcers that plaintiff would
have been subject to any harm by their actions and there was no evidence that ofcers acted with any improper motive.
284 C. 502. The mere presence of two uniformed ofcers, unaccompanied by any aggressive or coercive conduct, is not
a show of authority that constitutes a seizure; it serves law enforcement purposes for the ofcers to make a brief inquiry
of the defendant to determine whether assistance is required. 288 C. 836. Resentencing did not violate double jeopardy
where defendant challenged legality of sentences and not validity of conviction, and trial court was free to refashion en-
tire sentence for each crime within connes of the original sentencing package as long as the entire sentence had not been
fully served. 292 C. 417. Defendant’s rights were not violated because there was manifest necessity to declare a mistrial
on basis of totality of the circumstances when prosecutor unexpectedly became seriously ill during complex trial and no
other prosecutor could have assumed duties within time constraints of existing jurors. 295 C. 1. When the police are fa-
miliar with the informant and his credibility has been established, and the police are able to corroborate several aspects
of a tip by personal observation, the fact that the tip did not state the informant’s basis of knowledge does not preclude
the ofcers from having a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity warranting an investigative stop. 297
C. 1. Section does not mandate that custodial interrogation, advisement of Miranda rights and any resulting statements of
defendant be recorded. 298 C. 537. The phrase “clearly warranted by law” contemplates a requirement that the legal
prerequisites for imposing a particular punishment be denitively established before punishment is imposed; it does not
speak to the question of what those prerequisites shall be. 303 C. 71. Death penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment; holdings in 230 C. 183 and 238 C. 389 reafrmed. Id. It is not a violation for the sole aggravating factor
found by the jury re a capital felony, namely, murder committed for pecuniary gain under Sec. 53a-46a(i)(6), to duplicate
an element of the underlying crime of capital felony by murder for hire under Sec. 53a-54b(2). 305 C. 101, but see 318
C. 1. It is reasonable and permissible for ofcers to briey detain a suspect’s companion incident to the lawful stop of the
suspect when the ofcers reasonably believe that the suspect presents a threat to their safety. 313 C. 1. Cruel and unusual
punishments are prohibited under the due process provisions; the death penalty as imposed following the enactment of
P.A. 12-5 repealing the death penalty only for those felonies committed on or after April 25, 2012, is so out of step with
contemporary standards of decency as to violate the ban on excessive and disproportionate punishment; the prospective
abolition of the death penalty also violates the due process provisions because it no longer serves any legitimate penolog-
ical purpose. 318 C. 1. Defendant was seized no later than when one of the police ofcers commanded him to stop and
such seizure was not supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a warrantless
seizure. 323 C. 34. Parole eligibility under Sec. 54-125a(f) is an adequate remedy for a violation under Miller v. Alabama,
132 S. Ct. 2455, thus re-sentencing is not required for punishments that include parole eligibility. 333 C. 378.
Cited. 4 CA 514; 9 CA 147. Right to be free of double jeopardy is necessary to due process guaranteed by this section.
15 CA 749. Cited. 16 CA 358; 19 CA 594; 22 CA 10; 23 CA 431; 24 CA 195. Double jeopardy in Connecticut Constitu-
tion discussed. 25 CA 243. Prohibition against double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. Id., 282; 27 CA 128; 28 CA 708; 30 CA
606; 31 CA 548. State constitution rights cited. Id. Cited. 33 CA 143. Double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. Id., 590; 34 CA
751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211. Held to encompass protection against double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. 35 CA
431. Double jeopardy provisions cited. Id. Cited. 37 CA 228. Right to be informed of nature and cause of criminal charge
cited. Id. Due process and personal liberty guarantees provided by this section encompass protection against double
jeopardy. Id., 276. Cited. Id., 338; Id., 404; Id., 722. Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id. Cited. 38 CA 643. Double jeop-
ardy cited; due process cited. Id. Double jeopardy provisions cited. Id., 661. Cited. Id., 750; 39 CA 11. Right to be free
of unreasonable searches and seizures cited. Id. Cited. Id., 63; Id., 455; 40 CA 387; Id., 420; Id., 762. Custodial arrests
cited. Id. Cited. 41 CA 255. Right to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 751. Right not to be twice put in jeopardy cited;
double jeopardy rights cited. Id. Cited. 42 CA 264; Id., 640. Prohibition against double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. 43 CA
142. Prohibition against double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. Id., 176. Violation of Connecticut Constitution cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 252; 44 CA 6. Due process rights cited; greater protection against double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. Id., 231. Prohibi-
tions against double jeopardy cited. 45 CA 369. Cited. Id., 658; Id., 679; 46 CA 734. State constitution does not afford
greater double jeopardy protection than federal constitution. 48 CA 71. Defendant did not raise double jeopardy claim
arising from transfer from Superior Court for juvenile matters to Superior Court as an adult at any time before the appeal
process, so claim is waived. 51 CA 117. Brief detention at roadside sobriety checkpoint did not violate defendant’s due
process rights. 56 CA 252. Defendant not deprived of right to fair trial by prosecutor’s questions during cross-examina-
tion and comments during closing arguments and by jury instructions concerning state’s burden of proof on element of
intent and the effect of defendant’s intoxication in determining whether state proved the requisite intent beyond a reason-
able doubt. 59 CA 207. Defendant’s analysis under section clearly inapplicable to defendant’s due process claim re estab-
lishment of violation of probation by proof beyond a reasonable doubt or, in the alternative, proof by clear and convincing
evidence in a revocation of probation hearing as such hearing clearly complied with provisions of section. 61 CA 99.
“Reasonable and articulable suspicion that person is engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity” warranted by
specic and identiable facts. 62 CA 376. Jury instruction in which the phrases “reasonable doubt” and “the benet of
the doubt” are included does not suggest that jury could only acquit in a close case if it could give defendant “the benet
of the doubt” and therefore does not impinge on defendant’s right to due process. Id., 625. Although court did not hold
an evidentiary hearing before ordering defendant to wear leg shackles, defendant’s right to fair trial before an impartial
jury was not infringed since court detailed for the record its justication for ordering the use of restraints. 63 CA 386.
Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress confession he gave to the police and various seized burglary
tools; defendant’s confession was sufciently attenuated from his initial detention to be purged of any possible taint or
154 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
illegality and the burglary tools were found on the ground in plain view of police ofcers who were conducting a proper
surveillance of defendant. 67 CA 634. Investigatory stop by extraterritorial police ofcer did not violate defendant’s right
of personal liberty where police ofcer’s investigation was limited to requesting defendant’s license, registration and
insurance information before turning over the investigation to the correct municipal ofcers. 70 CA 297. Reiterated
previous holdings that even if there was no probable cause for arrest, police ofcer could detain individual based on
reasonable suspicion and totality of evidence, even if defendant wore different clothing than suspect. 74 CA 248. Defen-
dant’s conviction of two counts of robbery in the rst degree did not violate constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy; with regard to each offense, state had to prove a different purpose–for robbery of elderly husband, that defen-
dant’s purpose in using force on him was to overcome his resistance to the taking of property or to its retention after the
taking, and for robbery of elderly wife, that the force used on her husband was for purpose of compelling her to deliver
up the property; under Blockburger test, defendant may be convicted of two offenses arising out of same criminal inci-
dent if each crime contains an element not found in the other, double jeopardy not violated; since robbery is a crime
against the person, and there were multiple victims, legislature intended multiple punishments. Id., 545. Trial court vio-
lated defendant’s right against double jeopardy by improperly sentencing him on three counts of conspiracy arising from
single agreement and on both possession of narcotics count and possession of narcotics with intent to sell counts; a single
agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements and thus several conspiracies because it contemplates violation of
several statutes rather than one; double jeopardy precludes sentencing defendant for possession and possession with in-
tent to sell when violations resulted from same act or transaction, because possession is a lesser offense included in of-
fense of possession with intent to sell; trial court should have merged such convictions. Id., 580. Police action of moving
defendant three hundred feet from residence for security reasons and purpose of a show-up identication that provided
probable cause for arrest was permissible investigative detention and not impermissible arrest. 85 CA 329. Because po-
lice ofcer’s initial encounter with defendant was to assist him as a distressed motorist, ofcer’s conduct did not consti-
tute illegal seizure, except that a seizure under these facts later arose once additional cruisers arrived at which time a
reasonable person in defendant’s position would not have felt free to leave. Id., 356. Defendant’s erratic behavior includ-
ing jumping into vehicle and trying to drive off, nervous demeanor and rocking back and forth, and inability to produce
license or registration provided reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, that is, of presence of contra-
band in vehicle. Id. Reafrmed previous holdings that police must have specic, articulable facts for search and seizure,
such as unusual conduct. Size and manner of clothing are not criminal behavior. Id., 755. No right to counsel at summary
contempt proceedings because, although criminal in nature, such proceedings concern offenses against court as an organ
of public justice and not violations of criminal law. 88 CA 599. Trial court properly granted motion to suppress evidence
that was fruit of the poisonous tree; police ofcer who conducted investigatory stop did not have a reasonable and artic-
ulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop–defendant had not been operating his vehicle in an erratic or illegal
manner, police ofcer cited no facts to indicate that defendant was operating his vehicle while under the inuence of in-
toxicating liquor or that he was otherwise engaged in, or about to engage in, criminal behavior, and such ofcer had a sus-
picion that the defendant wanted to avoid her but lacked a specic and articulable basis necessary to conclude reasonably
that an investigatory stop was justied. 95 CA 616. Conviction of trespassing in rst degree under Sec. 53a-107(a)(2)
and criminal violation of protective order under Sec. 53a-223(a) did not violate constitutional protection against double
jeopardy because legislature intended multiple punishments for offense of trespassing in violation of a protective order.
97 CA 72. A person is seized when his freedom of movement is restrained by physical force or show of authority, and the
key consideration is whether, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free
to leave, under objective standard focusing on reasonable person’s probable reaction to ofcer’s conduct, and in present
case, defendant was under seizure once ofcer had approached his vehicle and asked him to produce his documents. 113
CA 250. Under Sec. 14-149(a), defendant’s convictions on multiple counts of violations arising out of a single vehicle
violated defendant’s right against multiple punishments for the same offense. Id., 541. In light of the totality of circum-
stances including ofcer’s experience, information available to ofcer and rational inferences derived from such infor-
mation, ofcer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting defendant was involved in criminal activity and
therefore investigatory stop was reasonable and fteen minute detention while ofcer further investigated suspected
crime was appropriate under the circumstances. 120 CA 497. Conviction of both criminal possession of a rearm under
Sec. 53a-217(a)(3)(A) and criminal violation of a protective order under Sec. 53a-223(a) does not constitute double
jeopardy. 122 CA 399; judgment afrmed, see 307 C. 1. Section, when read in conjunction with Art. I, Sec. 13, does not
create an ex post facto clause in Connecticut Constitution. 127 CA 336. Convictions for manslaughter in the rst degree
and carrying a dangerous weapon do not violate double jeopardy because manslaughter in the rst degree does not re-
quire use of or carrying a dangerous weapon and carrying a dangerous weapon does not require the intent element that
rst degree manslaughter mandates. 131 CA 528. Sentences for murder and felony murder were ancillary to capital fel-
ony conviction, thus the convictions for murder and felony murder must be vacated. 145 CA 494; judgment afrmed, see
317 C. 741. Parole eligibility hearing under Sec. 54-125a(f) is a constitutionally adequate remedy for sentences that were
imposed in violation of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455; resentencing not required. 167 CA 744. Defendant’s felony
offender classications and resulting enhanced sentences do not violate the due process guarantee that encompasses
protection against double jeopardy because his conduct relating to his conviction of robbery in the rst degree is tempo-
rally and substantively distinct from his conduct relating to his conviction of attempt to escape from custody, and because
robbery in the rst degree and attempt to escape from custody are conceptually separate and distinct offenses that do not
share any similar elements and both offenses require proof of facts the other does not. 173 CA 119; judgment afrmed in
part, see 330 C. 793. Mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-ve years of incarceration imposed on juvenile homicide
offender not violative of constitutional requirements because subsequent enactment of Sec. 54-125a(f) rendered offender
eligible for parole. 177 CA 242. Trial court improperly denied the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence be-
cause his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated as (1) the offenses of manslaughter in the rst degree under
Sec. 53a-55(a)(1) and risk of injury to a child under Sec. 53-21 arose from the same actions and constituted the same
offense, (2) the offense of risk of injury to a child, as charged, is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the rst
degree, and (3) there is no authority that would support the conclusion that the legislature intended to specically autho-
rize multiple punishments under the statutes in question. 197 CA 302; judgment reversed, see 340 C. 425.
Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 155
An arrest by a police ofcer without a warrant is ground for an action for false imprisonment unless the arrest is au-
thorized by Sec. 6-49. 22 CS 311. Original arrest of defendant on charge of assault being valid, subsequent proceedings
upon victim’s death charging defendant with murder could be based on this arrest and were not invalidated by later issu-
ance of invalid bench warrant. 26 CS 207. Cited. 28 CS 257. Right of self-expression in hair styling is constitutionally
protected right of privacy and plaintiff allowed an injunction against defendants excluding him from school. Id., 375.
Cited. 30 CS 584; 37 CS 515; 41 CS 356. The Blockburger analysis should apply because United States v. Dixon, 509
U.S. 688, overruled Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, which utilized the “same conduct” test, and therefore subsequent
prosecution for operating under the inuence after defendant had paid ne for a speeding infraction arising from the
same incident is not barred by the double jeopardy clause. 47 CS 258. Department of Correction’s classication of
petitioner as sexual offender despite the fact that petitioner had been acquitted of sexual assault charges is clearly un-
warranted by law. 49 CS 416.
Arrest without warrant pursuant to Sec. 6-49 not unlawful merely because pursuit of defendant by police ofcer was
interrupted when defendant temporarily succeeded in eluding ofcer. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 42. A curfew to contain a riot
imposed by mayor of New Haven under special laws empowering this action, held constitutional. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 22.
Search of defendant pursuant to Sec. 54-33b and subsequent arrest constitutional. Id., 637. However forceful and per-
suasive the arguments may be compelling a determination that the Connecticut disorderly conduct statute, Sec. 53-175 is
unconstitutional as containing no ascertainable standard of quiet, the circuit court should leave such a decision to higher
courts. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 73, 77.
(Right of redress for injuries.)
Sec. 10.
1
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial or delay.
1
Liquors kept by an agent of the owner to sell or exchange in violation of law are a nuisance, and the owner cannot
maintain replevin for them when levied upon, as property of the agent, by one of his creditors. 49 C. 166. Law imposing
liability on railroad company for injuries caused by re from its locomotives, is not in violation of this clause. 54 C. 455.
Nor is the grade crossing law. 58 C. 536. Duty of court to direct a verdict for the defendant, when. 66 C. 241; 91 C. 442.
Cited. 72 C. 528. No person can take redress for injury into his own hands. 88 C. 368. Courts should see that no judgment
is rendered against one who has had no opportunity to be heard; 67 C. 9; and has power to prevent fraudulent advantage
being gained by legal process. 68 C. 472. Discretion of court as to continuing action. 69 C. 186; 75 C. 308; Id., 314; 78
C. 654; 79 C. 380; 81 C. 474. Law creating taxing district within a city held valid. 104 C. 200. When foreign receiver
may bring action in this state. Id., 670. Guarantees to every litigant right to introduce all proper evidence; failure to admit
evidence held error under this section. 107 C. 457. Right to have workmen’s compensation determined by act in effect
at time of injury is a vested right. 112 C. 130, 142. Validating acts of 1929 ineffective to impair vested right to com-
mon-law cause of action for personal injuries caused by negligence, which was never suspended by the guest statute. Id.,
145. Special act validating a decient notice to city of defective sidewalk held constitutional. 124 C. 183. Common
control provision of unemployment compensation act is valid. 128 C. 213. “Injury” means one violative of established
law; no action by child for alienation of mother’s affections. 134 C. 163. Retroactive statute impairing vested rights held
unconstitutional. 136 C. 127. Amendments to unemployment compensation act did not impair vested right. 137 C. 129.
Nonresident plaintiff may bring suit for support. Id., 404. Zoning ordinance prohibiting sale or display of new or used
cars in any open lot in any zone is an unwarranted interference with the constitutional right to carry on a lawful business.
Id., 701. Neither the federal government nor the state is under any constitutional obligation to allow a deduction for a tax
imposed by the other. 141 C. 257. Does not require that taxation be equal and uniform. Id., 266. Same as federal consti-
tution’s due process clause. 142 C. 699. Substantially same as the fourteenth amendment to U.S. Constitution. 143 C. 9.
Cited. Id., 698. Word “injury” means a legal injury, that is, one violative of established law of which a court can properly
take cognizance. 144 C. 155. A permit to sell liquor is a matter of privilege and not of right. By engaging in the liquor
business the permittee assumes the risk of a variety of situations which could impose liability on him. It is not an uncon-
stitutional exercise of the police power for a permittee who sells in violation of the law to be prevented from defending
on the ground that the particular drink which he sold did not cause or contribute to the buyer’s intoxication. Id., 241.
“Injury” means an injury which is violative of established law of which a court can properly take cognizance. 145 C. 196.
Depreciation of neighborhood because of housing project not such an injury as covered by this section. Id. Ordinance
licensing and regulating trailer and mobile home parks held constitutional except for two provisions. 146 C. 720. Does
not guarantee any particular form of procedure at a public hearing but circumstances govern each case. 147 C. 321.
Providing of school transportation to nonprot private schools by towns under Sec. 10-281 held constitutional. Id., 374.
Substantially the same as due process clause of the federal constitution. Id. Provision in municipal building code which
prohibited the repair of any building of nonreproof construction within the inner re limits of the city after it had been
damaged to the extent of fty per cent of the cost of replacing the original building, held not to violate due process. Id.,
602. Building code made no provision for a hearing before issuance of a condemnation and demolition order, held not to
violate due process as aggrieved person could appeal to review board and to the courts. Id. Regulations imposed on a
lawful business cannot exceed what is reasonably necessary to accomplish their purpose. 148 C. 481. Question of con-
stitutionality of statute (Sec. 17-273a) concerning return of indigent person to state of origin not determined as stipulated
facts held inadequate. 149 C. 216. An act found to serve a public purpose is not rendered unconstitutional by the fact that
it might incidentally benet particular industries or lending institutions. 150 C. 333. Cited. Id., 336, footnote. Where
change of zone deprived plaintiffs of any worthwhile rights or benets in their land, defendant’s action in changing the
zone was unreasonable and conscatory and therefore in violation of this section. 151 C. 314. Compensation for taking;
section does not apply where injury is only consequential and there has been no physical taking of land or any interest
in it and no physical invasion of it. 152 C. 688. Court cannot strike down as unconstitutional a legislative enactment
merely because it contains technical words the exact meaning of which is not evident, without explanation, to other
156 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
persons disassociated from the technical eld. 153 C. 465. Cited. Id., 574. Due process does not guarantee any particular
form of state procedure. Due regard must be had to nature of proceeding and individual right affected by it and Sec.
8-127 affords sufcient due process for determination of redevelopment area. 156 C. 521. Has substantially same mean-
ing as the due process clause of amendment XIV of federal constitution. Id. Applicant for readmission to the bar under
circumstances where testimony of chairman of committee on recommendations had testied for his disbarment should
have opportunity to cross-examine as right of due process of law. 157 C. 67. Exclusion of public except press and parents
of parties from courtroom during testimony of female plaintiff as to acts of rape by defendant held properly ordered by
trial court. Id., 198. Procedure for condemnation under the urban redevelopment statutes is not unconstitutional as vio-
lating this section. 159 C. 116. Sec. 7-433c, while imposing a nancial obligation on towns, is in the interest of public
safety, hence, it does not deprive town of property without due process of law. 168 C. 84. Mechanic’s lien as a taking of
property without due process. Id., 371. Right of redress for actionable injury not restricted by no-fault insurance law. 169
C. 267. Cited. Id., 267; 170 C. 155. Section 12 of article I of the constitution of 1818, now this section, does not require
taxation to be equal and uniform. 174 C. 556. Cited. 176 C. 409; Id., 563; Id., 613; 177 C. 78. Application of antitrust act
to contract entered into prior to the effective date of the act does not violate plaintiff’s rights under this section. Id., 218.
Cited. Id., 295; 178 C. 393; 180 C. 11; Id., 153. Sec. 52-325 concerning lis pendens is unconstitutional for failure to
provide notice to proper owners and an opportunity for a hearing to challenge the lis pendens. Id., 501. Unconstitution-
ality of Sec. 52-325 became moot upon entry of judgment of strict foreclosure. 181 C. 141. Party accorded right of ap-
pellate review is entitled to full and unhampered exercise of that right, otherwise party is deprived of due process. Id.,
296. Cited. 183 C. 552; 184 C. 75; Id., 483; 185 C. 88; 188 C. 98; Id., 336. Sec. 52-325 as amended by P.A. 81-8 meets
minimum requirements of procedural due process. 189 C. 471. Cited. Id., 550; Id., 727; 191 C. 110; Id., 514; 192 C. 150;
Id., 539; Id., 704; 193 C. 59. Imposition of academic sanctions for nonattendance discussed. Id., 93. Cited. Id., 157.
Denial of due process cited. Id. Due process clauses of state and federal constitutions require that on subject to a signi-
cant deprivation of liberty or property must be accorded adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Id.,
180. Cited. Id., 589. Whether delay in civil jury trial is unconstitutional under this section; separation of powers; nonjus-
ticiability of issue discussed. Id., 670. Cited. 194 C. 52. Right to due process cited. Id. Claims of appellate delay arise
under this constitutional guaranty. Id., 510. Cited. Id., 601. Due process rights cited. Id.; 195 C. 276. Tax on net income
of unincorporated businesses and an added fourth base of taxation to the corporate business tax held to be constitutional.
Id., 284. Due process clause of the Connecticut Constitution cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id., 326. Due
process cited. Id., 405. Cited. Id., 534. Due process cited. Id.; Id., 543; Id., 558. State constitutional grounds cited. Id.,
682. Indigent defendants in state-supported paternity actions have constitutional right under both the federal and state
constitutions to court-appointed counsel at state expense; due process consideration discussed. 196 C. 403. Due process
right to state-appointed counsel cited. Id. Paternity defendant’s right to court-appointed counsel depends upon defen-
dant’s indigency. Id., 413. Constitutional entitlement to court-appointed counsel cited. Id. Constitutional right to substan-
tive due process cited. Id., 440. “The twin headstones of due process analysis under the minimum contracts doctrine are
foreseeability and fairness.” 197 C. 34. Due process cited. Id., 141. Due process clause cited. 198 C. 229. Due process
right cited. Id., 498. Due process cited; judgment of appellate court in 2 CA 36 reversed in part and case remanded with
direction that judgment of trial court be reinstated. 199 C. 70. Defendant’s constitutional rights cited; due process cited.
Id., 287. Due process cited. Id., 368. Sec. 52-434(a)(4) interpreted to require consent to referral therefore also held con-
stitutional. Id., 496. Due process cited. Id. Sec. 52-434(a)(4) not void for vagueness. Id., 518. Due process cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 618. Due process cited. Id. Cited. 200 C. 115. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 376. Constitutional right to due
process cited. Id. Denial of due process cited. Id., 489. Sec. 52-577a is constitutional under this article. Id., 562. Does not
protect right to redress unless “one suffers a recognizable injury”. Id., 676. Application of “clear and convincing evi-
dence” and “fair preponderance of the evidence” standards of proof discussed; state due process clause, cited. 201 C.
229. Due process cited. Id., 577; Id., 700. Supreme court adopted appellate court holding that plaintiff not deprived of
due process by written hearsay evidence admitted by board of re commissioners; due process cited. 202 C. 28. Cited.
Id., 252; Id., 429. Deprivation of state constitutional rights cited. Id. Due process provision cited. 203 C. 14. Cited. Id.,
63. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 109; Id. 156; Id., 246. Rights to due process of law and constitutional rights cited.
Id. Due process cited. Id., 525. Cited. 204 C. 17. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 399. Deprivation of due process cited.
Id., 639. Due process cited. Id., 760; 205 C. 178. “... has been viewed as a limitation upon the legislature’s ability to
abolish common law and statutory rights ...” existing in 1818 when constitutional provision was adopted. Id., 219. Cited.
Id., 495. Deprivation of fundamental state constitutional rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 542. Tenure is a protected property
right under federal and state constitutions; due process, cited. 206 C. 113. Constitutional principles of due process cited.
Id., 125. Constitutional requirements of due process cited. Id., 608. Constitutional rights to due process cited. 207 C. 59.
Due process; violation and deprivation of constitutional rights, cited. Id., 346. Cited. Id., 496; Id., 518; Id., 599. Access
to the courts cited. Id. Due process deprivations cited. Id., 743. Due process cited. 208 C. 1; Id., 13. Due process rights
cited. Id., 21. Cited. Id., 267. Connecticut Constitution cited; due process cited. Id. Due process violation cited. Id., 492.
Due process cited. Id., 576. Cited. 209 C. 59. Due process cited. Id. State constitutional rights cited. Id., 679. Procedural
due process cited. 210 C. 697. Procedural due process cited. Id. “... does not ensure that a plaintiff may obtain satisfaction
of multiple judgments for the same injury”. 211 C. 67. Due process cited. Id., 508. Cited. Id., 662; 212 C. 83. Disparate
treatment violates constitutional provision. Id. Access to courts provisional. Id. Cited. Id., 311. Denial of due process
cited. Id., 441; Id., 710. Due process cited. 213 C. 136. Cited. Id., 282. Due process clauses cited. 214 C. 256. Cited. Id.,
801. Due process rights cited. Id., 407. Right to due process cited. 215 C. 82. Cited; procedural safeguards cited. Id., 162.
Cited. Id., 435. Procedural due process rights cited; constitutional deprivations cited. Id., 450. Due process cited. Id.,
469. Constitutional rights to due process cited. Id., 474. Substantive due process cited. Id., 590. Violation of due process
rights cited. Id., 616. Rights to due process of law cited. Id., 675. Cited. 216 C. 1. Rights to due process cited. Id. Viola-
tion of constitutional rights cited. Id. Does not independently create right to attorney’s fees. Id., 85. Right to due process
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 127. Due process cited. Id.; Id., 541; Id., 563. Unconstitutionally vague cited. 217 C. 1. Deprivation
of fundamental right or of a fair trial cited. Id., 24. Application of constitutional claims in summary process cases dis-
cussed. Id., 313. Due process cited. Id. Rights to due process; unconstitutionally vague and over broad cited. Id., 404.
Rights to due process and unconstitutionally vague cited. Id., 435. Void for vagueness cited. Id., 447. Rights to due
Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 157
process cited. Id., 490. Violation of due process clauses cited. 218 C. 144. Denial of due process cited. Id., 181. Cited.
Id., 531. Does not require de novo review by trial court of factual ndings by arbitrators. Id., 646. Rights to due process
and access to the courts cited. Id. Claims constituting general attack on validity of regulation should be presented by way
of declaratory judgment action. Id., 737. Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id. Unconstitutional deprivation of right to
bring actions that existed at common law discussed. 219 C. 179. Due process cited. Id. 620. Due process rights cited. Id.,
657; Id., 703. Rights to due process and a fair hearing cited. 220 C. 86. Due process cited. Id., 192. Cited. Id., 225. Vio-
lation of due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 285. Due process violation cited. Id., 455. Cited. Id., 527. Due process cited.
Id.; Id., 689; Id., 739. Due process cited; constitutional rights cited. Id., 812. Due process of law cited. Id., 901. Due
process rights cited. 221 C. 217. Cited. Id., 768. Due process cited. Id., 903. Due process rights cited; right to fair hearing
cited. 222 C. 98. Plaintiff did not meet burden that regulation at issue was impermissibly vague as applied to facts of
case. Id., 607. Impermissibly vague, unconstitutionally vague cited. Id. State right to privacy cited; plaintiff did not es-
tablish standing to assert constitutional rights of individual permit (to carry pistols or revolvers) holders not properly
before the court. Id., 621. Unconstitutionally vague cited; due process protections cited. Id., 784. Due process rights of
parties whose property rights are to be affected cited. 223 C. 68. Right to due process cited. Id., 492. Due process cited.
224 C. 263. Rights to due process cited. 225 C. 499. Due process rights cited. Id., 528. Due process requires a hearing to
provide opportunity to present evidence; judgment of appellate court in 27 CA 755 reversed. Id., 757. Constitutional
protection and due process right cited. Id. Right to due process cited. Id., 804. Due process cited. 226 C. 1; Id., 105.
Cited. Id., 282; Id., 314. State due process cited. Id. Right to due process cited. Id., 418. Cited. Id., 475. Open courts
provision of state constitution cited. Id. Requirements of due process cited. Id., 757. Cited. Id., 773. Facially unconstitu-
tional, principles of due process cited. Id. Due process of law cited. Id., 812. Due process rights cited. 227 C. 71. Cited.
Id., 363. Home rule provision cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 545. Due process rights cited. Id., 748; 228 C. 95. Due
process of law cited. Id., 630. Rights to due process cited; right to cross-examine cited. Id., 651. Rights to due process
cited. Id., 766. Cited. 229 C. 256. Due process cited. Id., 627. Procedural due process cited. Id., 771. Due process of law
cited. Id., 801. Cited. 230 C. 335; Id., 351. Denial of notice and opportunity to be heard cited. Id., 459. Violation of due
process rights cited. Id., 641. Right to fair notice and due process cited. Id., 668. Due process cited. Id., 698. Right to due
process cited; fundamental constitutional rights to liberty and property cited. Id., 828. Cited. Id., 914. Constitutional
rights and due process cited. 231 C. 308. Cited. Id., 328; Id., 918; Id., 919. Due process of law cited. 232 C. 27. Due
process cited. Id., 91; Id., 172. Due process of law cited. Id., 758. Cited. Id., 901; Id., 902; 233 C. 153. Procedural due
process of law cited. Id. Due process rights cited. Id., 198. Cited. Id., 251. Denial of due process rights cited. Id., 296.
Section incorporates no governmental obligation to provide minimum subsistence. Id., 557. Constitutionally incorporat-
ing preexisting rights cited; due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 701. Due process principles cited; afrmative governmental
obligations to provide shelter as a constitutionally incorporated right under this section cited. Id. Presumption of legiti-
macy in certain instances rebuttable by putative father; judgment of appellate court in 34 CA 129 reversed. 234 C. 51.
Constitutional right and due process interest cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 194. Procedural due process cited. Id., 221.
Rights to due process cited. 235 C. 693. Due process cited. Id., 865. Cited. 236 C. 1. Due process rights cited. Id., 625.
Due process cited. Id., 681. Deprivation of due process cited. 237 C. 1. Right to due process cited. Id., 272. Due process
rights cited. Id., 679. Cited. 238 C. 1. Rights to due process cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 216. Cited. Id., 692. Right
to access to courts cited. Id. Rights to due process cited. 239 C. 144. Due process cited. Id., 168. Rights to due process
cited. Id., 449. Substantive due process cited. Id., 574. Due process clauses cited. Id., 708. Due process rights cited. 240
C. 671. Rights to due process cited. Id., 799. Due process concerns cited. 241 C. 24. Cited. Id., 269. Due process rights
cited. Id. Article does not guarantee a right to a state constitutional damages claim based on pre-1818 common law action
for rights akin to those protected under Secs. 7 and 8 of Art. I. 244 C. 23. Procedures of Sec. 31-349c(a) do not meet
minimal due process requirements under fourteenth amendment to federal constitution and Art. I, Secs. 8 and 10 of
Connecticut Constitution. At a minimum, parties to workers’ compensation claim seeking transfer to Second Injury Fund
must have opportunity to review evidence presented to medical panel and panel’s ndings prior to its decision. Identity
of panel members must be disclosed with opportunity for parties to object. Parties must have opportunity to present their
evidence and arguments to panel, panel must have at least one member who is an expert in eld of medicine applicable
to claimant’s injuries, and there must be some level of review by commissioner to insure application by panel of appro-
priate legal standards and opportunity for correction of clearly erroneous factual ndings (see also 257 C. 520; 257 C.
527). 257 C. 481. Heart and hypertension benets paid under Sec. 7-433c are special compensation and not workers’
compensation for purposes of reimbursement from special injury fund pursuant to Sec. 31-306(a)(2)(A) and such a result
does not deny municipal employers a protected property interest without due process of law. 269 C. 763. It is not a vio-
lation for the sole aggravating factor found by the jury re a capital felony, namely, murder committed for pecuniary gain
under Sec. 53a-46a(i)(6), to duplicate an element of the underlying crime of capital felony by murder for hire under Sec.
53a-54b(2). 305 C. 101. In the absence of improper state action, the admission of identication evidence implicates due
process principles only when the evidence is so extremely unreliable that its admission would deprive defendant of his
right to a fair trial. 312 C. 687. Retroactive application of amended civil action statute of limitations, Sec. 52-577d, to
revive an otherwise time barred claim does not violate defendant’s substantive due process rights; court has never rec-
ognized a vested right in the lapsing of a statute of limitations; state constitution does not provide greater protection to
defendant’s interest in the lapse of a statute of limitations than is afforded under federal constitution; however, retroac-
tive application of statute that would extend a lapsed criminal statute of limitations would violate the ex post facto clause
of the federal constitution. 317 C. 357. Plaintiff estate in the case of a workers’ compensation claim is neither a natural
person nor an articial person and is therefore not entitled to the protections of this article. 323 C. 26. Petitioner failed
to establish that there exists a fundamental right to an in person termination of parental rights trial. 343 C. 642.
Judgment of appellate court in 2 CA 36 reversed in part, see 199 C. 70. Due process cited. Id. Under certain circum-
stances a court has jurisdiction to review administrative action although there is no statutory procedure for an appeal. 2
CA 43. Constitutional claims concerning due process cited. Id. Interview of minor child by judge in absence of parents
and their counsel where objected to by a party determined to be a violation of that party’s due process rights. Id., 132.
Cited. Id., 196; Id., 362. Due process clause cited. Id., 363. Cited. Id., 449. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 689. Due
process rights cited. Id. Cited. 3 CA 118. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id.; Id., 184. Due process cited. Id. Due process
158 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
rights cited. Id., 322. Procedural due process cited. Id., 404. State due process cited. Id., 432. Due process cited; right to
due process was fullled by a full, trial-type evidentiary hearing held before impartial hearing panel, procedure selected
pursuant to Sec. 10-151. 4 CA 1. Constitutional right to be free from state deprivation of property without due process of
law cited. Id., 209. Due process rights cited. Id., 216. Cited. Id., 307. Due process rights cited; void for vagueness cited.
Id. Due process considerations with uniform administrative procedures act provisions discussed. Id., 359. Due process
cited. Id.; Id., 464. Fair trial cited. Id., 669. Cited. 5 CA 369. Due process cited. Id.; Id., 520; Id., 649. Fundamental rights
to a fair trial cited. 6 CA 143. Due process cited. Id., 229. Zoning regulations seeking to terminate a valid nonconforming
use after a grace period held unconstitutional. Id., 237. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 301; Id., 471; 7 CA 164; Id., 639.
Due process cited; constitutional rights cited. Id. Unconstitutionally void for vagueness cited. 8 CA 407. Due process; fair
hearing, cited. Id., 508. Due process rights cited. Id., 656. Due process principles cited. 9 CA 260. Denial of due process
cited. Id., 396. Due process rights cited. Id., 514. Constitutionally defective notice of public hearing cited. Id., 538. Due
process rights cited. Id., 608. Deprivation of property without due process cited. 10 CA 80. Void for vagueness; due pro-
cess, cited. Id., 86. Denial of due process cited. Id., 90. Due process cited. Id., 201; Id., 292. Cited. Id., 347. Constitutional
right to due process cited. Id. Due process clauses cited. Id., 428. Due process cited. 11 CA 332. Deprivation of due pro-
cess cited. Id., 693. Cited. 12 CA 190. Right to due process cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 435. Due process rights cited.
Id., 455. Right to due process cited. 13 CA 91. Constitutional right to due process cited. Id., 114. Violation of due process
rights cited. Id., 400. Deprivation of property without due process cited. Id., 632. Due process; fundamental constitutional
right and fair trial, cited. 14 CA 296. Due process violation cited. Id., 413. Due process cited. Id., 487. Bill of attainder
and ex post facto law cited. 15 CA 342. Cited. Id., 569. Due process cited. Id. Due process rights cited. Id., 738. Consti-
tutional principles of due process cited. 16 CA 619. Due process cited. 17 CA 4; Id., 13; Id., 166. Due process clauses
cited. 18 CA 254. Due process cited. Id., 393. Due process rights cited. Id., 488. Cited. Id., 515. Due process rights cited.
19 CA 20. Cited. Id., 402. Due process rights cited. Id., 505; Id., 588; 20 CA 51; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 450. Right
to due process cited. Id., 425. Due process cited. Id., 638. Rights of due process cited. Id., 705. Cited. 21 CA 40. Due
process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard cited. Id. Constitutional challenges and issues and deprivation
of constitutional right cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 489; 22 CA 4; Id., 181; Id., 193; Id., 396; Id., 591. Right to due
process cited. 23 CA 207. Due process requirements cited. Id., 287. Due process violation cited. Id., 410; Id., 499. Due
process rights cited. 24 CA 377; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 233. Minimum due process standards cited. Id., 662;
judgment of appellate court in Dragon v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board reversed, see 223 C. 618. Due process
cited. 25 CA 164. In civil proceedings certain misconduct by itself does not infringe on constitutional right to fair trial;
probable prejudice standard applies. Id., 217. Constitutional right to fair trial cited. Id. Right to due process cited. Id., 536.
Rights to due process cited. Id., 586; judgment of appellate court in In re Valerie D. reversed, see 223 C. 492. Due process
and right to fair trial cited. Id., 741. Due process cited. 26 CA 564; 27 CA 142. Cited. Id., 195. Due process rights cited.
Id. Cited. Id., 530. Deprivation of due process cited. Id., 543. Right to due process cited. Id., 614, 615; judgment of appel-
late court in Nelseco Navigation Co. v. Department of Liquor Control reversed, see 226 C. 418. Currently accepted stan-
dards of procedural due process cited. Id., 755, 760; judgment of appellate court in Housing Authority v. Lamothe re-
versed, see 225 C. 757. Cited. Id., 769; judgment of appellate court in Matza v. Matza reversed, see 226 C. 166. Right to
due process cited. Id. Procedural due process cited. 28 CA 536. Impermissibly vague and unconstitutional cited. 29 CA 1.
Due process rights cited. Id., 48. Due process clauses cited. Id., 105. Due process cited. Id., 112. Constitutional right to
fair trial cited. Id., 181. Due process cited. Id., 378; Id., 463. Cited. 30 CA 594. Due process rights cited. Id., 742. Cited.
31 CA 12; Id., 400. Deprivation of state constitutional rights to due process cited. Id. Arbitrary determination of child’s
best interest cited. Id. Vagueness and impermissibly vague cited. Id., 674. Due process rights, procedures employed under
state and federal constitutions cited. Id., 690. Due process right to be heard cited. Id., 761. Due process cited. Id., 819. Due
process and fair procedure cited. 32 CA 56. Due process rights cited. Id., 147. Cited. Id., 187. Right to due process cited.
Id., 280; Id., 340. Unconstitutional and void cited; due process of law cited. Id., 384. Due process afforded where oppor-
tunity to present argument in support of claim is either oral or written. Id., 395. Due process rights cited. Id. Due process
cited. Id., 465. Denial of due process cited. Id., 515. Due process right cited. 33 CA 632. Due process of law cited. Id.,
727. Constitutional due process of law cited. 34 CA 343. Due process rights cited. Id., 352. Cited. Id., 395; Id., 521. Due
process of law cited; service of process and violation of due process cited. Id., 634. Due process cited. Id., 673. Due
process right cited. Id., 772. Due process rights cited. 35 CA 160; Id., 421; Id., 594. Due process cited. Id., 599. Rights to
procedural due process cited. 36 CA 298. Due process rights cited. Id., 597. Due process cited. Id., 635; judgment re-
versed, see 636 C. 330. Denial of due process cited. Id., 670. Due process cited. 37 CA 100. Deprivation of due process
cited. Id., 515. Not a taking of property without due process of law cited. Id., 835. Due process cited. 38 CA 198; Id., 240;
Id., 263; Id., 506. Cited. Id., 685. Access to courts and due process cited. Id. Due process cited. 39 CA 253. Cited. Id., 280;
Id., 289. Due process cited. Id., 429. Cited. Id., 674. Rights to due process cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 684; 40 CA
278. Right to due process cited. Id., 458. Due process cited. Id., 501. Cited. 41 CA 238. Right to due process cited. Id. Due
process cited. Id., 382; Id., 866; 42 CA 318. Deprivation of due process cited. Id., 480. Constitutional rights as a tenured
teacher cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id., 631. Right to due process cited. Id., 803. Due process cited. 43 CA
39. Right to due process cited. Id., 227. Substantive and procedural due process cited; violation of Connecticut Constitu-
tion cited. Id., 654. Cited. Id., 659. Due process cited; constitutional right to cross-examination cited. Id. Due process
cited. 44 CA 99. Due process rights cited. Id., 179; Id., 370; Id., 759. Due process of law cited. 45 CA 89. Cited. Id., 707.
Due process cited. Id. Rights to due process cited. Id., 712. Due process grounds cited. 46 CA 150. Requirements of due
process cited. Id., 182. Cited. Id., 559. Defendant’s analysis under section clearly inapplicable to defendant’s due process
claim re establishment of violation of probation by proof beyond a reasonable doubt or, in the alternative, proof by clear
and convincing evidence in a revocation of probation hearing as such hearing clearly complied with provisions of section.
61 CA 99. Repose section of Sec. 52-584 does not violate open courts provision of Art. I, Sec. 10. 66 CA 518. Section
curtails legislature’s power to unduly restrict a right that existed at common law prior to adoption of constitution in 1818.
85 CA 15. Although court incorrectly interjected itself into the proceedings by terminating the evidentiary hearing before
plaintiff had completed presentation of his case-in-chief, plaintiff had full opportunity to testify and plaintiff’s counsel
examined defendant at length on direct examination and thus was not denied a meaningful opportunity to present evidence
or to cross-examine defendant and therefore the court did not violate plaintiff’s due process rights. 89 CA 210. Plaintiff
Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 159
could not prevail on her claims that trial court deprived her of due process by nding her in contempt for acts that had
occurred subsequent to and had not been pleaded in defendant’s motion for contempt and plaintiff could not complain that
she was not on notice and that trial court improperly terminated the contempt hearing without affording plaintiff an op-
portunity to defend herself thus denying her due process and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 94 CA 306. Plaintiff
could not prevail on his claims that his right to due process was violated when he was suspended without pay and without
a hearing from February 18, 1993, through his July 12, 2001, acquittal; there was an independent nding of probable
cause that provided sufcient protection against an improper suspension and although there was appreciable delay from
plaintiff’s arrest on felony charges and suspension until his acquittal, delay did not constitute a violation of his due process
rights, and because he was suspended without pay from the time that he requested reinstatement until his disciplinary
hearing; although there was a ten-month delay from the time of his acquittal until the time hearing was held, delay did not
violate plaintiff’s due process rights. Id., 445. Where defendant was neither forced to exercise nor prevented from exer-
cising the right to testify, defendant who invoked privilege against self-incrimination during trial dissolving marriage was
not deprived of property without due process when court denied motion to continue dissolution trial until after completion
of criminal proceeding. 115 CA 521. Delay of several months during divorce proceeding did not violate due process. 121
CA 451. Right to pursue judicial remedy is not abridged by requirement under Sec. 52-190a to obtain letter from similar
health care provider in medical malpractice action because requirement is merely a procedural limitation that neither
eliminates nor unreasonably burdens plaintiff’s right to legal recourse. 132 CA 68. Due process rights not violated when
court decided motion to strike substitute complaint without deciding motion to strike original complaint; due process
rights also not violated when court ignored conict of interest issues raised in memoranda in opposition to motion to strike
and allowed defendants to present a speaking motion. 144 CA 79. Sec. 31-296 procedural safeguards, postdeprivation
remedies and public interest in providing speedy, effective, inexpensive method for determining workers’ compensation
claims are sufcient to satisfy due process requirements. Id., 413. Sec. 52-584 re statute of repose does not violate open
courts provision. 154 CA 1. Violation of procedural due process when attorney was not given adequate notice of and time
to prepare for disciplinary hearing in which court found him in wilful violation of its orders and ordered attorney sus-
pended from the practice of law for twenty days. 166 CA 557. Plaintiff was denied, at a properly noticed evidentiary
hearing, the opportunity to present his own evidence, to cross examine the court-appointed therapist and for adequate time
to review the report on which the court relied in violation of his right to due process of law. 187 CA 795.
A physician has no vested or constitutional right to practice in a hospital. 21 CS 55. Cited. 24 CS 298; 28 CS 257.
Exclusion of aliens from grand jury service under Sec. 54-45 did not violate defendant’s rights since citizenship require-
ment bears rational relation to demands of jury service. 35 CS 98. Cited. 36 CS 108. No violation of due process where
the breach of a landlord’s covenant may not be raised in an action for possession and tenant limited to separate suit for
damages. 37 CS 579. Cited. Id., 723; Id., 745; 38 CS 70. Notice provision of Sec. 8-28, by publication, complies with
requirement of due process, where right of appeal is extended to a large class of people. Id., 590. Cited. 39 CS 264. Due
process cited. Id. Right to court-appointed counsel where indigent defendant is faced with civil contempt proceeding to
enforce child support orders applied in instant case. 40 CS 111. Procedural due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 208. Rights
of due process cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 361. Cited. Id., 365; Id., 381. Due process cited. Id. State regulation on
Medicaid abortion funding unconstitutional; due process rights and privacy rights, cited. Id., 394. Constitutional issue of
procedural due process cited. 41 CS 14. Cited. Id., 31; Id., 48. Right to trial by impartial jury cited. Id. Cited. Id., 130.
State constitutional issue cited. Id. Due process requirement cited. Id., 196. Due process cited. Id., 376. Due process and
denial of cross-examination of defendant’s experts cited. 42 CS 57. Due process cited. Id., 144. Cited. Id., 439. Right to
due process cited. Id. Lis pendens statute(s) Sec. 52-325 et seq., provide(s) for immediate post deprivation hearing and
are thus constitutional. Id., 241. Deprivation of property without due process of law cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague
probable cause standard cited. Id. Due process requirements cited. Id., 323. Cited. Id., 460. Due process cited. Id. Due
process of law cited. Id., 526. Due process cited. 43 CS 13; Id., 91. Due process of law cited. Id., 108. Cited. Id., 222.
Right to procedural due process cited. Id., 386. Due process cited. Id., 457. Due process safeguard and protections cited.
44 CS 53. Due process cited. Id., 121. Cited. Id., 223; Id., 297. Due process cited. Id. Due process of law cited. Id., 361.
Violation of due process cited. Id., 472. Termination of a person’s job because a close relative of the person sought legal
recourse from the employer violates public policy. 48 CS 636. Public service company’s due process rights were not vio-
lated by expedited process to determine need for interim rate decrease under Sec. 16-19(g). 51 CS 307. Plaintiffs failed to
establish that their damages action for denial of a land use permit constituted a damages action for the violation of a qua-
si-constitutional right that existed at common law in Connecticut prior to 1818 that was incorporated in section. Id., 636.
Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 455. Defendant’s conviction under section 19-242 of selling toilet preparations and drug
sundries at less than wholesale price reversed, since this section, as applied to these facts, is price-xing legislation
and as such is violative of due process provisions of federal and state constitutions. Id., 491. Beneciary of welfare
assistance has no vested right to aid and therefore no property in assistance subject to constitutional protection. 4 Conn.
Cir. Ct. 449. Welfare regulations providing limits on cash surrender value of life insurance policies of beneciaries of
aid to dependent children found not arbitrary and not a denial of equal protection of laws. Id., 453, 454. Requirement
that tenant give bond on appeal of summary process action not unconstitutional as to indigent tenants. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct.
282. However forceful and persuasive the arguments may be compelling a determination that the Connecticut disorderly
conduct statute, Sec. 53-175, is unconstitutional as containing no ascertainable standard of quiet, the circuit court should
leave such a decision to higher courts. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 73, 77.
(Right of private property.)
Sec. 11.
1
The property of no person shall be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation therefor.
1
Right to take private property. A city authorized to aid a railroad may lay a tax for that purpose; 15 C. 501; such
authority is valid. 41 C. 234. But the state cannot raise money by taxation to pay a pension to civil war veterans. 85
C. 344. Taking the property of an inhabitant of a town under an execution against it is valid. 16 C. 381; 121 U.S. 121.
160 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
Liquors illegally kept may be forfeited. 25 C. 286. Taxation is not the taking of private property without compensation;
23 C. 189; 32 C. 130; nor is imposition of liability on a railroad company for res; 54 C. 459; nor a requirement that
physicians report infectious diseases. 56 C. 225. A franchise may be taken. 17 C. 462; 81 C. 62. A town cannot authorize
owner of cattle to pasture them on highway in front of another’s premises. 28 C. 169. Resolution authorizing trustees
to sell property and invest proceeds for all concerned is valid. 44 C. 116. Of right in general, see 69 C. 435. State can
authorize town to take; 81 C. 62; quaere, whether it can for United States. 75 C. 319. Grant of power to private person
must clearly appear. 69 C. 668; 75 C. 387; 87 C. 199. Power to take “adjacent land” includes what. 83 C. 137. Right to
compensation does not extend to damages due to exercise of police power. 86 C. 561; 95 C. 364. Power extends to all
property. 77 C. 421; 86 C. 151; Id., 361. Property already devoted to public use can be taken for another only by clear
authority. 72 C. 301; 77 C. 83; 86 C. 151; see 84 C. 522. Stock of a corporation may be taken; 77 C. 421; 78 C. 1; 203
U.S. 372; so mortgage rights; 76 C. 581; waters of a stream for sewage purposes. 69 C. 668; 72 C. 551; 76 C. 436. Rights
of riparian proprietor. 69 C. 682. Property may be taken for a temporary purpose. 75 C. 387; 76 C. 446. Limitations in
general statutes may apply to special charter. 72 C. 687; see 86 C. 166. Prior unlawful entry will not prevent taking. 86
C. 36. Zoning law upheld. 95 C. 364; see 104 C. 616, 637; 110 C. 92, 130. Statute forbidding bathing in tributary to
reservoir, even as to riparian owners, upheld. 123 C. 492. Depreciation of neighborhood because of erection of housing
project not within purview of section. 145 C. 196. Power of eminent domain and police power distinguished. 146 C.
650. Zoning regulations did no more than offer assurance of measure of supervision by responsible public authority over
conditions affecting public health, safety and general welfare, and consequently were proper exercise of police power.
149 C. 712. Where change of zone deprived plaintiffs of any worthwhile rights or benets in their land, defendant’s
action in changing the zone was unreasonable and conscatory and therefore in violation of this section. 151 C. 314.
Trial court properly considered in its valuation the possibility of recovering remediation costs from successor company
of the former owner. 272 C. 14. Trial court properly considered availability of state economic development grant funds
in calculating property’s fair market value. Id. Generally, under principles of inverse condemnation, property owner
may seek compensation in an eminent domain proceeding for pretaking damages caused by the condemnor. 276 C. 426.
Public use; necessity, and its determination. Taking for a railroad is for a public use; 21 C. 305; 72 C. 488; 77 C.
417; so for a telephone. 90 C. 179. Land cannot be taken simply to improve a landscape. 60 C. 292; but see 95 C. 365.
But license may be exacted for advertising on private land. 90 C. 663. Whether use is public is a question for the courts;
taking to establish harbor lines is for such use. 60 C. 291. If property is ultimately to go to benet private person, it is
not taken for public use. 75 C. 92. Limitation to public use may be found in charter restrictions of municipality to which
power is granted. 87 C. 200. Public use dened; construction of reservoirs to equalize ow of stream where one branch
is taken for city water supply; Id., 204; 89 C. 671; see 241 U.S. 649; grant to private educational institution; 87 C. 421; to
cemeteries. Id., 428. Delegating power; conclusiveness of legislative act as to public use and necessity; 69 C. 435; 72 C.
488; 76 C. 436; 77 C. 421; 85 C. 350; 86 C. 151; 87 C. 193; Id., 428; 203 U.S. 372; necessity must be reasonable. 86 C.
361. Power to authorize condemnation implies power to do so conditionally. 70 C. 626. Grant of power to build specic
railroad determines necessity. 74 C. 662. Approval of taking larger piece will not cover taking of smaller. 83 C. 603.
Economic development projects created and implemented pursuant to chapter 132 that have public economic benets of
creating new jobs, increasing tax and other revenues and contributing to urban revitalization satisfy the public use clause.
Exercise of eminent domain power is unreasonable, in violation of public use clause, if the facts and circumstances of
the particular case reveal that the taking specically is intended to benet a private party. Delegation of eminent domain
power to private persons rather than public ofcials is not unconstitutional where a public purpose is thereby advanced
and where the benet of the property taken is considered to be available to the general public. Determination of what
property is necessary to be taken in any given case in order to effectuate the public purpose is, under our constitution,
a matter for the exercise of legislative power. When legislature delegates the making of that determination to another
agency, the decision of that agency is conclusive. Agency’s decision, however, is open to judicial review only to discover
if it was unreasonable or in bad faith or was an abuse of the power conferred. 268 C. 1.
Compensation; taking. Raising abutments to railroad bridge so as to obstruct entrance to abutting property is not a
taking. 21 C. 309; 66 C. 225. Damages once paid for raising causeway cover future changes. 29 C. 536. City may order
railroad bridge to be widened without compensation, when. 32 C. 234. Injury to abutting property by railroad embank-
ment not a taking; 42 C. 195; nor injury due to excavating or lling highway; 44 C. 250; nor is compelling railroad to
pay portion of expense of bridge over highway; 60 C. 10; nor is change of grade in highway; 29 C. 536; 68 C. 79; 77 C.
438; 86 C. 566; nor consequential injuries due to improvement of navigation; 9 C. 442; nor consequential damages
generally. 21 C. 320. New ferry may be chartered without compensation to old one, when. 30 C. 39; see 10 How. 511.
Meaning of taking. 54 C. 297; 69 C. 435; 72 C. 302; 82 C. 51; 85 C. 237. Forbidding further use of cemetery is not a
taking. 62 C. 392. Discontinuing highway; interfering with access to land. 66 C. 225; 75 C. 348; 77 C. 438. Additional
servitude in street by stream, or street railway; 26 C. 259; 67 C. 197; 69 C. 146; 70 C. 610; 85 C. 401; temporary location;
75 C. 343; 76 C. 311; 77 C. 431; layout of street over railroad; 72 C. 225; crossing of stream by street railway; 70 C. 610;
cutting new channel in navigable waters; Id., 685; 71 C. 65; discharge of sewage in stream. 72 C. 550. Reasonable use
of highway for building materials is not a taking. 75 C. 343. As to construction of sewer in street, see 69 C. 171. Land is
not taken till proceedings begun; effect of prior unlawful entry. 75 C. 239; 86 C. 36. Compensation must be made. 14 C.
152; 17 C. 59; 41 C. 93. A town cannot be deprived of a ferry without it. 17 C. 91. As to necessity of prepayment of
damage. 19 C. 151; 49 C. 402; 54 C. 297; 70 C. 628; 77 C. 431; 95 C. 6, 229. A statute not providing for compensation
is invalid. 69 C. 155; 72 C. 551; 75 C. 343; 95 C. 6. That taking is under order of public utilities commission does not
obviate necessity of payment. 81 C. 581. Condemnation of “the waters” of a stream. 69 C. 461. What constitutes just
compensation; provision for payment of past damages; annual payment. 76 C. 435. Consent to taking as waiving dam-
ages. 80 C. 124; 90 C. 179. Costs of litigation; past damage. 75 C. 238. Rule of damages where part of, or an easement
in, land is taken. 81 C. 581. Appointment by legislature of special commission to x compensation. 85 C. 498. Damages
for temporary occupation of highway by railroad; 77 C. 431; for taking toll-bridge. 82 C. 460. Taking of land by city
situated in another town upheld though town was not a party; right to tax not property but attribute of sovereignty. 101
C. 195. Compensation not required where state makes reasonable regulations under police power. 116 C. 458.
Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 161
Landowner is entitled to judicial review of action of appraisers in condemnation. 117 C. 237. Right of landowner for
damages for change of highway grade is created by legislative authority and is not within the requirement of this provi-
sion. Id., 501. Assessment of sum in excess of actual benets from public improvement violates this provision. 127 C.
617. State must pay compensation for taking land of municipality if held in proprietary capacity, but not if in governmen-
tal capacity. 129 C. 109–112. Whether taking of land held by municipality for restricted use falls within this constitu-
tional provision, quaere. Id., 114. No compensation for depreciation unless some property is taken. Id., 477. Entitled to
compensation for destruction of oyster bed by construction of sewer outfall. 131 C. 533. Just compensation for land
taken includes interest on the amount of damages from the date the taking is complete. 134 C. 226. Temporary shutting
off by the state of all access to plaintiff’s gas station was merely an exercise of state’s right under its easement over
plaintiff’s property, and there was no taking in the constitutional sense. 135 C. 78. Cited. Id., 687. Mere delegation of
authority to condemn is a sufcient declaration that use is public. 138 C. 582. Private property may be condemned for
parking motor vehicles when public is served by taking vehicles from streets to relieve trafc congestion. 140 C. 8.
Cited. 141 C. 135. Establishment of encroachment line by water resources commission not an unconstitutional taking of
property for public use without compensation. 146 C. 650. “Taken” means exclusion of owner from his private use and
possession and actual assumption of exclusive possession for public purposes by condemnor. 148 C. 47. Law intends
condemnee be put in as good pecuniary condition by just compensation as if property had not been taken. Just compen-
sation is ordinarily, but not necessarily, market value of property taken. 150 C. 530. Section does not apply where injury
is only consequential and there has been no physical taking of land or any interest in it and no physical invasion of it.
152 C. 688. Change of zone from industrial to residential, reasonable under circumstances, did not constitute taking of
property without just compensation although appellant was disadvantaged economically. 155 C. 310. Cited. Id., 318.
Zoning commission’s refusal to change zonal classication of plaintiff’s property to that use recommended in merely
advisory opinion concerning town plan of development was not a taking without just compensation as property still is
usable for residence under its present zoning. 156 C. 99. “Taken” means generally exclusion of owner from his private
use and possession and assumption of use and possession for public purpose by authority exercising right of eminent
domain. Id., 131. Just compensation means full equivalent in money for property taken and includes interest on award
from date of taking to date of payment by state. Id., 416. Just compensation is the value of the property taken considered
with reference to the uses for which it is then adapted. 159 C. 407. The issue before the referee was the fair value of the
subject property. The referee correctly concluded that evidence relating to the administrative procedure by means of
which the commissioner’s assessment was arrived at was irrelevant. Id., 443. Cited. 163 C. 214. Referee, in determining
the damages, should have awarded an amount sufcient to replace all that was taken and not just the portion of the
parkland condemned. 165 C. 768. Doctrine of sovereign immunity not available to the state as a defense to claims under
this section. 167 C. 334. Doctrine of sovereign immunity to suit does not apply to actions seeking nothing more than a
declaration of rights in taking of property. Id. State’s substantial interference with plaintiff’s right to use and enjoyment
of property constitutes a taking hereunder. Id. Denition of “taken.” 169 C. 195. Even absent an actual physical appro-
priation, property is taken in constitutional sense when it cannot be utilized by condemnee for any reasonable and proper
purpose or when economic utilization of it is, for all practical purposes, destroyed. 171 C. 257. Cited. 172 C. 427; 175
C. 576; 178 C. 579; 179 C. 293; 180 C. 11. Merely because the total value of the property has decreased does not justify
a conclusion that there has been an unconstitutional taking. Id., 692. Cited. 185 C. 145; 186 C. 490; 188 C. 336. Where
face of record indicated that facts in complaint did not amount to unconstitutional taking, a claimed jurisdictional defect
(sovereign immunity) required dismissal of the complaint. 190 C. 622. Determination of interest in condemnation pro-
ceedings is a fact of just compensation. 192 C. 377. Cited. 200 C. 151. Unconstitutional taking without compensation.
Id. Cited. 208 C. 146. Due process cited. Id. Cited. 209 C. 480; Id., 724. Unconstitutional taking cited. Id. Cited. 211 C.
382; 214 C. 225. Constitutional right to just compensation cited. 215 C. 437. Taking of property without compensation
cited. Id., 616. Cited. 216 C. 320. Unconstitutional and conscatory cited. Id. “Taking” cited. Id. Taking property without
just compensation cited. 217 C. 447. Cited. Id., 588. Taking of property without just compensation cited. 218 C. 737.
Unconstitutional taking without just compensation cited. 219 C. 51. Burden of demonstrating nality not met. Id., 404.
Unconstitutional taking of property without compensation, “taking”, “conscation” cited. Id. Unconstitutional depriva-
tion of any reasonable use of land was conscatory cited. 220 C. 584. Taking of property without just compensation
cited. Id., 914. Cited. 221 C. 736. Unconstitutional “taking” and sovereign immunity discussed. 222 C. 280. Taking of
property without just compensation cited. Id. Cited. Id., 402; 224 C. 124. Unconstitutional taking, taking issue, unrea-
sonable taking cited. Id. Taking of property without just compensation cited. 227 C. 71. Unconstitutional taking of
property without compensation cited. 228 C. 187. Cited. Id., 785. Unconstitutional taking of property without just com-
pensation cited. Id. Cited. 229 C. 247. Constitutional “taking” cited. 230 C. 140. Cited. 231 C. 418. Due process of law
cited. Id. Cited. 233 C. 557; 234 C. 221. Taking claim cited; deprivation of property without just compensation cited. Id.
Municipal trafc regulation prohibiting vehicular trafc on city street for three hours each weekday from approximately
May through October did not constitute taking of plaintiffs’ property for which they were entitled to just compensation,
plaintiffs having failed to establish a causal relationship between the street closing and any decline in the value of their
properties or any loss in rental income. 244 C. 206. Plaintiff failed to prove adverse effect on property value from airline
overights where trial court found that the market had already adjusted the value of the property, taking into account
such ights prior to plaintiff’s purchase of property. 249 C. 138. Re properties on opposite sides of a river intended for
use as bridge abutments, trial court’s ndings re the properties’ highest and best use was not adequately supported by the
record since it was only speculative that an entity other than the state would use the land for such purpose. 255 C. 529.
Evidence of environmental contamination and remediation cost is relevant to valuation of real property taken by eminent
domain and admissible in a condemnation proceeding. 256 C. 813. Connecticut law on inverse condemnation requires
total destruction of property’s economic value or substantial destruction of an owner’s ability to use or enjoy property
and party was not deprived of all reasonable and proper use of property and had introduced no evidence that property
could not be marketed for highest and best use. 284 C. 55. In inverse condemnation claim, plaintiff failed to demonstrate
that zoning regulations and board’s refusal to issue variance deprived plaintiff of viable use of property since plaintiff
was free to maintain current use as water well, despite high radon levels in raw water, because no nal action had
occurred barring current use and no evidence was offered re safety of water at point of residential use. 287 C. 282.
162 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. I
Trial court should have dismissed state employee’s claim of unconstitutional taking of group health insurance stock
brought under a “group as a whole” theory; trial court properly dismissed constructive trust and resulting trust claims.
296 C. 186. Plaintiffs did not have a vested property interest in unclaimed deposits attributable to the period from
December 1, 2008, through March 31, 2009, and, accordingly, the provision in P.A. 09-1 that all unclaimed deposits
accruing during that period must be paid to the state does not rise to the level of an unconstitutional taking of property.
309 C. 810. Inverse condemnation of rental property occurred when taking of adjacent parking lot by eminent domain
resulted in more than an eighty per cent diminution of the rental property’s value, substantially destroying the use of the
rental property. 326 C. 139.
Deprivation of property without just compensation cited. 3 CA 531, 535. Cited. 4 CA 271; 11 CA 439. Unconstitu-
tional taking of property without just compensation cited. 18 CA 69. Cited. 20 CA 148. Taking without just compensa-
tion cited. 23 CA 115. Unlawful taking, practical conscation, unconstitutional taking without compensation cited. Id.,
379; decision reversed, see 219 C. 404. Taking without just compensation cited; illegal taking cited. Id., 441. Cited. 24
CA 708. Unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation cited. Id. Unconstitutional taking cited. Id., 841.
Cited. 25 CA 137. Unconstitutional taking and taking without just compensation cited. Id. Cited. Id., 468. Unconstitu-
tional taking of property without just compensation cited. 27 CA 297. Unconstitutional taking of property cited. 28 CA
262. Unconstitutional taking cited. 36 CA 98. Cited. 40 CA 75. Taking without just compensation cited. Id. Cited. 43
CA 606. Procedural and substantive due process claims cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 514. Takings clause cited. Id. Takings
clause of state constitution cited. Id., 721. Inverse condemnation not precluded where property has not been stripped of
all physical use for a purpose permitted by zoning. 51 CA 262.
Necessary implication that property of no person shall be taken for private use regardless of any procedure for com-
pensation. Meaning of public use discussed. Constitutionality of chapter 913 discussed. 24 CS 328. Zoning restrictions
applicable only to gasoline lling stations not unconstitutional as applicable to a class. 26 CS 475. Provision for cash
contribution in lieu of land requirement in regulations for subdivision plan, where moneys are not collected for direct ben-
et of subdivision, held a tax and unconstitutional. 27 CS 78. Plaintiff failed to prove that regulation of defendant zoning
commission requiring a distance of 1,500 feet between gasoline station sites deprived him of his property rights. Id., 363.
Cited. 31 CS 216. Expectancy of employment is not a recognized property interest and challenge of constitutional validity
of New Haven police commissioner’s discretion in making appointments of supernumerary policemen by candidate de-
nied. Id., 362. Cited. 34 CS 52. As lessee’s option to purchase constitutes a right in property, lessee cannot be divested of
it through the medium of condemnation without just compensation. Lessee Texaco entitled to judgment for excess of total
award above optioned purchase price. Id., 194. Cited. 35 CS 303; 37 CS 515. Just compensation cited. 38 CS 24. Contin-
ued possession of rental property by the state without authorization from landlord, without statutory authority and without
resorting to eminent domain, after lease has expired, amounts to unconstitutional taking of property. 40 CS 171. Recovery
for fair value of use and occupancy of property constitutionally condemned should be denied when condemnee’s property
taken without his knowledge. Id., 202. Cited. 41 CS 196. Provisions requiring just compensation cited. Id. Unconsti-
tutional taking of property cited. 42 CS 256. Evidence of environmental contamination should be excluded in eminent
domain valuation proceeding. 46 CS 355. Takings clause; standard for determining value of property that is partially taken
and for determining damages discussed. Id. Requirement in Sec. 22a-245a(d) that deposit initiators pay outstanding bottle
deposit balance to the state for the period from December 1, 2008, to March 31, 2009, is a taking without compensation.
51 CS 425. Sovereign immunity is not available as a defense to claims for just compensation under section. Id., 636.
(Writ of habeas corpus.)
Sec. 12.
1
The privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless,
when in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it; nor in any case,
but by the legislature.
1
The clause de suspension of the writ of habeas corpus has no reference to a reasonable delay occasioned in the
disposition of the case. 33 C. 329. In habeas corpus proceedings, granting bail pending appeal, if proper at all, is dis-
cretionary. 78 C. 155. Where defendant had been represented by a special public defender who failed to proceed with
his appeal on the grounds that he could not do so conscientiously and the court denied his motion for appointment of
other counsel, his rights have been violated under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and there was no error in habeas corpus proceeding directing that he be discharged from prison unless, at
his further request, counsel is appointed and the necessary extensions of time to perfect appeal are granted. 152 C. 501.
In same case, plaintiff cannot demand that other counsel be appointed if new counsel also concludes that there is no
substantial error which he can assign on appeal. Id. Where on habeas corpus it has properly been determined that a right
of appeal required by the federal constitution has been denied, any rule restricting an appeal because of lapse of time is
inapplicable. Id. Cited. 180 C. 153; 188 C. 98; 196 C. 309; 223 C. 834; 233 C. 557. To obtain habeas relief on the basis
of a freestanding claim of actual innocence requires afrmative evidence that petitioners did not commit the crimes
of which they were convicted, not simply the discrediting of evidence on which the conviction rested. 301 C. 544.
Dismissal of petition for writ of habeas corpus upheld. 49 CA 31. Two-prong test for claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel in petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id., 52. Mere allegation of a constitutional right is insufcient to meet initial
hurdle of proving an abuse of discretion when habeas court has denied certication to appeal. Id., 75. Two-pronged test
for petitioner to obtain appellate review of dismissal of petition for habeas corpus. 51 CA 305. In appeal of judgment
dismissing petition for habeas corpus, petitioner’s claim that trial and appellate counsels provided ineffective assistance
is reviewed under a two-pronged test. Id., 615. Test for proving whether dismissal of petition for writ of habeas corpus
was an abuse of discretion discussed. 57 CA 307. Where court found that habeas corpus petitioner failed to prove that
his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that said counsel had not represented
conicting interests, therefore not denying defendant his due process rights, it was held that the habeas court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing petition for certication to appeal denial of the writ. 61 CA 347.
Art. I CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 163
(No attainder.)
Sec. 13.
1
No person shall be attainted of treason or felony, by the legislature.
1
Cited. 155 C. 318; 233 C. 557. Ban on assault weapons, Secs. 53-202a–53-202k, is not a bill of attainder. 234 C.
455. Prohibition against bill of attainder cited. Id.
Cited. 34 CA 557. Bills of attainder cited. Id. Cited. 43 CA 176. Violation of Connecticut Constitution cited. Id.
Section, when read in conjunction with Art. I, Sec. 9, does not create an ex post facto clause in Connecticut Constitution.
127 CA 336.
(Right to assemble and petition.)
Sec. 14.
1
The citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their
common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for
redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.
1
Cited. 155 C. 318. Court held defendant had no duty to adopt the specic language requested in preparing petitions
for circulation either under provisions of city charter or state statutes. 184 C. 410. Both Connecticut Constitution Art. I,
Sec. 4 and this section are designed as a safeguard against acts of the state and do not limit the private conduct of individ-
uals or persons. 192 C. 48. Right of petition cited. 197 C. 141. Cited. 204 C. 287; Id., 683; 205 C. 495. Deprivation of fun-
damental state constitutional rights cited. Id. Cited. 219 C. 657; 232 C. 345; 233 C. 557; 234 C. 455; Id., 513; 239 C. 356.
Enumerated constitutional rights cited. Id. In order to prevail on claim that municipal ordinance violates state constitution
plaintiff must identify the specic additional expressive rights recognized under state constitution and describe how such
rights are infringed upon by the ordinance. 254 C. 799. Town ordinance restricting park access to residents and their
guests violates freedom of assembly guarantee. 257 C. 318. Minimal state involvement present in private shopping mall
does not constitute state action. 270 C. 261. Under the state constitution, employee speech pursuant to ofcial job duties
on certain matters of signicant public interest is protected from employer discipline in a public workplace; modied
balancing test in 391 U.S. 563 and 461 U.S. 138 applies to speech by a public employee pursuant to the employee’s
ofcial duties. 319 C. 175.
Cited. 38 CA 306. Involved right to free speech cited; “ghting words” limitation cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 559. Court
will not review freedom of association claim that was not preserved at trial and does not meet the third prong of the State
v. Golding test. 47 CA 149.
Private property owners rights are subordinated to rights under this section and Sec. 4 of this article. 37 CS 90. Cited.
Id., 515. Civil union legislation does not deny plaintiffs, eight same sex couples, the right of free expression and asso-
ciation because civil union and marriage in Connecticut now share same benets, protections and responsibilities under
law; Connecticut Constitution requires that there be equal protection and due process of law, not that there be equivalent
nomenclature for such protection and process. 49 CS 644.
(Right to bear arms.)
Sec. 15.
1
Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.
1
Cited. 179 C. 516; 205 C. 456; 209 C. 322. Plaintiffs did not establish standing to assert constitutional rights of
individual permit holders not properly before court. 222 C. 621. Right to keep and bear arms cited. Id. Cited. 233 C. 557.
Ban on assault weapons, Secs. 53-202a–53-202k, does not violate principles of right to bear arms. 234 C. 455. Right to
bear arms cited. Id. Cited. 242 C. 211. Right to bear arms cited. Id.
Cited. 15 CA 161. Right to bear arms cited. Id.; Id., 342. Court’s instructions on the “combat by agreement” exception
to self defense did not violate defendant’s right to carry a rearm. 84 CA 551.
Cited. 36 CS 108.
(Military power subordinate to civil.)
Sec. 16. The military shall, in all cases, and at all times, be in strict subordination
to the civil power.
(Quartering of soldiers.)
Sec. 17. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
(No hereditary emoluments.)
Sec. 18. No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or
conferred in this state.
(Trial by jury.)
Sec. 19.
1
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.
1
Amended by Article IV., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
164 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. III
(Equal protection. No segregation or discrimination.)
Sec. 20.
1
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected
to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his civil or political
rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin.
1
Amended by Article V., and Article XXI., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
ARTICLE SECOND.
OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS.
(Distribution of powers.)
1
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and
each of them conded to a separate magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative, to
one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another.
1
Amended by Article XVIII., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
ARTICLE THIRD.*
OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.
* Qualication for admission as attorney a judicial matter and not under control of legislature. 145 C. 222. Cited.
175 C. 586; 222 C. 166.
Cited. 11 CS 489.
(Legislative power, in whom vested.)
Sec. 1.
1
The legislative power of this state shall be vested in two distinct houses or
branches; the one to be styled the senate, the other the house of representatives, and
both together the general assembly. The style of their laws shall be: Be it enacted by
the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened.
1
The general assembly is vested with power to enact retrospective legislation. 4 C. 227; 15 C. 495–498; 28 C. 102; 30
C. 155; Id., 327; 77 C. 528; 78 C. 427; 81 C. 213; 104 C. 584; 3 Dal. 391. The constitution is a grant, not a limitation of
power. 85 C. 319; 96 C. 112. Where the constitution requires that an act should be done generally, the general assembly
has power to prescribe the mode. 13 C. 119; 22 C. 632, 633. In matters in the nature of contractual relations the general
assembly may modify or restrict the future exercise of its powers. 17 C. 40; Id., 93; 36 C. 282. The general assembly has
power to validate an usurious contract; 28 C. 102; 30 C. 155; or an invalid tax lien. 90 C. 312; 104 C. 584. See 107 C.
705. Statutes affecting remedies, although retrospective, are constitutional. 30 C. 324. A statute providing that votes in an
election of state ofcers might be taken outside the limits of the state held unconstitutional. Id., 591. The legislature may
delegate governmental power to municipal corporations; 39 C. 183; 60 C. 103; 80 C. 480; or to subordinate boards. 88
C. 471; 89 C. 530; see 151 U.S. 556. Prior to the adoption of Art. 10, Sec. 3 of 1818 constitution, the general assembly
had power to authorize towns to aid in the construction of railways. 41 C. 234. Local option law held not a delegation of
legislative power. 42 C. 369–374. Power of general assembly over the assets of an insurance company. Id., 594–598. The
general assembly may repeal any law, except those in the nature of grants. 45 C. 142. A special act extending the time
for an appeal from probate held constitutional. Id., 313. Legislation in the exercise of the police power of the state held
constitutional. Id., 358. An act authorizing a tenant in tail to convey the property in fee simple held constitutional. 23 C.
94; 44 C. 109; 51 C. 45. The general assembly may at any time change the laws of inheritance. Id., 64. Commissions to
cause removal of grade crossings may be created by the legislature. 54 C. 297, 298.
Power of legislature over local municipalities. 68 C. 140; 10 How. 511; 170 U.S. 309. The legislature is the sole
authority that can act for the state in accepting a trust. 69 C. 64. The general assembly cannot authorize the courts nor
the judges thereof to exercise powers essentially legislative, the execution of which is not incidental to the discharge of
any judicial function. Id., 576; 72 C. 4. Duty of legislature to provide for support of judiciary. 78 C. 547. Laws must be
certain; Id., 266; and accord with republican form of government. 81 C. 536. Legislature may enact succession tax law
with reasonable classication of estates. 76 C. 241. May repeal forfeiture to be recovered in qui tam action, to affect
pending suits. 78 C. 428. May delegate to commission determination of number of railway tracks to be allowed on
highway bridge; 89 C. 531; or value of condemned property; 76 C. 566; but cannot grant to it legislative discretion. 89
C. 530. Determines what property shall be taxed; 85 C. 124; Id., 348; but power not unlimited. 73 C. 255; 85 C. 344; 90
C. 666; 6 Wall. 594; 100 U.S. 491.
Art. III CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 165
Cannot grant state aid to all veterans of civil war resident in the state. 85 C. 344. May require records kept by employ-
ers as to their employees to be open to inspection by public ofcial. 86 C. 141. May validate acts not originally in consti-
tutional form. 87 C. 506. A grant to a municipality of the right to condemn land need not follow this form. Id. Legislature
can grant land between high and low water. 88 C. 12. Power to establish and maintain highways; 68 C. 131; 75 C. 451; to
impose burden of building sidewalks and curbs, of paving, keeping sidewalks clean, etc. Id.; Id., 471; 76 C. 97; 77 C. 219;
83 C. 204; 203 U.S. 379. Power over public ofcers and their salaries; granting extra compensation without approval of
governor. 78 C. 553. May x terms of judges. 87 C. 555. May impose on town payment of ofcer appointed by state; 76 C.
167; of control of towns in general, see 10 How. 511; 170 U.S. 309. May make statute of limitation applicable to pending
action. 77 C. 528. Can prohibit marriage of epileptics. 78 C. 242. Can prescribe conditions of admission to learned profes-
sions. 79 C. 55. Has wide discretion as to penalty for criminal act. 83 C. 1. May x arbitrary sum to be paid by railroad for
blocking highway. 82 C. 1. Power over municipal corporations. 68 C. 140. Our legislature has broader powers than those
of some states. 67 C. 465. Cannot authorize change in charitable trust. 85 C. 309. Legislature can establish statutory crime
of libel, despite its existence at common law. 90 C. 98. For limitations on power of validation, see 107 C. 705; on power
to delegate rate making to a municipality. 106 C. 576. May determine where trolley company may lay tracks within a city,
or delegate that power to the city. 107 C. 321. Statute delegating to milk administrator power to set minimum prices held
not to afford requisite standards of policy and procedure. 126 C. 623. Act requiring mayor’s approval of application for
license to sell gasoline held not to set up sufcient guides for mayor’s discretion. 128 C. 701–705. An act which serves no
other purpose than individual gain is beyond the legislature’s power hereunder. 133 C. 511. Cited. 135 C. 653. Power to
adopt town plan rests solely upon police power, and is valid as to property owners affected only after notice and opportu-
nity to be heard plus opportunity to appeal to courts. 137 C. 84. Creation of independent authorities to effectuate a public
purpose within the area of the municipality is a proper exercise of the legislative function. 140 C. 8.
Court review of legislation enacted under police power discussed. 147 C. 48. Challenge of unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power is successfully met if ordinance declares a legislative policy, establishes primary standards for carrying
it out or lays down an intelligible principle to which agency must conform with a proper regard for protection of public
interest. Regulations themselves are not unconstitutional because of failure to establish adequate standards to meet constitu-
tional requirement. 149 C. 712. Delegation of legislative power in chapter 579 to a private corporation is constitutional if it
serves a public purpose. In creating agency to administer law complete in itself and designed to accomplish particular pur-
pose, legislature, having established primary standards to carry out law, may authorize agency to adopt rules and regulations
to execute provisions of law. 150 C. 333. Objection based on unconstitutional delegation of legislative power overcome.
152 C. 57–59. Claim that act authorizing insurance rate-regulatory procedures constituted an illegal delegation of legislative
power to insurance commissioner and private insurance companies held invalid. 153 C. 465, 478. Legislature cannot pro-
vide for a suspension of probate court judges by probate court administrator as constitution establishes a four-year term for
probate judges. 157 C. 150. Fixing of court fees is a legislative function and attempted delegation of this power to probate
court administrator is unconstitutional. Id. Public purpose for legislative acts, dened. 162 C. 291. Constitutionality of
chapter 581 (Secs. 32-32–32-46, 1972 public act 248, the “Connecticut Product Development Corporation Act”) upheld.
167 C. 111. Court has long held that every presumption will be in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative act and
parties challenging the constitutionality of an act in a proceeding seeking declaratory relief have the burden of showing its
invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. For legislative delegation of powers to an administrative instrumentality to survive
a constitutional attack, statute must declare a legislative policy, establish primary standards or lay down an intelligible prin-
ciple to which the instrumentality must conform. Within these limitations, statute may authorize instrumentality to supply
the details of its operations by passing its own rules and regulations. Id. Modern trend holds that statutory standards are
constitutionally sufcient so long as they are described as denitely as reasonably practicable under the circumstances. Id.
Chapter 581 (Secs. 32-32–32-46, 1972 public act 248, the “Connecticut Product Development Corporation Act”) contains
adequate standards; no improper delegation of legislative power has resulted in contravention of this article and section. Id.,
123. Cited. 174 C. 146; 193 C. 670; 194 C. 165. Valid or invalid delegation of legislative power cited. 196 C. 623. Cited.
197 C. 554; 203 C. 63. Delegation of legislative power discussed. 209 C. 652. Cited. 212 C. 570; 232 C. 345.
Cited. 23 CA 221. The enactment clause provision refers only to laws passed by General Assembly and not to pub-
lished compilations of all laws passed by legislature in a given session, as is required to be prepared and published by stat-
ute. 123 CA 862. Claims act, Chapter 53, is not an unconstitutional delegation of authority by the legislature. 133 CA 479.
Challenge of constitutional delegation of legislative power is successfully met if statute declares a legislative policy,
establishes primary standards for carrying it out, or lays down intelligible principle to which agency must conform, with
proper regard for protection of public interests, and affords a resort to courts for protection of both public interests and
private rights. 23 CS 357.
(General assembly, when and where held. Adjournment. Reconvened session
to consider vetoes.)
Sec. 2.
1
There shall be a regular session of the general assembly to commence on the
Wednesday following the rst Monday of the January next succeeding the election of
its members, and at such other times as the general assembly shall judge necessary; but
the person administering the ofce of governor may, on special emergencies, convene
the general assembly at any other time. All regular and special sessions of the general
assembly shall be held at Hartford, but the person administering the ofce of gover-
nor may, in case of special emergency, convene the assembly at any other place in the
state. The general assembly shall adjourn each regular session not later than the rst
Wednesday after the rst Monday in June following its organization and shall adjourn
166 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. III
each special session upon completion of its business. If any bill passed by any regular or
special session or any appropriation item described in Section 16 of Article Fourth has
been disapproved by the governor prior to its adjournment, and has not been reconsidered
by the assembly, or is so disapproved after such adjournment, the secretary of the state
shall reconvene the general assembly on the second Monday after the last day on which
the governor is authorized to transmit or has transmitted every bill to the secretary with
his objections pursuant to Section 15 of Article Fourth of this constitution, whichever
occurs rst; provided if such Monday falls on a legal holiday the general assembly shall
be reconvened on the next following day. The reconvened session shall be for the sole
purpose of reconsidering and, if the assembly so desires, repassing such bills. The general
assembly shall adjourn sine die not later than three days following its reconvening.
1
Amended by Article III., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(Senate, number, qualifications.)
Sec. 3.
1
The senate shall consist of not less than thirty and not more than fty
members, each of whom shall be an elector residing in the senatorial district from
which he is elected. Each senatorial district shall be contiguous as to territory and shall
elect no more than one senator.
1
Amended by Article II., Sec. 1, and Article XV., Sec. 1, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of
Connecticut.
(House of representatives, how constituted.)
Sec. 4.
1
The house of representatives shall consist of not less than one hundred
twenty-ve and not more than two hundred twenty-ve members, each of whom shall
be an elector residing in the assembly district from which he is elected. Each assembly
district shall be contiguous as to territory and shall elect no more than one representa-
tive. For the purpose of forming assembly districts no town shall be divided except for
the purpose of forming assembly districts wholly within the town.
1
Amended by Article II., Sec. 2, and Article XV., Sec. 2, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of
Connecticut.
(Districts to be consistent with federal standards.)
Sec. 5.
1
The establishment of districts in the general assembly shall be consistent
with federal constitutional standards.
1
Amended by Article XVI., Sec. 1, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(Decennial reapportionment.)
Sec. 6.
1
a. The assembly and senatorial districts as now established by law shall con-
tinue until the regular session of the general assembly next after the completion of the
next census of the United States. Such general assembly shall, upon roll call, by a yea
vote of at least two-thirds of the membership of each house, enact such plan of districting
as is necessary to preserve a proper apportionment of representation in accordance with
the principles recited in this article. Thereafter the general assembly shall decennially
at its next regular session following the completion of the census of the United States,
upon roll call, by a yea vote of at least two-thirds of the membership of each house, enact
such plan of districting as is necessary in accordance with the provisions of this article.
b. If the general assembly fails to enact a plan of districting by the rst day of the April
next following the completion of the decennial census of the United States, the governor
shall forthwith appoint a commission consisting of the eight members designated by the
president pro tempore of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives, the minor-
ity leader of the senate and the minority leader of the house of representatives, each of
whom shall designate two members of the commission, provided that there are members
of no more than two political parties in either the senate or the house of representatives.
Art. III CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 167
In the event that there are members of more than two political parties in a house of the
general assembly, all members of that house belonging to the parties other than that of
the president pro tempore of the senate or the speaker of the house of representatives, as
the case may be, shall select one of their number, who shall designate two members of the
commission in lieu of the designation by the minority leader of that house.
c. The commission shall proceed to consider the alteration of districts in accordance
with the principles recited in this article and it shall submit a plan of districting to the secre-
tary of the state by the rst day of the July next succeeding the appointment of its members.
No plan shall be submitted to the secretary unless it is certied by at least six members of
the commission. Upon receiving such plan the secretary shall publish the same forthwith,
and, upon publication, such plan of districting shall have the full force of law.
d. If by the rst day of the July next succeeding the appointment of its members
the commission fails to submit a plan of districting, a board of three persons shall
forthwith be empaneled. The speaker of the house of representatives and the minor-
ity leader of the house of representatives shall each designate, as one member of the
board, a judge of the superior court of the state, provided that there are members of
no more than two political parties in the house of representatives. In the event that
there are members of more than two political parties in the house of representatives,
all members belonging to the parties other than that of the speaker shall select one
of their number, who shall then designate, as one member of the board, a judge of
the superior court of the state, in lieu of the designation by the minority leader of the
house of representatives. The two members of the board so designated shall select an
elector of the state as the third member.
e. The board shall proceed to consider the alteration of districts in accordance
with the principles recited in this article and shall, by the rst day of the October next
succeeding its selection, submit a plan of districting to the secretary. No plan shall be
submitted to the secretary unless it is certied by at least two members of the board.
Upon receiving such plan, the secretary shall publish the same forthwith, and, upon
publication, such plan of districting shall have the full force of law.
1
Amended by Article XII., Article XVI., Sec. 2, Article XXVI., and Article XXX., Sec. 2, of the Amendments to the
Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(Canvass and declaration of votes. Return and result to be submitted to both
houses.)
Sec. 7.¹ The treasurer, secretary of the state, and comptroller shall canvass publicly the
votes for senators and representatives. The person in each senatorial district having the
greatest number of votes for senator shall be declared to be duly elected for such district,
and the person in each assembly district having the greatest number of votes for repre-
sentative shall be declared to be duly elected for such district. The general assembly shall
provide by law the manner in which an equal and the greatest number of votes for two
or more persons so voted for for senator or representative shall be resolved. The return
of votes, and the result of the canvass, shall be submitted to the house of representatives
and to the senate on the rst day of the session of the general assembly. Each house shall
be the nal judge of the election returns and qualications of its own members.
¹Elections clause affords the state House of Representatives exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff̓s election challenge,
particularly in the absence of legislation sharing that jurisdiction with the courts in some way. 331 C. 436.
(General assembly, election.)
Sec. 8.
1
A general election for members of the general assembly shall be held on the
Tuesday after the rst Monday of November, biennially, in the even-numbered years.
168 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. III
The general assembly shall have power to enact laws regulating and prescribing the
order and manner of voting for such members, for lling vacancies in either the house
of representatives or the senate, and providing for the election of representatives or
senators at some time subsequent to the Tuesday after the rst Monday of November
in all cases when it shall so happen that the electors in any district shall fail on that day
to elect a representative or senator.
1
Cited. 163 C. 637.
(Counting of votes. Return of votes.)
Sec. 9.
1
At all elections for members of the general assembly the presiding ofcers
in the several towns shall receive the votes of the electors, and count and declare them
in open meeting. The presiding ofcers shall make and certify duplicate lists of the
persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each. One list shall be delivered
within three days to the town clerk, and within ten days after such meeting, the other
shall be delivered under seal to the secretary of the state.
1
Amended by Article XXXIV., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
Statutes allowing soldiers to vote in the eld for state ofcers held unconstitutional. 30 C. 591.
(Term of office.)
Sec. 10. The members of the general assembly shall hold their ofces from the
Wednesday following the rst Monday of the January next succeeding their election
until the Wednesday after the rst Monday of the third January next succeeding their
election, and until their successors are duly qualied.
(Dual job ban.)
Sec. 11.
1
No member of the general assembly shall, during the term for which he
is elected, hold or accept any appointive position or ofce in the judicial or executive
department of the state government, or in the courts of the political subdivisions of the
state, or in the government of any county. No member of congress, no person holding
any ofce under the authority of the United States and no person holding any ofce in
the judicial or executive department of the state government or in the government of any
county shall be a member of the general assembly during his continuance in such ofce.
1
Statutory dual job prohibition as creating disqualication for second ofce or as implying resignation of rst ofce.
146 C. 299. Does not violate equal protection guarantees or rst amendment of the U.S. Constitution. State college
teacher is appointive position. Section was intended to encompass state employment generally. Not void for vagueness
or impermissibly over broad. 175 C. 586.
Cited. 9 CA 825; 37 CA 348.
(Officers. Quorum.)
Sec. 12.
1
The house of representatives, when assembled, shall choose a speaker, clerk,
and other ofcers. The senate shall choose a president pro tempore, clerk and other of-
cers, except the president. A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do busi-
ness; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of
absent members in such manner and under such penalties as each house may prescribe.
1
Clerks proper custodians of les and records of legislature during its sessions. 77 C. 262. Cited. 135 C. 653.
(Powers of each house.)
Sec. 13.
1
Each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings, and punish
members for disorderly conduct, and, with the consent of two-thirds, expel a member,
but not a second time for the same cause; and shall have all other powers necessary for
a branch of the legislature of a free and independent state.
1
Courts will not enter into question whether legislature has followed correct procedure in passing act. 79 C. 152.
Cited. 135 C. 653; 194 C. 165.
Art. IV CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 169
Cited. 11 CA 342.
(Journal. Yeas and nays.)
Sec. 14.
1
Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and publish the same
when required by one-fth of its members, except such parts as in the judgment of a
majority require secrecy. The yeas and nays of the members of either house shall, at
the desire of one-fth of those present, be entered on the journals.
1
Cited. 135 C. 653.
Cited. 31 CS 392.
(Privilege from arrest. Privilege as to speech or debates.)
Sec. 15.
1
The senators and representatives shall, in all cases of civil process, be
privileged from arrest, during any session of the general assembly, and for four days
before the commencement and after the termination of any session thereof. And for
any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
1
Cited. 192 C. 704; 197 C. 566. Issuance of subpoena by impeachment committee not protected by speech and debate
clause where there is a colorable claim brought in good faith. 271 C. 540.
Plaintiff’s claims against legislative defendants in their ofcial capacities barred by absolute legislative immunity
provided by speech and debate clause. 148 CA 605.
(Debates to be public.)
Sec. 16.
1
The debates of each house shall be public, except on such occasions as in
the opinion of the house may require secrecy.
1
Cited. 232 C. 345.
(Salary. Transportation.)
Sec. 17. The salary of the members of the general assembly and the transportation
expenses of its members in the performance of their legislative duties shall be deter-
mined by law.
ARTICLE FOURTH.*
OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.
* Cited. 175 C. 586.
Cited. 11 CS 489; 41 CS 525.
(State officers, election date.)
Sec. 1.
1
A general election for governor, lieutenant-governor, secretary of the state,
treasurer and comptroller shall be held on the Tuesday after the rst Monday of
November, 1966, and quadrennially thereafter.
1
Amended by Article I., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(Terms of officers.)
Sec. 2. Such ofcers shall hold their respective ofces from the Wednesday follow-
ing the rst Monday of the January next succeeding their election until the Wednesday
following the rst Monday of the fth January succeeding their election and until their
successors are duly qualied.
(Governor and lieutenant-governor voted for as unit.)
Sec. 3. In the election of governor and lieutenant-governor, voting for such ofces
shall be as a unit. The name of no candidate for either ofce, nominated by a political
170 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. IV
party or by petition, shall appear on the voting machine ballot labels except in con-
junction with the name of the candidate for the other ofce.
(Counting of votes. Return of votes. Canvass and declaration of votes. Choice
by general assembly, when and how made.)
Sec. 4.
1
At the meetings of the electors in the respective towns held quadrennially
as herein provided for the election of state ofcers, the presiding ofcers shall receive
the votes and shall count and declare the same in the presence of the electors. The
presiding ofcers shall make and certify duplicate lists of the persons voted for, and of
the number of votes for each. One list shall be delivered within three days to the town
clerk, and within ten days after such meeting, the other shall be delivered under seal
to the secretary of the state. The votes so delivered shall be counted, canvassed and
declared by the treasurer, secretary, and comptroller, within the month of November.
The vote for treasurer shall be counted, canvassed and declared by the secretary and
comptroller only; the vote for secretary shall be counted, canvassed and declared by the
treasurer and comptroller only; and the vote for comptroller shall be counted, canvassed
and declared by the treasurer and secretary only. A fair list of the persons and number
of votes given for each, together with the returns of the presiding ofcers, shall be, by
the treasurer, secretary and comptroller, made and laid before the general assembly,
then next to be held, on the rst day of the session thereof. In the election of governor,
lieutenant-governor, secretary, treasurer, comptroller and attorney general, the person
found upon the count by the treasurer, secretary and comptroller in the manner herein
provided, to be made and announced before December fteenth of the year of the elec-
tion, to have received the greatest number of votes for each of such ofces, respectively,
shall be elected thereto; provided, if the election of any of them shall be contested as
provided by statute, and if such a contest shall proceed to nal judgment, the person
found by the court to have received the greatest number of votes shall be elected. If two
or more persons shall be found upon the count of the treasurer, secretary and comptrol-
ler to have received an equal and the greatest number of votes for any of said ofces,
and the election is not contested, the general assembly on the second day of its session
shall hold a joint convention of both houses, at which, without debate, a ballot shall be
taken to choose such ofcer from those persons who received such a vote; and the bal-
loting shall continue on that or subsequent days until one of such persons is chosen by
a majority vote of those present and voting. The general assembly shall have power to
enact laws regulating and prescribing the order and manner of voting for such ofcers.
The general assembly shall by law prescribe the manner in which all questions concern-
ing the election of a governor or lieutenant-governor shall be determined.
1
Amended by Article XXXIV., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
The legislature cannot authorize electors to vote for state ofcers in any place other than as prescribed. 30 C. 591.
Electors’ meetings must be held at the time named in the constitution. Id., 603. A joint declaration of the result of the
election is indispensable. 61 C. 359–366. The particular procedure prescribed by the constitution must be followed. Id.,
366; 62 C. 284. The direction to proceed to choose on the second day of the session prohibits a choice at a later day. 61
C. 366–374, but see 62 C. 284.
(Governor. Qualifications.)
Sec. 5.
1
The supreme executive power of the state shall be vested in the governor.
No person who is not an elector of the state, and who has not arrived at the age of
thirty years, shall be eligible.
1
If no successor has been elected, the governor then in ofce remains the de jure as well as de facto governor. 61 C. 359.
Cited. 200 C. 386.
(Lieutenant-governor, qualifications.)
Sec. 6. The lieutenant-governor shall possess the same qualications as are herein
prescribed for the governor.
Art. IV CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 171
(Compensation of governor and lieutenant-governor.)
Sec. 7. The compensations of the governor and lieutenant-governor shall be estab-
lished by law, and shall not be varied so as to take effect until after an election, which
shall next succeed the passage of the law establishing such compensations.
(Governor to command militia.)
Sec. 8. The governor shall be captain general of the militia of the state, except when
called into the service of the United States.
(Governor may require information.)
Sec. 9. He may require information in writing from the ofcers in the executive
department, on any subject relating to the duties of their respective ofces.
(Power to adjourn general assembly.)
Sec. 10.
1
The governor, in case of a disagreement between the two houses of the
general assembly, respecting the time of adjournment, may adjourn them to such time
as he shall think proper, not beyond the day of the next stated session.
1
Whether governor had right to adjourn general assembly, quaere. 135 C. 655.
(Information and recommendations to general assembly.)
Sec. 11.
1
He shall, from time to time, give to the general assembly, information of
the state of the government, and recommend to their consideration such measures as
he shall deem expedient.
1
Cited. 220 C. 584; 232 C. 345.
(Faithful execution of laws.)
Sec. 12.
1
He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
1
Appointment of state’s attorneys by the judges of the superior court does not violate the doctrine of separation of
powers. 180 C. 662. Cited. 200 C. 386.
This section does not preclude appointment of state’s attorneys by superior court. 28 CS 252. Appointment of state’s
attorneys by judges of superior court not violation of section. Id., 366.
(Reprieves after conviction.)
Sec. 13.
1
The governor shall have power to grant reprieves after conviction, in all
cases except those of impeachment, until the end of the next session of the general
assembly, and no longer.
1
Limitation on period during which reprieve may operate runs from time it is issued, not from day of conviction. 124
C. 121. “Next” refers, not to session in existence when reprieve is granted, but to one which begins thereafter. Id., 124.
(Commissions to be in name and by authority of state.)
Sec. 14. All commissions shall be in the name and by authority of the state of Con-
necticut; shall be sealed with the state seal, signed by the governor, and attested by the
secretary of the state.
(Powers and duties of governor in relation to bills. Presentation to governor
after adjournment. Procedure on veto.)
Sec. 15.
1
Each bill which shall have passed both houses of the general assembly
shall be presented to the governor. Bills may be presented to the governor after the
adjournment of the general assembly, and the general assembly may prescribe the time
and method of performing all ministerial acts necessary or incidental to the adminis-
tration of this section. If the governor shall approve a bill, he shall sign and transmit
it to the secretary of the state, but if he shall disapprove, he shall transmit it to the
secretary with his objections, and the secretary shall thereupon return the bill with the
governor’s objections to the house in which it originated. After the objections shall
172 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. IV
have been entered on its journal, such house shall proceed to reconsider the bill. If,
after such reconsideration, that house shall again pass it, but by the approval of at least
two-thirds of its members, it shall be sent with the objections to the other house, which
shall also reconsider it. If approved by at least two-thirds of the members of the second
house, it shall be a law and be transmitted to the secretary; but in such case the votes of
each house shall be determined by yeas and nays and the names of the members voting
for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively. In
case the governor shall not transmit the bill to the secretary, either with his approval or
with his objections, within ve calendar days, Sundays and legal holidays excepted,
after the same shall have been presented to him, it shall be a law at the expiration of
that period; except that, if the general assembly shall then have adjourned any regular
or special session, the bill shall be a law unless the governor shall, within fteen cal-
endar days after the same has been presented to him, transmit it to the secretary with
his objections, in which case it shall not be a law unless such bill is reconsidered and
repassed by the general assembly by at least a two-thirds vote of the members of each
house of the general assembly at the time of its reconvening.
1
Three days within which governor may return bill means three days during which house which originated it is in
session. 77 C. 260. Legislature may grant money without approval of governor. 78 C. 557. Right of governor to cancel
approval of bill not properly before him. 79 C. 150. Necessity of approval of private law. 78 C. 557; 87 C. 515. Power to
veto separate items in an appropriation bill given by amendment of 1923 (Art. 4, Sec. 16). Acts signed by the governor
more than three days after nal adjournment held void. 109 C. 624. Prohibits presentation to the governor after adjourn-
ment and expiration of three-day period. 112 C. 129. Cited. 135 C. 653. Governor’s partial veto of an appropriation bill
held unconstitutional. 152 C. 431. Governor has no constitutional power of partial veto even if legislation is inherently
unconstitutional. Id. Contingent veto held unconstitutional and void. 164 C. 299. Is not circumvented by provisions of
Sec. 4-85b. 200 C. 386.
(Veto of separate items in appropriation bills.)
Sec. 16.
1
The governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items of any
bill making appropriations of money embracing distinct items while at the same time
approving the remainder of the bill, and the part or parts of the bill so approved shall
become effective and the item or items of appropriations so disapproved shall not
take effect unless the same are separately reconsidered and repassed in accordance
with the rules and limitations prescribed for the passage of bills over the executive
veto. In all cases in which the governor shall exercise the right of disapproval hereby
conferred he shall append to the bill at the time of signing it a statement of the item
or items disapproved, together with his reasons for such disapproval, and transmit the
bill and such appended statement to the secretary of the state. If the general assembly
be then in session he shall forthwith cause a copy of such statement to be delivered
to the house in which the bill originated for reconsideration of the disapproved items
in conformity with the rules prescribed for legislative action in respect to bills which
have received executive disapproval.
1
Only items of appropriation may be vetoed under this section. 152 C. 431. Not an item of appropriation. 164 C.
299. Cited. 200 C. 386.
(Lieutenant-governor, president of senate.)
Sec. 17. The lieutenant-governor shall by virtue of his ofce, be president of the
senate, and have, when in committee of the whole, a right to debate, and when the
senate is equally divided, to give the casting vote.
(When to succeed governor. When to act as governor.)
Sec. 18.
1
In case of the death, resignation, refusal to serve or removal from ofce of
the governor, the lieutenant-governor shall, upon taking the oath of ofce of governor,
be governor of the state until another is chosen at the next regular election for governor
and is duly qualied. In case of the inability of the governor to exercise the powers and
Art. IV CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 173
perform the duties of his ofce, or in case of his impeachment or of his absence from
the state, the lieutenant-governor shall exercise the powers and authority and perform
the duties appertaining to the ofce of governor until the disability is removed or, if the
governor has been impeached, he is acquitted or, if absent, he has returned.
1
Amended by Article XXII., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(When president pro tempore to become lieutenant-governor or act as
lieutenant-governor.)
Sec. 19.
1
If the lieutenant-governor succeeds to the ofce of governor, or if the
lieutenant-governor dies, resigns, refuses to serve or is removed from ofce, the
president pro tempore of the senate shall, upon taking the oath of ofce of lieutenant-
governor, be lieutenant-governor of the state until another is chosen at the next regular
election for lieutenant-governor and is duly qualied. Within fteen days of the
administration of such oath the senate, if the general assembly is in session, shall elect
one of its members president pro tempore. In case of the inability of the lieutenant-
governor to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his ofce or in case of his
impeachment or absence from the state, the president pro tempore of the senate shall
exercise the powers and authority and perform the duties appertaining to the ofce of
lieutenant-governor until the disability is removed or, if the lieutenant-governor has
been impeached, he is acquitted or, if absent, he has returned.
1
Cited. 183 C. 7.
(Election of president pro tempore when general assembly in recess.)
Sec. 20. If, while the general assembly is not in session, there is a vacancy in the
ofce of president pro tempore of the senate, the secretary of the state shall within
fteen days convene the senate for the purpose of electing one of its members presi-
dent pro tempore.
(Death or failure to qualify of governor-elect.)
Sec. 21. If, at the time xed for the beginning of the term of the governor, the gover-
nor-elect shall have died or shall have failed to qualify, the lieutenant-governor-elect,
after taking the oath of ofce of lieutenant-governor, may qualify as governor, and,
upon so qualifying, shall become governor. The general assembly may by law provide
for the case in which neither the governor-elect nor the lieutenant-governor-elect shall
have qualied, by declaring who shall, in such event, act as governor or the manner in
which the person who is so to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accord-
ingly until a governor or a lieutenant-governor shall have qualied.
(Treasurer, duties.)
Sec. 22.
1
The treasurer shall receive all moneys belonging to the state, and disburse
the same only as he may be directed by law. He shall pay no warrant, or order for the
disbursement of public money, until the same has been registered in the ofce of the
comptroller.
1
The duties of treasurer construed. 69 C. 73. Cited. 129 C. 276. “Warrant or order” means a written request or direc-
tion by some authorized person to the treasurer to pay a specied sum from the public moneys to a designated person.
133 C. 130. Withdrawal by unemployment compensation administrator to pay benets falls within requirement of reg-
istry. Id., 131. Cited. 179 C. 552; 200 C. 386.
(Secretary, duties.)
Sec. 23.
1
The secretary of the state shall have the safe keeping and custody of the
public records and documents, and particularly of the acts, resolutions and orders of
the general assembly, and record the same; and perform all such duties as shall be pre-
scribed by law. He shall be the keeper of the seal of the state, which shall not be altered.
174 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. V
1
Clerks of legislature proper custodians of les and records during sessions. 77 C. 262. Records of secretary as evi-
dence of existence of act of general assembly. 79 C. 147.
(Comptroller, duties.)
Sec. 24.
1
The comptroller shall adjust and settle all public accounts and demands,
except grants and orders of the general assembly. He shall prescribe the mode of
keeping and rendering all public accounts. He shall, ex ofcio, be one of the auditors
of the accounts of the treasurer. The general assembly may assign to him other duties
in relation to his ofce, and to that of the treasurer, and shall prescribe the manner in
which his duties shall be performed.
1
As to the duties of the comptroller in adjusting and settling accounts. 61 C. 568, 569. Legislature may make money
grant without approval of governor. 78 C. 557. Cited. 129 C. 277. Does not preclude general assembly from ordering
payment of amounts of benets to be xed by unemployment compensation administrator. 133 C. 112, 129. “Adjust and
settle” means no more than that comptroller is to x amount due a claimant. Id., 127. Section of bill prescribing mode of
keeping books by comptroller held unconstitutional and void. 152 C. 431.
(Sheriffs for the several counties.)
Sec. 25.
1
Sheriffs shall be elected in the several counties, on the Tuesday after the
rst Monday of November, 1966, and quadrennially thereafter, for the term of four
years, commencing on the rst day of June following their election. They shall become
bound with sufcient sureties to the treasurer of the state, for the faithful discharge of
the duties of their ofce. They shall be removable by the general assembly. In case the
sheriff of any county shall die or resign, or shall be removed from ofce by the general
assembly, the governor may ll the vacancy occasioned thereby, until the same shall
be lled by the general assembly.
1
Repealed by Article XXX., Sec. 1, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(Accounts of the state to be published.)
Sec. 26. A statement of all receipts, payments, funds, and debts of the state, shall be
published from time to time, in such manner and at such periods, as shall be prescribed
by law.
ARTICLE FIFTH.*
OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.
* County commissioners are not judges within the meaning of this article; 25 C. 186; nor justices of the peace. 102 C. 29,
31. Special commission to determine what shall be included in purchase of lighting plant by city, etc., not judges; 76 C. 571;
nor is compensation commissioner. 89 C. 148. Cited. 130 C. 139; 138 C. 157, 164, 167; 175 C. 586; 199 C. 496; 211 C. 289.
Cited. 16 CA 437.
General Assembly has no power to dene jurisdiction of either Supreme Court or Superior Court; history. 11 CS 489.
Cited. 41 CS 525.
(Courts, powers, and jurisdiction.)
Sec. 1.
1
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, a superior
court, and such lower courts as the general assembly shall, from time to time, ordain
and establish. The powers and jurisdiction of these courts shall be dened by law.
1
Amended by Article XX., Sec. 1, of the Amendments of the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(Supreme and superior court judges, appointments, terms, removal.)
Sec. 2.
1
The judges of the supreme court and of the superior court shall, upon nom-
ination by the governor, be appointed by the general assembly in such manner as shall
by law be prescribed. They shall hold their ofces for the term of eight years, but may
Art. VI CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 175
be removed by impeachment. The governor shall also remove them on the address of
two-thirds of each house of the general assembly.
1
Amended by Article XX., Sec. 2, and Article XXV., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of
Connecticut.
(Lower court judges, appointment, terms.)
Sec. 3.
1
Judges of the lower courts shall, upon nomination by the governor, be
appointed by the general assembly in such manner as shall by law be prescribed, for
terms of four years.
1
Under former constitutional provisions: A judge of a city court, appointed by the common council, under an act
of the legislature authorizing such appointment, held to be a judge de facto. 36 C. 449. Whether an act is constitutional
which provides that in the sickness or absence of the judge, a justice of the peace may be called in by the clerk to act
as judge, quaere. 38 C. 479, see also, 102 C. 29, 31. As to term of judge of city court elected to ll vacancy, see 78 C.
55. Power of governor to ll vacancy; effect of electing judge for term and until his successor is elected and qualied.
87 C. 539. Cited. 130 C. 139; 132 C. 524. Applies to judges of all municipal courts whether called city, town, borough
or police courts. The rights of judges, appointed previous to the time amendment XLVII (to original const.) became
effective, expired June 30, 1949, and thereafter they were de facto and not de jure judges. 135 C. 638. Not self-executing
but could become effective only when general assembly had xed the term of judges and manner in which appointments
were to be made. Id. This amendment requires implementation by legislation and does not supersede section 5 until the
legislature acts. 138 C. 153. Not superseded by section 6 until legislature acts to implement the later amendment. Id.
Operative date of amendment. 144 C. 612, 624.
(Probate court judges, election, terms.)
Sec. 4.
1
Judges of probate shall be elected by the electors residing in their respective
districts on the Tuesday after the rst Monday of November, 1966, and quadrennially
thereafter, and shall hold ofce for four years from and after the Wednesday after the
rst Monday of the next succeeding January.
1
Cited. 138 C. 164. Provisions of 1967 probate court act for suspension of probate court judges by chief court admin-
istrator are unconstitutional shortening of four-year term of ofce provided by this section. 157 C. 150. Judge of probate
holds public ofce of state government but he does not hold an ofce established by the constitution even though his
term and those who can vote for him are set forth therein. Id. Cited. 192 C. 704; 193 C. 180.
(Justices of the peace.)
Sec. 5.
1
Justices of the peace for the several towns in the state shall be elected by
the electors in such towns; and the time and manner of their election, the number for
each town, the period for which they shall hold their ofces and their jurisdiction shall
be prescribed by law.
1
Repealed by Article VIII., Sec. 1, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(Age limitation, exception.)
Sec. 6.
1
No judge or justice of the peace shall be eligible to hold his ofce after
he shall arrive at the age of seventy years, except that a chief justice or judge of the
supreme court, a judge of the superior court, or a judge of the court of common pleas,
who has attained the age of seventy years and has become a state referee may exercise,
as shall be prescribed by law, the powers of the superior court or court of common
pleas on matters referred to him as a state referee.
1
Amended by Article VIII., Sec. 2, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
ARTICLE SIXTH.
OF THE QUALIFICATIONS OF ELECTORS.
(Qualifications of electors.)
Sec. 1.
1
Every citizen of the United States who has attained the age of twenty-one
years, who has resided in the town in which he offers himself to be admitted to
the privileges of an elector at least six months next preceding the time he so offers
176 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. VI
himself, who is able to read in the English language any article of the constitution or
any section of the statutes of the state, and who sustains a good moral character, shall,
on his taking such oath as may be prescribed by law, be an elector.
1
Amended by Article IX., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(Determination of qualifications.)
Sec. 2.
1
The qualications of electors as set forth in Section 1 of this article shall be
decided at such times and in such manner as may be prescribed by law.
1
Under former constitutional provision: The action of the board cannot be controlled by mandamus. 34 C. 414, 415.
Exemption of the board from liability. 53 C. 527. Liability of town for expenses of board. 75 C. 545, see 76 C. 167.
Selectmen and town clerk are not exclusive judges where requirement is that of “resident elector.” 103 C. 167. Cited.
129 C. 624.
Waiver of counsel intelligent, when. 29 CS 426.
(Forfeiture and restoration of electoral privileges.)
Sec. 3.
1
The general assembly shall by law prescribe the offenses on conviction of
which the privileges of an elector shall be forfeited and the conditions on which and
methods by which such rights may be restored.
1
Amended by Article VII., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(Free suffrage.)
Sec. 4.
1
Laws shall be made to support the privilege of free suffrage, prescribing the
manner of regulating and conducting meetings of the electors, and prohibiting, under
adequate penalties, all undue inuence therein, from power, bribery, tumult and other
improper conduct.
1
Purpose of the section and of legislation pursuant thereto is to secure the exercise of free suffrage. 72 C. 105. To
throw out ballot for immaterial error would not be to support the right of free suffrage. 75 C. 15. Cited. 136 C. 636.
(Voting by ballot or machine. Optional party lever.)
Sec. 5.
1
In all elections of ofcers of the state, or members of the general assembly,
the votes of the electors shall be by ballot, either written or printed, except that voting
machines or other mechanical devices for voting may be used in all elections in the
state, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. The right of secret voting
shall be preserved. At every election where candidates are listed by party designation
and where voting machines or other mechanical devices are used, each elector shall
be able at his option to vote for candidates for ofce under a single party designation
by operating a straight ticket device, or to vote for candidates individually after rst
operating a straight ticket device, or to vote for candidates individually without rst
operating a straight ticket device.
1
Amended by Article XXIV., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(Privilege of electors from arrest.)
Sec. 6.
1
At all elections of ofcers of the state, or members of the general assembly,
the electors shall be privileged from arrest, during their attendance upon, and going to,
and returning from the same, on any civil process.
1
Extent of protection guaranteed by this section. 3 C. 537.
(Absentee voting.)
Sec. 7.
1
The general assembly may provide by law for voting in the choice of any
ofcer to be elected or upon any question to be voted on at an election by qualied voters
of the state who are unable to appear at the polling place on the day of election because
of absence from the city or town of which they are inhabitants or because of sickness or
physical disability or because the tenets of their religion forbid secular activity.
Art. VII CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 177
1
Amended by Article XXXIV., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
Cited. 136 C. 636. The constitutional language of “unable to appear” and “sickness” is sufciently capacious to
include the particular disease of COVID-19; the word “sickness” encompasses the existence of a specic disease such
as the COVID-19 pandemic addressed by Executive Order No. 7QQ and is not limited to an illness suffered by an indi-
vidual voter; the text suggests that physical inability to get to the polling place on election day is not the sine qua non for
rendering a voter “unable to appear” there, instead, that determination of ability is squarely within the individual voter’s
control or judgment. 338 C. 1.
(Admission of electors in absentia.)
Sec. 8.
1
The general assembly may provide by law for the admission as electors
in absentia of members of the armed forces, the United States merchant marine,
members of religious or welfare groups or agencies attached to and serving with the
armed forces and civilian employees of the United States, and the spouses and depen-
dents of such persons.
1
Amended by Article XXVII., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(Removal to another town.)
Sec. 9.
1
Any person admitted as an elector in any town shall, if he removes to another
town, have the privileges of an elector in such other town after residing therein for six
months. The general assembly shall prescribe by law the manner in which evidence
of the admission of an elector and of the duration of his current residence shall be
furnished to the town to which he removes.
1
Repealed by Article XIII., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(Eligibility to office.)
Sec. 10.
1
Every elector shall be eligible to any ofce in the state, except in cases
provided for in this constitution.
1
Amended by Article II., Sec. 3, and Article XV., Sec. 3, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of
Connecticut.
ARTICLE SEVENTH.*
OF RELIGION.
*Former provision cited. 7 C. 77. Effect of constitutional provision on former located societies, undetermined. 16
C. 516. General Assembly cannot divide an ancient society, nor divide its funds and assign part to new society. 23 C.
255. It may well be questioned whether this section does not forbid including religious instruction in list of necessaries.
40 C. 77. Providing of transportation to nonprot private schools by towns under Sec. 10-281 constitutional. 147 C.
374. Reasonable regulation of location of churches and schools for religious education does not violate constitutional
guarantee of freedom of religion. 149 C. 712. Resale of land to church at lower prices than paid for other land of church
condemned by urban redevelopment authority is not an aid to religion in violation of this article. 159 C. 116. Secs. 30-74,
30-77 and 30-91 insofar as they prohibited sale of alcoholic liquor on Good Friday are unconstitutional. Entanglement
of government and religion discussed. 183 C. 552. Cited. 191 C. 336.
Cited. 7 CA 745.
(No legal compulsion to join or support church. No preference in religion.
Equal rights of all religious denominations.)
It being the right of all men to worship the Supreme Being, the Great Creator and
Preserver of the Universe, and to render that worship in a mode consistent with the
dictates of their consciences, no person shall by law be compelled to join or support,
nor be classed or associated with, any congregation, church or religious association.
No preference shall be given by law to any religious society or denomination in the
state. Each shall have and enjoy the same and equal powers, rights and privileges, and
178 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. VIII
may support and maintain the ministers or teachers of its society or denomination, and
may build and repair houses for public worship.
ARTICLE EIGHTH.
OF EDUCATION.
(Free public schools.)
Sec. 1.
1
There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the
state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation.
1
Cited. 162 C. 573. Furnishing of education for the general public is a state function. 167 C. 368. Present system of
school nancing, relying principally on local taxes, violates this section; nature of state interest in education. 172 C. 615.
Option to town which lacks resources to implement higher quality educational program which is available to property-richer
towns is illusory. Id., 645. Right to education is a fundamental right. Id. General assembly mandated duty for nancing
elementary and secondary education. Id. History reviewed. Id. Not required to have equalized pot of money per town. Id.,
658. Cited. 175 C. 586; 182 C. 93; Id., 253; 187 C. 187; 193 C. 93. Legislative provision for nancing education violated
provisions of Connecticut Constitution (Horton v. Meskill, 172 C. 615). 193 C. 670. Cited. 195 C. 24. Free public education
cited. Id. Cited. 197 C. 554; 210 C. 286. Not violated by termination of emergency housing program; fundamental right to
public education cited; violation of constitutional rights cited. 214 C. 256. Cited. 228 C. 640. Legislature did not intend to
create a right to special education for gifted children under this section. 229 C. 1. Constitutional right to an education cited.
Id. Cited. 233 C. 557; 236 C. 1; 237 C. 169. Plaintiffs have proved a violation under state constitution of their fundamental
right to a substantially equal educational opportunity free from substantial racial and ethnic isolation. 238 C. 1. Equal op-
portunity to a free public education; fundamental right to education cited. Id. Town charter that allows for separate referenda
for town’s operating budget and education budget and that allows voters to reject the budgets three times does not rise to the
level of a veto and does not violate state policy concerning education. 268 C. 295. This section entitles Connecticut public
school students to an education suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible citizens able to participate fully
in democratic institutions, progress to institutions of higher education or to attain productive employment and otherwise
contribute to the state’s economy; to satisfy this standard, the state, through the local school districts, must provide students
with an objectively meaningful opportunity to receive the benets of this constitutional right. 295 C. 240. Plaintiffs failed
to establish that the state’s educational offerings are not minimally adequate under this section and cannot prevail on their
claims that the state has not provided them with a suitable and substantially equal educational opportunity. 327 C. 650.
Cited. 6 CA 309; 13 CA 1; 28 CA 306.
Educational provisions of constitution lays a basis for a suit by citizens for young beneciary. 29 CS 199. Cited.
Id., 404. The Connecticut system of education violates Art. I, Sec. 20 of the Connecticut Constitution. 31 CS 377. This
section makes it the duty of the General Assembly to provide for free public education and this creates a fundamental
correlative right to education. Id. (Afrmed. 172 C. 615.) State function and duty to furnish public education formally
recognized in 1965. Id., 381. State has constitutional duty to furnish free public and elementary education and general
assembly has constitutional duty to enact legislation to carry out state’s duty. Id., 382. Disparities in expenditure per
pupil tend to result in disparities in educational opportunity. Id., 387. Constitutional duty to educate is duty of state not
of towns. Id. Mandatory language that general assembly implement the principle by appropriate legislation makes it the
duty to provide free public education and create a correlative right to that education. Id., 389. Cited. 35 CS 55. Right to
free public elementary education discussed in relation to special education. Right not measured by physical or intellec-
tual ability of child. Id., 501. Cited. 40 CS 141. State constitutional mandate to furnish public education cited. Id. Cited.
42 CS 172; Id., 256; 44 CS 527. Public school student’s right to a free secondary school education was not violated
by school district’s mandatory dress code because code was rationally related to the purpose of eliminating disruption
caused by varying manners of dress. 47 CS 342.
(System of higher education.)
Sec. 2.
1
The state shall maintain a system of higher education, including The University
of Connecticut, which shall be dedicated to excellence in higher education. The general
assembly shall determine the size, number, terms and method of appointment of the
governing boards of The University of Connecticut and of such constituent units or
coordinating bodies in the system as from time to time may be established.
1
The use of the word “excellence” was inserted with the expectation that the university would serve as a model of ex-
cellence for the state system of higher education. Corrective action as to the act of the university senate if warranted, lies
within the provinces of the board of trustees from whom the university senate’s authority is derived, the governor who
appoints the trustees and ultimately, with the General Assembly. 165 C. 507. Cited. 175 C. 586; 233 C. 557; 238 C. 1.
(Charter of Yale College.)
Sec. 3.
1
The charter of Yale College, as modied by agreement with the corporation
thereof, in pursuance of an act of the general assembly, passed in May, 1792, is hereby
conrmed.
Art. IX CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 179
1
History of tax exemption. 71 C. 316; 92 C. 108. Cited. 169 C. 454.
(School fund.)
Sec. 4.
1
The fund, called the SCHOOL FUND, shall remain a perpetual fund, the
interest of which shall be inviolably appropriated to the support and encouragement
of the public schools throughout the state, and for the equal benet of all the people
thereof. The value and amount of said fund shall be ascertained in such manner as the
general assembly may prescribe, published, and recorded in the comptroller’s ofce;
and no law shall ever be made, authorizing such fund to be diverted to any other use
than the encouragement and support of public schools, among the several school soci-
eties, as justice and equity shall require.
1
School moneys belong to school societies composed of all denominations residing within parochial limits of said
societies. 2 R. 461. Resolution of general assembly dividing school funds between two societies which had been created
by an act dividing a society, not unconstitutional. 40 C. 469–472. Whether statute could subject fund to loss from cause
subsequently arising, quaere. 81 C. 12. Town itself, and not its ofcers, must make good in case of loss of part of fund;
town must act as a duciary in relation to fund. 105 C. 317, 321. Unconstitutional to use School Fund for transportation
of private school children under section 10-281. 147 C. 374. Expresses concept of equality in public education. 172 C.
615. Cited. 195 C. 24. Not violated by termination of emergency housing program; fundamental right to public education
cited; violation of constitutional rights cited. 214 C. 256. Cited. 233 C. 557.
ARTICLE NINTH.
OF IMPEACHMENTS.
(Power of impeachment.)
Sec. 1.
1
The house of representatives shall have the sole power of impeaching.
1
Jurisdiction of courts over actions concerning impeachment proceedings discussed. 192 C. 704. Cited. 193 C. 180.
Impeachment power cited. Id. Cited. 234 C. 539. Impeachment provision cited. Id. Reafrmed previous holding that
legislative impeachment authority is subject to judicial review where legislative action is outside of constitutional im-
peachment and there are egregious and irreparable violations of state or federal constitutional guarantees, and further
held that there should be judicial review in the case of a sitting governor to afford reasonable opportunity to challenge
impeachment proceedings while matter is before impeachment committee when challenge is based on a constitutional
violation and tangible harm. 271 C. 540.
(Trial of impeachments.)
Sec. 2.
1
All impeachments shall be tried by the senate. When sitting for that purpose,
they shall be on oath or afrmation. No person shall be convicted without the concur-
rence of at least two-thirds of the members present. When the governor is impeached,
the chief justice shall preside.
1
Jurisdiction of courts over actions concerning impeachment proceedings discussed. 192 C. 704.
(Liability to impeachments.)
Sec. 3.
1
The governor, and all other executive and judicial ofcers, shall be liable
to impeachment; but judgments in such cases shall not extend further than to removal
from ofce, and disqualication to hold any ofce of honor, trust or prot under the
state. The party convicted, shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial
and punishment according to law.
1
Judge of probate may be disbarred as attorney. 88 C. 451. Judges of probate court may be removed by impeachment.
157 C. 150. Jurisdiction of courts over actions concerning impeachment proceedings discussed. 192 C. 704. Cited. 234
C. 539. Impeachment cited. Id.
(Treason against the state.)
Sec. 4.
1
Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against it, or
adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of
treason, unless on the testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act, or on
180 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. XI
confession in open court. No conviction of treason, or attainder, shall work corruption
of blood, or forfeiture.
1
Cited. 197 C. 436.
Prohibition against bill of attainder cited. 15 CA 161; Id., 342.
ARTICLE TENTH.
OF HOME RULE.
(Delegation of legislative authority to political subdivisions. Terms of town, city
and borough elective officers. Special legislation.)
Sec. 1.
1
The general assembly shall by general law delegate such legislative author-
ity as from time to time it deems appropriate to towns, cities and boroughs relative
to the powers, organization, and form of government of such political subdivisions.
The general assembly shall from time to time by general law determine the maximum
terms of ofce of the various town, city and borough elective ofces. After July 1,
1969, the general assembly shall enact no special legislation relative to the powers,
organization, terms of elective ofces or form of government of any single town, city
or borough, except as to (a) borrowing power, (b) validating acts, and (c) formation,
consolidation or dissolution of any town, city or borough, unless in the delegation of
legislative authority by general law the general assembly shall have failed to prescribe
the powers necessary to effect the purpose of such special legislation.
2
1
Under former constitutional provision: Whether a town can lawfully elect a single selectman, quaere. 32 C. 109.
Not applicable to assessors. 52 C. 216. Nor to members of school committee. 59 C. 60. Origin of provision for annual
election of selectmen. 75 C. 462. Meaning of “ofcers of local police”. Id., 347. Nature of ofce of selectman; 71 C. 724;
as agents of town and agents of the law. 64 C. 100; 85 C. 498; 88 C. 306. Article authorizes delegation of responsibility
for raising large part of funds for education to towns. 172 C. 615 (Diss. Op.). Legislature has the authority to grant sub-
poena power to municipalities. 180 C. 243. Cited. 182 C. 93; 185 C. 88; 192 C. 399. Does not follow from constitutional
commitment to home rule that the legislature is precluded from addressing problems of state-wide concern whenever
the remedy affects a single locality. 193 C. 506. Cited. 196 C. 623. Home rule cited. Id. Cited. 197 C. 554; 205 C. 495.
Deprivation of fundamental state constitutional rights cited. Id. Sec. 22a-458 in this instance prevails over town charter
and does not violate this constitutional provision. 216 C. 436. Home rule provision of Connecticut Constitution cited.
Id. Cited. 234 C. 217.
Cited. 10 CA 80; 16 CA 213; 29 CA 207.
Cited. 43 CS 470.
2
Cited. 195 C. 524; 216 C. 112.
(Regional governments and compacts.)
Sec. 2. The general assembly may prescribe the methods by which towns, cities and
boroughs may establish regional governments and the methods by which towns, cities,
boroughs and regional governments may enter into compacts. The general assembly
shall prescribe the powers, organization, form, and method of dissolution of any gov-
ernment so established.
ARTICLE ELEVENTH.
GENERAL PROVISIONS.
(Official oath. Form.)
Sec. 1.
1
Members of the general assembly, and all ofcers, executive and judicial,
shall, before they enter on the duties of their respective ofces, take the following oath
or afrmation, to wit:
Art. XI CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 181
You do solemnly swear (or afrm, as the case may be) that you will support the
Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the state of Connecticut, so
long as you continue a citizen thereof; and that you will faithfully discharge, accord-
ing to law, the duties of the ofce of .... to the best of your abilities. So help you God.
1
Applicable only to ofcer appointed after adoption of constitution. 5 C. 278. Cited. 135 C. 647. Even though a
state referee had not taken an oath of ofce he is a de facto ofcer and validity of his acts is not open to challenge in a
remonstrance. 136 C. 72. Cited. 162 C. 250; 179 C. 140; Id., 552.
Cited. 3 CA 590.
(Extra compensation to public officers prohibited.)
Sec. 2.
1
Neither the general assembly nor any county, city, borough, town or school
district shall have power to pay or grant any extra compensation to any public ofcer,
employee, agent or servant, or increase the compensation of any public ofcer or
employee, to take effect during the continuance in ofce of any person whose salary
might be increased thereby, or increase the pay or compensation of any public contrac-
tor above the amount specied in the contract.
1
Amended by Article XIX, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(Emergency provision for temporary succession to powers and duties of public
offices.)
Sec. 3. In order to insure continuity in operation of state and local governments in
a period of emergency resulting from disaster caused by enemy attack, the general
assembly shall provide by law for the prompt and temporary succession to the powers
and duties of all public ofces, the incumbents of which may become unavailable for
carrying on their powers and duties.
(Claims against the state.)
Sec. 4.
1
Claims against the state shall be resolved in such manner as may be pro-
vided by law.
1
Cited. 166 C. 251. State is immune from suit on claim for liability without its consent; Chapter 53 provides for ad-
judication of claims against the state with its permission. 172 C. 603. Cited. 177 C. 268. Sovereign immunity cited. 187
C. 94, 101. Issue of whether a municipality must specially plead governmental immunity to merit its consideration as a
defense to an action alleging negligent operation of a city park discussed. Id., 180. Cited. 195 C. 534; 204 C. 17; 222 C.
280. Request for an order directing the chief court administrator to allocate sufcient resources to juvenile courts to elim-
inate alleged unlawful practices would not result in a violation of sovereign immunity. 244 C. 296. Exception to doctrine
of sovereign immunity for actions by state ofcers in excess of their statutory authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional
statute applies only to actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief and not to actions seeking only money damages. 265
C. 301. Sovereign immunity bars action seeking monetary damages against state ofcials in their ofcial capacities even
when they acted in excess of statutory authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. Id., 338. Exception to doctrine
of sovereign immunity applies to equitable counterclaims by defendant in an equitable action brought by the state; the state
does not waive its sovereign immunity for counterclaims seeking monetary damages simply by initiating litigation against
a private party; when the state brings a cause of action, it waives its sovereign immunity with respect to the procedure
established for the action’s nal and complete disposition in the courts, including an appeal or a writ of error. 310 C. 60.
Doctrine of sovereign immunity protected defendant attorney general’s action in issuing a press release stating that
the case involving the plaintiffs, nursing home operators, “was one of the most reprehensible and outrageous Medicaid
frauds we have seen,” and that plaintiffs were engaged in the most “egregious” and “blatant” abuse of Medicaid funds
he had ever seen and plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that defendant’s behavior should be examined under
standard in Sec. 4-165; such standard is inapplicable because liability under statute only applies when defendant has not
established defense of sovereign immunity and such immunity applies to facts in this case. 67 CA 613. Legislature’s
delegation of its equitable authority to the Claims Commissioner is unambiguous and unequivocal and does not violate
constitutional principle of bicameralism. 133 CA 479.
Statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state. 26 CS 24.
(Effect of Constitution on existing corporations, officers, laws.)
Sec. 5.
1
The rights and duties of all corporations shall remain as if this constitution
had not been adopted; with the exception of such regulations and restrictions as are con-
tained in this constitution.
2
All laws not contrary to, or inconsistent with, the provisions
of this constitution shall remain in force, until they shall expire by their own limitation,
182 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Art. XIII
or shall be altered or repealed by the general assembly, in pursuance of this constitution.
The validity of all bonds, debts, contracts, as well of individuals as of bodies corporate,
or the state, of all suits, actions, or rights of action, both in law and equity, shall continue
as if no change had taken place. All ofcers lling any ofce by election or appointment
shall continue to exercise the duties thereof, according to their respective commissions
or appointments, until their ofces shall have been abolished or their successors selected
and qualied in accordance with this constitution or the laws enacted pursuant thereto.
1
Right of general assembly to divide towns and school districts not taken away by section. 14 C. 469. But it is not
competent for general assembly to divide an ancient ecclesiastical society established before the adoption of present
constitution. 23 C. 269–277. Resolution of general assembly passed prior to adoption of constitution thrusting whole
burden of maintenance of bridge on one town not unconstitutional. Id., 419, 420. Towns originally constituting colony of
Connecticut not corporations in proper sense prior to constitution of 1639; review of history and power of towns. 32 C.
131. No rights or franchises contemplated except such as were then existing; and a right to have and enjoy a new tribunal
cannot be regarded as one actually possessed. 36 C. 448. Act of 1889, providing that secretary of state board of education
shall be a member of every school committee, etc., not unconstitutional as conicting with section, because towns did
not have right when constitution was adopted to elect school committees. 59 C. 62.
2
Under former constitutional provision prohibiting municipal aid to, or investment in the stock of, railroad corpora-
tions: An act authorizing an assessment of damages against a city for change of highway lines for necessary relocation
of railroad line, is not within this provision. 54 C. 277, see 178 U.S. 323. Under former Sec. 16-98 one-half the expense
of a highway across a railroad is to be borne by the company constructing the same, and one-half thereof is to be paid to
the company by the municipality which is constructing such highway. The municipality may not contract to assume the
railroad’s statutory obligation. 150 C. 366.
ARTICLE TWELFTH.
OF AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
(Method of proposing and approving amendments.)
1
Amendments to this constitution may be proposed by any member of the senate
or house of representatives. An amendment so proposed, approved upon roll call by a
yea vote of at least a majority, but by less than three-fourths, of the total membership
of each house, shall be published with the laws which may have been passed at the
same session and be continued to the regular session of the general assembly elected
at the general election to be held on the Tuesday after the rst Monday of November
in the next even-numbered year. An amendment so proposed, approved upon roll call
by a yea vote of at least three-fourths of the total membership of each house, or any
amendment which, having been continued from the previous general assembly, is again
approved upon roll call by a yea vote of at least a majority of the total membership
of each house, shall, by the secretary of the state, be transmitted to the town clerk in
each town in the state, whose duty it shall be to present the same to the electors thereof
for their consideration at the general election to be held on the Tuesday after the rst
Monday of November in the next even-numbered year. If it shall appear, in a manner to
be provided by law, that a majority of the electors present and voting on such amend-
ment at such election shall have approved such amendment, the same shall be valid,
to all intents and purposes, as a part of this constitution. Electors voting by absentee
ballot under the provisions of the statutes shall be considered to be present and voting.
1
Amended by Article VI., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
ARTICLE THIRTEENTH.
OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS.
(Method of convening by vote of general assembly.)
Sec. 1. The general assembly may, upon roll call, by a yea vote of at least two-thirds
of the total membership of each house, provide for the convening of a constitutional
Art. XIV CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 183
convention to amend or revise the constitution of the state not earlier than ten years
from the date of convening any prior convention.
(Method of convening by vote of electors.)
Sec. 2. The question “Shall there be a Constitutional Convention to amend or revise
the Constitution of the State?” shall be submitted to all the electors of the state at
the general election held on the Tuesday after the rst Monday in November in the
even-numbered year next succeeding the expiration of a period of twenty years from
the date of convening of the last convention called to revise or amend the constitution
of the state, including the Constitutional Convention of 1965, or next succeeding the
expiration of a period of twenty years from the date of submission of such a question
to all electors of the state, whichever date shall last occur. If a majority of the electors
voting on the question shall signify “yes”, the general assembly shall provide for such
convention as provided in Section 3 of this article.
(Selection of membership, date of convening.)
Sec. 3. In providing for the convening of a constitutional convention to amend or
revise the constitution of the state the general assembly shall, upon roll call, by a yea
vote of at least two-thirds of the total membership of each house, prescribe by law the
manner of selection of the membership of such convention, the date of convening of
such convention, which shall be not later than one year from the date of the roll call
vote under Section 1 of this article or one year from the date of the election under
Section 2 of this article, as the case may be, and the date for nal adjournment of such
convention.
(Submission of proposals to electors, approval, effective date.)
Sec. 4. Proposals of any constitutional convention to amend or revise the consti-
tution of the state shall be submitted to all the electors of the state not later than two
months after nal adjournment of the convention, either as a whole or in such parts
and with such alternatives as the convention may determine. Any proposal of the con-
vention to amend or revise the constitution of the state submitted to such electors in
accordance with this section and approved by a majority of such electors voting on
the question shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of this constitution.
Such proposals when so approved shall take effect thirty days after the date of the vote
thereon unless otherwise provided in the proposal.
ARTICLE FOURTEENTH.
OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS CONSTITUTION.
(Approval of Constitution by the people.)
This proposed constitution, submitted by the Constitutional Convention of 1965,
shall become the constitution of the state of Connecticut upon approval by the people
and proclamation by the governor as provided by law.
1
1
Referendum December 14, 1965. Proclaimed by the governor December 30, 1965.
185
AMENDMENTS
TO THE
CONSTITUTION
OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
ARTICLE I.*
*Adopted November 25, 1970.
Cited. 174 C. 308.
(State officers, election date.)
Section 1 of article fourth of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
A general election for governor, lieutenant-governor, secretary of the state, trea-
surer, comptroller and attorney general shall be held on the Tuesday after the rst
Monday of November, 1974, and quadrennially thereafter.
ARTICLE II.*
*Adopted November 25, 1970.
(Senate, number, qualifications.)
Sec. 1. Section 3 of article third of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
1
The senate shall consist of not less than thirty and not more than fty members,
each of whom shall have attained the age of twenty-one years and be an elector resid-
ing in the senatorial district from which he is elected. Each senatorial district shall be
contiguous as to territory and shall elect no more than one senator.
1
Amended by Article XV., Sec. 1, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
186 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. III
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
(House of representatives, how constituted.)
Sec. 2. Section 4 of said article third is amended to read as follows:
1
The house of representatives shall consist of not less than one hundred twen-
ty-ve and not more than two hundred twenty-ve members, each of whom shall have
attained the age of twenty-one years and be an elector residing in the assembly district
from which he is elected. Each assembly district shall be contiguous as to territory
and shall elect no more than one representative. For the purpose of forming assembly
districts no town shall be divided except for the purpose of forming assembly districts
wholly within the town.
1
Amended by Article XV., Sec. 2, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
(Eligibility to office.)
Sec. 3. Section 10 of article sixth of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
1
Every elector who has attained the age of twenty-one years shall be eligible to any
ofce in the state, but no person who has not attained the age of twenty-one shall be
eligible therefor, except in cases provided for in this constitution.
1
Amended by Article XV., Sec. 3, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
ARTICLE III.*
*Adopted November 25, 1970.
Cited. 124 C. 122; 132 C. 523; 135 C. 651; 139 C. 209; 232 C. 345.
(General Assembly, when and where held. Adjournment. Reconvened session
to consider vetoes.)
Section 2 of article third of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
There shall be a regular session of the general assembly on the Wednesday follow-
ing the rst Monday of January in the odd-numbered years and on the Wednesday
following the rst Monday of February in the even-numbered years, and at such other
times as the general assembly shall judge necessary; but the person administering the
ofce of governor may, on special emergencies, convene the general assembly at any
other time. All regular and special sessions of the general assembly shall be held at
Hartford, but the person administering the ofce of governor may, in case of special
emergency, convene the assembly at any other place in the state. The general assembly
shall adjourn each regular session in the odd-numbered years not later than the rst
Wednesday after the rst Monday in June and in the even-numbered years not later
than the rst Wednesday after the rst Monday in May and shall adjourn each special
session upon completion of its business. If any bill passed by any regular or special
session or any appropriation item described in Section 16 of Article Fourth has been
disapproved by the governor prior to its adjournment, and has not been reconsidered
by the assembly, or is so disapproved after such adjournment, the secretary of the
state shall reconvene the general assembly on the second Monday after the last day on
which the governor is authorized to transmit or has transmitted every bill to the secre-
tary with his objections pursuant to Section 15 of Article Fourth of this constitution,
whichever occurs rst; provided if such Monday falls on a legal holiday the general
assembly shall be reconvened on the next following day. The reconvened session shall
be for the sole purpose of reconsidering and, if the assembly so desires, repassing
such bills. The general assembly shall adjourn sine die not later than three days fol-
lowing its reconvening. In the even year session the general assembly shall consider
Art. IV AMENDMENTS TO THE 187
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
no business other than budgetary, revenue and nancial matters, bills and resolutions
raised by committees of the general assembly and those matters certied in writing by
the speaker of the house of representatives and president pro tempore of the senate to
be of an emergency nature.
ARTICLE IV.*
*Certied as adopted December 22, 1972. (See Ponsor et al v. Schaffer. Hartford Superior Court Docket No. 179114.)
An act enlarging justice’s jurisdiction does not impair the right of trial by jury. 4 C. 538; 25 C. 286. A provision in a
city charter, that the jury should be taken from the freemen of the city, is not repugnant to this clause. 12 C. 252. A statute
exempting military ofcers from suits at law for imposing nes is not in violation of this clause. 14 C. 205. This provi-
sion does not prevent the legislature from authorizing courts to grant nonsuits. 24 C. 478. The act allowing justices to
adjudge the forfeiture of liquors illegally kept, is no impairment of jury trial. 25 C. 286. The act prohibiting appeal from
judgment for limited sum is constitutional. 34 C. 54; 38 C. 240. What reasonable conditions are no infringement of right
to jury trial. 34 C. 54. The act providing for court trial of probate appeals is constitutional. 35 C. 455. An act providing
for the seizure of boat illegally taking oysters was held unconstitutional, since it gave no right of appeal. 37 C. 323. An
act which allowed the accused to select court or jury trial was held not opposed to public policy and was constitutional.
46 C. 363, 367. The law authorizing a decree of ejectment on foreclosure does not infringe the right of jury trial. Id., 526.
An issue of fact raised by the return to an alternative mandamus is to be tried by the court; such having been the practice
prior to the adoption of the constitution. 47 C. 341, 343. The jury law is not in conict with this provision. 48 C. 546,
547; 72 C. 98. Section not applicable to proceedings for revocation of liquor licenses. 49 C. 599–607. No right exists to
trial by jury before county commissioners. 50 C. 324. A law declaring that the determination of a judge of the superior
court shall be conclusive in contested election cases, is constitutional. 51 C. 125–128. The ofce of mayor is not recog-
nized by the constitution. Id., 125. The charter of New Haven is not unconstitutional as denying right of jury trial in city
court on charge of drunkenness. Id., 422. Practice of assessing damages by court after default in tort held constitutional,
inasmuch as such practice was established before the adoption of the constitution. 53 C. 2. Section de proceedings for
setting aside designation of natural oyster beds, does not violate. 56 C. 519. An act requiring one on trial to disclose
where he secured liquor was held constitutional. 59 C. 591. The statute providing for a jury of six only, in summary
process, is valid. 66 C. 438. The law de quieting title to land does not prohibit a jury trial in cases involving purely legal
claims. 68 C. 286. Cited. 72 C. 98. Reasonable modications of procedure do not violate; proof of will out of court; 74
C. 260; requirement that case be claimed for jury in certain time. 75 C. 611; see 69 C. 131. Setting aside verdict does not
violate; 74 C. 71; 75 C. 678; 76 C. 496; 81 C. 624; 86 C. 225; if discretion is properly exercised; 91 C. 460; or setting it
aside unless part of judgment be remitted. 78 C. 299; 86 C. 322. On setting aside verdict, supreme court cannot direct
opposite verdict. 81 C. 579. Jury must take law from judge. 75 C. 218. Judge may state facts to jury which as reasonable
men they must nd; 81 C. 347; or direct verdict. 81 C. 578; 91 C. 442. Historical review of trial by jury in Connecticut.
75 C. 219. Requirement, under guise of condemnation proceedings, that past damages for trespass be determined by
commission would violate. 76 C. 443. Provision does not apply to equitable actions; 79 C. 262; 131 C. 312; but adding
claim for injunction in trespass action will not prevent jury trial of issues of title, possession and damages; 85 C. 161; if,
however, equitable issues rst tried are conclusive, jury may be refused. 73 C. 486. Rules governing right to jury trial
where case involves claim both for damages and for equitable relief. 130 C. 206. Section does not concern incidental
issues of fact involved in equitable issues. 113 C. 608. Statute forbidding keeping house reputed to be house of ill-fame
does not violate. 82 C. 112; 83 C. 56; Id., 551. Issues upon equitable claims arising in action to remove cloud from title
are for jury. 78 C. 100. Does not include proceedings by mayor to remove municipal ofcer; 81 C. 585; nor right in action
for specic performance; judge may order. 82 C. 293. See as to equity actions. 81 C. 451; 83 C. 110. Right does not
extend to appeals from probate. 90 C. 49. Preserves and perpetuates fundamental law; legislature may create new of-
fenses and deny right of trial by jury; admission of certied copies of chemists’ analysis of liquor held not unconstitu-
tional. 103 C. 514, 515. Cited. 116 C. 477; 126 C. 606. Right to jury trial may be waived. 127 C. 336. No party has a
constitutional right to a trial by jury of any action not so triable in 1818, when the constitution was adopted. 135 C. 294.
Cited. 137 C. 18. Right to jury trial includes right to have jury, rather than court, pass upon factual issue of damages,
when there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men as to amount which should be
awarded. 138 C. 625. Cited. 143 C. 159. Guarantees as a political right the institution of jury trial in all its essential
features as derived from our ancestors and now existing by force of common law, but this right may be subjected to
conditions and regulations of procedure for the better promotion of justice and the public welfare so long as the sub-
stance of the right is not adversely affected or the exercise of the right is not prevented. 144 C. 228. Whether party has
waived his right to a jury trial presents a question of fact for the trial court. 147 C. 153. Cited. 156 C. 323; 160 C. 219.
Jury to decide issues of fact, when. 163 C. 191. Cited. 169 C. 1. Right of trial by jury not subverted by no-fault insurance
law. Id., 267, 298. Cited. 170 C. 356; Id., 367. Connecticut Constitution, while granting that right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate, states that the number of such jurors, which shall not be less than six, is to be established by law. 171
C. 395. Time limitation imposed for voir dire was arbitrary and constituted reversible error. 173 C. 102. Cited. 177 C.
677. Sec. 51-217 implements right to trial by jury and does not unconstitutionally encroach upon judicial power. 180 C.
382. No party has right to trial by jury in an equitable action; a dissolution of marriage, although a creature of statute is
an equitable action. 181 C. 225. Cited. 183 C. 207. Sec. 52-216a held unconstitutional as violating this article in permit-
ting trial court to interfere with fact-nding function of jury. 186 C. 337. Right to trial by jury cited. 187 C. 264, 270,
188 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. IV
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
469. Cited. 188 C. 432; 189 C. 550; 190 C. 639; 191 C. 276. Integrity of constitutional right to a jury determination of
damages discussed. 193 C. 582. Cited. 194 C. 223. Right to trial by jury cited. Id. Cited. Id., 573. Right to jury trial cited.
Id. Cited. 196 C. 53. Constitutional right to trial by jury cited. Id. Cited. Id., 667; 197 C. 34; Id., 314; Id., 337. Right to
trial by jury cited. Id. Cited. Id., 358. Right to jury trial cited. Id.; 199 C. 308. Cited. 200 C. 586; Id., 615; 201 C. 125;
Id., 385; Id., 489. Right to trial by jury cited. Id. Cited. 202 C. 158; 203 C. 63. Right to jury trial cited. Id. “... trial court’s
refusal to allow defense counsel to inquire whether the jurors would be inclined to give more weight to a police ofcer’s
testimony ...” constituted reversible error. Id., 506. Constitutional right to question members of the venire cited. Id. Vio-
lation of constitutional right to conduct voir dire examination cited. 204 C. 156. Cited. Id., 377; 205 C. 61; Id., 456. Right
to trial by jury cited. Id. Cited. 206 C. 454. Right to a jury trial cited. Id. Sec. 14-295 violates right to trial by jury. Id.,
608. Amount of damage award is matter peculiarly within the province of the jury. 207 C. 125. Right to trial by jury cited.
Id.; Id., 276. Constitutional right of trial by jury including right to have issues of fact determined by jury. 208 C. 21.
Cited. Id., 52. Right to voir dire cited. Id. Cited 209 C. 34. Right to a unanimous jury verdict cited. Id. Right to a jury
trial cited. Id., 450; Id., 579. State constitutional rights cited. Id., 679. Right to a jury trial cited. 210 C. 359. Cited. 211
C. 370. Right to a jury trial cited. Id.; 212 C. 31. Cited. Id., 83. Right to a jury trial cited. Id. “... all arbitration actions
pursuant to Lemon Law II are essentially equitable ...”; therefore claim to entitlement to jury trial held to be without
merit. 213 C. 138. Right to jury trial cited. Id., 233; 214 C. 717. Cited. 216 C. 40. Right to trial by jury cited. Id.; 217 C.
1. Right of trial by jury does not encompass the corresponding right that all court rules, procedures and methods current
in 1818 would remain unchanged. Id., 532. Right to trial by jury cited. Id. Cited. Id., 671. Right to trial by impartial jury
cited. Id. Cited. 218 C. 309. Parties to trial have constitutional right to be present during voir dire of prospective jurors;
right to trial by jury encompasses that right. Id., 386. Right to be present for jury voir dire cited. Id. Cited. Id., 646; 220
C. 112; Id., 285. Fair cross section requirement cited; unconstitutional jury selection and discrimination cited; right to
jury trial cited. Id., 487. Cited. 221 C. 346. Right of jury trial cited. Id. Right to factual issues resolved by jury cited. Id.,
473. Cited. 222 C. 1. Deprivation of constitutional rights cited. Id. Right to a jury trial cited. Id., 591. Cited. 223 C. 299;
Id., 786. Constitutional right to jury determination of amount of punitive damages cited. Id. Constitutional right to a jury
cited. 224 C. 372. Constitutional rights to have issues of fact determined by a jury cited. Id.; 225 C. 420. Where there is
no issue of fact, there is no right to jury trial; judgment of appellate court in 26 CA 181 reversed in part. Id., 807. Right
to jury trial cited. Id. Cited. 226 C. 618. Right to jury trial cited. Id. Cited. 227 C. 175. Right to jury trial cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 301. Right to an impartial jury cited. Id. Requirement of unanimous verdict part of constitutional safeguard of trial
by jury; judgment of appellate court in 29 CA 68 reversed. Id., 566. Constitutional safeguard of trial by jury cited. Id.
Right of trial by jury cited. Id., 677. Cited. Id., 711. Right to jury drawn from fair cross section of community cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 829. Right to a jury trial cited. Id. Unconstitutionality under state constitution cited. Id. Right to jury cited. Id.,
903. Cited. 229 C. 634. Right to a jury trial cited. Id. Article does not give rise to right to jury trial for claims under
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUPTA). 230 C. 144. Right to jury trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 183. Defendant can
waive right to presence of judge during voir dire; henceforth judge must be continuously present to oversee voir dire in
a criminal case. Id., 385, see also 37 CA 801. Presence of judge at criminal jury trial voir dire cited. Id. Right to jury trial
cited. Id., 698. Cited. 231 C. 242; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502. Right
to jury trial cited. Id.; Id., 455. Cited. Id., 480; Id., 691. Right to jury trial cited. Id. Taking of notes by jurors discussed.
233 C. 215. Questioning during voir dire about note-taking cited. Id. Cited. Id., 813. Right to jury trial cited. Id. Cited.
234 C. 660; 235 C. 107; Id., 502. Right to fair and impartial jury trial cited. Id. Right to jury trial cited. Id., 679; 236 C.
582. Cited. 237 C. 238. Voir dire of venire persons individually cited. Id. Right to trial by jury cited. Id., 378. Cited. Id.,
454. Right to individual voir dire cited. Id. Right to trial by jury cited. Id., 633. Cited. 238 C. 389. Right to fair and im-
partial jury cited. Id. Rights to jury trial cited. 239 C. 144. Right to have factual issues resolved by jury cited. Id., 168.
Right to jury trial cited. 240 C. 799; 241 C. 24. Cited. Id., 439. Right to jury determination of essential element cited;
failure to instruct jury on essential element cited. Id. Cited. Id., 322. Right under Connecticut Constitution that jury
unanimously agree on liability as principal or accessory cited. Id. Cited. Id., 502. Right to a jury trial cited. 242 C. 666;
Id., 296. Prelitigation commercial contractual jury trial waiver is presumptively enforceable, and party seeking to avoid
waiver has burden of producing evidence that it did not intend to waive right to a jury trial. 246 C. 1. Identication and
excusal for cause, prior to the guilt phase of a capital felony trial, of venire persons whose views concerning death pen-
alty preclude them from serving as jurors at sentencing phase, but not at guilt phase, of trial does not violate state con-
stitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury. 251 C. 671. Trial court’s denial of defendant’s challenges for cause to
four venire persons did not improperly force him to use four peremptory challenges in violation of his right to trial by a
fair and impartial jury since defendant did not exercise all of his peremptory challenges and did not seek any additional
challenges. 256 C. 23. In determining whether a party has right to trial by jury under state constitution court must ascer-
tain whether action being tried has roots in common law, and if so, whether the remedy involved was one in law or eq-
uity. If action existed at common law and involved a legal remedy, right to jury trial exists. Art. I, Sec. 19 guarantees right
to jury trial in all cases for which a such a right existed at the time of the adoption of constitutional provision in 1818 or
for cases that are substantially similar to cases for which right to jury trial existed at common law in 1818. 262 C. 45.
Inverse condemnation action has no common law analogue that was triable to a jury prior to 1818, its nearest historical
analogue, eminent domain, gives rise to a proceeding in equity, therefore there is no right to jury trial for cause of action
based on inverse condemnation. Id. Defendant does not have a right to ascertain juror’s opinion on specic evidence in
advance of trial and cannot question venire persons about specic mitigating factors. 269 C. 213. Where defendant has
history of mental illness and required treatment to become competent for trial, standard for waiver of constitutional
rights is applicable to all defendants found competent for trial. 271 C. 740. A defendant’s right to jury trial does not in-
clude right to bar plaintiff from receiving benet of any pretrial settlement amounts that plaintiff has negotiated with
other alleged tortfeasors. 284 C. 645. A defendant personally must waive the fundamental right to a jury trial; counsel
may not make that decision as a matter of trial strategy. In the absence of a written waiver, trial court must canvass de-
fendant to ensure that any waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary. 288 C. 770. Trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying motion for disclosure, where plaintiff’s law rm had been involved in prior debt collection actions
against three jurors, because trial court properly found that the only attorneys in the prior actions with whom the jurors
Art. IV AMENDMENTS TO THE 189
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
had a business relationship were the attorneys the jurors had hired to represent their own interests. 289 C. 88. Trial court
did not abuse its discretion by precluding defense counsel from asking venirepersons specically about self-defense. 292
C. 656. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in restricting questions about specic defenses during voir dire of potential
jurors. Id. Plaintiff had no right to a jury trial on issues raised in connection with enforcement of settlement agreement.
298 C. 495. Defendant’s decision to forgo a jury determination in capital felony sentencing proceeding and opt for sen-
tencing by a three-judge panel was knowing, voluntary and intelligent; formulaic canvass of defendant is not required
and validity of jury waiver is determined by examination of totality of the circumstances. 303 C. 71. A prosecutor’s ex-
ercise of a peremptory challenge on the basis of a venire person’s negative perceptions or distrust of law enforcement or
the criminal justice system did not constitute an impermissible, race based reason under the Connecticut constitution.
342 C. 489.
Cited. 1 CA 511. Constitutional right of trial by jury cited. 2 CA 523. Setting aside of jury verdict discussed. Id. Right
to trial by jury cited. 3 CA 374. Right to jury trial cited; right to unanimous verdict cited. Id., 650. Cited. 4 CA 592. Jury
trial cited. 5 CA 434. Held jury award of damages inadequate as a matter of law. 6 CA 322. Right to jury trial cited. Id.
Cited. 8 CA 317. Right to fair trial cited. Id. Right to a jury trial cited. Id., 491. Cited. Id., 542; Id., 642. Right to trial by
jury guaranteed by Connecticut Constitution. Id. Cited. 9 CA 255. Constitutional right to trial by jury cited. Id., 524.
Clarication of instructions is mandatory when any member of jury manifests confusion about the law; constitutionally
protected right to properly instructed jury cited. 10 CA 697. Constitutional right to unanimous jury verdict cited. 11 CA
80; Id., 102. Constitutional right in appropriate cases to have issues of fact decided by a jury cited. Id., 232. Constitu-
tional right to have disputed issues heard by a jury cited. Id., 434. Right to jury trial cited. 12 CA 239. Trial by jury cited.
Id., 258. Constitutional right to jury trial cited. Id., 408. Cited. 13 CA 189. Right to jury trial cited. Id.; Id., 378; Id., 667;
14 CA 10; Id., 159; Id., 289. Cited. 15 CA 297. Right to jury trial cited. Id.; 16 CA 318. Cited. Id., 333. Constitutional
right to exercise intelligently right to challenge jurors cited. Id. Right to jury trial cited. Id., 601; 17 CA 466; 18 CA 602.
Constitutional right to issues decided by jury cited. 19 CA 22. Right to jury trial cited. Id., 379. Cited. 20 CA 6. Right to
jury trial cited. Id., 410. Party has right to be present during jury selection in civil case. 22 CA 131. Cited. Id., 351. Right
to jury trial cited. Id., 440; 23 CA 1. Constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury cited. Id., 437. Consti-
tutional right of trial by jury cited. Id., 735. Right to have jury decide issues of fact cited. 24 CA 489. Cited. 25 CA 171.
Impermissible restriction of voir dire cited. 26 CA 52. Because of result reached in case court found it unnecessary to
determine whether recordation is a constitutional right because it is fundamental to constitutional right of voir dire. Id.,
125. Right to voir dire cited. Id. Cited. Id., 165. Right to a jury trial cited. Id., 181; judgment reversed in part, see 225 C.
804. Right of trial by jury and rights to have issues of fact resolved by jury cited. 27 CA 135. Constitutional rights to have
issues of fact resolved by a jury cited. Id., 487. Cited. Id., 643. Deprivation of fair trial by an impartial jury cited. Id.
Cited. 28 CA 126. Right to trial by jury cited. Id. Cited. Id., 693. State constitutional right to jury trial cited. Id. Right to
a jury trial cited. 29 CA 359; Id., 452; Id., 642. Right to a jury trial and right to have factual issues resolved by jury cited.
30 CA 327. Cited. Id., 359; Id., 470. Right to jury trial cited. 31 CA 178. Judge’s absence from voir dire in criminal
proceeding cannot be waived or subject to harmless error or prejudicial review. Id., 278. Individual juror possesses right
not to be excluded from jury on account of race. Id. Right to voir dire examination of prospective jurors cited. Id. Right
to jury trial cited. Id.; 32 CA 21; Id., 831. Right to jury trial and a fair trial cited. 33 CA 205. Right to fair and impartial
jury cited. Id., 339; judgment reversed on issues of sufciency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502. Cited.
34 CA 58; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537. Constitutional right to jury trial and a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 103.
Right to jury trial cited. Id.; Id., 595. Cited. 35 CA 160; Id., 212. Right to trial by jury cited. Id., 541; Id., 714. Denial of
right to a jury trial cited. Id., 728. Right to have jury decide issues of fact cited. 36 CA 1. Cited. Id., 631; Id., 753. Con-
stitutional right to have jury decide issues cited. 37 CA 146. Cited. Id., 321. Right to have trial judge present during jury
voir dire cited. Id., 509. Cited. 38 CA 198. Right to trial by jury cited. Id. Cited. Id., 231. Constitutional right to preemp-
tory challenges cited. Id. Right to trial by jury cited. Id., 546. Cited. Id., 598; Id., 661. Right to trial by jury cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 685. Right to trial by jury cited. Id. Cited. Id., 684. Right to jury trial cited. Id.; 39 CA 702. Cited. 40 CA 328;
41 CA 19. Right to jury trial cited. Id., 47; Id., 454; Id., 695. Right to have issues of fact determined by a jury cited. 42
CA 712. Cited. Id., 542; 43 CA 113. Right to jury trial cited. Id.; Id., 142; Id., 294. Constitutional rights to have factual
issues determined by the jury cited. Id., 453. Right to a jury trial cited; right to core constitutional rights cited. Id., 555.
Right to have issues of fact determined by a jury cited, Id., 756. Cited. 44 CA 187. Fundamental right to a jury trial cited.
Id. Constitutional right to trial by jury and to have issues of fact determined by jury cited. Id., 211. Cited. 45 CA 165.
Right to trial before impartial jury cited. Id. Right to jury trial cited. 46 CA 24. Cited. Id., 432. Trial by jury and waiver
cited. Id. Right to a jury trial cited. Id., 443. Right to a jury trial cited; lack of waiver of jury trial cited. Id., 486. Cited.
Id., 600. Right to question each juror individually cited. Id. Voir dire rights discussed. 47 CA 597. Trial court did not
improperly impede the defendant’s ability to question prospective jurors or prevent defendant from effectively exercis-
ing peremptory challenges. 49 CA 486. Litigants have constitutional right to have issues of fact determined by jury; as-
sessment of damages is peculiarly within province of jury and their determination should be set aside only when verdict
is plainly excessive and exorbitant. 57 CA 778. Appellate court rejected defendant’s claim that trial court violated his
rights under Art. I, Secs. 8, 19 and 20 of the Connecticut Constitution when it improperly allowed the state to exercise a
peremptory challenge against prospective juror, who was a member of defendant’s racial group, without a racially neu-
tral explanation reasonably related to the issues in the case. Appellate court found that evidence supported prosecutor’s
reasons for striking the prospective juror and defendant failed to establish that the state gave a pretextual reason for ex-
cusing the prospective juror. 62 CA 182. Section guarantees right to jury trial in all cases for which such right existed at
time of adoption of that provision in 1818 or in substantially similar cases. 76 CA 24. Foreclosure action is equitable in
nature and therefore does not give rise to right to a jury trial. 95 CA 315. In a case concerning a male on male, or female
on female, sexual assault, relevant questions to venirepersons that delve into prejudices, beliefs and attitudes toward
homosexuality should be permitted, but questions relating to the issue of struggling with sexual identity are not permitted
as such questions are unrelated to the issues in the case, are not based on undisputed facts and would test the prospective
jurors’ views of certain facts. 112 CA 694. Litigants have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by the jury
and not by the court, and in this case, there was an issue of material fact and therefore the court improperly directed a
190 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. VI
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
verdict. 115 CA 47. Trial court’s denial of request by plaintiff to poll jury re exposure to potentially inammatory article
concerning case constituted an abuse of discretion that, at a minimum, jeopardized plaintiff’s constitutional right to an
impartial jury. 128 CA 341; judgment reversed, see 309 C. 688. Defendant’s right to trial by jury was not violated when
jury was instructed that it must unanimously nd defendant not guilty of the greater offense before deliberating on a
lesser included offense. 131 CA 1. Right to a jury trial is subject to certain limitations, and plaintiff did not have consti-
tutional right to jury trial in summary process action, as set forth in Sec. 52-215. 135 CA 831. Plaintiff’s claim was eq-
uitable in nature, and therefore not entitled to a jury trial, but defendants independently were entitled to have a jury
decide the issues founded in tort that were presented in their counterclaim. 136 CA 347. Court’s decision to excuse a
selected juror without rst notifying defendant or counsel did not violate right to individual voir dire. 168 CA 321.
Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to a jury trial on the ground that a negligence action seeking monetary
damages against the state was not the same or similar in nature to an action that could have been tried to a jury in 1818
because the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred actions against the state prior to adoption of the state constitution in
1818. 182 CA 278.
Cited. 5 CS 506. Permissible to transfer a case from small claims court to municipal court and then to common pleas
to obtain jury trial. 11 CS 106. “The right to question each juror individually by counsel shall remain inviolate” does not
contain the right to question each juror outside the presence of the other prospective jurors. 33 CS 599. Right of trial by jury
may be subjected to reasonable conditions and regulations, even if right is cut off completely in some cases where monetary
interests are relatively small. 35 CS 549. Court has duty to set aside jury verdict, despite right to trial by jury including issues
of fact to be decided by jury, where verdict was manifest injustice and palpably against evidence. 37 CS 1. Right to trial by
jury not extended to cases falling into category of petty offenses not triable by jury at common law. Id., 693. Waiver of right
to trial by jury under chapter 960a considered voluntary where issue not raised in trial court. Id., 755. Use of preemptory
challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely on basis of membership in a cognizable group within meaning of the repre-
sentative cross section rule violates a party’s state constitutional right to trial by jury. 41 CS 48. Violation of constitutional
rights cited; right to trial by jury cited. Id. Cited. 42 CS 534. Impartial jury drawn from cross section of community cited. Id.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 202. Jury trial criteria (Sec. 51-266) not a violation. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 493.
(Trial by jury. Challenging of jurors.)
Section 19 of article rst of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, the number of such jurors, which
shall not be less than six, to be established by law; but no person shall, for a capital
offense, be tried by a jury of less than twelve jurors without his consent. In all civil
and criminal actions tried by a jury, the parties shall have the right to challenge jurors
peremptorily, the number of such challenges to be established by law. The right to
question each juror individually by counsel shall be inviolate.
ARTICLE V.*
*Adopted November 27, 1974.
(Equal protection. No segregation or discrimination.)
Section 20 of article rst of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
1
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to seg-
regation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political
rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin or sex.
1
Amended by Article XXI., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
ARTICLE VI.*
*Adopted November 27, 1974.
Cited. 138 C. 162; 192 C. 671; 229 C. 1.
(Method of proposing and approving amendments.)
Article twelfth of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
Art. VIII AMENDMENTS TO THE 191
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Amendments to this constitution may be proposed by any member of the senate or
house of representatives. An amendment so proposed, approved upon roll call by a yea
vote of at least a majority, but by less than three-fourths, of the total membership of
each house, shall be published with the laws which may have been passed at the same
session and be continued to the regular session of the general assembly elected at the
next general election to be held on the Tuesday after the rst Monday of November in
an even-numbered year. An amendment so proposed, approved upon roll call by a yea
vote of at least three-fourths of the total membership of each house, or any amendment
which, having been continued from the previous general assembly, is again approved
upon roll call by a yea vote of at least a majority of the total membership of each
house, shall, by the secretary of the state, be transmitted to the town clerk in each
town in the state, whose duty it shall be to present the same to the electors thereof for
their consideration at the next general election to be held on the Tuesday after the rst
Monday of November in an even-numbered year. If it shall appear, in a manner to be
provided by law, that a majority of the electors present and voting on such amendment
at such election shall have approved such amendment, the same shall be valid, to all
intents and purposes, as a part of this constitution. Electors voting by absentee ballot
under the provisions of the statutes shall be considered to be present and voting.
ARTICLE VII.*
*Adopted November 27, 1974.
Punishment inicted refers to penalty prescribed, not to that actually imposed, for offense. 86 C. 624. Cited. 129 C.
624; 188 C. 671.
(Forfeiture and restoration of electoral privileges.)
Section 3 of article sixth of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
The general assembly shall by law prescribe the offenses on conviction of which the
right to be an elector and the privileges of an elector shall be forfeited and the condi-
tions on which and methods by which such rights may be restored.
ARTICLE VIII.*
*Adopted November 27, 1974.
(Justices of the Peace.)
Section 1. Section 5 of article fth of the Constitution is repealed.
(Age limitation, exception.)
Sec. 2. Section 6 of said article fth is amended to read as follows:
1
No judge shall be eligible to hold his ofce after he shall arrive at the age of seventy
years, except that a chief justice or judge of the supreme court, a judge of the superior
court, or a judge of the court of common pleas, who has attained the age of seventy
years and has become a state referee may exercise, as shall be prescribed by law, the
powers of the superior court or court of common pleas on matters referred to him as
a state referee.
1
Cited. 158 C. 16; Id., 291. Exception does not include circuit court judges. 164 C. 360. State trial referees are not
judges of the court whose powers they exercise, but are sui generis. Id. History of section and state referees. Id. State
192 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XI
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
referee sitting under the provisions of this section sits as a special tribunal. 167 C. 564. State referee system does not
encroach upon and does not unconstitutionally compete with other constitutional courts. 177 C. 173. Provisions of Sec.
52-434(a)(4) not in conict. 199 C. 496. Cited. Id., 518; 200 C. 38. Sec. 51-198(c) authorizing retired judge to perform
limited, temporary duties associated with former ofce does not violate mandatory retirement provision because such
duties do not amount to “holding ofce”. 293 C. 641.
Cited. 7 CA 136; 21 CA 359.
ARTICLE IX.*
*Adopted November 24, 1976.
The electoral privilege must be exercised in the town of the elector’s residence. 30 C. 603. A free colored person,
born in this state, is a citizen thereof. 32 C. 565. Who is an elector in general. 64 C. 161. Cited. 129 C. 624; 136 C. 636.
Cited. 43 CS 297.
(Qualifications of electors.)
Section 1 of article sixth of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
Every citizen of the United States who has attained the age of eighteen years, who is
a bona de resident of the town in which he seeks to be admitted as an elector and who
takes such oath, if any, as may be prescribed by law, shall be qualied to be an elector.
ARTICLE X.*
*Adopted November 24, 1976.
(Preregistration of seventeen-year-old citizens as electors.)
Article sixth of the Constitution is amended by adding the following section:
1
Any citizen who will have attained the age of eighteen years on or before the day
of a regular election may apply for admission as an elector within the period of four
months prior to such election, at such times and in such manner as may be prescribed
by law, and, if qualied, shall become an elector on the day of his or her eighteenth
birthday.
1
Amended by Article XIV., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
ARTICLE XI.*
*Adopted November 24, 1976.
Cited. 192 C. 704; 193 C. 180; 240 C. 157. Because Supreme Court is empowered to determine all matters of judicial
discipline in the rst instance as well as upon appeal of the review council’s decisions, the court’s review of the review
council’s legal conclusions is de novo. 246 C. 183.
Cited. 42 CS 129.
(Judicial censure, removal or suspension. Judicial Review Council.)
Article fth of the Constitution is amended by adding a new section to read as
follows:
In addition to removal by impeachment and removal by the governor on the address
of two-thirds of each house of the general assembly, judges of all courts, except those
courts to which judges are elected, may, in such manner as shall by law be prescribed,
Art. XII AMENDMENTS TO THE 193
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
be removed or suspended by the supreme court. The general assembly may establish a
judicial review council which may also, in such manner as shall by law be prescribed,
censure any such judge or suspend any such judge for a denite period not longer than
one year.
ARTICLE XII.*
*Adopted November 24, 1976.
(Reapportionment procedure. Reapportionment Committee. Reapportion-
ment Commission.)
Section 6 of article third of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
1
a. The assembly and senatorial districts as now established by law shall continue
until the regular session of the general assembly next after the completion of the next
census of the United States. On or before the fteenth day of February next following
the completion of the decennial census of the United States, the general assembly
shall appoint a reapportionment committee consisting of four members of the senate,
two who shall be designated by the president pro tempore of the senate and two who
shall be designated by the minority leader of the senate, and four members of the
house of representatives, two who shall be designated by the speaker of the house of
representatives and two who shall be designated by the minority leader of the house
of representatives, provided there are members of no more than two political parties
in either the senate or the house of representatives. In the event that there are members
of more than two political parties in a house of the general assembly, all members of
that house belonging to the parties other than that of the president pro tempore of the
senate or the speaker of the house of representatives, as the case may be, shall select
one of their number, who shall designate two members of the commission in lieu of
the designation by the minority leader of that house. Such committee shall advise the
general assembly on matters of apportionment. Such general assembly shall, upon roll
call, by a yea vote of at least two-thirds of the membership of each house, enact such
plan of districting as is necessary to preserve a proper apportionment of representa-
tion in accordance with the principles recited in this article. Thereafter the general
assembly shall decennially at its next regular session following the completion of the
census of the United States, upon roll call, by a yea vote of at least two-thirds of the
membership of each house, enact such plan of districting as is necessary in accordance
with the provisions of this article.
b. If the general assembly fails to enact a plan of districting by the fteenth day of
the May next following the completion of the decennial census of the United States,
the governor shall forthwith appoint a commission designated by the president pro
tempore of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives, the minority leader
of the senate and the minority leader of the house of representatives, each of whom
shall designate two members of the commission, provided that there are members of
no more than two political parties in either the senate or the house of representatives.
In the event that there are members of more than two political parties in a house of the
general assembly, all members of that house belonging to the parties other than that of
the president pro tempore of the senate or the speaker of the house of representatives,
as the case may be, shall select one of their number, who shall designate two members
of the commission in lieu of the designation by the minority leader of that house.
194 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XIV
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
The eight members of the commission so designated shall within fteen days select an
elector of the state as a ninth member.
c. The commission shall proceed to consider the alteration of districts in accor-
dance with the principles recited in this article and it shall submit a plan of districting
to the secretary of the state by the rst day of the September next succeeding the
appointment of its members. No plan shall be submitted to the secretary unless it is
certied by at least ve members of the commission. Upon receiving such plan the
secretary shall publish the same forthwith, and, upon publication, such plan of district-
ing shall have the full force of law. If the commission shall fail to submit such a plan
by the rst day of September, the secretary of the state shall forthwith so notify the
chief justice of the supreme court.
d. Original jurisdiction is vested in the supreme court to be exercised on the peti-
tion of any registered voter whereby said court may compel the commission, by man-
damus or otherwise, to perform its duty or to correct any error made in its plan of
districting, or said court may take such other action to effectuate the purposes of this
article, including the establishing of a plan of districting if the commission fails to le
its plan of districting by the rst day of September as said court may deem appropri-
ate. Any such petition shall be led within forty-ve days of the date specied for any
duty or within forty-ve days after the ling of a plan of districting. The supreme court
shall render its decision not later than sixty days following the ling of such petition
or shall le its plan with the secretary of the state not later than the fteenth day of
December next following the completion of the decennial census of the United States.
Upon receiving such plan the secretary shall publish the same forthwith, and, upon
publication, such plan of districting shall have the full force of law.
1
Amended by Article XVI., Sec. 2, Article XXVI., and Article XXX., Sec. 2, of the Amendments to the Constitution
of the State of Connecticut.
ARTICLE XIII.*
*Adopted November 26, 1980.
(Removal to another town.)
Section 9 of article sixth of the Constitution is repealed.
ARTICLE XIV.*
*Adopted November 26, 1980.
(Preregistration of seventeen-year-old citizens as electors.)
Article tenth of the amendments to the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
1
Any citizen who will have attained the age of eighteen years on or before the day
of a regular election may apply for admission as an elector at such times and in such
manner as may be prescribed by law, and, if qualied, shall become an elector on the
day of his or her eighteenth birthday.
1
Amended by Article XXXI., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
Art. XVI AMENDMENTS TO THE 195
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
ARTICLE XV.*
*Adopted November 26, 1980.
(Senate, number, qualifications.)
Section 1 of article two of the amendments to the Constitution is amended to read
as follows:
1
The senate shall consist of not less than thirty and not more than fty members,
each of whom shall have attained the age of eighteen and be an elector residing in the
senatorial district from which he is elected. Each senatorial district shall be contiguous
as to territory and shall elect no more than one senator.
1
Cited. 232 C. 345.
(House of representatives, how constituted.)
Section 2 of article two of the amendments to the Constitution is amended to read
as follows:
1
The house of representatives shall consist of not less than one hundred twenty-
ve and not more than two hundred twenty-ve members, each of whom shall have
attained the age of eighteen years and be an elector residing in the assembly district
from which he is elected. Each assembly district shall be contiguous as to territory
and shall elect no more than one representative. For the purpose of forming assembly
districts no town shall be divided except for the purpose of forming assembly districts
wholly within the town.
1
“Town integrity” principle discussed. 187 C. 721. Federal “one person one vote” principle (see Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 577, 84 S. Ct. 1362) cited; reconciliation with Connecticut town integrity principle discussed; federal con-
stitutional requirements for fair voting standards cited. 222 C. 166. Town integrity principle cited. Id. Cited. 232 C. 345.
(Eligibility to office.)
Section 3 of article two of the amendments to the Constitution is amended to read
as follows:
1
Every elector who has attained the age of eighteen years shall be eligible to any
ofce in the state, but no person who has not attained the age of eighteen shall be eli-
gible therefor, except in cases provided for in this constitution.
1
Jurors held not to be public ofcers. 48 C. 535. Applies only to ofcers of state government. 103 C. 168. Charter re-
quiring members of board of nance to be “resident electors” of city upheld. Id. Does not require that every ofceholder
be an elector. 114 C. 529. Does not apply to town ofcers. 136 C. 632. Judge of probate held not to be constitutional
ofcer within meaning of section. 157 C. 150. The ofce of Attorney General impliedly is exempt from the general
qualication requirements for state constitutional ofcers; “active practice at the bar” requirement in Sec. 3-124 is not
unconstitutional. 298 C. 748.
ARTICLE XVI.*
*Adopted November 26, 1980.
(Congressional and general assembly districts to be consistent with federal
standards.)
Section 1. Section 5 of article third of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
1
The establishment of congressional districts and of districts in the general assem-
bly shall be consistent with federal constitutional standards.
196 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XVI
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
1
Board permitted to cut town lines to achieve minimum population deviation, when. 164 C. 8. Cited. 187 C. 721.
Federal “one person one vote” principle (see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577, 84 S. Ct. 1362) cited; reconciliation
with Connecticut town integrity principle discussed; federal constitutional requirements for fair voting standards cited.
222 C. 166. Town integrity principle cited. Id. Cited. 232 C. 345.
(Reapportionment procedure. Reapportionment Committee. Reapportion-
ment Commission.)
Sec. 2. Article twelve of the amendments to the Constitution is amended to read as
follows:
1
a. The assembly and senatorial districts and congressional districts as now estab-
lished by law shall continue until the regular session of the general assembly next
after the completion of the taking of the next census of the United States. On or before
the fteenth day of February next following the year in which the decennial census
of the United States is taken, the general assembly shall appoint a reapportionment
committee consisting of four members of the senate, two who shall be designated
by the president pro tempore of the senate and two who shall be designated by the
minority leader of the senate, and four members of the house of representatives, two
who shall be designated by the speaker of the house of representatives and two who
shall be designated by the minority leader of the house of representatives, provided
there are members of no more than two political parties in either the senate or the
house of representatives. In the event that there are members of more than two polit-
ical parties in a house of the general assembly, all members of that house belonging
to the parties other than that of the president pro tempore of the senate or the speaker
of the house of representatives, as the case may be, shall select one of their number,
who shall designate two members of the committee in lieu of the designation by the
minority leader of that house. Such committee shall advise the general assembly on
matters of apportionment. Upon the ling of a report of such committee with the clerk
of the house of representatives and the clerk of the senate, the speaker of the house of
representatives and the president pro tempore of the senate shall, if the general assem-
bly is not in regular session, convene the general assembly in special session for the
sole purpose of adopting a plan of districting. Upon the request of the speaker of the
house of representatives and the president pro tempore of the senate, the secretary of
the state shall give notice of such special session by mailing a true copy of the call of
such special session, by registered or certied mail, return receipt requested, to each
member of the house of representatives and of the senate at his or her address as it
appears upon the records of said secretary not less than ten nor more than fteen days
prior to the date of convening of such special session or by causing a true copy of the
call to be delivered to each member by a sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, state police-
man or indifferent person at least twenty-four hours prior to the time of convening of
such special session. Such general assembly shall, upon roll call, by a yea vote of at
least two-thirds of the membership of each house, adopt such plan of districting as is
necessary to preserve a proper apportionment of representation in accordance with the
principles recited in this article. Thereafter the general assembly shall decennially at
its next regular session or special session called for the purpose of adopting a plan of
districting following the completion of the taking of the census of the United States,
upon roll call, by a yea vote of at least two-thirds of the membership of each house,
adopt such plan of districting as is necessary in accordance with the provisions of this
article.
b. If the general assembly fails to adopt a plan of districting by the rst day of the
August next following the year in which the decennial census of the United States is
Art. XVII AMENDMENTS TO THE 197
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
taken, the governor shall forthwith appoint a commission designated by the president
pro tempore of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives, the minor-
ity leader of the senate and the minority leader of the house of representatives, each
of whom shall designate two members of the commission, provided that there are
members of no more than two political parties in either the senate or the house of
representatives. In the event that there are members of more than two political parties
in a house of the general assembly, all members of that house belonging to the parties
other than that of the president pro tempore of the senate or the speaker of the house of
representatives, as the case may be, shall select one of their number, who shall desig-
nate two members of the commission in lieu of the designation by the minority leader
of that house. The eight members of the commission so designated shall within thirty
days select an elector of the state as a ninth member.
c. The commission shall proceed to consider the alteration of districts in accor-
dance with the principles recited in this article and it shall submit a plan of districting
to the secretary of the state by the thirtieth day of the October next succeeding the
appointment of its members. No plan shall be submitted to the secretary unless it is
certified by at least five members of the commission. Upon receiving such plan the
secretary shall publish the same forthwith, and, upon publication, such plan of district-
ing shall have the full force of law. If the commission shall fail to submit such a plan
by the thirtieth day of October, the secretary of the state shall forthwith so notify the
chief justice of the supreme court.
d. Original jurisdiction is vested in the supreme court to be exercised on the
petition of any registered voter whereby said court may compel the commission, by
mandamus or otherwise, to perform its duty or to correct any error made in its plan
of districting, or said court may take such other action to effectuate the purposes of
this article, including the establishing of a plan of districting if the commission fails
to file its plan of districting by the thirtieth day of October as said court may deem
appropriate. Any such petition shall be filed within thirty days of the date specified
for any duty or within thirty days after the filing of a plan of districting. The supreme
court shall render its decision not later than forty-five days following the filing of such
petition or shall file its plan with the secretary of the state not later than the fifteenth
day of January next following the time for submission of a plan of districting by the
commission. Upon receiving such plan the secretary shall publish the same forthwith,
and, upon publication, such plan of districting shall have the full force of law.
1
Amended by Article XXVI., and Article XXX., Sec. 2, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of
Connecticut.
ARTICLE XVII.*
*Adopted November 24, 1982.
(Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions. What cases bailable. Speedy trial.
Due process. Excessive bail or fines. Probable cause shown at hearing, when
necessary.)
Section 8 of article first of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
1
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself
and by counsel; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted by the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process to obtain witnesses
198 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XVIII
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
in his behalf; to be released on bail upon sufcient security, except in capital offenses,
where the proof is evident or the presumption great; and in all prosecutions by infor-
mation, to a speedy, public trial by an impartial jury. No person shall be compelled to
give evidence against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall excessive bail be required nor excessive nes imposed. No
person shall be held to answer for any crime, punishable by death or life imprison-
ment, unless upon probable cause shown at a hearing in accordance with procedures
prescribed by law, except in the armed forces, or in the militia when in actual service
in time of war or public danger.
1
Amended by Article XXIX., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
ARTICLE XVIII.*
*Adopted November 24, 1982.
Effect of division into departments. 78 C. 547. Legislature cannot exercise or confer judicial power. 36 C. 446; see 8
C. 547; 3 Dal. 395. But it can give more effect to evidence than it had at common law; 66 C. 163; shift the burden of
proof or order of taking testimony; 79 C. 351; enlarge methods of remedial justice; 78 C. 100; can repeal forfeiture re-
coverable in qui tam action, to affect pending cases; Id., 428; can pass law affecting procedure in pending action; 81 C.
217; or reasonably modifying statute of limitations in such case. 77 C. 528. But it cannot disturb a nal judgment of a
court; 83 C. 353; see 71 C. 43; and as to probate decree, see 3 Dal. 386; nor authorize change in application of charitable
trust. 85 C. 309. Nature of judicial and legislative functions. 73 C. 18; 78 C. 428. Functions overlap; administrative body
may perform judicial acts; committing witness for failure to testify. 65 C. 36. The courts cannot exercise legislative
functions; 33 C. 586; nor administrative functions; as in control of manner of construction of street railway; 69 C. 576;
78 C. 301; but they may review exercise of administrative powers to see if they are properly exercised; 80 C. 623; 84 C.
40; 85 C. 517; so question whether lands are “seriously damaged” may present judicial question; 84 C. 24; so power of
municipality to impose conditions on street railway. 74 C. 102; 80 C. 623. Legislature can leave it to courts to determine
towns beneted by highway change; 68 C. 153; so apportionment of expense of reconstructing bridge crossed by high-
way and street railway. 88 C. 471; 89 C. 537. Functions of courts on appeals in liquor license matters. 65 C. 146; 76 C.
686; 79 C. 4; 81 C. 454; 89 C. 310. Courts cannot review valuation of land by special commission to assist assessors. 73
C. 646. Question of common convenience and necessity is judicial. 71 C. 50. This article not violated by act of 1925
authorizing tax collectors to depute sheriff or other ofcer to serve tax warrant. 106 C. 231. Proceeding by petition to
judge for restoration of elector’s name to party list is judicial, not administrative. 124 C. 275–277. Statute delegating to
milk administrator power to set minimum prices held not to afford requisite standards of policy and procedure. 126 C.
623. Act requiring mayor’s approval of application for license to sell gasoline held not to set up sufcient guide for
mayor’s discretion. 128 C. 701–705. Plaintiffs cannot seek approval of zoning board and at same time attack the consti-
tutionality of its power to act as an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. 137 C. 36. Qualication for admission as
attorney a judicial matter and not under legislative control. One object of this article was to divest general assembly of
judicial power. 145 C. 222. Limits of power of legislature and judicial branch discussed. 147 C. 48. Objection based on
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power overcome. 152 C. 57–59. Nonjudicial powers or duties cannot be im-
posed on superior court judge. 157 C. 150. Provisions of general assembly for administration of and procedure in probate
court upheld. Distinction as to powers of regulation of constitutionally established courts and lower courts discussed. Id.
Special act permitting the incorporation of a charitable trust association is an infringement on the judicial branch’s power
to interpret a bequeath. 161 C. 312. Statute held to infringe upon judicial power. Analysis and history. 166 C. 501. Cited.
168 C. 212. Art. prohibits legislature from exercising those powers which are inherently within the sphere of the judi-
ciary. Test for determining unconstitutionality of statute which infringes upon judicial power. 171 C. 395. Connecticut’s
state colleges are not a separate, fourth department of state government. State board of higher education is within exec-
utive department. State’s interest in enforcing separation of powers is compelling state interest which justies dual-job
ban restrictions. 175 C. 586, 595, 596, 602, 609. Exercise of judicial power by a retired judge who has been designated
a state referee is not unconstitutional. 177 C. 173. Cited. 179 C. 552; 181 C. 292; 182 C. 253; 183 C. 17; Id., 313; 184
C. 569. The Sentence Review Act (Secs. 51-194 through 51-197) does not violate the separation of powers provisions
since those provisions do not preclude the legislature from authorizing the judicial department to vacate its own judg-
ments. 187 C. 109. Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (chapter 735a) does not violate the doctrine of separation of
powers in present circumstances. 190 C. 510. Cited. 191 C. 336; 192 C. 234; Id., 704; 193 C. 180. Constitutional sepa-
ration of powers cited. Id. Cited. Id., 670; 197 C. 554; 199 C. 618. Sec. 4-85(b) not in violation of separation of powers
doctrine. 200 C. 386. Cited. 203 C. 63; Id., 641; 206 C. 40. Separation of powers clause of state constitution cited. Id.
Cited. 209 C. 579; Id., 652; 211 C. 289; Id., 555; 212 C. 83. Separation of powers provisions cited. Id. Cited. Id., 368;
Id., 570; 213 C. 54; Id., 373; Id., 570. Principle of separation of powers cited. 214 C. 256. Unconstitutional usurpation
of legislative power cited. 215 C. 616. Cited. 217 C. 532. “... the existence of discretionary judicial authority over oral
argument does not automatically preclude some measure of legislative regulation.” Cited. Id., 671. Separation of powers
cited. Id. Constitutional provision applies to state, not municipalities. 220 C. 584. Separation of powers doctrine cited.
Id. Cited. 221 C. 331. Separation of powers principle cited. Id. Cited. 222 C. 166. Distribution and separation of powers
Art. XVIII AMENDMENTS TO THE 199
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 799. Separation of powers cited. Id. Exercise of judicial power conned to members of judiciary
cited. Id. Encroachment on judiciary power cited. Id. Cited. 224 C. 168. Separation of powers provisions cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 917. Separation of powers doctrine cited. Id.; 225 C. 355. Separation of powers cited. Id., 450. Cited. 226 C. 314;
227 C. 207. Separation of powers doctrine cited. Id., 566. Cited. Id., 641; 229 C. 1. Separation of powers cited. Id., 193.
Cited. 230 C. 183. Separation of powers cited. Id. Separation of powers principal cited. 232 C. 65. “... separation of
powers doctrine does not obliterate the obligation and authority of the judicial branch to investigate and discipline pros-
ecutors.” 234 C. 579. Separation and distribution of powers cited; mandates of separate magistry cited. Id. Principles of
separation of powers cited. 236 C. 1. Separation of powers cited. 238 C. 1. Cited. Id., 389; Id., 653; 242 C. 17. Separation
of powers doctrine cited. Id. Statute that grants prosecutor discretion to recommend transfer of juvenile from criminal
docket to juvenile docket does not violate principles of separation of powers by impermissibly infringing upon the judi-
cial function. 245 C. 93. Composition of Elections Enforcement Commission as provided by Secs. 9-7a(a) and 9-7b(a)
does not violate separation of powers doctrine. 255 C. 78. Sec. 1-210(b)(10) does not violate the separation of powers
clause because it preserves powers of the judicial branch and does not delegate to Freedom of Information Commission
the power to dene the attorney-client privilege. 260 C. 143. Public act which prohibits trial court from releasing on bail
any person who has been convicted of an offense “involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force
against another person” violates the separation of powers provision because it presents signicant interference with or-
derly functioning of Superior Court’s judicial role. 261 C. 492. No immunity to governor from subpoena to testify before
inquiry committee performing investigative, fact-nding advisory duties re impeachment since there is a compelling
government need for all relevant information from third parties and from the governor, and misconduct of governor not
exempt from accountability because not all executive power lies with governor and there is no categorical immunity
from a legislative subpoena. 271 C. 540. Sec. 51-198(c) does not constitute a legislative encroachment on judicial pow-
ers because it does not purport to remove power from the judicial branch and confer it upon another branch nor does it
interfere with the orderly performance of the Supreme Court’s essential functions by assigning it additional, nonjudicial
duties, but rather promotes that orderly performance by permitting the court to exercise its core function in the most ef-
cient manner. 293 C. 641. Debt negotiation statutes, Secs. 36a-671 to 36a-671e, as limited by Sec. 36a-671c(1), offend
the separation of powers provision of the Connecticut Constitution and are unenforceable with respect to Connecticut
attorneys engaged in the bona de practice of law. 318 C. 652. A legislature can exercise its right to limit judicial discre-
tion in sentencing by bestowing on prosecutors the right to make decisions that may curtail judicial discretion because it
is the legislative branch that has the power to dene a crime and set its punishment. 329 C. 770.
Cited. 3 CA 497. Separation of powers provision of the Connecticut Constitution cited. Id. Constitutional principle of
separation of powers cited and discussed. 4 CA 339. Due process cited. 6 CA 469. Cited. 7 CA 164. Grievance commit-
tee mechanism does not supplant or diminish inherent and plenary power of superior court to regulate and discipline its
ofcers; court has discretion to grant or deny motion to amend; potential separation of powers issue cited. 9 CA 464. Sep-
aration of powers doctrine cited. 14 CA 322. Cited. Id., 688. Separation of powers cited. 19 CA 495. Unlawful delegation
of legislative power cited. 22 CA 193. Cited. 23 CA 221. Separation of powers cited. Id. Cited. Id., 657. Constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers cited. 25 CA 421; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 299. Cited. 28 CA 145. Sec. 51-183b
not in violation of separation of powers; doctrine of separation of powers cited. 29 CA 157. Doctrine of separation of
powers cited. 39 CA 632. Cited. 46 CA 545. Violation of separation of powers cited. Id. Administrative suspension of
driver’s license by Department of Motor Vehicles and prosecution by the court of underlying offense of driving while in-
toxicated does not violate separation of powers provision. 51 CA 4. The recalculation of presentence connement credits
by Commissioner of Correction in wake of Harris v. Commissioner of Correction did not violate separation of powers
doctrine because commissioner, an agent of the executive branch, implemented policy in accordance with judiciary’s
interpretation of a statute promulgated by legislature and petitioner failed to demonstrate any improper commingling
of governmental powers. 104 CA 793. Separation of powers doctrine was not violated where court allowed petitioner
to accept plea deal after nding ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to advise him to accept plea deal, since such
action did not impermissibly transfer control of plea bargaining process from executive to judicial branch. 120 CA 560.
Trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of prosecution for creating a public disturbance in violation of Sec. 53a-181a, midway
through defendant’s direct examination and predicated on trial judge’s view that the state’s time is more precious than
a $75 infraction, infringed on a core legislative function in violation of the separation of powers mandate of state con-
stitution; it is the responsibility of the state’s attorneys, not the judiciary, to determine when, who, why and whether to
prosecute for violations of law. 134 CA 346.
Cited. 11 CS 489. Demurrer to special defense of state questioning constitutionality of special act allowing plaintiff
to sue state for negligence overruled. 20 CS 496. Cited. 38 CS 426; 40 CS 394; 41 CS 90; 42 CS 57; Id., 129. Separation
of powers cited. Id., 526; 44 CS 297. Constitutional separation of legislative, executive and judicial functions and powers
cited. 45 CS 11. Administrative adjudication under Sec. 20-342(h) by defendant Department of Consumer Protection
concluding that plaintiff swimming pool contractor violated Home Improvement Act by failure to return homeowner’s
deposit after his cancellation of contract and defendant’s subsequent ordering of restitution under that statute to home-
owner found not to be an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers provision of the state constitution. 48
CS 248.
Presumed legislature intended to exclude from operation of “right to know” statutes the exclusive power over ad-
mission to the bar vested in superior court. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 313, 321. No judicial power is conferred by constitution
on general assembly, either directly or as incident of legislative power, and general assembly cannot confer it. Id., 318.
(Distribution of powers. Delegation of regulatory authority. Disapproval of
administrative regulations.)
Article second of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
200 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each
of them conded to a separate magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative, to one;
those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another. The
legislative department may delegate regulatory authority to the executive department;
except that any administrative regulation of any agency of the executive department
may be disapproved by the general assembly or a committee thereof in such manner
as shall by law be prescribed.
ARTICLE XIX.*
*Adopted November 24, 1982.
A tillerman in a city re department at a xed yearly salary, payable monthly, and holding ofce during good
behavior, is within this provision. 50 C. 546. One holding under a reappointment is not affected. 54 C. 174. A city
council serving without compensation voted to pay to a committee of the council for the ordinary services of such
a committee; held void. Id., 443. Purpose of this article; does not apply to judges. 78 C. 550. Nor prevent city from
passing general ordinance increasing salaries of policemen; 81 C. 664; nor prevent a town school committee from
increasing salaries of school teachers all of whom were already under contract; 95 C. 204; nor prevent general assembly
from authorizing municipal corporations to increase compensation in contracts for performing public works where war
had raised costs upon which estimates were made. 106 C. 658. Act permitting furnishers of material or labor to recover
from town in amount not exceeding total it agreed to pay principal contractor held not to violate this provision. 109 C.
547. Cited. 116 C. 12; 157 C. 179; 201 C. 377.
Cited. 40 CS 539.
(Extra compensation to elected officials and public contractors prohibited;
exception.)
Section 2 of article eleventh of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
Except as provided in this section, neither the state nor any political subdivision of
the state shall pay or grant to any elected ofcial of the state or any political subdi-
vision of the state, any compensation greater than the amount of compensation set at
the beginning of such ofcial’s term of ofce for the ofce which such ofcial holds
or increase the pay or compensation of any public contractor above the amount spec-
ied in the contract. The provisions of this section shall not apply to elected ofcials
in towns in which the legislative body is the town meeting. The compensation of an
elected ofcial of a political subdivision of the state whose term of ofce is four years
or more may be increased once after such ofcial has completed two years of his term
by the legislative body of such political subdivision. The term “compensation” means,
with respect to an elected ofcial, such ofcial’s salary, exclusive of reimbursement
for necessary expenses or any other benet to which his ofce would entitle him.
ARTICLE XX.*
*Adopted November 24, 1982.
Cited. 195 C. 303; 210 C. 401.
(Courts, powers and jurisdiction.)
Section 1. Section 1 of article fth of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
1
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, an appellate
court, a superior court, and such lower courts as the general assembly shall, from
Art. XX AMENDMENTS TO THE 201
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
time to time, ordain and establish. The powers and jurisdiction of these courts shall
be dened by law.
1
All courts in this state are of limited jurisdiction; facts showing jurisdiction must be alleged. 5 C. 439. The supreme
court of errors was constituted as a court for the correction of errors of law only. 34 C. 174. Upon appeal to a judge of
the superior court, allowed by a city charter, the judge is a special tribunal for a particular purpose, and not a court within
the meaning of the constitution. 35 C. 73, 222. State courts retain jurisdiction except where the federal constitution or
Congress has granted exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts, or the exercise of the jurisdiction is incompatible with
such exercise by those courts. Id., 381. No judicial power is vested by the constitution in the general assembly; it cannot
delegate to common council power to appoint city court judge; judicial power is vested in the courts by the constitution.
36 C. 446; see 3 Dal. 395. The legislature may in some cases exercise powers judicial in their nature. Where the time
allowed for appeal from probate had elapsed, an act extending such time was held constitutional. 45 C. 313–316; over-
ruled, 69 C. 576. Former words “inferior courts” mean those whose judgments are reviewable, rather than those whose
proceedings are invalid unless jurisdiction appears upon the face of the record. 49 C. 596; 50 C. 325; see also 102 C. 29.
County commissioners when trying causes for the revocation of licenses are not an inferior court in the constitutional
sense. 49 C. 596; 50 C. 325. An act conferring upon a board of health power to examine into and remove nuisances
dangerous to health is not invalid as conferring judicial powers upon a tribunal not warranted by the constitution. 51 C.
80. A judge of the supreme court hearing an application for the appointment of a receiver is a special tribunal and not a
court within the meaning of the constitution. 63 C. 580. The supreme court is one for the correction of errors of law, and
not for the trial or retrial of questions of fact. 64 C. 432; 104 C. 418. The general assembly cannot authorize the courts,
or the judges thereof acting judicially, to exercise powers essentially legislative; the power of regulating the location,
construction, and operation of street railways is legislative. 69 C. 576. Courts can refuse duties imposed on them by U.S.
government, 82 C. 367; but see 223 U.S. 1. Power to authorize change in charitable trust. 85 C. 309. Extent of judicial
power in respect to administrative functions. Id., 517. That parties may refuse to proceed with condemnation after
appraisal is made does not make proceedings nonjudicial. Id., 663. Courts cannot act in nonjudicial matters; but may
appraise damages in condemnation proceedings though parties can refuse to carry out proceeding. Id. Limits of power
of legislature to “dene” jurisdiction. 64 C. 452. What are “inferior courts”; does not include a justice of the peace. 102
C. 29, 31. Test of inferior court is whether it exercises limited jurisdiction, as distinguished from general jurisdiction
of superior court; court of common pleas as established in 1941 is an inferior court. 130 C. 122, 133, 134. Intent of
constitution that superior court continue with essential characteristics it possessed when constitution was adopted. Id.,
127. Power of general assembly to create inferior courts discussed. Id., 133–144. Cited. 142 C. 72. Supreme court of
errors and superior court are constitutional courts; their members hold judicial power of state. 145 C. 222. Superior
court is constitutional court of unlimited jurisdiction. 154 C. 272, 278. This section divides courts into (1) supreme court
and superior court, called “constitutional courts” and (2) all other courts called “lower courts” which are established
by legislature. General assembly has power to make rules for administration of “lower courts.” 157 C. 150. The circuit
court is one of the lower courts which the general assembly may create and dene the powers and jurisdiction thereof.
159 C. 150. General assembly may not infringe upon judicial power; separation of powers discussed; history. 166 C.
501. Interpretation of phrase “by law” in Art. V, Sec. 1. 171 C. 395. Cited. 172 C. 88. Exercise of judicial power by a
retired judge who has been designated a state referee does not violate this section. 177 C. 173. Cited. 179 C. 552; 185
C. 495. The Sentence Review Act (Secs. 51-194 through 51-197) does not materially detract from the superior court’s
jurisdiction over serious criminal offenses or from its power to impose punishment, nor does it impair the essential nature
of the Supreme Court as a court of last resort for the correction of errors. 187 C. 109. Cited. Id., 292. Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act (chapter 735a) does not violate doctrine of separation of powers in present circumstances. 190 C.
510. Cited. 191 C. 336; 192 C. 234; Id., 704. “There is fundamentally greater legislative authority over legislative courts
created pursuant to this provision ...” than over constitutional courts. 193 C. 180. Cited. 195 C. 303; Id., 534; 199 C. 417;
Id., 618; 203 C. 63; Id., 641; 209 C. 579; 212 C. 83. Separation of powers provisions cited. Id. Cited. 213 C. 54; Id., 373.
Cited; impermissible delegation of judicial power cited; usurp a constitutionally mandated judicial function cited. 215
C. 162. Cited. 216 C. 127; Id., 135; 222 C. 299; Id., 480; 224 C. 168. Separation of powers provisions cited. Id. Cited.
230 C. 427; 238 C. 389. Petitioner failed to establish that there exists a fundamental right to an in person termination of
parental rights trial. 343 C. 642.
Cited. 4 CA 339; 14 CA 688; 17 CA 627; 19 CA 340; 20 CA 470; 23 CA 221; 25 CA 262; 29 CA 157; 45 CA 324.
Fixing the qualications for, as well as admitting persons to, the practice of law in this state has ever been an exercise of
judicial power. 126 CA 692. Because there is no precedent in Connecticut to authorize the civil writ of audita querela in
the criminal context, defendant’s request to do so is declined. 130 CA 652.
Cited. 24 CS 185. General assembly retains police powers to make laws for comfort and welfare of society, not-
withstanding vesting of judicial power in courts. 28 CS 52. The circuit court and superior court are part of one judicial
system, hence conviction in circuit court bars prosecution for a higher degree of crime on same facts in superior court
under doctrine of double jeopardy. 31 CS 289. Cited. 39 CS 347. Administrative adjudication under Sec. 20-342(h)
by defendant Department of Consumer Protection concluding that plaintiff swimming pool contractor violated Home
Improvement Act by failure to return homeowner’s deposit after his cancellation of contract and defendant’s subsequent
ordering of restitution under that statute to homeowner found not to be an unconstitutional violation of the judicial pow-
ers provision of the state constitution. 48 CS 248.
No judicial power is vested by constitution in general assembly, either directly or as an incident of legislative power,
and general assembly cannot confer it. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 313, 318. Presumed legislature intended to exclude from opera-
tion of “right to know” statutes the exclusive power over admission to bar vested in superior court. Id., 321.
(Supreme, appellate and superior court judges, appointment, terms, removal.)
Sec. 2. Section 2 of article fth of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
202 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXI
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
1
The judges of the supreme court, of the appellate court and of the superior court
shall, upon nomination by the governor, be appointed by the general assembly in such
manner as shall by law be prescribed. They shall hold their ofces for the term of
eight years, but may be removed by impeachment. The governor shall also remove
them on the address of two-thirds of each house of the general assembly.
1
Amended by Article XXV., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
ARTICLE XXI.*
*Adopted November 28, 1984.
Special zoning regulations to alleviate replacement of businesses displaced by redevelopment are giving assistance to
a permissible classication of persons and not unequal treatment. 156 C. 287. Continued connement in a state hospital
of a dementia praecox patient who mutilated himself under the inuence of religious delusions is not a violation of his
constitutional rights hereunder. 157 C. 56. Proceedings against plaintiff for violation of zoning regulation while other
violators on his street were not proceeded against is not a denial of equal protection where no discrimination but laxity in
enforcement was the cause. Id., 548. Cited. 168 C. 26. Nonexemption of some plaintiffs from operation of no-fault insur-
ance law is not denial of equal protection. 169 C. 267, 294. Cited. 170 C. 258. Jury fee serves legitimate state interest in
paternity action and satises equal protection clause of Art. I, Sec. 20. Id., 367. Cited. 171 C. 321. Classication of mari-
juana, for penalty purposes, with substances generally considered more harmful is not so irrational and unreasonable as
to violate equal protection clauses of U.S. and Connecticut Constitutions. Id., 600. Art. I, Sec. 20 of Connecticut Consti-
tution is the state counterpart of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 172 C.
496. Cited. Id. (Diss. Op.). Present system of school nancing, relying principally on local taxes, violates this section;
meaning and application of section and relationship to federal equal protection clause. Id., 615. Current system is not
appropriate to discharge state’s constitutional duty to educate its students and therefore violates constitution. Id. Equal
protection clause is not addressed to the minimal sufciency but rather to the unjustiable inequalities of state action. Id.
Cited. 173 C. 220; Id., 473; Id., 506. Those provisions in Secs. 12-408(1) and 12-411(1) which impose sales or use taxes
respectively, upon rental payments by Connecticut lessee for personalty purchased or brought into state after July 1, 1975,
do not deny lessees equal protection of law. 174 C. 51. Cited. 176 C. 11; Id., 638; 177 C. 304; 178 C. 180; 179 C. 62; Id.,
552; Id., 627; 184 C. 75; 185 C. 124; Id., 211. Equal protection cited. 186 C. 725, 733, 735. Since the purpose of Sec.
7-308, which is to prevent double liability on the part of a municipality for the negligence of municipal remen, bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not violate principles of equal protection. 187 C. 53.
Equal protection cited. Id., 144; Id., 187; Id., 451. Cited. 188 C. 98; Id., 385; Id., 557; Id., 626; Id., 653; 189 C. 550; Id.,
727; 192 C. 48. Secs. 17-317 and 53a-47(h) held invalid as violation of equal protection provisions of federal and state
constitutions. Id., 520. Secs. 17-317 and 53a-47(h) held unconstitutional. Id., 532. Cited. Id., 539; 193 C. 59; Id., 70.
Imposition of academic sanctions for nonattendance discussed. Id., 93. Cited. 193 C. 144. Equal protection cited. Id. Held
unconstitutional portion of special act limiting liability for damages in New Britain where same treatment not applicable
to other municipalities. Id., 589. Right to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 670. Legislative provisions for nancing
education violates provisions of Connecticut Constitution (Horton v. Meskill, 172 C. 615) cited. Id. Cited. 194 C. 52.
Right to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 129. Equal protection clauses cited. Id. Cited. Id., 165. Equal protection
claim cited. Id. Cited. Id., 416. Equal protection cited. Id. Claims of appellate delay arise under this constitutional guar-
anty. Id., 510. Cited. Id., 601. Equal protection rights cited. Id. Cited. 195 C. 24. Equal protection cited. Id. Tax on net
income of unincorporated businesses and an added fourth base of taxation to the corporate business tax held to be consti-
tutional. Id., 284. Equal protection clause of Connecticut Constitution cited. Id. Equal protection cited. Id., 543. State
constitutional grounds cited. Id., 682. Cited. 196 C. 309. Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 440. Constitutional right to
equal protection cited. Id. Equal protection clause of Connecticut Constitution cited. Id. Cited. Id., 572. Equal protection
rights under state constitution cited. Id., 623. Equal protection cited. Id., 655. Cited. 197 C. 87. Equal protection cited. Id.,
629. Cited. 198 C. 671. Equal protection clause of state constitution cited. Id. Constitutional rights to equal protection
cited. 199 C. 179. Cited. 200 C. 151. Constitutional entitlement to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 268. Equal pro-
tection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 350. Right to equal protection under state constitution cited. Id. Cited. Id., 376. Constitutional
right to equal protection cited. Id. Sec. 52-577a is constitutional under this article. Id., 562. Cited. 201 C. 577. Equal
protection cited. 203 C. 14. Cited. Id., 63. Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 156; Id., 246. Equal protection cited. Id.
Equal protection clause cited. Id., 267. Cited. Id., 624. Rights to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 641. Constitutional
rights to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. 204 C. 17; Id., 287. Equal protection cited. Id. State equal rights amendment
cited. Id., 639. Cited. Id., 746. Equal protection cited. Id.; Id., 760. Cited. 205 C. 27. Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
219. Equal protection cited. Id. Right to equal protection cited. Id., 723. Cited. 206 C. 31. Right to equal protection cited.
Id., 229; Id., 685. Cited. 207 C. 59. Constitutional rights to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 276. Equal protection
clause of the Connecticut Constitution cited. Id. Cited. Id., 412. Equal protection claim cited. Id. Cited. Id., 496. Equal
protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 518. Equal protection clauses cited. Id.; Id., 565. Cited. Id., 599. Equal protection cited. Id.
Equal protection clauses cited. 208 C. 505. Equal protection cited. Id., 576; Id., 816. Cited. 209 C. 23. Equal protection
cited. Id.; Id., 59; Id., 636. Equal protection guarantees cited. 210 C. 110. Cited. Id., 462. Equal protection cited. Id. Equal
protection rights cited. Id., 519. Cited. 211 C. 166. Equal protection clauses cited. Id. Equal protection rights cited. Id.,
258. Equal protection guarantees cited. Id., 289. Equal protection cited. Id., 555. Cited. Id., 591. Right to equal protection
Art. XXI AMENDMENTS TO THE 203
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
not violated; appellate court judgment in 15 CA 74 reversed. Id. Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. 212 C. 83. Fee require-
ment not violation of constitutional rights. Id. Equal protection cited. Id. Right to equal protection cited. Id., 195. Equal
protection cited. 213 C. 19. Right to equal protection cited. Id., 112. Equal protection cited. Id., 136. Cited. Id., 373. Equal
protection claim cited. Id. Equal protection of the law cited. 214 C. 256. Right to equal protection cited. Id., 321. Cited;
guarantees of equal protection cited. 215 C. 292. Equal protection cited. Id., 469. Rights to equal protection of the laws
cited. Id., 675. Cited. 216 C. 85. Equal protection of the laws cited. Id. Cited. 217 C. 164. Equal protection of laws cited.
Id. Rights to equal protection cited. Id., 490. Cited. Id., 568. Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. 218 C. 531. Constitutional
rights of privacy cited. Id. Cited. 219 C. 703; 220 C. 61. Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 721. Equal protection of the
law cited; constitutional rights cited. 221 C. 166. Equal protection cited. Id., 903. Equal protection clause cited. 222 C. 1;
Id., 672. Violation of equal protection clause cited. 223 C. 492. Equal protection cited. Id., 903; 224 C. 168. Denial of
equal protection cited. Id., 711. Equal protection cited. 225 C. 355. Commissioner of motor vehicle’s exercise of authority
under Sec. 14-111 violates this constitutional provision; judgment of appellate court in 27 CA 495 reversed. Id., 499.
Right to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 528. Equal protection rights cited. Id. Abandonment of “deliberate bypass
rule” and adoption of “cause and prejudice standard” discussed. 227 C. 124. Equal protection rights cited; jury array vio-
lation of constitutional rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 147. Equal protection rights and federal and state constitutional rights
cited; unconstitutional jury composition cited. Id. Guarantees of equal protection cited. Id., 175. Equal protection clause
cited. Id., 261. Equal protection rights cited. Id., 301. Equal protection clause cited. Id., 363. Right to equal protection
cited. Id., 545. Equal protection provisions cited. 228 C. 393. Equal protection clauses of state constitution cited. Id., 699.
Cited. 229 C. 1. Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 10. Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 228. Rights to due process
and a fair trial cited; state constitutional claim cited. Id. Cited. Id., 312. Rights to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 557.
Equal protection rights cited. Id. Equal protection of the law cited. Id., 801. Right to equal protection and a fair trial cited.
230 C. 88. Equal protection cited. Id., 183. Equal protection right cited. Id., 385, see also 37 CA 801. Right to equal pro-
tection cited. Id., 400. Cited. Id., 914. Equal protection rights cited. 231 C. 235. Cited. Id., 514. Equal protection cited. Id.;
232 C. 91. Cited. Id., 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502. Right to equal protection
cited. Id.; 233 C. 44. Cited. Id., 106; Id., 251; Id., 557. Equal protection cited. 234 C. 51; Id., 194. Cited. Id., 217. Ban on
assault weapons, Secs. 53-202a–53-202k, does not violate principles of equal protection. Id., 455. Right to equal protec-
tion cited. Id. Cited. Id., 735; 235 C. 502. Rights to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 865. Sec. 38a-336 is constitutional
within equal protection provisions. 236 C. 299. Equal protection cited. Id. Equal protection claims cited. Id., 318. Cited.
Id., 421. Equal protection clause cited. Id. Plaintiffs have proved a violation under state constitution of their fundamental
right to a substantially equal educational opportunity that is free from substantial racial and ethnic isolation. 238 C. 1.
Equal opportunity to a free public education cited; fundamental right to education cited; right to protection from segrega-
tion cited. Id. Cited. Id., 389. Equal protection of the law cited. 239 C. 168. Equal protection provisions cited; constitu-
tionality and unconstitutionality of statute and fair trial cited. Id., 427. Cited. Id., 708. Equal protection cited. Id. Equal
protection clause cited. 240 C. 489. Cited. 242 C. 17. Equal protection cited. Id. Equal protection guarantees cited. Id.,
125. Statute that grants prosecutor discretion to recommend transfer of some juveniles from criminal docket to juvenile
docket does not violate right to equal protection of the law. 245 C. 93. State required to offer a nondiscriminatory reason
to the court for exercising a peremptory challenge when defendant claims the challenge is based on a prospective juror’s
ancestry or ethnic origin. 256 C. 1. 1997 amendment to Sec. 22a-208a prohibiting establishment or construction of new
plant or station within 1/4 mile of day care center operating as of July 8, 1997, in municipality with population greater
than 100,000 persons violates right to equal protection guaranteed by Connecticut Constitution, Art. I, Secs. 1 and 20, by
creating classications unrelated to legitimate state interest. 257 C. 429. In light of the equal protection clause design as
a safeguard against acts of the state and not as a limitation on private conduct of individuals or persons, court cannot
construe constitutional guarantee as a statement of public policy sufcient to override the explicit, contrary expression of
legislative intent embodied in the statutory exemption afforded employers with fewer than three employees under the Fair
Employment Practices Act. 260 C. 691. Plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection not violated by development corporation’s
decision to condemn their homes but not the social club located on same parcel of land since there was a rational basis for
condemnation decision and plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proving that development corporation acted arbitrarily
or irrationally in making its decision. 268 C. 1. Because insanity acquittee’s federal equal protection claim in commitment
extension proceeding satises rational basis review, it is axiomatic that same conclusion satises state equal protection
analysis. Id., 508. Failure of legislature to impose smoking ban on casinos and private clubs under Sec. 19a-342 does not
violate equal protection rights of owners of restaurants and cafes subject to the ban and uncertainties of enforcement
provides rational basis for exemption. 281 C. 277. Sexual orientation constitutes a quasi-suspect classication to which
intermediate scrutiny applies and statutory scheme that prohibits same sex marriage impermissibly discriminates against
gay persons on account of their sexual orientation in violation of equal protection. 289 C. 135. Because the prohibition in
Sec. 7-308 on a cause of action by a municipal reghter against a fellow employee is rationally related to legitimate
governmental interest of reducing municipal liability and fostering provision of effective reghting services, it does not
violate equal protection clause. 300 C. 395. It is not a violation for the sole aggravating factor found by the jury re a
capital felony, namely, murder committed for pecuniary gain under Sec. 53a-46a(i)(6), to duplicate an element of the
underlying crime of capital felony by murder for hire under Sec. 53a-54b(2). 305 C. 101; death penalty unconstitutional
on other grounds, see 318 C. 1. Plaintiffs failed to establish that the educational system in this state violates the equal
protection provisions of the state constitution by failing to ensure that the poorer school districts had funding that is sub-
stantially equal to the wealthier school districts. 327 C. 650.
Provisions of Sec. 5-177 are constitutional under this article. 1 CA 454. Cited. 2 CA 43. Constitutional claims concern-
ing equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 363. Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. 3 CA 148. Equal protection cited. Id. State
equal protection cited. Id., 432. Equal protection rights cited. 4 CA 307. Cited. Id., 451. Equal protection cited. 5 CA 369.
Constitutional right of equal protection cited. 6 CA 546. Cited. 7 CA 164. Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 180. Right
to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 457. Right to equal protection cited. Id. Equal protection cited. 8 CA 50; Id., 407.
Cited. 9 CA 598. Equal protection clause cited. Id. Cited. 12 CA 190; Id., 268; Id., 427; Id., 455. Equal rights amendment
cited. Id. Right to equal protection cited. 13 CA 91. Cited. Id., 300. Equal protection cited. 14 CA 487. Denial of pretrial
204 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXI
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
detention credit violates equal protection. 15 CA 74; judgment reversed, see 211 C. 591. Equal protection cited. Id.; judg-
ment reversed, see 211 C. 591. Right to equal protection cited. Id., 161. Equal protection cited. Id., 342. Cited. 16 CA 379.
Equal protection cited. 18 CA 393; 19 CA 20; 20 CA 51; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 450. Cited. Id., 241. Equal pro-
tection cited. Id., 599. Cited. 21 CA 40. Deprivation of constitutional right and constitutional issues and challenges cited.
Id. Constitutional rights to equal protection cited. Id., 688. Equal protection rights cited. 22 CA 402. Constitutional right
to equal protection of the law cited. 23 CA 592. Equal protection of the law violations cited. 24 CA 541. Right to equal
protection cited. Id., 612. Cited. 25 CA 433. Right to equal protection cited. Id. Rights to equal protection cited. Id., 586;
judgment reversed, see 223 C. 492. Cited. 26 CA 10. Rights to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 466. Equal protection
rights cited. Id., 553. Because the medical reporting requirements are necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and
are narrowly tailored to accomplish goal they do not violate the constitutional provisions. 27 CA 495; judgment reversed,
see 225 C. 499. Equal protection clause of state constitution cited. Id. Public policy of refusing to countenance knowing
misappropriation of state moneys outweighed policy of minimizing discrimination against mentally ill. Id., 635. Cited.
Id., 675. Right to equal protection cited. Id.; 28 CA 1. Cited. 30 CA 428; Id., 463. State constitution equal protection and
nondiscrimination cited. Id. Cited. Id., 594. Equal protection cited. Id. Deprivation of state constitutional rights to equal
protection cited; arbitrary determination of child’s best interest cited. 31 CA 400; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 459.
Equal protection cited. Id., 621; Id., 771. Cited. 32 CA 187. Rights to equal protection cited. Id., 280; Id., 340. Denial
of equal protection cited. Id., 515. Guarantee of equal protection cited. Id., 553. Equal protection clauses cited. Id., 656.
Constitutional protection is to persons with chronic physical and mental disabilities. 33 CA 242. Equal protection cited.
Id. Cited. Id., 339; judgment reversed on issues of sufciency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502. Equal
protection cited. Id. Equal protection of the law cited. Id., 727. Cited. 34 CA 395; Id., 521. Equal protection cited. Id.,
557; 35 CA 599. Cited. 36 CA 584. Rights to equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 623. Right to equal protection cited.
37 CA 360; Id., 672; Id., 801. Cited. Id., 856. Right to equal protection cited. Id. Rights to equal protection cited. 38 CA
434; Id., 598; Id., 685. Cited. Id., 731. Right to equal protection cited. 39 CA 183. Equal protection clauses cited. Id., 216.
Cited. Id., 253. Right to equal protection cited. Id., 364. Cited. Id., 384. Denial of equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 742.
Equal protection cited. Id. Right to equal protection cited. 41 CA 139. Cited. Id., 341. Equal protection cited. Id.; Id., 866.
Right to equal protection cited. 42 CA 803. Equal protection clauses cited. 43 CA 265. Cited. 44 CA 457. Equal protection
cited. Id.; Id., 611. Rights of equal protection cited. 45 CA 66. Cited. Id., 110. Rights of equal protection cited. Id., 116.
Equal protection cited. Id., 712. Equal protection rights cited. 46 CA 616. Right to equal protection cited. Id., 640; Id.,
810. Inmates given administrative segregation classications are not considered part of a suspect class; this distinction is
predicated on a rational basis, and the award of statutory good time does not intrude upon a fundamental right. 50 CA 421.
Failure to refer case to three-judge panel when actuarial data indicated life expectancy was less than sentence not violative
of equal protection. Id., 521. Suspending a person’s driver’s license under driver license compact based on out-of-state
conviction for rst arrest, rather than allowing participation in alcohol education program, did not violate equal protec-
tion. 52 CA 326. Appellate court rejected defendant’s claim that trial court violated his rights under Art. I, Secs. 8, 19 and
20 of the Connecticut Constitution when it improperly allowed state to exercise a peremptory challenge against a pro-
spective juror, who was a member of defendant’s racial group, without a racially neutral explanation reasonably related to
the issues in the case. Appellate court found that evidence supported the prosecutor’s reasons for striking the prospective
juror and defendant failed to establish that the state gave a pretextual reason for excusing the prospective juror. 62 CA
182. Section is declaratory of state’s fundamental public policy against sex discrimination. 64 CA 573. Court’s application
of the presentence connement credit pursuant to Sec. 18-98d(a) did not violate petitioner’s right to equal protection. 80
CA 580. Petitioner could not prevail on his claim that his sentence violated this section because he was required to allege
purposeful discrimination in order to assert an equal protection violation. 123 CA 197.
The Connecticut system of education under the authority of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez,
411 U.S. 1, violates this article. 31 CS 377. (Afrmed. 172 C. 615.) Connecticut system of education violative of equal
protection. Id., 377. Education system not justied on grounds that it serves the legitimate objective of local control.
Id. The classication of marijuana with the dangerous psychoactive drugs, amphetamines and barbiturates, under Sec.
19-480(b) for penalty purposes is irrational and thus violative of the equal protection clauses of the federal and state
constitutions. 32 CS 324. Exclusion of aliens from grand jury service under Sec. 54-45 did not violate defendant’s rights
since citizenship requirement bears rational relation to demands of jury service. 35 CS 98. Cited. Id., 130. Right to
equal protection not violated by order to pay entire amount of support previously advanced by welfare department for
illegitimate child. Id., 628. Failure of state to pay expense of blood grouping tests for indigent defendant in paternity
action is not a denial of equal protection. Id., 679. Cited. 37 CS 515; Id., 723; Id., 745. Equal protection cited. 38 CS
331. Cited. Id., 407; Id., 426; 39 CS 142; 40 CS 6. State’s equal rights amendment cited. Id. Equal protection cited. Id.,
361. Cited. Id., 365; 381. State regulation on Medicaid abortion funding is unconstitutional; equal rights amendment
cited. Id., 394. Cited. 41 CS 48. Violation of constitutional rights cited. Id. Right to equal protection cited. Id. Substantial
differences in compensation and benets cited. Id., 141. Equal protection cited. Id., 229. Cited. 42 CS 172; Id., 256;
Id., 526. Equal protection cited. Id. Cited. Id., 574. Equal protection cited. 43 CS 91. Equal protection clause cited. Id.,
278; Id., 297. Cited. Id., 386; Id., 470. Equal rights amendment, prohibiting discrimination because of sex, included in
Connecticut Constitution Amdt. V, cited. 45 CS 84. New Haven City Charter art. V, sec. 10(a) provision that mayor of
city “shall have been a legal voter in and resident of the city for at least ve years immediately preceding said mayor’s
election” violates equal protection. 48 CS 521. Textual emphasis of Connecticut constitutional guarantee is on person
discriminated against rather than, as in U.S. Constitution, on entity forbidden from discriminating. Because Connecticut
provision expressly refers to exercise of “political rights”, equal protection guarantee can be construed with reference to
several other distinctive guarantees of political rights contained in Connecticut Constitution. Id. Civil union legislation
does not deny plaintiffs, eight same sex couples, equal protection, due process, and right of free expression and associ-
ation because civil union and marriage in Connecticut now share same benets, protections and responsibilities under
law; Connecticut Constitution requires that there be equal protection and due process of law, not that there be equivalent
nomenclature for such protection and process. 49 CS 644. Petitioner, a white inmate who alleged that he was denied
parole release because of racial discrimination arising from quota system employed by Board of Pardons and Paroles that
Art. XXII AMENDMENTS TO THE 205
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
unfairly advantages black and Hispanic inmates over white inmates, was not denied equal protection because petitioner
failed to prove that board deviated from race neutral statutory criteria and discriminated against him on account of his
race and that board was motivated by discriminatory purpose. 50 CS 149.
Defendant given minimum ne for driving while intoxicated after evidence of indigence; held not denial of equal
protection of law. Where penalty imposed is within limits xed by statute, it will not be disturbed on appeal unless there
is an abuse of discretion. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 228.
(Equal protection. No segregation or discrimination.)
Article fth of the amendments to the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to seg-
regation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political
rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or
mental disability.
ARTICLE XXII.*
*Adopted November 28, 1984.
Absence of governor from state divests governor of power to act even where the other state ofcials who could have
exercised the governor’s powers in her absence were also absent from state. 183 C. 7. Cited. 236 C. 1.
(Permanent or temporary transfer of governor’s authority, powers and duties
to lieutenant-governor. Council on gubernatorial incapacity.)
Section 18 of article fourth of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
a. In case of the death, resignation, refusal to serve or removal from ofce of the
governor, the lieutenant-governor shall, upon taking the oath of ofce of governor, be
governor of the state until another is chosen at the next regular election for governor
and is duly qualied.
b. In case of the impeachment of the governor or of his absence from the state,
the lieutenant-governor shall exercise the powers and authority and perform the duties
appertaining to the ofce of governor until, if the governor has been impeached, he is
acquitted or, if absent, he has returned.
c. Whenever the governor transmits to the lieutenant-governor his written dec-
laration that he is unable to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his ofce,
and until the governor transmits to the lieutenant-governor a written declaration to the
contrary, the lieutenant-governor shall exercise the powers and authority and perform
the duties appertaining to the ofce of governor as acting governor.
d. In the absence of a written declaration of incapacity by the governor, whenever the
lieutenant-governor or a majority of the members of the council on gubernatorial incapac-
ity transmits to the council on gubernatorial incapacity a written declaration that the gov-
ernor is unable to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his ofce, the council shall
convene within forty-eight hours after the receipt of such written declaration to determine
if the governor is unable to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his ofce. If the
council, within fourteen days after it is required to convene, determines by two-thirds vote
that the governor is unable to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his ofce, it
shall transmit a written declaration to that effect to the president pro tempore of the senate
and the speaker of the house of representatives and to the lieutenant-governor and the lieu-
tenant-governor, upon receipt of such declaration, shall exercise the powers and authority
206 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXII
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
and discharge the duties appertaining to the ofce of the governor as acting governor;
otherwise, the governor shall continue to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of
his ofce. Upon receipt by the president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the
house of representatives of such a written declaration from the council, the general assem-
bly shall, in accordance with its rules, decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight
hours for that purpose if not in session. If the general assembly, within twenty-one days
after receipt of the written declaration or, if the general assembly is not in session, within
twenty-one days after the general assembly is required to assemble, determines by two-
thirds vote of each house that the governor is unable to exercise the powers and discharge
the duties of his ofce, the lieutenant-governor shall continue to exercise the powers and
authority and perform the duties appertaining to the ofce of governor; otherwise, the
governor shall resume the powers and duties of his ofce.
e. In the absence of a written declaration of incapacity by the governor and in an
emergency, when the governor is unable to exercise the powers and perform the duties
of his ofce and the business of the state requires the immediate exercise of those powers
and performance of those duties, the lieutenant-governor shall transmit to the council on
gubernatorial incapacity a written declaration to that effect and thereupon shall exercise
the powers and authority and discharge the duties appertaining to the ofce of gover-
nor as acting governor. The council shall convene or the members of the council shall
otherwise communicate with each other collectively within twenty-four hours after the
receipt of such written declaration to determine if the governor is unable to exercise the
powers and perform the duties of his ofce. If the council, within fourteen days after
it is required to convene, determines by two-thirds vote that the governor is unable to
exercise the powers and perform the duties of his ofce, it shall transmit a written dec-
laration to that effect to the president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the
house of representatives and to the lieutenant-governor and the lieutenant-governor shall
continue to exercise the powers and authority and perform the duties appertaining to the
ofce of governor as acting governor; otherwise, the governor shall resume the powers
and duties of his ofce. Upon receipt by the president pro tempore of the senate and the
speaker of the house of representatives of such a written declaration from the council,
the general assembly shall, in accordance with its rules, decide the issue, assembling
within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the general assembly, within
twenty-one days after receipt of the written declaration or, if the general assembly is not
in session, within twenty-one days after the general assembly is required to assemble,
determines by two-thirds vote of each house that the governor is unable to exercise the
powers and discharge the duties of his ofce, the lieutenant-governor shall continue to
exercise the powers and authority and perform the duties appertaining to the ofce of
governor; otherwise, the governor shall resume the powers and duties of his ofce.
f. Whenever the governor transmits to the president pro tempore of the senate and
the speaker of the house of representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists he shall resume the powers and duties of his ofce upon the determination by a
majority vote of each house of the general assembly, in accordance with its rules, that
he is able to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his ofce.
g. There shall be a council on gubernatorial incapacity, the membership, proce-
dures and terms of ofce of the members of which the general assembly shall establish
by law.
h. The supreme court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate
disputes or questions arising under this section.
Art. XXV AMENDMENTS TO THE 207
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
ARTICLE XXIII.*
*Adopted November 28, 1984.
Cited. 221 C. 300; 227 C. 566; Id., 641; 234 C. 539.
Cited. 42 CS 291; 43 CS 38.
(Division of criminal justice. Appointment of state’s attorneys by a criminal
justice commission.)
Article fourth of the Constitution is amended by adding a new section to read as
follows:
There shall be established within the executive department a division of criminal justice
which shall be in charge of the investigation and prosecution of all criminal matters. Said
division shall include the chief state’s attorney, who shall be its administrative head, and
the state’s attorneys for each judicial district, which districts shall be established by law.
The prosecutorial power of the state shall be vested in a chief state’s attorney and the
state’s attorney for each judicial district. The chief state’s attorney shall be appointed as
prescribed by law. There shall be a commission composed of the chief state’s attorney
and six members appointed by the governor and conrmed by the general assembly, two
of whom shall be judges of the superior court. Said commission shall appoint a state’s
attorney for each judicial district and such other attorneys as prescribed by law.
ARTICLE XXIV.*
*Adopted November 19, 1986.
Cited. 231 C. 602.
Balancing factors of length of delay, reason for delay, assertion of right and prejudice, defendant was not deprived of
right to a speedy trial. 47 CA 91.
Cited. 27 CS 68.
(Prohibiting the use of a party lever in any state or local election.)
Section 5 of article sixth of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
In all elections of ofcers of the state, or members of the general assembly, the votes
of the electors shall be by ballot, either written or printed, except that voting machines
or other mechanical devices for voting may be used in all elections in the state, under
such regulations as may be prescribed by law. No voting machine or device used at
any state or local election shall be equipped with a straight ticket device. The right of
secret voting shall be preserved.
ARTICLE XXV.*
*Adopted November 19, 1986.
Cited. 130 C. 139; 138 C. 161. Exercise of judicial power by a retired judge who has been designated a state referee
is not unconstitutional. 177 C. 173. Cited. 179 C. 140. Authority to create additional judgeships as well as to designate
those to ll them is included in this grant and also Art. III, Sec. 1 of the Connecticut Constitution which vests legislative
powers of state in the senate and the house of representatives. 193 C. 670. Cited. 195 C. 534; 199 C. 417. Provisions
of Sec. 52-434(a)(4) not in conict. Id., 496. Cited. Id., 518; 203 C. 246; 213 C. 54; Id., 373; 222 C. 799. Method of
appointment of family support magistrates and attorney referees cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 157.
208 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXVI
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Cited. 12 CA 190; 31 CA 278; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 385; Id., 599; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 627; 35
CA 769; 37 CA 85; 38 CA 491.
(Selection, nomination, appointment and removal of judges. Judicial selection
commission.)
Section 2 of article twenty of the amendments to the Constitution is amended to
read as follows:
Judges of all courts, except those courts to which judges are elected, shall be nomi-
nated by the governor exclusively from candidates submitted by the judicial selection
commission. The commission shall seek and recommend qualied candidates in such
numbers as shall by law be prescribed. Judges so nominated shall be appointed by the
general assembly in such manner as shall by law be prescribed. They shall hold their
ofces for the term of eight years, but may be removed by impeachment. The gover-
nor shall also remove them on the address of two-thirds of each house of the general
assembly and the supreme court may also remove them as is provided by law.
ARTICLE XXVI.*
*Adopted November 28, 1990.
(Reapportionment procedure. Reapportionment Committee. Reapportion-
ment Commission.)
Section 2 of article sixteen of the amendments to the Constitution is amended to
read as follows:
1
a. The assembly and senatorial districts and congressional districts as now estab-
lished by law shall continue until the regular session of the general assembly next
after the completion of the taking of the next census of the United States. On or before
the fteenth day of February next following the year in which the decennial census
of the United States is taken, the general assembly shall appoint a reapportionment
committee consisting of four members of the senate, two who shall be designated by
the president pro tempore of the senate and two who shall be designated by the minor-
ity leader of the senate, and four members of the house of representatives, two who
shall be designated by the speaker of the house of representatives and two who shall
be designated by the minority leader of the house of representatives, provided there
are members of no more than two political parties in either the senate or the house of
representatives. In the event that there are members of more than two political parties
in a house of the general assembly, all members of that house belonging to the parties
other than that of the president pro tempore of the senate or the speaker of the house
of representatives, as the case may be, shall select one of their number, who shall des-
ignate two members of the committee in lieu of the designation by the minority leader
of that house. Such committee shall advise the general assembly on matters of appor-
tionment. Upon the ling of a report of such committee with the clerk of the house of
representatives and the clerk of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives
and the president pro tempore of the senate shall, if the general assembly is not in
regular session, convene the general assembly in special session for the sole purpose
of adopting a plan of districting. Upon the request of the speaker of the house of rep-
resentatives and the president pro tempore of the senate, the secretary of the state shall
give notice of such special session by mailing a true copy of the call of such special
session, by registered or certied mail, return receipt requested, to each member of the
house of representatives and of the senate at his or her address as it appears upon the
Art. XXVI AMENDMENTS TO THE 209
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
records of said secretary not less than ten nor more than fteen days prior to the date of
convening of such special session or by causing a true copy of the call to be delivered
to each member by a sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, state policeman or indifferent
person at least twenty-four hours prior to the time of convening of such special session.
Such general assembly shall, upon roll call, by a yea vote of at least two-thirds of the
membership of each house, adopt such plan of districting as is necessary to preserve
a proper apportionment of representation in accordance with the principles recited in
this article. Thereafter the general assembly shall decennially at its next regular session
or special session called for the purpose of adopting a plan of districting following the
completion of the taking of the census of the United States, upon roll call, by a yea vote
of at least two-thirds of the membership of each house, adopt such plan of districting
as is necessary in accordance with the provisions of this article.
b. If the general assembly fails to adopt a plan of districting by the fteenth day
of the September next following the year in which the decennial census of the United
States is taken, the governor shall forthwith appoint a commission designated by the
president pro tempore of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives, the
minority leader of the senate and the minority leader of the house of representatives,
each of whom shall designate two members of the commission, provided that there
are members of no more than two political parties in either the senate or the house of
representatives. In the event that there are members of more than two political parties
in a house of the general assembly, all members of that house belonging to the parties
other than that of the president pro tempore of the senate or the speaker of the house of
representatives, as the case may be, shall select one of their number, who shall desig-
nate two members of the commission in lieu of the designation by the minority leader
of that house. The eight members of the commission so designated shall within thirty
days select an elector of the state as a ninth member.
c. The commission shall proceed to consider the alteration of districts in accor-
dance with the principles recited in this article and it shall submit a plan of districting
to the secretary of the state by the thirtieth day of the November next succeeding the
appointment of its members. No plan shall be submitted to the secretary unless it is
certied by at least ve members of the commission. Upon receiving such plan the
secretary shall publish the same forthwith, and, upon publication, such plan of district-
ing shall have the full force of law. If the commission shall fail to submit such a plan
by the thirtieth day of November, the secretary of the state shall forthwith so notify the
chief justice of the supreme court.
d. Original jurisdiction is vested in the supreme court to be exercised on the peti-
tion of any registered voter whereby said court may compel the commission, by man-
damus or otherwise, to perform its duty or to correct any error made in its plan of
districting, or said court may take such other action to effectuate the purposes of this
article, including the establishing of a plan of districting if the commission fails to
le its plan of districting by the thirtieth day of November as said court may deem
appropriate. Any such petition shall be led within thirty days of the date specied
for any duty or within thirty days after the ling of a plan of districting. The supreme
court shall render its decision not later than forty-ve days following the ling of such
petition or shall le its plan with the secretary of the state not later than the fteenth
day of February next following the time for submission of a plan of districting by the
commission. Upon receiving such plan the secretary shall publish the same forthwith,
and, upon publication, such plan of districting shall have the full force of law.
1
Amended by Article XXX., Sec. 2, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
210 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXIX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
ARTICLE XXVII.*
*Adopted November 25, 1992.
(Absentee admission of electors.)
Section 8 of article sixth of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
The general assembly may provide by law for the absentee admission of electors.
ARTICLE XXVIII.*
*Adopted November 25, 1992.
Implementation of amendment entrusted to legislature; separation of powers cited; case is nonjusticiable. 236 C. 1.
Cited. Id.
Plaintiff’s challenge to budget act is not ripe for adjudication due to ongoing, incomplete budget process; because
General Assembly has sole authority to dene terms by law under Subsec. (b), court has no jurisdiction to consider
plaintiff’s proposed denitions of those terms; claim presents a nonjusticiable political question. 52 CS 118.
(Limit on state expenditures. Maximum authorized increase; “emergency or extra-
ordinary circumstances”; definitions to be defined by general assembly. Surplus.)
Article third of the Constitution is amended by adding section 18 as follows:
Sec. 18. (a) The amount of general budget expenditures authorized for any scal
year shall not exceed the estimated amount of revenue for such scal year.
(b) The general assembly shall not authorize an increase in general budget expen-
ditures for any scal year above the amount of general budget expenditures autho-
rized for the previous scal year by a percentage which exceeds the greater of the
percentage increase in personal income or the percentage increase in ination, unless
the governor declares an emergency or the existence of extraordinary circumstances
and at least three-fths of the members of each house of the general assembly vote to
exceed such limit for the purposes of such emergency or extraordinary circumstances.
The general assembly shall by law dene “increase in personal income”, “increase
in ination” and “general budget expenditures” for the purposes of this section and
may amend such denitions, from time to time, provided general budget expenditures
shall not include expenditures for the payment of bonds, notes or other evidences of
indebtedness. The enactment or amendment of such denitions shall require the vote
of three-fths of the members of each house of the general assembly.
(c) Any unappropriated surplus shall be used to fund a budget reserve fund or for
the reduction of bonded indebtedness; or for any other purpose authorized by at least
three-fths of the members of each house of the general assembly.
ARTICLE XXIX.*
*Adopted November 27, 1996.
A prosecution for a common law offense does not require an indictment. 3 C. 122; 60 C. 94. There is no right of trial
by jury before a justice of the peace. 4 C. 78; 12 C. 451. Meaning of “indictment or information.” 12 C. 451. Accused has
no constitutional right to be present before grand jury. 21 C. 279; 47 C. 104. Law requires one on trial for intoxication to
disclose how he obtained liquor, upheld; 59 C. 520; so one providing for restraint of parent abandoning child. 35 C. 540.
Art. XXIX AMENDMENTS TO THE 211
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Penalties should be held excessive only in very clear cases. 39 C. 497. A statute authorizing the appointment of a receiver
of partnership without notice to partners would not be valid. 41 C. 307. Regulations permitting sale of life estate against
remonstrance of remaindermen is valid. 44 C. 116. Arguments of counsel may properly be limited. 47 C. 535. The leg-
islature may regulate the conduct of jury trials. 48 C. 546. There is no right to trial by jury before county commissioners
as to revocation of a liquor license. 50 C. 324. Statute making owner of vehicle liable for injury done by servant, upheld.
51 C. 468. Statute making railroad company liable for re set by locomotive without regard to negligence, upheld. 54 C.
459. A judge may grant a new trial for verdict against the evidence. 65 C. 278; 69 C. 186; 72 C. 109; 74 C. 638; 79 C.
481. Admission of evidence against accused secured by trespass does not violate this provision. 67 C. 304; 101 C. 231;
120 C. 573. Bail in general, taking it pending appeal. 71 C. 461; see 65 C. 282. Power of court to restrict counsel from
commenting on severe penalty provided for offense. 75 C. 55. Cited. 287 U.S. 62. Requires written charges and notice
in proceeding for contempt not committed in presence of court. 75 C. 354. Law penalizing the keeping of a house “re-
puted” to be one of ill-fame, upheld. 82 C. 112; 83 C. 56; Id., 551; see 47 C. 550. Penalty of $1,000 ne for violation of
usury law held not excessive. 83 C. 3. Nature of power to x amount and to take bail. 83 C. 286. Cautioning accused that
statements will be used against him. 92 C. 67, 82. How far state’s attorney may comment on counsel’s failure to explain
incriminating evidence introduced by prosecution; 96 C. 292; where accused takes the stand himself. 105 C. 119. Admis-
sion of testimony given by a witness at a preliminary hearing on same charge, where accused had had opportunity to
cross-examine and witness had escaped from detention before trial in upper court and could not be located, held not
error. 96 C. 310. Statute making admissible a certied copy of analysis of liquor by a state chemist, upheld. 103 C. 513.
Common law exceptions to hearsay rule not affected. Id. Statute making owner of dog liable for injuries caused by it,
upheld. 105 C. 90. After acquittal and discharge accused cannot be tried again for same offense. 106 C. 116. Require-
ments for jurisdiction when obtained by garnishment stated and applied. 107 C. 554. Refusal to try issue of fact on a plea
to jurisdiction after demurrer thereto sustained, upheld. Id., 560. To require accused to give testimony tending to prove
his divorce was colorable violates this clause. 110 C. 356 (Diss. Op.). Danger of incrimination must be real, not remote;
privilege must be claimed as to specic questions. Id., 482. Statute authorizing summary commitment by justice for re-
fusal to testify in investigation is valid. Id., 490–500. Cited. 113 C. 377. Right to bill of particulars where information
charges offense merely by name or denition. 119 C. 72, 73; 124 C. 561. Provision of Tenement House Act forbidding
recovery of rent for unlawful occupation does not impose “ne.” 121 C. 459. State’s right to appeal criminal case is not
unconstitutional. 122 C. 538. Does not protect person being questioned by grand jury, but only gives immunity from
answering particular questions. 126 C. 73. Statute limiting signs advertising price of gasoline held invalid. Id., 373.
Statute forbidding drugs, articles or instruments to prevent conception is constitutional. Id., 412–426. Not mandatory to
specify maximum ne in penal statute. Id., 426. Filing of original information without preliminary hearing upheld.
127 C. 581. Does not require trial within territorial subdivision in which offense was committed. 129 C. 572. Penalty of
$50 for each rent overcharged under Price Control Act is not unconstitutional. 131 C. 132; 132 C. 64. Does not require
that one arrested for crime shall be promptly taken before a committing magistrate. 136 C. 113. Legislature itself may
exercise power of eminent domain or it may delegate it to another agency to determine what property is necessary for
the public use. 138 C. 582. A provision in a will that widow should receive a stipulated amount either by order for wid-
ow’s allowance or by way of a bequest, held constitutional. 139 C. 652. Short form information authorized by rule (P.B.
493) does not infringe as rule (P.B. 495) provides for bill of particulars. 141 C. 319. Cited. 143 C. 698. Guarantees as a
political right the institution of jury trial in all its essential features as derived from our ancestors and now existing by
force of common law, but this right may be subjected to conditions and regulations of procedure for the better promotion
of justice and the public welfare so long as the substance of the right is not adversely affected or the exercise of the right
is not prevented. 144 C. 228. Requires an indictment by a grand jury in all cases in which the penalty to be imposed may
be life imprisonment. Id., 295. Injured defendant required to attend court on stretcher and under some medication, not
denied due process. 145 C. 11. Denition of fair trial. Id. Denition of speedy trial. Id. Jury recommendation for life
imprisonment under Sec. 53-10 not violation of due process. Id., 60. The terms of a penal statute must be sufciently
explicit to inform those subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. 146 C. 78. Whether
knowledge is a necessary element in proving that a prohibited act is a crime is a matter of legislative intention. Id. Grand
jury in which 7 out of 18 are attorneys, not in itself illegal where there is no evidence of an intentional and systematic
exclusion of any group. Id., 137. Defendant not denied a fair trial when he did not have and did not request counsel on
his presentation in police court. Id., 227. Act authorizing an administrative board to make orders but which has no pro-
vision for judicial review, held constitutional as the aggrieved party’s right to due process is protected by his privilege to
apply to a court. Id., 237. No denition of public use for the purpose of eminent domain can be large enough to include
any private use. Id. Zoning regulations forbidding the operation of trailer parks in residential zones held valid. Id., 311.
Right to a speedy trial may be waived where a defendant consents to delay or both prosecution and defense agree upon
postponement, and waiver may be implied where the defendant, in court, interposes no objection to a continuance. 147
C. 22. Circumstances determine whether defendant has been denied a speedy trial. Id., 95. Refusal of court to allow
defendant to cross-examine probation ofcer who prepared a presentence investigation held not to violate this section.
Id., 125. When refusal to engage counsel for pretrial proceedings violates due process. Id., 194. Voluntariness of confes-
sion of accused under detention. Id. Where one act constitutes several crimes there may be a separate prosecution for
each. Id., 426. Cited. 149 C. 572. Constitutional right of accused in a criminal case to have assistance of counsel may be
waived, if it is waived intelligently, understandably and in a competent manner. Defendant’s unsubstantiated attacks on
the two public defenders concerned in the case, and on public defenders in general, were without merit, and appointment
of a special public defender would not be justied. Id., 655. There is no specic provision against double jeopardy in the
Connecticut Constitution, but we have in large part adopted the common-law rule against it as necessary to the due
process guaranteed by this section. Secs. 51-195 and 51-196 subject certain sentences to possibility of review if re-
quested by the person sentenced. The jeopardy, so far as the sentence is concerned, is a single continuing one, and any
change in the sentence results from the sentenced person’s own voluntary act. There is no double jeopardy. Id., 692. In
order to hold zoning regulation unconstitutional as violative of due process of law, it must appear that the provisions are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
212 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXIX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Id., 712. A witness is not justied in refusing to answer a question on ground of self-incrimination unless it appears that
there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger of incrimination, and that the danger is not a mere remote possibility. The
determination that there is such a danger cannot be left solely to the judgment of the witness. The witness should not,
however, be required completely to explain the precise basis of his apprehension of danger and thus provide “leads” to
evidence for future use against him. Where the state opposes a claim of privilege against self-incrimination on the ground
of immunity from possible punishment, the state has the burden of proving the adequacy of the immunity claimed. 150
C. 220. Even if accused waives his privilege against self-incrimination by voluntarily testifying, the waiver is limited to
the particular proceeding on which he volunteers the testimony. 153 C. 34. Use, in second part of information, over de-
fendant’s objection, of testimony as to prior conviction which was given in rst part of information, was a violation of
his constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Id. Where imposition of sentence upon witness
against defendant was delayed until after his trial, defendant’s claim that he was thereby deprived of his constitutional
right to a fair trial was without merit. Id., 79, 80. Fact that court-appointed appraisers in foreclosure action not required
to hold hearings and take evidence not violative of due process. Id., 293. Cited. Id., 324. There is no federal constitutional
impediment to dispensing entirely with the grand jury in state prosecutions. Id., 451, 457. Whether an accused has been
denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial depends on the facts in a particular case. Id., 564, 569–571. Appellant,
claiming that proposed zoning amendments would deprive him of use of his property, was entitled to introduce addi-
tional evidence on constitutional question in court to which appeal was taken. 155 C. 265. Admissibility in evidence of
statements made during illegal detention depends on voluntariness thereof and whether it was brought about by, or fruit
of, illegal detention. Id., 316. Where defendant, represented by counsel, did not at any time before trial date raise ques-
tion of speedy trial or claim trial and did not claim to be prejudiced by delay, present claim that he was denied guarantee
to a speedy trial is without merit. Id., 367. No federal constitutional impediment to dispensing entirely with grand jury
in state prosecutions. Id. Prosecution by information in case of infamous crimes is not violation of defendant’s rights
under U.S. Constitution. 156 C. 391. Speedy trial means state must proceed without unreasonable or undue delay and
under facts of this case there was no denial of right as intervals were necessary to prepare trial proceedings. 157 C. 114.
Charge concerning defendant’s right not to testify was correct taken as a whole. 158 C. 412. In all cases, even capital
ones, not falling in the exceptional situation “where the proof is evident or the presumption great,” bail should be or-
dered. A grand jury indictment where defendant was excluded from the jury room was not sufcient to put this defendant
in the exception “where the proof is evident”. 159 C. 264. That crime is punishable by death sufcient to bring the ac-
cused within the exception disentitling him to bail. Id., 285. Indictment for a capital offense when the defendants were
not allowed in the grand jury room during the grand jury hearing is not sufcient evidential weight to shift the burden of
proof from the state to show the proof was “evident or the presumption great” so bail would be denied. Id. Cited. 162 C.
316. The creation of new rights to insure a fair trial is an appropriate exercise of legislative power. 166 C. 501 (Diss.
Op.). Taxation of the exercise and nonexercise, after enactment of tax of a power of appointment created prior to enact-
ment of tax is not unconstitutional. Id., 581. Sec. 14-66 is a proper exercise of the police power of the state as it serves
the safety and welfare of the motoring public. 167 C. 304. Procedural due process not violated where, absent specic
provisions in municipal charter for removal, the mayor removed the chairman of board of nance in manner mirroring
method of his appointment. Id., 357. Cited. Id., 379; Id., 408. Procedure for relief against excessive bail set under a bench
warrant accords with due process requirements. Id., 539. Second mortgagee has no standing to attack attachments and
judgments in distribution of proceeds of rst mortgage foreclosure. He does not stand in mortgagor’s shoes to claim
latter’s constitutional rights. 168 C. 43. Plaintiff who waived counsel after ample notication he was entitled to counsel
cannot claim on appeal denial of due process at hearing. Id., 94. Sec. 14-111(c) draws a reasonable distinction based on
public policy in requiring suspension of licenses only of those careless drivers contributing to accident causing death. Id.
To determine whether procedural due process requirements apply, the court must rst determine whether a party has
been deprived of liberty or property by some action of the government, furthermore, in making this determination, the
court must look not to the weight but to the nature of the interest at stake, any weighing process being relevant only to a
determination of the form of hearing required in particular situations. Id., 478. Cited. 169 C. 267, 305. Defendant’s right
to compel testimony must give way to witness’ privilege against self-incrimination in case where no timely exception
was taken; when privilege may be invoked; there is no basis for granting immunity from prosecution to witness for de-
fense. 170 C. 206. Tax imposed on basis of domicile but enacted subsequent to abandonment of such domicile does not
violate due process. Id., 567. Cited. 171 C. 269; Id., 705; 172 C. 458; Id., 531; Id., 577. Testimony of state’s chief toxi-
cologist, based partly on test by chemist under his supervision, did not violate defendant’s right to confront witnesses
against him. Id., 593. Discussed. 173 C. 165. Cited. Id., 317; Id., 473; Id., 506. Whether right to speedy trial was denied
must be determined by application of balancing test. 174 C. 89. Cited. Id.; 175 C. 147. Loss of evidence under circum-
stances of case did not violate defendant’s right to fair trial or deprive him of due process of law. Id., 315. Cited. Id., 512;
176 C. 270; 177 C. 78; Id., 304; Id., 648; Id., 677; 178 C. 67; Id., 145; Id., 163; Id., 600; 179 C. 1; Id., 46. City has suf-
cient standing to raise constitutionality of procedures employed by department of environmental protection. Id., 111.
Cited. Id., 155; 180 C. 54. Right to impeach the credibility of the state’s eyewitness to the crime implicates defendant’s
constitutional right to confront the witness who testify against him. Id., 382. Where defendant was indicted for murder,
the court’s charge on the lesser offenses of manslaughter and negligent homicide, which do not require the same state of
mind as murder, did not violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Id. Sixteen
month delay was not unreasonable per se and was not a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial since defendant acqui-
esced in delay for eleven months. Id., 589. Discussion of due process in connection with discharge of tenured teacher.
181 C. 69. Cited. Id., 151. Constitutional rights in connection with grand jury proceedings discussed. Id., 268. Cited. 182
C. 124; Id., 220. Constitution does not guarantee a criminal defendant a right to a nonjury trial. Id., 353. Cited. Id., 403.
State, over defendant’s objection, seeking to have a trial closed must demonstrate a compelling need in order to deny his
right to public trial. Id., 412. It is error of constitutional magnitude for judge to instruct jurors that they may discuss the
case among themselves prior to its submission to them. Id., 419. Cited. Id., 497; Id., 511; Id., 585; part of ruling in State
v. Jacobowitz overruled, see 224 C. 1. “Void for vagueness” and burden of proof charge to jury discussed. 183 C. 17.
Cited. Id., 73. Waiver of “Miranda” rights discussed. Id., 280. Cited. Id., 394; 184 C. 121. Inadequate pretrial
Art. XXIX AMENDMENTS TO THE 213
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
investigation is sufcient to constitute a denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel. Id., 547. Cited. Id., 597; 185
C. 63; Id., 118; Id., 163. Right to speedy trial discussed. Id., 199. Cited. Id., 211; Id., 402; Id., 495. Discussion of hearsay
rules and the confrontation clause. 186 C. 521. Discussion of sufciency of court’s instruction. Id., 555. Cited. Id., 574;
Id., 654. Due process cited. Id., 725; Id., 773. Cited. 187 C. 6, 11. Due process cited. Id., 53; Id., 73. Fair trial cited. Id.,
94. Due process cited. Id., 109; Id., 144. Fair trial cited. Id., 199; Id., 216. Right to notice cited. Id. Right of cross-exami-
nation cited. Id., 264. Right of confrontation cited. Id. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
cited. Id. Right of confrontation cited. Id., 281. Right to counsel cited. Id. Defendant was not denied her constitutional
right of confrontation by the state’s failure to call as a witness the state chemist who had actually performed the toxico-
logical tests on the narcotics found in her possession. Id., 292. Right of accused to testify cited. Id. Introduction of new
relevant evidence in rebuttal discussed. Id., 335. Identication procedure discussed. Id., 348. Due process rights in pa-
rental rights termination proceedings discussed. Id., 431. Right to speedy and public trial cited. Id., 469. Right to con-
front witnesses discussed. Id. Right to remain silent discussed. Id. Although due process is not intended to hold admin-
istrative agencies under a short leash it is designed to restrain them from roaming at will over the adjudicative landscape.
Id., 476. Right to remain silent cited. Id., 504. Due process cited. Id., 513. Right to counsel cited. Id. Right against
self-incrimination cited. Id. Cited. 188 C. 336; Id., 354; Id., 515; Id., 542; Id., 626; Id. 653. Right to jury trial discussed.
Id., 697. Cited. 189 C. 337; Id., 364; Id., 631; 190 C. 20. Waiver of “Miranda” rights discussed. Id., 104. Cited. Id., 143.
Due process and liberty interests discussed. Id., 327. Cited. Id., 496; Id., 541; Id., 594; Id., 822; 191 C. 27; Id., 37. State-
ments obtained in violation of privacy required to effectuate “Miranda” rights may not be admitted into evidence in the
case in chief without violating due process right to fair trial; 159 C. 385 overruled. Id. Cited. 191 C. 142; Id., 146; Id.,
233; Id., 412; Id., 545; Id., 604; Id., 622; 192 C. 37. Denial of defendant’s motion for inspection of certain psychiatric
records discussed. Id., 166. Fairness and due process discussed. Id., 618. Constitutional right to probable cause hearing
took effect May 26, 1983, being the effective date of implementing legislation. Statutory provisions for grand jury, Sec.
54-45, remained in effect until that time. Right to probable cause hearing vested immediately on that date for all unin-
dicted defendants; amendment was not fully self-executing. Id., 671. Cited. Id., 700; Id., 704. Right to speedy trial fac-
tors discussed. Id., 739. Cited. 193 C. 70; Id., 93; Id., 144. Due process cited. Id. Unconstitutional procedures; constitu-
tionally acceptable practice; constitutional principles, cited; admissibility of identication evidence discussed. Id., 238.
Cited. Id., 270. Effective assistance of counsel; inadequacy of counsel; due process, constitutional claims and right to
counsel cited. Id., 333. Right to confrontation and to compel testimony of witnesses; due process; fair trial and present
own defense cited. Id., 350. Cited. Id., 439. Denial of effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 457. Right to
due process cited. Id. Under provision against self-incrimination, right to “no adverse inference” instruction request re-
afrmed; question of harmless error for failure to instruct discussed. Id., 474. Cited. Id. Constitutional right to a fair trial
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 526. Right to effective assistance of counsel; due process and privilege against self-incrimination
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 632. Constitutional right to a fair trial and due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 646. “Miranda” rights
cited. Id. Due process cited. Id. Fair trial cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 670. Taking of wax impressions and photo-
graphs of teeth are not denial of right against self-incrimination. Id., 695. Right to impartial jury cited; right to confron-
tation, cross-examination and counsel cited. Id. Cited. 194 C. 96. Right to a speedy trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 165. Due
process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 213; Id., 223; Id., 233; Id., 245. Constitutional right against self-incrimination cited. Id.
Admission of testimony of defendant’s refusal to make written statement after being given “Miranda” warnings dis-
cussed. Id., 258. Constitutional right of a defendant to testify does not permit him to give testimony in disregard of the
rules of evidence. Id., 361. Right to be heard by himself cited. Id. Cited. Id., 408. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited.
Id. Equal protection and due process challenges to composition of grand jury differentiated and discussed. Id., 416. Fair
cross-section claim cited. Id. Due process challenge cited. Id. Cited. Id., 438. Constitutional right of fair trial cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 483. Fair trial cited. Id. Claims of appellate delay arise under this constitutional guaranty. Id. 510. Cited. Id.,
530. Denial of fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 573. Deprivation of constitutional right to fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 589.
Substantive due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 594. Right not to testify cited. Id. Cited. Id., 617. Due process cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 623. Fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 692; 195 C. 128. Constitutional right
to due process and a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 160. Denial of due process cited. Id. “Miranda” warnings cited. Id.,
232. Cited. Id., 284; Id., 421. Fair trial, due process and impartial jury cited. Id. Confrontation clause of state constitution
cited. Id. Right to due process and fair trial cited. Id., 444. Speedy trial rights and due process cited. Id., 461. State con-
stitution compulsory process and due process clauses cited; right to confrontation cited; ineffective assistance of counsel
cited; right to fair trial cited. Id., 475. Cited. Id., 496. Due process rights cited. Id. Right to effective assistance of counsel
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 505. Fundamental constitutional right to be released on bail cited. Id. Cited. Id., 534. Due process
cited. Id. Ineffective assistance of counsel and due process cited. Id., 561. Due process cited. Id., 598. Cited. Id., 611.
Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 624. “Miranda” rights, constitutional privilege against self-incrimination cited. Id.
Suppression of allegedly incriminating statements cited. Id. Cited. Id., 636. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id.
Prosecutor’s summation violated due process. 196 C. 32. Due process cited. Id.; Id., 157. Due process rights cited. Id.,
289. Cited. Id., 309. Due process cited. Id. Violation of due process rights cited. Id., 395. “When jury instruction is
challenged ... as constitutionally decient in fundamental respect the challenge can succeed only if it is reasonably pos-
sible that the jury was misled by the instruction into misunderstanding an issue that has fundamental constitutional sig-
nicance.” Id., 430. Cited. Id., 557. Court announced that “habeas corpus is the preferred route for review of convictions
challenged solely on the grounds of inadequate assistance of counsel”. Id., 567. Right to effective assistance of counsel
cited. Id. Inadequate assistance of counsel cited. Id. Constitutional right to impartial jury cited. Id., 667. Cited. Id., 655.
Due process cited. Id. Cruel and unusual punishment cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 667. Cited. 197 C. 50; Id., 60. Due
process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 67. A criminal defendant waives his privilege against self-incrimination when he places his
mental status in issue, although federal and state constitutions ordinarily protect an accused against compulsory submis-
sion to psychiatric examination. Id., 106. Cited. Id., 115. Due process and effective assistance of counsel cited; fair trial
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 180. Right under state constitution coextensive with rights under federal constitution (fth and sixth
amendments) cited. Id. Fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial cited. Id., 180. Effective assistance of counsel
cited. Id., 201. Due process cited. Id., 247. Right to cross-examine witnesses cited. Id., 280. Due process and a fair trial
214 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXIX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
cited. Id., 298. Right to due process cited. Id., 309. Effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Constitutional right to an
impartial jury cited. Id., 314. Requirement of a fair trial cited; due process cited. Id., 326. Due process cited; right to
confront accusers cited; right to effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. 337. Right against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion cited; assistance of counsel cited; confrontation right cited. Id., 358. Section does not guarantee the right to hybrid
representation. Id., 369. Right to assistance of counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 413; Id., 507; Id., 507; Id., 554; Id., 574. Due
process cited. Id. Fairness of trial cited. Id. Privilege against self-incrimination cited. Id. Cited. Id., 588; Id., 595. Due
process cited. Id. Fundamental right and fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 602. Fundamental constitutional right to liberty
cited. Id. Due process cited; right to impartial jury cited. Id., 629. Cited. Id., 644. Due process clause cited. Id. Right to
fair trial cited. Id., 666. Fair trial cited; due process cited; right not to testify cited. Id., 677. Right to a fair trial cited, right
to due process cited; right to remain silent cited. Id., 685. Right to a public trial. Id., 698. Right to trial by impartial jury
cited; right to a fair trial cited; due process cited. 198 C. 1. Right to trial by impartial jury cited; right to fair trial cited;
due process cited. Id. Fair trial cited. Id., 23. Due process cited. Id., 43; Id.; 68. Cited. Id., 77. Fundamental constitutional
right and a fair trial cited; due process cited; assistance of counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 92; Id., 111. Right to confront
witnesses against cited; due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 124. Fair trial cited; assistance of counsel cited; privilege against
self-incrimination cited. Id. Effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 147. Fundamental right and a fair trial cited; due
process cited; right to confrontation cited. Id., 190. Fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial cited; due process
cited. Id., 209. Court held “an illegal arrest imposes no jurisdictional barrier to a defendant’s subsequent prosecution”
and overruled 153 C. 127 to the extent that it holds to the contrary. Id., 255. Cited. Id., 273. Right to testify cited. Id.
Right to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 285. Due process rights cited; fundamental constitutional right cited. Id. Fair
trial and due process cited. Id., 328. “Although the Connecticut Constitution contains no specic double jeopardy provi-
sion, the due process guarantees of article rst, section 8 have been held to include such a protection.” Id., 369. Cited.
Id., 397. Fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial cited; due process cited. Id. Right to speedy trial cited; due
process cited. Id., 435. Right to testify cited; due process right to present effective defense cited. Id., 454. “The claim that
inconsistent verdicts must be set aside is not one of constitutional dimension.” Id., 490, 492. Deprivation of a fundamen-
tal constitutional right and fair trial cited. Id. “... admission of statements made by a conspirator in furtherance of the
conspiracy is deemed not to violate the confrontation clause ...”. Id., 506. Right to confront witnesses against cited;
deprivation of fundamental right and a fair trial cited. Id. Pre and post arrest silence; “Miranda” warnings and permitted
cross-examination discussed. Id., 517. Right to remain silent cited; deprivation of fundamental constitutional rights
cited; right to fair trial cited; right to effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Declined review of ineffective counsel
claims even if supported by record so that all related claims could be considered at once either on a petition for a new
trial or for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. Right to speedy trial cited. Id., 542. Infringement of fundamental constitutional
right cited; due process cited; fair trial cited. Id., 560. Cited. Id., 573. Right to speedy trial cited. Id. Privilege against
self-incrimination cited. Id. Cited. Id., 598. Effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Due process cited. Id. Deprivation
of a fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 680. Fundamental constitutional
right and a fair trial cited; due process cited; effective assistance of counsel cited; impartial jury cited; compulsory pro-
cess cited. 199 C. 14. Right to counsel during trial and/or sentencing procedure and waiver of same discussed. Id., 30.
Cited. Id., 47. Due process cited; constitutional protection under Connecticut Constitution cited. Id. Cited. Id., 70. Crim-
inal defendant does not have ultimate decision to call witnesses when he is represented by counsel; his right to compul-
sory process is protected by representation by counsel. Id., 88. Cited. Id., 102. Right to a fair trial cited; right to effective
assistance of counsel cited; right to due process cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 121. Cited. Id., 163. Due process cited.
Id. Cited. Id., 207. Right to a fair trial cited; due process cited; effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Judgment of
appellate court in 2 CA 551 reversed and case remanded to court with direction to reinstate judgment of trial court. Id.,
231. Due process cited. Id. Court announced it would prospectively follow ruling in Luce v. U.S., 105 S. Ct 460, which
held that to “raise and preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant must
testify”. Id., 255. State and federal constitutional right to testify cited. Id. Fundamental right to present a defense cited.
Id. Due process cited. Id., 273. Cited. Id., 281. Constitutional right to confrontation cited. Id. Right to due process and a
fair trial cited. Id., 308. Cited. Id., 322. Fundamental constitutional right of a defendant not to testify in his criminal trial
cited. Id. Right to due process and a fair trial cited. Id. Denial of effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 354. Due
process cited. Id., 359. Cited. Id., 389; Id., 399. Due process cited, Id. Denial of right to a fair trial cited. Id. Fair trial
guaranty cited. Id. Cited. Id., 417. Right to assistance of counsel cited. Id. Claim of ineffective assistance of counsel more
properly pursued on petition for new trial or on petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id., 462. Denial of effective assistance
of counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 473. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 481. Right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
cited. Id. Right to be informed of nature of charges cited. Id. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 496. Due process cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 537. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id.; Id., 557. Due process right cited. Id. Cited. Id., 631. Due process cited.
Id. Cited. Id., 667. Due process right to fair warning cited. Id. Cited. Id., 693. Right to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
718; 200 C. 102. State due process clause cited. Id. Cited. Id., 113. Due process cited. Id. Right to confrontation cited.
Id. Right to be present at all stages cited. Id. Cited. Id., 224; Id., 268. Right to due process and a fair trial cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 310. Right to a fundamentally fair trial cited. Id. Constitutional standards of due process and violates due process
cited. Id. Denial of due process and a fair trial cited. Id. Right to compulsory process cited. Id. Finding of probable cause
at preliminary hearing is reviewable on appeal. Id., 323. Right to confront and cross-examine witnesses cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 350. Due process rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 412. Violation of due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 453. Due process and
fundamental fairness cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 465. Cited. Id., 544. Constitutional right to a fair trial cited. Id.
State constitutional rights to due process; fundamental constitutional rights, cited. Id., 586. Cited. Id., 607. Right to
self-representation cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 615. Opportunity for fair trial; due process, cited. Id., 642. Cited. Id.,
721. Deprivation of fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial cited. Id., 743. Cited. 201 C. 74. Ineffective assis-
tance of counsel cited. Id., 103, 105, 107. Right to effective assistance of counsel; right to due process; right to impartial
jury; right to a fair trial; right to confrontation and compulsory process, cited. Id., 125. Right to due process cited. Id.,
162. Fair trial and due process of law; effective assistance of counsel; constitutional rights to an adequately instructed
jury, cited. Id., 174. Deprivation of a fair trial cited. Id., 190. Cited. Id., 211. Right to confront accusers; constitutional
Art. XXIX AMENDMENTS TO THE 215
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
right as to effective cross-examination for bias, cited. Id. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 368. “... hearsay
claims do not automatically invoke constitutional rights to confrontation”; due process obligation; confrontation clauses,
cited. Id. Due process; constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence; voluntary and intelligent waiver of consti-
tutional rights; due process rights implicating fairness of trial, cited. Id., 395. Cited. Id., 421. Scope and nature of right
to testify would not necessarily be changed by virtue of its possible multiple origin so as to preclude fair comment upon
an accused’s interest. Id., 462. Right of confrontation; due process rights; right to be heard by himself, cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 489. Denial of effective assistance of counsel; right to jury trial, cited. Id. Cited. Id., 505. Fundamental constitutional
right and fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 517. Rights of confrontation cited. Id. Denial of effective assistance of counsel
cited. Id., 534. Right to due process; right to fair trial; constitutional rights to confrontation, compulsory process and
right to present a defense; speedy trial right; right to effective assistance of counsel, cited. Id., 559. Cited. Id., 598. Fun-
damental constitutional right cited. Id. Use of preinstructions discussed; fair trial before impartial jury; due process,
cited. Id., 605. Compelled self-incrimination; constitutional right to no adverse inuence instruction; due process; fun-
damental constitutional right; constitutional rights to compulsory process, cited. Id., 659. Cited. Id., 675. Denial of ef-
fective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Due process cited. 202 C. 1. Cited. Id., 18. Deprivation of a fundamental consti-
tutional right and a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 39. Right against self-incrimination cited. Id. Constitutional right of
defendant to be present at all stages of trial cited. Id., 75. Cited. Id., 259. Effective assistance of counsel; rights to com-
pulsory process and confrontation; right effectively to cross-examine, cited. Id. Due process right to fair trial cited. Id.,
316. Cited. Id., 349. Due process; rights to adequately instructed jury and fair trial, cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 369.
Cited. Id., 385. Due process; state constitutional right to a disinterested grand jury, cited. Id. Cited. Id., 429. Deprivation
of state constitutional rights; deprivation of liberty in violation of constitutional rights, cited. Id. Cited. Id., 463. Consti-
tutional rights to due process; right to trial by impartial jury, cited. Id. Constitutional rights; compelled testimony, cited.
Id., 509. Cited. Id., 520. Constitutional rights to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 541. Constitutional rights to due process
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 615, 624. Constitutional right to be informed of nature of charge cited. Id. Cited. Id., 629. Unconsti-
tutionally vague; constitutionally entitled to be informed of nature and cause of accusations; vagueness doctrine and
requirements of due process, cited. Id. Constitutional right to due process and to present a defense; constitutional right
to call witnesses; invoke privilege against self-incrimination; right to confrontation and cross-examine witnesses, cited.
Id., 676. Cited. 203 C. 63. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 81; Id., 97; Id., 159. Conict-free representation; right to
assistance of counsel; right to due process; rights of confrontation, cited. Id. Cited. Id., 212; Id., 246. Rights to due pro-
cess of law and constitutional rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 385. State constitutional rights to obtain and present witnesses
to establish a defense cited. Id., 445. Constitutional right to an impartial jury cited. Id., 506. Rights to due process; un-
constitutionally vague, cited. Id. Due process violation implicating fairness of trial cited. 204 C. 1. Cited. Id., 4. Consti-
tutional rights to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 120. Constitutional right to impartial jury cited. Id., 156. Due process
rights cited. Id., 187. Constitutional right to a fair trial; fundamental constitutional right that state establish guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, cited. Id., 207. Due process cited. Id., 240. Cited. Id., 287. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 377. Due
process clauses cited. Id. Cited. Id., 410. Unconstitutionally vague; due process, cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague and
violation of right to due process cited. Id., 429. Cited. Id., 523. Right to impartial jury and fair trial cited. Id. Constitu-
tional right to due process cited. Id., 571. Cited. Id., 585. Constitutional right to develop a defense cited. Id., 654. In
criminal prosecutions for sexual abuse of children of tender years, videotaping of victim’s testimony outside physical
presence of defendant is constitutionally permissible only under circumstances discussed. Id., 683. Federal and state
confrontation clauses; right of confrontation, cited. Id. Cited. Id., 724. Constitutional right to due process cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 769; 205 C. 39. Deprivation of constitutional due process and confrontation rights; right to establish a defense, cited.
Id., 61. Due process; constitutional duty of disclosure; right to fair trial; ineffective assistance of counsel, cited. Id., 132.
Cited. Id., 201; Id., 262. Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination; “Miranda” rights, cited. Id. Cited. Id., 298.
“Miranda” rights; due process rights, cited. Id. Fundamental constitutional right to proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt cited. Id., 352. Deprivation of fundamental constitutional right to proof of every element of alleged crime beyond
a reasonable doubt; “... it is an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to permit a reopening of the case to supply the missing
evidence.” Id., 370. Constitutional rights to confrontation, cross-examination and proper notice; constitutional right to
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, cited. Id., 386. Cited. Id., 437. State constitutional right to consult with counsel
during custodial interrogation; due process, cited. Id. Cited. Id., 456. Unconstitutionally vague or over broad; due pro-
cess, cited. Id. Cited. Id., 507. Constitutional right to cross-examine cited. Id. Cited. Id., 515. Common law rule against
double jeopardy “adopted ... as necessary to the due process guaranteed by ... our constitution”. Id., 528. Cited. Id., 542.
Right of cross-examination cited. Id. Fundamental constitutional right that state prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
constitutional right to a fair trial, cited. Id., 616. Cited. Id., 638; Id., 673. Due process; confrontation, cited. Id. Due
process right to present a defense; rights to due process and a fair trial, cited. Id., 723. Lack of authority of counsel to
invoke personal right of suspect no bar to imposition of duty to inform suspect of counsel’s efforts. 206 C. 157. Right to
counsel; due process; “Miranda” warnings independently required under due process, cited. Id. Denial of due process;
constitutional standards of due process, cited. Id., 182. Cited. Id., 203. Constitutional right against self-incrimination;
due process; right to fair trial, cited. Id., 213. Due process; vagueness and overbreadth, cited. Id., 267. Cited. Id., 300.
State due process rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 391. Rights to due process cited. Id., 512. Constitutional right not to testify
cited. Id., 621. Cited. Id., 636. Due process and taking clause cited. Id. Due process rights cited. Id., 657; Id., 685. Cited.
207 C. 1. Due process; privilege against self-incrimination, cited. Id. Right to fair trial cited. Id., 35. Cited. Id., 59. Rights
to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 109. Due process; effective assistance of counsel, cited. Id. Effective assistance of
counsel and due process cited. Id., 118. Due process cited. Id., 152. Clarication of the instructions is mandatory when
the jury or one of its members manifests confusion about the law; deprivation of fair trial cited. Id., 191. Failure to advise
of mandatory minimum sentence does implicate constitutional rights. Id., 276. Fundamental constitutional right and fair
trial; due process; privilege against self-incrimination; right to confront one’s accusers; right to assistance of counsel,
cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 374. Sec. 53-21 unconstitutionally vague in circumstances of the case; due process and
unconstitutional vagueness; void for vagueness doctrine, cited. Id., 456. Due process cited. Id., 565. Right to fair trial
and denial of constitutional due process right to a fair trial cited. Id., 646. Due process cited. 208 C. 38. Cited. Id., 52.
216 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXIX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Right to fair trial and fair and impartial jury; due process, cited. Id. Cited. Id., 125. State confrontation clause cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 156. Denial of fair trial; due process, cited. Id., 202. Cited. Id., 267. Connecticut Constitution cited; due pro-
cess cited. Id. Right to public trial cited; rights to confront accusers, present a defense and due process, and compulsory
process cited. Id., 365. Cited. Id., 543. Due process cited. Id. Cited. 209 C. 23. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 34. Due
process rights cited; right to be convicted by a unanimous verdict cited. Id. Constitutional right to a speedy trial cited.
Id., 52. Denial of effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 75. Due process cited. Id., 143. Fundamental fairness and due
process cited. Id., 225. Due process cited; right of confrontation cited. Id., 290. Fundamental right to unanimous jury
decision; fundamental due process rights cited. Id., 322. Due process rights and a fair trial cited. Id., 423. Right to con-
frontation cited; right to impartial jury and fair trial cited; right to speedy trial cited. Id., 564. Cited. Id., 622. Deprived
of fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 636. Right to confront witnesses cited; right not to
present evidence cited; right not to testify cited. Id. Cited. Id., 652. Due process and unconstitutional vagueness cited. Id.
Due process cited. Id., 719. Due process cited; right to present a defense cited; right to unanimous jury verdict cited. Id.,
733. Amount involved essential element of offense. Id., 801. Cited. 210 C. 22. “Miranda” rights cited; due process cited;
constitutional rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 51. Right to confront witnesses cited; right of confrontation cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
78. Right to a speedy trial cited; due process rights cited; right to fair trial cited; rights to confrontation and cross-exami-
nation cited. Id. Cited. Id., 110. Due process rights cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague cited; constitutional right to re-
main silent cited; deprivation of due process cited; deprivation of fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial cited.
Id., 132. Due process cited. Id., 157. Right of confrontation cited; due process rights cited; deprivation of fundamental
constitutional right cited; double jeopardy cited. Id., 244. Cited. Id., 286. Due process cited. Id. Due process cited. Id.,
304. Due process cited; due process right to trial by impartial jury cited. Id., 315. Cited. Id., 359. Due process cited; right
to confrontation cited; due process right to notice of charges cited; right to unanimous verdict and fair trial cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 396; Id., 435. Due process cited; notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, right
to confrontation and cross-examination cited; proof beyond reasonable doubt cited. Id. “Miranda” rights cited. Id., 619.
Due process right to fair trial cited. Id., 631. Cited. Id., 652. Constitutional rights of confrontation cited; due process
cited. Id. Constitutional right and a fair trial cited. Id., 751. Cited. 211 C. 18. Due process guarantees cited. Id. Right
against self-incrimination cited; due process right cited. Id., 101. Fundamental due process right cited. Id., 151. Cited.
Id., 215. Constitutional right to counsel cited. Id. Constitutional right to present witnesses and due process rights cited.
Id., 258. Cited. Id., 289. Due process right of confrontation and cross-examination cited. Id. Cited. Id., 352. Ineffective
assistance of counsel cited; Connecticut Constitution due process clause cited. Id. Cited. Id., 398. Ineffective assistance
of counsel cited; right to a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 455. Rights to notice of charges against him cited. Id. Due process
and right of confrontation cited; right to fair trial cited. Id., 555. Due process and right to fair trial cited. Id., 672. Cited.
212 C. 31. Due process rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 50. Right to confrontation cited; due process clause cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 83. Fee requirement not violation of constitutional rights. Id. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 223. Confrontation
rights cited; right to be informed of nature of charges cited. Id. Due process right to a fair trial, denial of fair trial cited.
Id., 325. Cited. Id., 351. Due process clause cited; fair trial cited. Id. Failure to disclose exculpatory evidence due process
cited; constitutional duty of disclosure cited. Id., 387. Right to a speedy trial cited. Id., 441. Right to due process and a
fair trial cited; right to impartial jury cited. Id., 593. Right to due process cited; fair opportunity to defend cited. Id., 612.
Home release status, unlike probation, does not confer liberty interest protected by state constitutional due process. 213
C. 38. Due process clause cited. Id. Cited. Id., 97. Right to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 161. Due process provision
cited; right to fair trial cited; right to compulsory process cited; right to assistance of counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 233.
Appellate review under State v. Evans, 165 C. 61, discussed; guidelines furnished. Id. Deprivation of a fundamental
constitutional right and a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 243. Right to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 388. Due process
rights cited; constitutional right to a fair trial cited; confrontation clause of state constitution cited. Id. Cited. Id., 405.
Involuntary statements under state constitution cited; due process right to fair trial cited. Id. Due process cited; right to
establish a defense cited. Id., 579. Equation of “great bodily harm” with “serious physical injury” insufcient to instruct
jury on use of deadly physical force in self-defense against threat of forcible sexual assault. Id., 593. Due process right
to establish a defense cited. Id. Cited. 214 C. 77; Id., 89. Deprivation of due process and a fundamental constitutional
right and a fair trial cited. Id., 118. Deprivation of right to due process under federal and state constitutions and a fair trial
cited. Id., 122. Insufciency of evidence presented at probable cause hearing renders moot subsequent prosecution and
conviction. Id., 132. Due process of law cited. Id. Constitutional rights of confrontation, compulsory process, due pro-
cess and privilege against self-incrimination cited. Id., 146. Fundamental right to have guilt established beyond a reason-
able doubt cited. Id., 161. Cited. Id., 232. Due process and due process jurisprudence and claims cited; constitutionally
protected interests cited. Id. Summary criminal contempt procedure discussed; due process rights cited; no claim of
constitutional deprivation of notice cited. Id., 344. Cited; deprivation of fair trial cited; void for vagueness cited; claims
of prosecutorial misconduct cited; constitutional right to due process cited. Id., 378. Due process cited; constitutional
right not to be tried without probable cause being found cited. Id., 476. Cited; right to notice of charges cited; right to
present a defense and to a fair trial and deprivation of due process rights cited. Id., 493. Due process right to establish a
defense cited. Id., 540. Considerations of due process cited. Id., 616. Cited. Id., 657. Ineffective assistance of counsel
cited; right to confrontation and pertaining to self-incrimination cited. Id., 717. Right to fair trial and due process cited;
right to impartial jury cited. Id., 752. Ability to present a defense cited; ineffective assistance of counsel cited. 215 C. 1.
Cited; rights to fair trial before impartial jury cited; due process clause cited. Id., 231. Constitutional right of confronta-
tion cited; due process cited. Id., 257. Due process clause cited. Id., 292. Due process right to fair trial cited. Id., 653.
Opportunity to cross-examine effectively; constitutional right to confrontation cited. Id., 716. Due process clause of
Connecticut Constitution cited. Id., 739. Cited. 216 C. 150, see also 26 CA 423, 27 CA 291, 223 C. 902 and 225 C. 10,
reversing judgment in State v. Marsala. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 172; Id., 188. Constitutional rights to due pro-
cess cited. Id. Right to establish defense cited. Id. Rights to due process cited; right to confrontation cited. Id., 273. Cited.
Id., 367. Right to impartial jury cited. Id. Right to due process cited. Id. Right to be convicted only upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt cited. Id. Cited. Id., 402, see also 234 C. 301. Cited. Id., 436. Due process rights cited. Id. Constitu-
tional right to due process cited; rights to confrontation cited. Id., 492. Right to confront witnesses in criminal proceeding
Art. XXIX AMENDMENTS TO THE 217
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
cited. Id., 563. Right to fair trial; deprivation of due process cited. Id., 585. Cited. Id., 647. Rights to effective assistance
of counsel and to due process of law and a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 678. Right to counsel, and ineffective assistance
of counsel cited. Id. Fair trial and right to be present at trial cited. Id. Due process limitation and claims cited. Id. Con-
frontation clause cited. Id. Constitutional right to undivided loyalty of counsel cited. Id., 822. Privilege against self-in-
crimination cited. 217 C. 24. Cited. Id., 73; Id., 243. Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation cited. Id.
Due process cited. Id. Right to confrontation cited. Id. Cited. Id., 498; Id., 532. Right to due process; right to impartial
jury cited. Id. Constitutional rights to due process cited; rights to fair trial and to present a defense cited. Id., 648. Right
to be heard by himself and by counsel cited. Id., 671. Cited. 218 C. 65. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 85. Right to
speedy trial cited. Id. Rights to due process and to confront witnesses against him cited. Id. State was free to create own
methods and procedures to establish probable cause; Sec. 54-46a constitutional. Id., 151. Rights to due process, depriva-
tion of fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 239. Rights to present a defense and to due process cited. Id. Privilege against
self-incrimination cited. Id. Right to assistance of counsel cited. Id. No right to presence of counsel at psychiatric exami-
nation itself. Id., 349. Right to due process cited. Id. Guarantee against self-incrimination cited. Id. Right to counsel
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 447. Right to confrontation cited. Id. Right to present a defense cited. Id. Due process right to a fair
trial cited. Id. Constitutional dilution of burden of proof cited. Id. Rights to due process cited. Id., 458. Cited. Id., 486.
State constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination cited. Id. Due process and right to fair trial cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 714. “Miranda” rights and self-incrimination clauses cited. Id. Constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion cited; rights to due process cited. Id., 766. Deprivation of due process rights cited. 219 C. 93. Rights to due process,
deprivation and rights of fair trial cited. Id., 160. Due process clauses cited; privileges against self-incrimination cited;
rights to counsel cited; rights to present a defense cited. Id., 234. Unconstitutionally vague, deprivation of fair trial, due
process right to fair warning, right to confront witnesses against cited. Id., 489. Due process requirements, right to fair
trial cited. Id., 605. Cited. Id., 721. Due process rights cited. Id. Constitutional right to fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 743.
State constitutional right to counsel cited. Id. “... proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms.” 220 C. 1. Right to effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Fundamental constitu-
tional rights to jury trial, confrontation and self-incrimination cited. Id., 6. Cited. Id., 61. Due process cited. Id. “... due
process concerns actual impact of resentencing on a defendant, not percentages.” Id., 169. Due process cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 270. Mandate that there be valid probable cause hearing cited. Id. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 345. Right to
present defense and confront witnesses cited. Id. Right to a fair trial cited. Id., 385. Due process, unconstitutional jury
selection and discrimination cited; right to fair trial cited. Id., 487. Cited. Id., 602. Due process cited. Id. Right to con-
front witnesses cited. Id. Right to counsel cited. Id. Right to fair trial cited. Id. Rights against self-incrimination cited;
rights to present a defense and to due process cited. Id., 698. Right to due process and a fair trial cited. Id., 765. State due
process rights cited. Id., 796. Cited. Id., 922. Rights to present a defense, confront and cross-examine witnesses and to
due process cited. 221 C. 58. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 84. Right to counsel cited; constitutional stan-
dard of cross-examination cited. Id., 128. Constitutional right to presumption of innocence and right to fair trial before
impartial jury cited. Id., 264. Rights to present a defense, to due process and to a fair trial cited; right to confront wit-
nesses cited. Id., 315. Right against self-incrimination cited. Id., 407. Voluntariness of statements under state constitution
cited. Id., 430. Cited. Id., 447. Due process rights cited. Id. Right to present a defense cited. Id. Right to compulsory
process cited. Id. Right to confront witnesses cited. Id. Prohibition against double jeopardy cited. Id. Due process rights
cited. Id., 498. Deprivation of fair trial or an impartial jury cited. Id., 518. Cited. Id., 643. Right to present a defense cited.
Id. Right to notice of charges against him cited. Id. Cited. Id., 685; 222 C. 1. Deprivation of constitutional rights cited.
Id. Right to present a defense cited. Id. Deprivation of effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 87. Deprivation of fair
trial cited; dilution of obligation to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt cited. Id., 117. Attorney in a disciplinary pro-
ceeding has no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel under general rule that civil proceedings ordinarily
do not give rise to right to counsel. Id., 131. Denial of right to effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. State due process
clause cited. Id., 233. Denial of effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 254–258. Right to confront witnesses and to due
process cited; fairness of trial cited. Id., 299. Cited. Id., 312. Deprivation of effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Due
process cited. Id. Confrontation rights cited. Id. Sec. 54-64f(c) as applied to defendant does not violate right of bail
provision. Id., 331. Constitutional right to be released on bail cited. Id. Due process cited. Id. Due process rights to fair
trial cited. Id., 444. Cited. Id., 506. Due process and right to be informed of charges cited. Id. Privilege against self-in-
crimination cited. Id. Right to remain silent cited. Id. Entitlement to probable cause hearing cited. Id. Right to fair trial
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 556; Id., 799. Due process cited. Id. Deprivation of fair trial cited; undue emphasis on defendant’s
burden of proof with respect to afrmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance cited. 223 C. 41. Cited. Id., 52.
Right to due process cited; violation of fundamental fairness cited. Id., 180. Constitutional right to present a defense
cited. Id., 207. Cited. Id., 243. Prohibition against double jeopardy cited. Id. Due process rights cited. Id. Deprivation of
fair trial cited. Id., 273. Cited. Id., 299. Due process cited. Id. Right of confrontation cited. Id. Cited. Id., 354. Fundamen-
tal fairness required by due process cited. Id. Due process right to impartial panel cited. Id. Ineffective assistance of ap-
pellate counsel cited. Id., 411. Due process right to fundamental fairness cited; right to fair trial cited. Id., 461. Cited. Id.,
535. Due process right to fair trial cited. Id. Constitutional right to present a defense cited. Id. Cited. Id., 595. Deprivation
of due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 635. Right to confrontation cited. Id. Violation of constitutional right to remain silent
cited. Id. Rights of confrontation cited; rights to fair trial cited; rights under due process cited. Id., 731. Cited. Id., 834.
Right to due process cited. Id., 903. Violation involving constitutional rights of due process warrants no more than a new
trial; judgment of appellate court in 25 CA 270 reversed in part; part of ruling in 182 C. 585 overruled. 224 C. 1. Right
to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 63. Ineffective assistance of counsel and due process cited. Id. “Miranda” rights cited.
Id. Cross-examination and impeachment of witnesses cited. Id. Constitutional right to a speedy trial cited. Id., 163. Right
to due process cited; unconstitutionally vague cited. Id., 168. Right to present a defense cited. Id., 196. Right to assis-
tance of counsel cited. Id., 253. Constitutional right to confrontation cited. Id. 325. Due process cited; right to notice of
crimes charged and to conduct adequate cross-examination cited. Id., 397. Cited. Id., 445. Due process cited. Id. Guar-
antees to due process and an impartial jury cited; right to jury selected from fair cross section of the community cited.
Id., 711. Right to due process cited. Id., 730. Void for vagueness cited. Id., 914. Cited. Id., 920; 225 C. 55. Constitutional
218 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXIX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
claim cited. Id. Privilege against self-incrimination and “Miranda” rights cited. Id. Due process and fair trial cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 270. Due process rights cited. Id. Due process rights to a fair trial cited. Id., 347. Due process cited. Id., 355.
Sec. 53a-13(a) does not violate state due process rights. Id., 450. Rights and provisions for due process cited. Id. Defen-
dant’s right to testify cited. Id. Right of cross-examination cited. Id. Deprivation of fair trial cited. Id., 519. Due process
challenge to constitutionality of Sec. 54-56d cited. Id., 524. Cited. Id., 609. Privilege against self-incrimination cited. Id.,
666. Cited. 226 C. 237. Due process and deprivation of fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 314. Due process cited. Id. Balance
between fth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and defendant’s right to compel witness testimony dis-
cussed. Id., 497. Right to compel witnesses cited. Id. Privilege against compelled self-incrimination cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
618. Rights to a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. 227 C. 1. Right to confrontation, cross-examination and due process cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 32; Id., 101. “Miranda” warnings and custodial interrogation cited. Id. Cited. Id., 301. Due process clauses and
due process rights cited. Id. Deprivation of fair trial cited. Id. Right to impartial jury cited. Id. Cited. Id., 333; Id., 389.
Right to confront witnesses cited. Id. Right to due process and a fair trial cited; rights against compelled self-incrimina-
tion cited. Id., 417. Cited. Id., 456. Due process cited. Id. Involuntary statements cited. Id. Due process and right to
present a defense cited; burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt cited. Id., 518. Cited. Id., 534. Due process cited. Id.
Unconstitutionally vague cited; right to due process cited. Id., 566. Cited. Id., 611. Confrontation and due process cited.
Id. Due process clause of Connecticut Constitution requires a new trial if jury is instructed that defendant may be found
guilty on a statutory alternative for which there is no evidence. Id., 616. Due process rights cited. Id. Right to due process
and to be present cited; right to assistance of counsel cited; right to cross-examine cited. Id., 677. Cited. Id., 711. Right
to due process cited. Id. Right to confront witnesses cited. Id. Right to jury drawn from cross section of community cited.
Id. Right to effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Right to fair trial cited. Id. Right to adequately instructed jury cited.
Id. Cited. Id., 751. Confrontation and due process rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 921. Due process clause cited. Id. Cited. 228
C. 62. Probable cause hearing cited. Id. Cited. Id., 118. Right to confront witnesses; right to due process and burden of
proof cited. Id. Proper standard for appellate review of denial of motion for continuance to retain private counsel dis-
cussed. Id., 234. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Rights to due process cited. Id. Right to counsel of choice
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 281. “Miranda” warnings’ independent signicance under state constitution cited. Id. Privilege
against compelled self-incrimination cited. Id. Right to present a defense and to due process of law cited. Id., 335. Cited.
Id., 393; Id., 412; Id., 456. Right to due process cited. Id. Right to confrontation cited. Id. Right to speedy appeal and to
confrontation and a fair trial cited; right to meaningful appeal cited; right to speedy trial cited. Id., 552. Right to have
one’s guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt cited. Id., 610. Constitutional right to establish a defense cited. Id., 756.
Cited. Id., 795. Void for vagueness cited. Id. Due process rights and right to effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 919.
Cited. Id., 928. Due process clause of the Connecticut Constitution cited. 229 C. 60. Cited. Id., 125. Disclosure of excul-
patory evidence cited. Id. Deprivation of fair trial cited. Id. Provision of counsel cited. Id. Due process rights cited. Id.
Deprivation of due process cited; ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 178. Cited. Id., 228. Right to due process
and a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 285. Due process cited. Id. Right to due process cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 397. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Rights to due process of law cited. Id. Right to a fair
trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 516. Right of defendant not to testify; right against self-incrimination cited. Id. Cited. Id., 529.
Due process rights cited; right to be informed of nature and cause of charges cited. Id. Violation of due process rights by
diluting state’s burden of proof cited; right of confrontation cited. Id., 557. Judgment of appellate court in 32 CA 217
reversed. Id., 580. Due process clause cited. Id. Due process clauses of state or federal constitution protect individuals
against governmental rather than private deprivation of property. Id., 592. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 691; Id., 703.
Due process rights cited. Id. Right to confrontation and due process cited. 230 C. 43. Deprivation of effective assistance
of trial and appellate counsel cited; judgment of appellate court in 31 CA 771 reversed. Id., 88. Cited. Id., 183. Uncon-
stitutional vagueness cited; rights of due process cited; due process clauses impliedly prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment cited; jury instruction depriving defendant of fair trial cited. Id. Right to effective assistance of counsel cited;
rights to due process and a fair trial cited. Id., 351. Cited. Id., 385, see also 37 CA 801. Right to impartial jury with
adequate voir dire cited; right to counsel, to remain silent, to be present during trial, to confrontation and against self-in-
crimination cited. Right to due process cited; right to present an insanity defense cited. Id., 400. Cited. Id., 572. Rights
to due process cited. Id. Ineffective assistance trial and appellate counsel cited; rights to due process cited. Id., 608.
Cited. Id., 909. Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id., 916. Cited. 231 C. 43. Constitutional right to trial cited; nondisclosed
exculpatory evidence cited. Id. Cited. Id., 77. Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id. Cited. Id., 235. Due process cited; right
to confrontation cited. Id. Lack of due process and ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 274. Rights to due process
cited; right of defendants to establish a defense cited; burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt cited. Id., 484.
Right to due process and effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id.,
936. Constitutional right to fair trial and due process cited. 232 C. 1. Cited. Id., 198. Due process rights cited. Id. Due
process requiring trial judge to ensure jury remains impartial and unprejudiced throughout trial; judgment of appellate
court in 33 CA 339 reversed with respect to this issue. Id., 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235
C. 502. Right to due process cited; right to unprejudiced jury cited. Id. Cited. Id., 691. Right to due process cited. Id. Due
process under state constitution requires consideration of three factors discussed; judgment of appellate court in 33 CA
184 reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Id., 707. Rights to due process and a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
740. Right to confrontation cited. Id., 910. Right to present a defense and self defense instruction cited. 233 C. 1. Due
process rights under state constitution cited. Id., 44. “... efcient, intervening cause ...” discussed. Id., 106. Right to
confrontation cited; right to consult with counsel cited; instruction regarding element of causation cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
215. Effective assistance of counsel cited; due process cited; instruction violating right to a fair trial cited. Id. Review of
comment on evidence is not constitutionally mandated when trial court in exercise of sound discretion determines such
commentary not necessary; judgment of appellate court in 33 CA 743 reversed. Id., 502. Right to due process cited. Id.
Judgment of appellate court in 34 CA 368 afrmed in part and remanded for articulation. Id., 517. Cited. Id., 557; Id.,
813. Self representation cited; right to effective assistance of counsel cited; due process requirements cited; prosecutorial
misconduct cited; confrontation issue cited. Id. Due process cited. 234 C. 97. Cited. Id., 139. Effective assistance of
counsel cited. Id. Due process rights cited. Id., 301. Due process of law cited; right to effective assistance of counsel
Art. XXIX AMENDMENTS TO THE 219
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
cited. Id., 324. Ban on assault weapons, Secs. 53-202a–53-202k, sufciently clear to satisfy due process requirements;
right to due process cited; facial vagueness cited. Id.; 455. Interplay of double jeopardy and prosecutorial misconduct
discussed. Id., 683. Prosecutorial misconduct cited; right to confrontation cited; ineffective assistance of counsel and
compulsory process cited. Id. Due process rights and deprivation of fair trial cited. 235 C. 145. Cited. Id., 206. Cruel and
unusual punishment impliedly prohibited cited; violation of state constitution cited. Id. Due process and right of defen-
dant to establish a defense cited. Id., 274. Unconstitutional dilution of proof beyond a reasonable doubt cited. Id., 397.
Admissibility of identication cited. Id., 402. Right to due process cited. Id., 405. Sec. 26-40a held not unconstitutionally
vague. Id., 427. Unconstitutionally vague and due process cited. Id. Rights of confrontation cited. Id., 473. Judgment of
appellate court in 33 CA 339 reversed on issues of sufciency of evidence and jury misconduct; judgment in 232 C. 431
superseded by en banc reconciliation. Id., 502. Rights to fair and impartial jury and due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 595.
Right to confrontation and due process cited; constitutional prohibitions against mandatory presumptions cited. Id. Due
process rights cited. Id., 671. Due process cited; privilege against self-incrimination and right to confront one’s accusers
cited. Id., 679. Right to present an effective defense cited. Id., 711. Right to confront witnesses against cited. Id., 746.
Cited. Id., 748. Due process and a fair trial cited; prosecutorial misconduct cited. Id. Due process cited; due process right
to present a defense cited. Id., 802. Cited. 236 C. 1. Due process and deprivation of fair trial cited. Id., 31. Cited. Id., 112.
Defendant’s right to be present throughout the trial cited; right of confrontation cited; defendant’s failure to testify and
due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 176; Id., 189. Due process and prohibition against relieving state of burden of proving
every element of crime beyond a reasonable doubt cited. Id. Right to a fair trial cited. Id., 209. Cited. Id., 266. Rights to
fair trial, due process and to counsel cited; right to present a defense cited. Id. Due process and right of defendant to
establish a defense cited. Id., 342. Cited. Id., 388. Right to assistance of counsel cited; due process cited; voluntariness
of statement cited. Id. Cited. Id., 421. Procedural and substantive due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 514. Constitutional
rights of confrontation, compulsory process and due process cited; right to impeach and discredit witnesses cited; right
to cross-examination cited. Id. Right to due process cited; right to counsel cited. Id., 561. Due process cited. Id., 602.
Constitutional right to present a defense cited. 237 C. 58. Cited. Id., 284. Fair trial and due process rights cited; uncon-
stitutionally vague and adequate notice of changes cited. Id. Right to counsel cited. Id., 332. Cited. Id., 348. Due process
rights cited; right that state prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt cited. Id. Right to counsel; right to remain
silent; right against self-incrimination, right to confrontation cited. Id., 378. Cited. Id., 390. Due process clause of state
constitution cited; proof beyond reasonable doubt of voluntariness of confession cited; failure to record confession
electronically cited; “Miranda” rights cited; preponderance of evidence cited. Id. Does not require electronic recording
in order for confession to be admissible at trial. Id. Cited. Id., 454. Fair trial by impartial jury cited; right to jury selected
from fair cross section of community cited. Id. Cited. Id., 576. Right to confront and cross-examine witnesses cited. Id.
Waiver of right to counsel cited; right to self-representation cited; right to confront accusers and privilege against self-in-
crimination cited; due process cited. Id., 633. Electronic recording of confessions is not a prerequisite to their admissi-
bility at trial under this section. Id., 694. State constitutional right to due process cited; right to counsel cited. Id. Cited.
238 C. 1. Rights to due process cited. Id. Right to present a defense cited. Id., 313. Cited. Id., 389. Prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment derived from due process clauses of state constitution cited; due process cited; right to
assistance of counsel cited; right to impartial jury cited; unconstitutional vagueness cited. Id. Cited. Id., 588. Right to
counsel cited. Id., 692. Cited. Id., 784. Right to due process cited. 239 C. 56. Cited. Id., 313. Procedural due process
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 405. Voluntariness of confession cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 427. Judgment of appellate court
in 39 CA 645 reversed and case remanded to that court with direction to remand case to trial court to consider due process
claim by full evidentiary hearing. Id., 467. Due process cited. Id. Rights to due process cited; right to fair trial cited; di-
lution of burden of proof cited. Id., 481. Fundamental requirements of fairness and right to fair trial cited. Id., 629. Cited.
240 C. 97; Id., 119. State constitution cited; due process cited. Id., 157. Due process right to fair trial cited. Id., 210.
Rights to confrontation and to present a defense cited; right to due process cited. Id., 395. Ineffective assistance of coun-
sel cited. Id,. 547. Cited. Id., 708. Due process rights cited; right to counsel cited. Id. Right to due process and unconsti-
tutionally vague cited. Id., 766. Cited. 241 C. 57. Right to compulsory process and to present a defense cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 322. Rights to due process and a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 439. Due process and right to jury determination of
essential element cited; failure to instruct jury on essential element cited. Id. Cited. Id., 502. Rights to due process and a
fair trial under state constitution cited. Id. Prosecutorial misconduct, due process and a fair trial cited. Id., 802. Cited. Id.,
823. Confrontation requirements cited. Id. Improper shifting of burden of proof, constitutional rights and deprivation of
a fair trial cited. 242 C. 93. Cited. Id., 125. Right to trial by jury cited; right to present a defense and to cross-examination
cited; violation of due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 143. Due process right to fair and impartial jury cited. Id. Unconsti-
tutionally vague on its face and as applied to conduct; due process requirements cited. Id., 211. Cited. Id., 296. Prohibi-
tion against double jeopardy and right to due process cited; right to confront accusers cited. Id. Deprivation of due pro-
cess cited; right to confront witnesses and to compulsory process cited. Id., 318. Speedy trial principles cited; ineffective
assistance of counsel and a fair trial cited. Id., 389. Notice of charge against defendant cited; constitutionally required
hearing re probable cause cited. Id., 409. Cited. Id., 432. Deprivation of due process and rights to a fair trial and to pres-
ent a defense cited; ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 445. Protected rights to due process cited. Id., 485. Cited.
Id., 505. Due process and withholding of exculpatory evidence cited. Id. Due process clause of Connecticut Constitution
cited; court invoked its supervisory authority to require trial courts to explain, upon request by a defendant, their reason
for imposing a greater sentence after trial than previously had been imposed under the terms of a plea agreement. Id.,
523. Cited. Id., 605; Id., 666. Right to confrontation and to cross-examination cited; right to due process and jury trial
cited. Id. Ineffective assistance of counsel and deprivation of due process cited. Id., 689. Ineffective assistance of counsel
cited. Id., 723. Rights to due process cited; constitutional requirements for fairness in initial identication procedures
cited. Id., 745. Cited. 243 C. 115. Constitutional speedy trial rights cited. Id. Does not require the presence of counsel for
a valid waiver of the right to counsel when defendant himself initiates contact with the police and has been properly
advised of his “Miranda” rights. Id., 205. Waiver of “Miranda” rights and right to counsel cited. Id. No due process right
exists for plaintiff lacking a property interest but the court recognizes a common-law right to fundamental fairness in
administrative hearings. Id., 266. Failure of police to preserve evidence was not a due process violation where evidence
220 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXIX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
was not material, police did not consider evidence signicant and any prejudice was minimal. Id., 282. Since Sec.
46b-127(a) does not create a vested liberty interest in juvenile status, the right to due process is not violated by transfer-
ring a juvenile to the criminal docket without notice, hearing or the assistance of counsel. 245 C. 93. Right to effective
assistance of counsel with respect to access to sentence review discussed. Id., 132. Lack of fair warning to defendant of
new construction of assault statute that found criminal liability for failure to act discussed. Id., 209. Defendant not de-
prived of right to probable cause hearing when attorney requested postponement beyond sixty-day period because
waiver of the time period in which to hold hearing may be asserted by the attorney for the defendant and does not require
the defendant personally to appear and be canvassed. Id., 301. Although Sec. 10-233d(a)(1) was not unconstitutionally
vague on its face, it was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of case since it did not provide student with
adequate notice that having marijuana in the trunk of a car off school grounds after school hours was seriously disruptive
of the educational process and would subject him to expulsion. 246 C. 89. Improper jury instruction concerning eviden-
tiary matter did not violate defendant’s due process rights. 248 C. 132. Court presumes that limitations provision in Sec.
31-349(b) and re-notication provision of Sec. 31-349(e) do not violate Connecticut Constitution because plaintiffs
briefed no argument that Connecticut Constitution entitles them to relief greater than that afforded by U.S. Constitution.
Id., 466. Court adheres to test that defendant’s right to remain silent is violated when a prosecutor’s comments are of
such character that the jury would “naturally and necessarily” take them to be comments on the failure of the defendant
to testify, declining to adopt less stringent test for state constitutional claims that right is violated when prosecutor’s
comments are “fairly susceptible” of being considered a comment on defendant’s failure to testify. Id., 652. Action of
prosecutor in giving doll to child victim, and trial court’s response in refusing to allow defendant to question child con-
cerning her treatment by the prosecutor, denied defendant due process. 249 C. 735. Amendment rendered indicting grand
juries obsolete. 250 C. 188. Jury was not coerced where judge did not permit it to cease deliberation and be sent home
for the day. Id., 385. Appellate Court properly rejected defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct during state’s
closing argument and state was not prohibited from asking jury to draw an inference from the absence of evidence con-
cerning any improper motivation behind the minor female victim’s identication of defendant. 251 C. 252. Duty of
disclosure of effort of counsel to contact defendant; State v. Stoddard, 206 C. 157, factually distinguished. Id., 285.
Identication and excusal for cause, prior to the guilt phase of a capital felony trial, of venire persons whose views
concerning the death penalty preclude them from serving as jurors at the sentencing phase, but not at the guilt phase, of
the trial does not violate the state constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury. Id., 671. Supreme Court has re-
peatedly equated common-law right to trial by an impartial jury that was incorporated into state constitution in 1818 to
that provided by federal constitution. Id. Defendant’s right to self-representation was not violated by trial court’s use of
standby counsel to provide defendant with access to legal materials, and defendant’s rights to self-representation and a
fair trial were not violated by trial court’s order that he remain in leg shackles during trial and trial court’s failure to allow
defendant to respond to the reasons given by ofcials for the shackling. Id., 768. Because lethal injection is constitutional
under federal constitution, it is constitutional under state constitution. 252 C. 128. Defendants were not entitled to either
new probable cause hearing or new trial because they failed to establish that the two pieces of allegedly exculpatory
evidence, a police report in which an informant stated that a third person admitted committing the murders and a witness
statement, were both favorable and material to their defenses under test for a Brady violation and that such violation
tainted subsequent prosecution of defendants and deprived them of right to a fair trial. Id., 533. Defendant’s due process
rights not violated by photographic identication of defendant by the mother of a victim who came to police station
without an appointment and unsolicited by the police for the purpose of requesting a picture of the person for whom an
arrest warrant had been issued and such identication procedures were not unnecessarily suggestive. Furthermore, such
identication was reliable under the totality of the circumstances–victim’s mother had ample opportunity to observe
defendant both times he visited her home, she viewed the picture with sufcient closeness and in good lighting and her
level of certainty was high. Id. Venire person’s potential reluctance to vote to convict constitutes a valid, race neutral
reason for the exercise of peremptory challenge; Supreme Court refused to consider unpreserved claim; trial court is not
required to undertake sua sponte review of prior peremptory challenges due to subsequent challenges that do not pass
Batson case test. Id. 280. Right to fair trial; trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering potential juror bias. Id.
Reasonable doubt; jury instruction that denes reasonable doubt as doubt for which you can give or assign a reason is
permitted; jury instruction that says reasonable doubt is something you can explain to someone is disapproved but does
not render an otherwise adequate instruction unconstitutional. Id. Reasonable doubt; jury instruction permissible that the
law is made to protect society and those whose guilt has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt and not to
protect those whose guilt has been so established. Id. Jury instruction was proper that Sec. 53a-54a incorporates doctrine
of transferred intent and holds both a principal and an accomplice liable for death of an unintended victim; no constitu-
tional error. Id., 354. Only substantial compliance is necessary for plea of guilty or nolo contendere under Practice Book
Sec. 39-20; Appellate Court reversed. Id., 375. Requirement that defendant bear burden of persuasion with respect to
afrmative defense of driving pursuant to valid work permit under Sec. 14-37a does not violate defendant’s due process
rights. 254 C. 107. Jury instructions concerning self-defense, in particular defendant’s duty to retreat and victims’ right
to use reasonable force in defense of their premises, did not violate defendant’s right to present a defense. Id., 184. Pros-
ecutor’s remarks during closing argument in which she rendered her opinion as to the credibility of victim’s testimony,
referred to facts not in evidence and appealed to the passions and emotions of jury constituted misconduct and denied
defendant his due process right to a fair trial. Id., 290. Witness statement as to furtherance of murder conspiracy held to
be within coconspirator exception to hearsay rule and therefore not violative of confrontation clause. Id., 739. Trial court
did not improperly prevent defendant from effectively cross-examining police detective about conduct during question-
ing of witness in unrelated civil case where civil judgment did not clearly or directly reect on detective’s veracity as a
witness in present case, did not prove that detective harbored a bias toward reluctant witnesses, and was collateral and
did not link detective’s acts in civil case with acts alleged in present case. 255 C. 61. Where the cause of a declared
mistrial, the conict between trier of fact presiding over both motion to suppress and trial itself, was brought to attention
of the court prior to trial, there was no surprise warranting declaration of a mistrial based on manifest necessity and,
therefore, subsequent reprosecution would constitute double jeopardy. Id., 186. Even though parental rights terminated,
Art. XXIX AMENDMENTS TO THE 221
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
parent has constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at termination proceeding because of claim to being a
parent. Id., 208. In case concerning assault of a police ofcer under Sec. 53a-167c, trial court denied defendant’s right to
confrontation and right to present a defense when it prevented defendant from questioning the ofcer re the rst element
of the crime, namely, whether the ofcer was performing his duties when defendant struck him. Id., 581. Defendant’s due
process right to a fair and impartial jury was not violated by trial court’s failure to sequester jury since pretrial publicity
was not so inammatory or inaccurate as to create a trial atmosphere utterly corrupted by press coverage. 256 C. 23.
Limited constancy of accusation doctrine upheld, and admission of overlapping constancy of accusation testimony from
multiple witnesses did not violate defendant’s confrontation and due process rights. Id. Due process rights of defendant
were not violated when trial court allowed witness who was reimbursed by state for lost wages in violation of state
statute to testify because trial court’s remedy of disclosing the reimbursement to the jury and allowing defendant to
cross-examine the witness about the reimbursement was sufcient to cure any prejudice created by the reimbursement.
Id. Due process does not require that defendant be given the opportunity to substantiate an immaterial claim. Id. Review
of claims that trial court lengthened defendant’s sentence as a punishment for exercising his or her constitutional right to
a jury trial should be based on the totality of the circumstances with the burden of proof on defendant. Id. In order for
defendant to have constructively possessed narcotics, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
knew of the character and presence of the narcotics and that he intended to and did exercise dominion and control over
the narcotics. Id., 164. There was substantial evidence presented to establish beyond reasonable doubt that defendant had
intentionally set one of the four res in question, despite defendant’s claim that there was an insufciency of evidence
for the jury to nd him guilty and that he therefore was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial; direct and cir-
cumstantial evidence was cited to show that defendant had the nancial motive and logistic opportunity to set the re
and the state’s experts testied that the re was set intentionally. Id., 214. Exemption from the securities registration
requirement is an afrmative defense to charge of selling unregistered securities under Sec. 36b-16 and Sec. 36b-21(g)
expressly places the burden of proving an exemption on the person claiming it; the existence and applicability of an
exemption does not negate any essential element of the crime that the state has the burden of proving beyond reasonable
doubt in order to convict, and requiring defendant to bear the burden of proving that afrmative defense by a preponder-
ance of the evidence does not violate defendant’s right to due process. Id., 313. Trial court’s instruction on attempted rst
degree sexual assault by fellatio found to be constitutionally inrm since trial court neither stated nor intimated that
penetration is a requirement generally of the crime and thus there was not reason for jury to have known that proof of
penetration was necessary to nd defendant guilty. Id., 517. Procedures of Sec. 31-349c(a) do not meet minimal due
process requirements under fourteenth amendment to federal constitution and Art. I, Secs. 8 and 10 of Connecticut Con-
stitution. At a minimum, parties to workers’ compensation claim seeking transfer to Second Injury Fund must have op-
portunity to review evidence presented to medical panel and panel’s ndings prior to its decision. Identity of panel
members must be disclosed with opportunity for parties to object. Parties must have opportunity to present their evidence
and arguments to panel, panel must have at least one member who is an expert in eld of medicine applicable to claim-
ant’s injuries, and there must be some level of review by commissioner to insure application by panel of appropriate legal
standards and opportunity for correction of clearly erroneous factual ndings. 257 C. 481, see also 257 C. 520, 257 C.
527. Trial court abused its discretion by failing to inquire into or investigate further defendant’s allegation, made follow-
ing his conviction but before sentencing, that he knew one of the jurors in his case from a prior criminal relationship;
trial court must conduct a preliminary inquiry, on the record, whenever it is presented with any allegations of jury mis-
conduct in a criminal case, regardless of whether an inquiry is requested by counsel. 259 C. 75. Unnecessary for court to
decide whether search warrant was required to conduct a thermal imaging scan to detect heat emanating from the arti-
cial lighting system used to cultivate marijuana within commercial premises; afdavit supporting search warrant appli-
cation for defendant’s commercial premises contained sufcient other facts to establish probable cause for issuance of
the warrant without the results of the thermal imaging scan. Id., 94. In future cases where defendant pleads not guilty by
reason of mental disease or defect and state substantially agrees with the claim so the trial is not an adversarial proceed-
ing on the issue, trial court must canvass defendant to ensure that his plea is made voluntarily and with full understanding
of its consequences. 261 C. 309. Although some of victim’s statements were improperly admitted and defendant was
unable to cross-examine victim because she was unavailable, the error was harmless because the facts alleged in the
statement were properly introduced at trial from different sources. Id., 336. Defendant’s right to counsel was not violated
because trial court was not required to complete a more detailed inquiry or canvass defendant, sua sponte, about a poten-
tial conict of interest re defense attorney when the attorney, as ofcer of the court, attested that there was no such
conict; state and federal constitutional standards for review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims are identical. Id.,
420. Trial court’s inquiry into potential conict of interest between defendant and his defense attorney was sufcient
under the circumstances–trial court learned that defendant and defense counsel could communicate during voir dire even
though they were seated approximately eight to ten feet away from each other, that defendant wanted defense counsel to
continue to represent him, although he wanted counsel to sit next to him, that defense counsel assured court that he
“absolutely” could represent his client adequately and that on the rst day of trial, counsel reported to court that their
differences were resolved. Furthermore, defendant made no claim during voir dire or trial that defense counsel’s perfor-
mance was decient. 262 C. 276. Where court instructed jury to disregard prejudicial testimony, burden is on defendant
to establish that, in context of the proceedings as a whole, the stricken testimony was so prejudicial, notwithstanding
court’s curative instructions, that jury reasonably cannot be presumed to have disregarded it. Id., 825. Housing authori-
ty’s failure to comply with statutory notice requirement of Sec. 8-44(d) did not deprive plaintiffs of any use or enjoyment
of their own property or deprive them of any other preexisting property right. 265 C. 280. Trial court’s nding that de-
fendant suffered from a severe personality disorder that justied involuntary connement and was therefore not a person
who should be discharged pursuant to Sec. 17a-593 was not an arbitrary or fundamentally unfair decision and did not
violate the defendant’s substantive due process rights. Id., 697. In considering death sentence, application of reasonable
doubt standard to measuring balance between aggravating and mitigating factors is not constitutionally required. 266 C.
171. Trial court did not violate defendant’s rights against self-incrimination under Art. I, Sec. 8 of Connecticut Constitu-
tion by ordering him to undergo polygraph examination; record discloses that defendant waived any such claim by
222 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXIX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
failing to raise such claim in trial court and by afrmatively acquiescing to trial court’s order. 267 C. 576. Although only
relevant evidence may be elicited through cross-examination, evidence tending to show motive, bias or interest of an
important witness is never collateral or irrelevant. Cited. Id., 710. Sec. 17a-593(c), as applied to insanity acquittee, did
not violate his procedural due process rights. 268 C. 508. Trial court properly allowed inmate imprisoned with defendant
while he awaited trial to testify re incriminating statements that defendant made to him both prior to and after the inmate
rst met with police to report the statements; inmate, after becoming an agent for the police, had not elicited defendant’s
statements deliberately and was no more than a passive listener; there is no constitutional violation when government
informant merely listens and reports. Id., 781. Alleged prosecutorial misconduct including remarks in closing argument
did not deny defendant due process; because it is necessary to review misconduct in the light of the entire trial, it is un-
necessary for reviewing court to apply the Golding test but rather court must apply the Williams factors; questions asked
outside jury’s presence during a hearing on motion to suppress were not improper. 269 C. 563. Prosecutor who asked
defendant whether police “put words in his mouth” did not improperly require defendant to comment on veracity of other
witnesses; prosecutor who asked re defendant’s testimony “Did all these witnesses get together and lie?” was not acting
improperly because it was defendant who initially suggested the witnesses were lying, not the state; defendant was not
deprived right to fair trial by prosecutor’s misdeeds, including prosecutor’s statement of personal opinions, gratuitous
sarcasm and use of defendant’s nickname, because of strength of the state’s case, trial court’s curative instructions and
defendant’s failure to object to the lesser improprieties. Id., 726. Sec. 17a-112(j) not unconstitutional as applied to termi-
nation of parental rights of unt mother upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that her child has been, among
other things, uncared for. 270 C. 382. Defendant’s due process right to have the state prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt does not mean that defendant has a due process right to have state’s burden evaluated only on state’s evidence to
the exclusion of the evidence that defendant chose to present and that jury heard. 271 C. 218. Defendant’s claim that
waiver rule violates the privilege against self-incrimination held contrary to well-established law. Waiver rule does not
compel defendant in a fth amendment sense to testify at all, but merely allows reviewing court to consider defendant’s
testimony as part of the record. Id. Denial of defendant’s right to be present during in-chambers inquiry was structural
defect necessitating automatic reversal of conviction and new trial without specic showing of harm. Id., 724. Temporal
proximity to nding of competency gives defendant with history of mental illness meaningful opportunity to discuss
waiver of probable cause hearing since defendant was competent when waiver occurred. Id., 740. Due process rights of
defendant not violated by trial court’s failure to canvass defendant regarding plea of not guilty by reason of mental dis-
ease or defect. Id. Trial court’s acceptance of jury’s corrected verdict, prior to jury’s discharge, does not violate defen-
dant’s double jeopardy rights. 272 C. 106. Defendant does not possess a state constitutional right of allocution in a cap-
ital sentencing hearing. Id. Trial court’s failure to inform defendant of the range of possible penalties he would face upon
conviction during its canvass of defendant made defendant’s waiver of counsel “not knowing, intelligent and voluntary”,
and therefore violated his right to counsel. 274 C. 818. Petitioner was not deprived of right to effective assistance of
counsel because there was no evidence that counsel failed to conform to the law and counsel had no obligation to pursue
novel legal claims. 275 C. 451. “Street show up” identication not unconstitutional under Neil v. Biggers test, 409 U.S.
188. Court failed to adopt new identication process standard. Id., 534. Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion
to suppress tape-recorded conversations between defendant and his cellmate in which defendant had portrayed himself
as a leader and active participant in victim’s murder and in destruction and disposal of victim’s body and personal effects;
in applying the four factors enunciated in State v. Asherman, defendant’s rights to due process were not violated. 277 C.
458. State’s failure to preserve defendant’s cellmate as an available witness did not violate defendant’s right to compul-
sory process, defendant having advanced no compelling policy considerations to warrant a broader reading of the state
compulsory process clause. Id. Deprivation of counsel at a probable cause hearing constitutes procedural error for which
harmless error review is proper. 279 C. 493. Sec. 53-21(a)(1), concerning risk of injury to a child, violated due process
and did not provide notice to defendant that conditions of apartment were so squalid that they posed a risk of injury to a
child’s mental health, where apartment was cluttered and had an unpleasant odor but showed no sign of mice or vermin,
rotting food or garbage. Id., 698. Disqualication of judge not required by defendant’s right to a probable cause hearing
when not specically required by Sec. 54-46a. 281 C. 572. Defendant, by his violent conduct, forfeited his right to rep-
resent himself. Id., 613. State constitutional right to counsel is triggered at the same time as federal constitutional right
to counsel, at arraignment. Id., 742. Reiterated previous holdings that “Miranda” warnings not necessary when defendant
informed numerous times that he is not under arrest and can leave the police station. 283 C. 598. Although constitution
guarantees defendant counsel that is effective, it does not guarantee counsel whom defendant will like. 284 C. 597.
Standard of review in evaluating habeas petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is whether there
is a reasonable probability that, but for appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue on appeal, petitioner would have
prevailed on his direct appeal. 286 C. 707. Violation of constitutional rights where defendant charged with possession of
narcotics under Sec. 21-279(a) and possession of narcotics with intent to sell under Sec. 21-277(a) where charges arose
from the same act or transaction and information alleges crimes committed on same date, at same location and with same
narcotic. 288 C. 345. A defendant personally must waive the fundamental right to a jury trial; counsel may not make that
decision as a matter of trial strategy; in the absence of a written waiver, trial court must canvass the defendant to ensure
that any waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Id., 770. Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel and
was entitled to a new trial when trial counsel refused to present witnesses to support third party culpability defense and
there was a reasonable probability sufcient to undermine condence in the jury’s verdict. 290 C. 502. Until scientic
research produces more denitive answers re various identication procedures, due process does not require the suppres-
sion of a photographic identication that is not the product of a double-blind sequential procedure, and in this case, the
procedures employed, although not ideal, were within the acceptable parameters of effective and fair police work and
satisfy due process requirements; photographic identications at issue were reliable under the totality of the circum-
stances and therefore admissible at trial (opinion concurring in the judgment). 291 C. 122. Defendant was not deprived
of impartial jury when juror was dismissed due to his actions toward marshal and responses to trial court’s questions. Id.,
769. Due process was violated when resentencing on remand effectively enlarged defendant’s original sentence by sub-
stituting term of probation for term of special parole, thereby exposing defendant to incarceration for an additional
Art. XXIX AMENDMENTS TO THE 223
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
ten-year period; resentencing did not violate double jeopardy where defendant challenged legality of sentences and not
validity of conviction, and trial court was free to refashion entire sentence for each crime within connes of the original
sentencing package as long as the entire sentence had not been fully served. 292 C. 417. Trial court did not abuse its
discretion by precluding defense counsel from asking venirepersons specically about self-defense. Id., 656. Defen-
dant’s due process rights were not violated because there was manifest necessity to declare a mistrial on basis of totality
of the circumstances when prosecutor unexpectedly became seriously ill during complex trial and no other prosecutor
could have assumed duties within the time constraints of existing jurors. 295 C. 1. Trial court improperly denied state’s
motion to dismiss state employee’s due process claims alleging stock had been taken without affording right to hearing
or other process, those claims having been premised on state constitutional taking claim that trial court should have
dismissed. 296 C. 186. State constitution does not provide defendant with greater compulsory process rights than under
federal constitution. Id., 476. Connecticut due process clause does not provide greater protection than the federal consti-
tution with respect to resentencing and application of the aggregate package theory. 297 C. 262. Neither privilege against
self-incrimination, right to counsel, right to present a defense or right to confrontation mandates that custodial interroga-
tion, advisement of Miranda rights and any resulting statements of defendant be recorded. 298 C. 537. Defendant was
not deprived of his rights to a jury trial and due process when trial court, at sentencing, considered evidence related to
crimes of which defendant was acquitted by the jury, because the evidence relied on by court in sentencing defendant,
i.e. his criminal record, the presentence investigation report, his ight to avoid arrest and sworn trial testimony, had the
necessary minimal indicium of reliability. 301 C. 669. Defendant’s decision to forgo a jury determination in capital fel-
ony sentencing proceeding and opt for sentencing by a three-judge panel was knowing, voluntary and intelligent; formu-
laic canvass of defendant is not required and validity of jury waiver is determined by examination of totality of the cir-
cumstances. 303 C. 71. Court’s limiting instruction on aggravating factor of committing murder in “an especially
heinous, cruel or depraved manner” that permits proof by callousness or indifference to the additional pain, suffering or
torture that defendant’s intentional conduct inicted on the victim does not render aggravating factor unconstitutionally
vague. Id. Death penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment; holdings in 230 C. 183 and 238 C. 389 reaf-
rmed. Id. Rights afforded crime victims do not grant a victim party status under statutes that govern appeals in criminal
matters. 304 C. 330. It is not a violation for the sole aggravating factor found by the jury re a capital felony, namely,
murder committed for pecuniary gain under Sec. 53a-46a(i)(6), to duplicate an element of the underlying crime of capi-
tal felony by murder for hire under Sec. 53a-54b(2); evidence that codefendant had said “I’ve got a job for you” and that
defendant made preparations for the murder and received a snowmobile after the victim was killed was sufcient to
support nding of probable cause that defendant committed murder for pecuniary gain. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1.
Where the state’s evidence in support of the conclusion that multiple thefts were part of a single scheme or course of
conduct, pursuant to Sec. 53a-121, was so overwhelming, and where that evidence was uncontroverted by defendant, the
trial court’s improper failure to instruct the jury that it could aggregate the value of the property stolen in the individual
thefts only if it rst concluded that the thefts were part of one scheme or course of conduct did not contribute to the
verdict and was harmless error. Id., 806. In the absence of improper state action, the admission of identication evidence
implicates due process principles only when the evidence is so extremely unreliable that its admission would deprive
defendant of his right to a fair trial. 312 C. 687. Preclusion of proffered demonstrative evidence by which defendant
sought to physically display to jury how his alleged disability prevented him from performing two mobility based eld
sobriety tests under any conditions did not infringe on constitutional right to present a defense. 313 C. 140. Automatic
reversal, not harmless error review, is the exceptional remedy for instances of structural defect of constitutional magni-
tude, and the state’s use of unreliable eyewitness identications resulting from unduly suggestive police procedures is
not one of the rare circumstances necessitating a new trial. 314 C. 131. Retroactive application of amended civil action
statute of limitations, Sec. 52-577d, to revive an otherwise time barred claim does not violate defendant’s substantive due
process rights; court has never recognized a vested right in the lapsing of a statute of limitations; state constitution does
not provide greater protection to defendant’s interest in the lapse of a statute of limitations than is afforded under federal
constitution; however, retroactive application of statute that would extend a lapsed criminal statute of limitations would
violate the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution. 317 C. 357. Vacatur remedy set forth in 308 C. 242 applies to
the double jeopardy violation caused by cumulative homicide convictions arising from the killing of a single victim. Id.,
741. Cruel and unusual punishments are prohibited under the due process provisions; the death penalty as imposed fol-
lowing the enactment of P.A. 12-5 repealing the death penalty only for those felonies committed on or after April 25,
2012, is so out of step with contemporary standards of decency as to violate the ban on excessive and disproportionate
punishment; the prospective abolition of the death penalty also violates the due process provisions because it no longer
serves any legitimate penological purpose. 318 C. 1. Right to bail not denied where trial court set monetary bond as a
condition of insanity acquittee’s release where acquittee was charged with committing new, violent crimes while housed
at maximum security psychiatric facility, and acquittee could not post that bond and was transferred to custody of Com-
missioner of Correction for temporary pretrial detention. 319 C. 288. Presumption of prejudice in jury tampering cases
articulated in 347 U.S. 227 remains good law with respect to external interference with jury’s deliberative process via
private communication, contact or tampering with jurors that relates directly to the matter being tried; once triggered,
presumption requires state to prove that there was no reasonable possibility that tampering affected the impartiality of
the jury. 320 C. 265. The bar on appellate relief under the victim’s rights amendment merely prohibits the court from
granting any relief that would directly affect the judgment in a criminal case or otherwise abridge the substantive rights
of a defendant; provision barring appellate relief does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over writs of error arising from
the victim’s rights amendment; focus of prohibition on appellate relief is on the substance of the relief, not on the identity
of the party seeking the relief, and prohibition was intended to apply to any person seeking a prohibited form of relief,
including victims; prohibition imposes same limitations on writs of error that it would impose on appeals by victims, if
they were statutorily authorized; victim’s rights amendment does not deprive victims of their right to le a writ of error
to enforce their constitutional rights, it also does not expand their rights to seek a form of appellate relief that previously
had been barred by statute. 326 C. 512. When it is undisputed and the arrest warrant application clearly alleges that
criminal misconduct was perpetrated against victim specically, the arrest warrant constitutes a sufcient determination
224 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXIX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
of status as victim to trigger the rights afforded by this article. 327 C. 173. In-chambers, off-the-record disposition con-
ferences between the prosecuting attorney, defense counsel, and the presiding judge are not court proceedings the
accused has the right to attend, consequently, neither does the victim or his or her authorized representative have a right
to attend them. Id. The right to bail is extinguished upon conviction, i.e., a nding of guilt, accepted by the court. Id.,
932. The proper framework, for state constitutional purposes, for evaluating the reliability of an identication that is the
result of an unnecessarily suggestive identication procedure requires that, to obtain a pretrial hearing, defendant has the
initial burden of offering some evidence that a system variable undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identica-
tion. If defendant meets this burden, the state must then offer evidence demonstrating that the identication was reliable
in light of all relevant system and estimator variables. If the state adduces such evidence, defendant must then prove a
very substantial likelihood of misidentication. If defendant meets that burden of proof, the identication must be sup-
pressed. 330 C. 91. Connecticut constitution contains a more protective prophylactic rule concerning the right against
compelled self-incrimination than the Federal constitution and the standard set forth in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.
452, thus, police ofcers are required to clarify an ambiguous request for counsel by a defendant before they can con-
tinue the interrogation. 331 C. 318. On motion for new trial based on juror misconduct, presumption of prejudice applies
if defendant can demonstrate that juror consulted a dictionary and was exposed to a denition of a material term that
substantially differed from the legal denition provided by the court, shifting the burden to the state to show that this
exposure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; ultimate inquiry is whether there is a reasonable possibility that
extrinsic material could have affected the verdict. 341 C. 387. Defendant’s right to confront witness was not violated
because the defendant was permitted to ask the victim a number of questions regarding the existence of a civil action, as
well as to probe for any inconsistencies between the witness’s testimony and the civil complaint. 342 C. 239.
Cited. 1 CA 373. Trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motions for continuance of trial so as to
permit him to be represented by the counsel of his choice. Id., 669. Although trial court’s charge concerning the defen-
dant’s capacity to distinguish right from wrong was in error since it involved the abandoned M’Naghten test, when re-
viewed in the context of the entire trial it did not violate defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights. Id., 697. Due
process at sentencing discussed where court considered facts which concerned counts dismissed pursuant to plea bargain.
Id., 724. Cited. 2 CA 127. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 204. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 219. Right to speedy,
public trial by impartial jury and right to assert privilege against self-incrimination cited. Id. Decision in 2 CA 551 et seq.;
judgment of appellate court reversed and case remanded to court with direction to reinstate judgment of trial court, see
199 C. 231. Due process cited. Id., 551. Right to fair trial cited. Id., 617. Cited. 3 CA 148. Effective assistance of counsel
and due process cited. Id. Fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 166. Fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 339. Right to speedy trial cited. Id. Rights of confrontation and due process, and right to present witnesses in
own behalf cited; right to fair trial cited. Id., 374. State constitutional question relative to burden of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt cited. Id., 650. Due process and constitutional right to a fair trial cited. 4 CA 54. Cited. Id., 451; Id., 514.
Effective assistance of counsel cited. 5 CA 79. Due process cited. Id., 113. Denial of due process cited; fair trial cited. Id.,
277. Cited. Id., 369. Due process cited. Id. Due process cited; fundamental constitutional right cited, Id., 378. Due process
cited. Id., 500. Cited. Id., 556. Right to compulsory process cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 571. Due process cited; fair
trial cited. Id., 599. Effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 612. Effective assistance of counsel; issue of fundamental
constitutional signicance cited. 6 CA 24. Right to effective assistance of counsel is not guaranteed to defendant in civil
proceeding. Id., 83. Right to effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 124. Right to a fair trial cited. Id. Consti-
tutional right of confrontation cited; fair trial cited. Id., 164. Robbery in second degree not a lesser included offense of
robbery in the rst degree; effect of attempted substitution discussed. Id., 247. Right to notice of crime charged cited. Id.
Deprivation of fair trial cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague or over broad cited. Id., 407. Cited. Id., 471. Ineffective assis-
tance of counsel cited. Id., 518. Constitutional rights of due process cited; ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 546.
Cited. Id., 680. Denial of effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Right to trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 667. Fundamental
constitutional right and a fair trial cited. Id. Due process right for conviction only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
cited. Id. Cited. 7 CA 1. Fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial cited. Id. Waiver of constitutional right to remain
silent cited. Id. Cited. Id., 27. Right to jury trial cited. Id. Due process cited. Id.; Id., 95. Cited. Id., 149. Due process cited.
Id. Compulsory process cited. Id. Effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 180. Does not guarantee the right
of hybrid representation. Id., 217. Cited. Id., 257; Id., 326. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 445. Denial of effective as-
sistance of counsel cited. Id. Constitutional right of defendant to testify cited. Id. Cited. Id., 457. Right of effective assis-
tance of counsel cited. Id. Due process right to fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 470. Fundamental right to a fair trial cited.
Id. Cited. Id., 477. Fundamental right to a fair trial cited. Id. Due process rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 503. Rights to due
process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 532; Id., 701. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 726; 8 CA 35. Right to
fair trial and impartial jury cited. Id. Cited. Id., 44. Constitutional right to confrontation and due process right to call
witnesses in defense cited. Id. Cited. Id., 63. Right to effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 96. Right to
confront opponent cited. Id. Cited. Id., 111. Effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Fundamental constitutional right to
notice of nature of charges cited. Id., 153. Right to confront accuser cited. Id., 190. Cited. Id., 216. Due process and right
to counsel; right to confrontation; right to fair trial, cited. Id. Right to public trial, impartial jury and counsel present; due
process; right of confrontation, cited. Id., 273. Cited. Id., 317. State right to confront witnesses and due process right to
fair trial cited. Id. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 342. State due process rights cited. Id., 345. Due process
cited. Id., 387. Cited. Id., 399. Ineffective assistance of counsel; constitutional right to notice, cited. Id., 478. Violation of
a fundamental constitutional right; right of confrontation and right against self-incrimination, cited. Id., 491. Cited. Id.,
528. Deprivation of constitutional right and denial of fair trial; due process, cited. Id. Constitutional right to fair notice
cited. Id., 545. Deprivation of a fair trial and due process cited. Id., 566. Denial of effective assistance of counsel cited.
Id. Due process right to a fair trial cited. Id., 581. Due process rights; fundamental constitutional right, cited. Id., 620. Due
process rights cited. Id., 631. Due process cited. Id., 667. Constitutional right of cross-examination cited. Id., 673. Right
to fair, speedy trial; due process, cited. 9 CA 74. Deprivation of effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 79. Ineffective
assistance of counsel cited. Id., 133. Due process cited. Id., 141. Cited. Id., 147. Due process cited. Id. Fundamental
constitutional right not to testify cited. Id., 169; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370. Right to assistance of counsel; right
Art. XXIX AMENDMENTS TO THE 225
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
to be free from compelled self-incrimination; due process right to fair trial; right to testify in own behalf, cited. Id., 208.
Denial of due process cited. Id., 228. “Use of an information to charge an offense not otherwise entitled to a trial by jury
does not thereby entitle a defendant to a trial by jury ...”. Id., 255. Constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt; unconstitutional dilution of burden of proof, cited. Id., 275. Denial of due process cited. Id., 313. Denial of
effective assistance of counsel; due process rights; right to counsel, cited. Id., 340. Due process cited. Id., 464. Due pro-
cess rights and clause cited. Id., 548. Cited. Id., 587. Constitutional right to self-representation; right to counsel cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 631; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352. Constitutional rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses cited.
Id., 631; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352. Right to be tried before an impartial jury; constitutional right to fair trial,
cited. Id., 656. Constitutional right to a fair trial cited. Id., 667. Right of confrontation; due process rights; constitutional
right of cross-examination; right of compulsory production of witnesses, cited. 10 CA 103. Right to due process cited.
Id., 130. Right to due process and effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 147. Right to assistance of counsel under state
constitution cited. Id., 265. Cited. Id., 279. Fundamental constitutional right cited. Id., 302. Due process and fundamental
constitutional right cited. Id., 330. Cited. Id., 347. Constitutional right to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 361. Constitu-
tional due process claims; right to fair trial and impartial jury, cited. Id. Right to due process; rights under state and federal
constitutions, cited. Id., 404. Denial of due process cited. Id., 422. Constitutional right against self-incrimination cited.
Id., 428. Due process rights cited. Id., 457. Proof of each element beyond a reasonable doubt; claim of insufcient evi-
dence, cited. Id., 462. Fundamental constitutional right that state establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt; instructional
error, cited. Id., 474. Due process and effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 520. Ineffective assistance of counsel
cited. Id., 546. Defendant not entitled under due process clause to cross-examine witnesses in a sentencing hearing; due
process cited. Id., 591. Cited. Id., 624. Constitutional right to an impartial jury cited. Id. Cited. Id., 643. Deprivation of
fundamental constitutional right and fair trial cited. Id., 659. Cited. Id., 683. Right to impartial jury cited. Id. Clarication
of instructions is mandatory when any member of jury manifests confusion about the law. Id., 697. Constitutionally
protected right to properly instructed jury; fundamental constitutional right to due process and a fair trial, cited. Id. Con-
stitutional right to fair notice of charges cited. Id., 709. Cited. 11 CA 80. Right to fair notice of charges cited. Id. Consti-
tutional right to testify and present a defense cited. Id., 102. Constitutional rights to an adequately instructed jury and
conviction only on proof beyond a reasonable doubt cited. Id. Constitutionally void for vagueness; due process; burden
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, cited. Id., 122. Constitutional rights to conviction on proper evidence by
impartial jury and to confrontation cited. Id., 236. Constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses cited. Id., 238. Due
process; unconstitutionally vague, cited. Id., 316. Due process cited. Id., 425. Cited. Id., 473. Due process violation im-
plicating fairness of trial cited. Id., 575. Due process cited. Id., 665. Rights of confrontation, compulsory process and due
process, cited. Id., 673. Constitutional right to fair trial and cross-examination cited. Id., 684. Cited. Id., 693. Deprivation
of due process cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 699. Due process rights cited. Id., 709. Cited. 12 CA 1. Constitutional
right to a speedy trial; constitutional right to notice, cited. Id. Deprivation of fundamental constitutional right and a fair
trial cited. Id., 74. Due process cited. Id., 101. Cited. Id., 163. Deprivation of fair trial and due process cited. Id. Funda-
mental constitutional right cited. Id., 172. Constitutional right of confrontation cited. Id., 196. Cited. Id., 221. Right to
due process cited. Id., 225. Due process rights cited. Id., 239. Due process; unconstitutionally vague, cited. Id., 258.
Cited. Id., 268. Due process rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 306. Constitutional right to a fair trial cited. Id., 320. Cited. Id.,
364. Constitutional right to speedy trial cited. Id. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 385. Cited. Id., 395. Right to
fair trial and due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 427. Constitutional right not to testify; opportunity for cross-examination,
cited. Id., 481. Constitutional right to a fair trial cited 13 CA 40. “... denial of cross-examination subject to harmless error
analyses.” Id., 60. Cited. Id., 76. Deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial cited. Id. Exculpatory
evidence unconstitutionally suppressed cited. Id., 133. Constitutional right to present a defense; constitutional right of
confrontation, cited. Id., 139. Constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict cited. Id., 288. Cited. Id., 368. Right of
confrontation; fundamental constitutional right that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, cited. Id. Right to con-
front accusers; privilege against self-incrimination cited. Id., 378. Constitutional right to a fair trial cited. Id., 386. Inef-
fective assistance of counsel; constitutional right to counsel, cited. Id., 413. Rights to due process; right to fair trial, cited.
Id., 420. Due process purposes; fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial cited. Id., 438. Due process clause and
rights cited. Id., 554. Fundamental constitutional right and right to fair trial cited. Id., 576. Constitutional right to proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt cited. Id., 578. Fundamental constitutional right to proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt cited. Id., 596. Cited. Id., 687. Denial of fair trial; denial of due process, cited. 14 CA 6. Due process guarantees of
this article have been held to encompass protection against double jeopardy. Id., 10. Due process violation; fundamental
constitutional right and fair trial, cited. Id., 88. Due process cited. Id., 108. Effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 140.
Fundamental constitutional right and fair trial; denial of due process, cited. Id., 146. Right of confrontation; right against
self-incrimination; right to due process, cited. Id., 159. Essentials of due process and fair treatment cited. Id., 205. Cited.
Id., 272. Unconstitutionally vague; due process rights; double jeopardy clause, cited. Id. Right to confrontation cited. Id.,
309. Right to confrontation is right to cross-examine but not right to all-inclusive cross-examination. Id., 322. Privilege
against self-incrimination; rights to confrontation, cited. Id. Cited. Id., 451. Due process; right to confront witnesses
against, cited. Id. Right to counsel; right against self-incrimination; right to confront witnesses against; right to fair trial,
cited. Id., 586. State due process clause cited. Id., 605. Presumption of innocence and state’s burden of proof; proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; fairness of trial; due process; right to testify, cited. Id., 657. Cited. Id., 688. Right to due
process; right to notice of charges; right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; constitutional right to fair trial; burden
of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, cited. Id. Denial of due process and a fair trial cited. 15 CA 34. Constitutional
right that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt cited. Id., 58. Right to due process; right to confront witnesses
against him, cited. Id., 122. Constitutional requirement to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt cited; unconstitutional
vagueness cited; fundamental constitutional right and fair trial cited. Id., 161. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited; right
to due process cited. Id., 197. “This court will not impose a degree of certitude as to date, time and place that will render
prosecution of those who sexually abuse children impossible”; constitutional requirement satised by information pro-
viding time frame with distinct beginning and equally clear end within which crimes are alleged to have been committed.
Id., 222. Cited. Id., 251. Right to present defense cited; due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 289. Due process rights cited;
226 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXIX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
right to fair and impartial jury cited; right to confront and cross-examine witnesses cited. Id., 342. Due process rights
cited. Id., 589; Id., 641. Cited. Id., 704. Right not to be convicted except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt cited; right
to fair trial and due process cited. Id. Cited. 16 CA 18. Due process right to a fair trial cited. Id. Privilege against self-in-
crimination and right to remain silent cited. Id., 75. Cited. Id., 184; Id., 318. Constitutional right to due process cited;
rights of confrontation cited. Id. Due process rights cited. Id., 333. Constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by
a jury and not by a court cited; right to have elements of offense proven beyond reasonable doubt cited. Id., 346. Cited.
Id., 358; Id., 402. Constitutional right to fair trial cited; right to due process cited. Id. Constitutional right to fair trial cited.
Id., 455. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 518. Right of confrontation cited; right against self-incrimination
cited; due process cited. Id., 601. Constitutional due process safeguards cited. 17 CA 17. Right not to be convicted except
on proof beyond reasonable doubt cited. Id., 104. Cited. Id., 174. Right to confrontation cited. Id. Acceptance of admis-
sion of parole violation requires only that court advise defendant of his right to a hearing to contest alleged violations. Id.,
226. Constitutional right of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt cited. Id., 243. Cited. Id., 257. Rights of due process
and right to remain silent cited; constitutional right to a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 359. Right to compulsory process
cited. Id. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited; due process cited. Id., 447. Due process cited; right to confront accusers
cited. Id., 466. Unconstitutionally diluted state’s burden of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt cited; due process
rights cited; fundamental rights to a fair trial cited. Id., 490. Cited. Id., 602. Privilege against self-incrimination cited; due
process cited; right to fair trial cited. Id. Right to confrontation cited. Id., 648. Cited. 18 CA 134. Due process cited; rights
under state constitution cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 175. Destruction of evidence discussed. Id., 223. Deprivation of
due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 273. Rights to confrontation cited; right to effective cross-examination cited; right to a
public trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 297. Rights to due process, effective assistance of counsel, compulsory process and to
present a defense cited. Id. Right to assistance of counsel cited. Id., 368. Due process and constitutional right to a fair trial
cited. Id., 602. Cited. Id., 694. Right to due process cited; right to impartial jury cited. Id. Due process cited; ineffective
assistance of counsel cited. Id., 716. Due process cited. 19 CA 48. Cited. Id., 195. Due process cited. Id. Due process
cited; right to present a defense and compulsory process cited; right to be informed of nature of charge cited. Id., 125.
Cited. Id., 179. Nature of charges against cited. Id. Cited. Id., 445. Rights to confront accusers and to due process cited.
Id. Denial of right to speedy trial cited; due process cited. Id., 495. Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id., 521. Cited. Id.,
554, 560. Inform of nature and cause of accusation cited. Id. Cited. Id., 571. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt cited. Id.,
594. Right not to testify cited. Id., 618. Due process rights cited. Id., 640. Denial of effective assistance of counsel cited.
Id., 646. Denial of fundamental constitutional right of fair trial cited; due process cited. Id., 654. Cited. Id., 668; Id., 674.
Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 695. Right to be present cited; right to acquittal unless proven guilty
of each element beyond a reasonable doubt cited. Id. Right to due process cited. 20 CA 27. Right to impartial jury and
fair trial cited; constitutional due process right and fair trial cited; right to unanimous verdict cited. Id., 40. Rights to due
process and fair trial cited. Id., 75. Cited. Id., 101. Due process cited; right to confrontation cited. Id., 115. Cited. Id., 168;
Id., 193. Double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. Id., 241. Constitutional rights to due process cited. Id., 271. Denial of due
process cited. Id., 386. Right to due process cited. Id., 410. Due process right to establish a defense cited. Id., 430. Right
to be apprised of charges cited. Id., 495. Due process guarantees interpreted as including protection against double jeop-
ardy cited; due process rights cited. Id., 572. Cited. Id., 586. Unconstitutional dilution of state’s burden of proof. Cited.
Id. Unconstitutionally vague cited; due process cited. Id., 599. Due process rights cited. Id., 643. Cited. Id., 691. Protec-
tion against self-incrimination cited. Id. “Statute does not limit the denition of ‘any person’ to adults.” Id., 694. Due
process rights cited; vagueness and void for vagueness cited. Id. Due process right to fair trial cited. Id., 721. Due process
cited; right of confrontation cited; fair trial cited. Id., 737. Cited. 21 CA 48. Due process rights and right to a fair trial
cited. Id. Cited; due process rights cited. Id., 138. Cited; right to confrontation cited; constitutional due process claims
cited. Id., 162. Due process cited. Id., 172. Constitutional rights to fair trial cited; due process rights cited. Id., 235. Cited;
ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 260. Cited; right to confrontation and confrontation clause cited; opportunity
to cross-examine adverse witnesses cited; restrictions on cross-examination cited. Id., 291. Violation of fundamental
constitutional right and deprivation of fair trial cited; due process clause cited; constitutional right to adequate instruction
cited. Id., 299. Denial of due process cited. Id., 331. Privilege against self-incrimination cited. Id., 386. Due process right
to present a defense and right to a fair trial cited. Id., 403. Cited; right to confront witnesses cited. Id., 411. Rights of due
process and ability to prepare a defense cited. Id., 431. Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id., 449. Right to cross-examine
and confront witnesses cited; right to trial by fair and impartial jury cited. Id., 467. Precluded from effective cross-
examination cited. Id., 474. Violation of due process rights cited. Id., 496. No due process violation cited. Id., 557. Fun-
damental right to a fair trial cited. Id., 622. Due process rights cited. Id., 654. Right to fair trial, due process cited; right
to impartial jury cited. Id., 688. Privilege against self-incrimination cited. 22 CA 53. Right not to be tried twice for same
offense cited; double jeopardy claim cited. Id., 73. Due process rights cited. Id., 108. Cited; guarantees right to present
closing argument cited; right to confront adverse witnesses through cross-examination cited. Id., 207. Right to effective
assistance of counsel cited; due process rights cited. Id., 303. Due process and a fair trial cited; constitutional duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence cited. Id., 329. Due process rights cited. Id., 340. Right to trial by jury cited; due process
cited. Id., 440. Due process cited; deprivation of fair trial cited. Id., 449. Due process rights cited. Id., 477. Cited. Id., 531.
Rights to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 567. Right to be informed of charges cited. Id. Deprivation of due process and
a fair trial cited. Id. Due process cited. Id., 601. Right to confrontation cited. Id., 665. Cited. Id., 669. Ineffective assis-
tance of counsel cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague and over broad; deprivation of due process cited. Id., 683. Right to
confront accusers cited; due process cited; privilege against self-incrimination cited. 23 CA 1. Constitutional right not to
testify cited; defendant’s rights cited; resort to privilege cited. Id., 28. Due process rights cited. Id., 50. Cited. Id., 63;
judgment reversed, see 220 C. 112. Denial of effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Right to fair trial before impartial
jury cited. Id. Right to confront witnesses against him cited. Id., 83. Taking without due process of law cited. Id., 115.
Right to present a defense cited; right to assistance of counsel cited; no enlargement of crime, constitutional infringement
cited. Id., 151. Right to present a defense cited; right to fair or impartial trial cited; dilution or shifting of state’s burden
of proof cited. Id., 160. Due process guarantees cited. Id., 215. Cited. Id., 221. Unconstitutional vagueness cited; funda-
mental due process right to fair warning cited. Id., 272. Cited. Id., 358. Right to confrontation cited. Id. Right to due
Art. XXIX AMENDMENTS TO THE 227
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
process, confrontation cited. Id., 392. Respondent’s right to confrontation and cross-examination here are statutory not
constitutional. Id., 410. Constitutional rights to confrontation and to cross-examination cited. Id. Rights to due process
cited. Id., 431. Violation of constitutional rights by relieving state of burden of proof cited; deprivation of right to due
process cited. Id., 479. Deprivation of fundamental constitutional right and fair trial cited; defendant convicted of offense
of which he was never given notice has been deprived of fundamental constitutional right. Id., 502. Right to fair trial;
deprivation of fair trial cited. Id., 532. Due process rights cited. Id., 564; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400. Rights
to due process cited; right to be present cited. Id., 642; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 629. Right of confrontation cited.
Id., 667. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 692. Privilege not to incriminate self cited; “Miranda” warnings
cited. Id., 705. Due process cited. Id., 746; judgment reversed, see 221 C. 595. Due process and deprivation of fair trial
cited. 24 CA 27; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652. Due process rights cited. Id., 57. Violation of due process cited. Id.,
146. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 152. Cited. Id., 195. Due process right to present a defense cited. Id. Right
to fair trial cited. Id. Right to due process cited; violation of constitutional rights by jury instruction cited. Id., 264. Due
process and right against compelled self-incrimination cited; “Miranda” rights cited; use of statement for impeachment
purposes made following “Miranda” warnings discussed. Id., 295. Unconstitutionally vague and over broad cited. Id.,
300. Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation against him cited. Id., 316. Right to speedy trial cited. Id.,
408. Due process rights cited. Id., 473; judgment reversed in part, see 221 C. 788. Due process rights cited. Id., 493. Due
process violations cited. Id., 541. Due process assertion of recognized specic defense cited. Id., 556. Due process cited.
Id., 563. A probation revocation hearing is not a criminal prosecution encompassing right to trial by jury. Id., 575. Right
to jury trial cited. Id. Denial of due process cited. Id. Fundamental right to establish a defense cited. Id., 586. Right to due
process cited. Id., 598. Due process cited. Id., 612. Cited. Id., 624. Due process cited. Id. Right not to testify cited; right
to establishment of guilt beyond reasonable doubt cited; right to fair trial, due process cited. Id., 642. Right to due process
and to present a defense cited. Id., 678. Rights to due process cited; right to be convicted only on proof beyond reasonable
doubt cited. Id., 685. Pertains to trial counsel not habeas counsel; effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 723. Cited. Id.,
729. Confrontation rights cited. 25 CA 21. Right to due process cited; fair trial cited. Id., 149. Cited. Id., 171. Deprivation
of a fair trial, constitutional right to a fair trial, denial of due process rights cited. Id., 181. Right to a fair trial, due process
cited. Id., 243. Right to confront and cross-examine witnesses cited. Id., 255. Cited. Id., 282; Id., 334. Right to a fair trial
cited. Id. Right to confront cited. Id., 354. Right to due process and to cross-examine cited. Id., 421; judgment reversed,
see 222 C. 299. Cited. Id., 433. Right to fair trial and impartial jury cited. Id. Right to due process cited. Id. Right to fair
trial and to present a defense cited. Id., 456. Rights to due process and establishment of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
cited. Id., 472. Right to confrontation cited; due process cited; right to an attorney cited; right to remain silent cited. Id.,
503. Right to due process and a fair trial cited. Id., 565. Due process concerns of right to fair and adequate notice of
charges cited. Id., 619. Due process rights cited. Id., 646. Right to confrontation cited; right to impeach witnesses cited;
unconstitutional comment on defendant’s failure to testify cited. Id., 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52. Right to due
process and fair trial cited; rights of confrontation and cross-examination cited. Id., 725. Right to effective assistance of
counsel and due process cited. Id., 734. Right to effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 741. Cited. 26 CA 10. Rights
to due process cited. Id. Denial of effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 52. Cited. Id., 81. Right of confrontation and
cross-examination cited. Id. Due process, right to remain silent, “Miranda” warnings, right to fair trial cited. Id., 86.
Cited. Id., 125. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Violation of right to fair trial by failure to disclose exculpatory
information cited. Id., 242. Cited. Id., 259. Due process overtones cited. Id. Right to fair notice of crimes charged cited.
Id. Information on nature and cause of accusation cited. Id. Dilution of burden of proof in violation of right to fair trial
cited. Id. Right to unanimous jury verdict and right to fair trial cited. Id., 279. Cited. Id., 305. Right to cross-examine
witnesses cited. Id. Cited. Id., 331. Right to fair trial and due process cited. Id. Right to present a defense cited. Id., 367.
Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id., 395. Due process rights cited. Id., 433. Right to counsel cited; right to fair trial and
due process of law cited. Id., 472. Due process rights cited. Id., 553. Cited. Id., 625; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656;
judgment of acquittal reversed, see 31 CA 452. Right to notice cited. Id. Conviction only on proof of each element of
offense beyond reasonable doubt cited. Id., 641. Cited. Id., 674. Right to due process cited. Id. Privileges against self-in-
crimination cited. Id. Rights of confrontation cited. Id. Constitutional speedy trial cited. Id., 698. Cited. Id., 758. Ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel cited. Id. Due process cited. Id. Right to public trial cited. Id. Rights to due process cited. Id.,
805. Due process cited; deprivation of fair trial cited. 27 CA 1. Right to cross-examine cited; right to fair trial cited.
Id., 30. Right to present a defense cited. Id., 49. Right to present a defense cited; right to due process cited. Id., 73. Cited.
Id., 103. Right to reasonable notice of the charges cited. Id. Cited. Id., 128; Id., 171. Due process and a fair trial cited. Id.
Right to effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Right of cross-examination cited. Id., 370. Right to fair trial under due
process clauses cited. Id., 520. Cited. Id., 530. Fundamental protection of due process of law cited. Id., 558. Denial of due
process cited. Id., 601. Cited. Id., 654. Constitutional rights to notice cited. Id., 654. Cited. Id., 675. Ineffective assistance
of counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 780. Deprivation of effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Ineffective assistance of
counsel cited. Id., 794. Difference between identication and “resemblance” testimony and reliability of such testimony
where impermissibly suggestive identication procedures used discussed; due process rights cited. 28 CA 9. Denial of
fair trial by being tried jointly cited. Id., 64. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusations cited. Id., 91.
Cited. Id., 126. Right to confront witnesses cited. Id. Confrontation rights cited. Id. Right not to be convicted except upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt of each element cited. Id., 161. Constitutional standard for confrontation cited; rights to
confront witnesses cited; dilution of state’s burden of proof cited. Id., 231. Due process clauses cited. Id., 283. Constitu-
tional rights to a fair trial cited. Id., 290. Right to an impartial jury cited. Id., 388. Cited. Id., 360; judgment reversed, see
229 C. 529. Right to be informed of nature of charge cited. Id. Constitutional right to a fair trial cited. Id., 402. Cited. Id.,
425. Right to effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Constitutional violation existing and deprivation of a fair trial cited.
Id., 444. Cited. Id., 474. Right to due process of law cited. Id. Deprivation of a fair trial cited. Id. Deprivation of fair trial
cited; guarantees of due process cited. Id., 548. Cited. Id., 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601. Right to fair notice
cited. Id. Dilution or shift of state’s burden of proof cited; issue of reasonable doubt cited; deprivation of constitutional
right and a fair trial cited. Id., 638. Violation of due process rights by pretrial identication procedure cited; unconstitu-
tional procedure cited; deprivation of fair trial cited. Id., 645. Cited. Id., 708. Right to a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 721.
228 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXIX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Effective cross-examination cited. Id. Due process cited. Id. Fundamental right to a fair trial cited; due process right to a
fair trial cited. Id., 771. Due process rights and unconstitutionally vague cited. Id., 825. Unconstitutionally vague cited.
29 CA 68; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 566. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited; unreliable evidence and violation
of fundamental fairness and guarantee of due process cited. Id., 162; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 397. Violation of a
fundamental right, right to fair trial, right to present a defense and due process cited. Id., 262. Necessity for expert wit-
nesses in habeas proceedings involving ineffective assistance of counsel claims discussed. Id., 274. Deprivation of effec-
tive assistance of counsel cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id., 283; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 795. Violation
of due process cited; privilege against self-incrimination cited; right to confront accusers cited. Id., 359. Due process
rights cited. Id., 409. Due process of law cited. Id., 452. Cited. Id., 524. Right of due process and defective instructions;
constitutional right to fair trial cited. Id. Rights to due process and a fair trial cited. Id., 533. Cited. Id., 584. Due process
clauses cited. Id. So vague and indenite as to violate due process cited; vagueness challenge, provision for fair warning
cited; fair notice cited. Right to confront witnesses against and to present witnesses in own behalf. Id., 642. Unconstitu-
tionally vague cited; due process right to fair warning cited. Id., 683. Deprivation of due process cited. Id., 744. Right to
fair trial and due process; right to select jury from fair cross section of community cited. Id., 754. Ineffective assistance
of counsel cited; constitutionally guaranteed right to understand consequences cited. Id., 773. Ineffective assistance of
counsel cited. Id., 817. Cited. Id., 843. Right to due process and a fair trial cited. Id. Fundamental right to acquittal where
there if failure to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of crime charged cited. Id., 825. Cited. 30 CA
9. Right to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 68. Right to due process cited. Id. Deprivation of fair trial cited. Id. Right to
effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Fundamental fairness and due process cited. Id., 108. Due process rights cited;
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to present a defense cited. Id., 164; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10.
Unconstitutionally vague and over broad cited. Id., 224. Right to due process and to present a defense cited. Id., 232.
Right to acquittal when failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt each and every element of crime charged cited; due
process cited. Id., 281. Cited. Id., 340. Right to due process and to cross-examine witnesses cited. Id., 346. Cited. Id., 359.
Right to speedy trial cited. Id. Due process and confrontation rights cited. Id., 381. Right to due process cited. Id., 416.
Cited. Id., 428. Due process of law; call or confront witnesses; establish a defense and effective assistance of counsel
cited. Id. Due process rights cited; right to present a defense cited; right of cross-examination cited; denial of confronta-
tion cited. Id., 470. Right to present a defense cited; right to fair trial cited. Id., 527. Cited. Id., 606. Right to compulsory
process and due process cited. Id., 654. Cited. Id., 677. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Cited. 31 CA 94. Right
to effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial cited. Id. Rights to due process and a fair trial cited. Id., 140. Cited. Id.,
178. Right to due process and a fair trial cited. Id. Right to confront witnesses cited. Id. Precluded from cross-examining
witness cited. Id. Cited. Id., 278. Right to public trial by impartial jury cited. Id. Voir dire in obtaining fair and impartial
jury cited. Id. Unconstitutionally broad jury instruction cited. Id. Due process safeguards cited. Id. Right to due process
cited. Id., 312. Fundamental right to present a defense cited. Id., 385. Cited. Id., 443. Denial of rights to due process cited.
Id. Compulsory process and confrontation cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague cited;
prosecutorial misconduct cited; ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 497. Constitutional right to fair notice cited.
Id., 548. Rights of notice and hearing and due process cited. Id., 621. Cited. Id., 771. Right to effective assistance of
counsel cited; due process right to fair trial cited. Id. Cited. 32 CA 21. Due process, fair trial before impartial jury cited.
Id. Cited. Id., 38. Ineffective assistance of counsel and right to speedy trial cited. Id. Right to due process cited. Id. Due
process rights cited. Id., 84. Due process right to present a defense, right to confrontation cited. Id., 178. Right to be in-
formed of nature of charge cited; due process clauses cited. Id., 217. Cited. Id., 224. Right not to be compelled to testify
against himself cited; violation of due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 296. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 438. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Right to present a defense and to confront witnesses against him cited;
fundamental right to fair trial cited. Id., 448. Due process rights cited; right to fair trial cited. Id., 483. Prosecutorial mis-
conduct and deprivation of fair trial cited. Id., 505. Cited. Id., 553. Due process concerns cited. Id. Cited. Id., 656. Due
process considerations cited; over breadth or vagueness cited. Id. Due process and fundamental right to present a defense
cited; right to confrontation cited. Id., 687. Due process rights cited. Id., 759. Cited. Id., 811. Privilege against self-in-
crimination cited; due process rights to a fair trial and to establish a defense cited; right of confrontation cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 831. Right to due process and fair trial cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague cited; fundamental constitutional right and
a fair trial cited. Id., 854. Right to speedy trial cited. 33 CA 49. Cited. Id., 60. Rights to due process and against self-in-
crimination cited; right to remain silent and “Miranda” rights cited. Id. Rights to confrontation cited. Id., 90. Due process
and confrontation rights cited. Id., 103. Due process cited. Id., 107. Due process and a fair trial cited. Id., 116. Cited. Id.,
126. Rights to due process and against self-incrimination cited. Id. Cited. Id., 133. Right to due process cited. Id. Due
process clauses cited. Id., 162. Right to effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial cited; due process rights cited. Id.,
171. Cited. Id., 184. Right to speedy trial and due process cited. Id. Fair and impartial trial cited; rights to due process
cited. Id., 205. Due process clauses cited; constitutionally awed cited. Id., 232. Cited. Id., 253. Confrontation or due
process clauses cited; dilution of burden of proof cited; deprivation of fair trial cited. Id. Rights to due process cited; right
to cross-examination cited. Id., 311. Cited. Id., 339; judgment reversed on issues of sufciency of evidence and jury
misconduct, see 235 C. 502. Due process cited. Id. Rights to due process and a fair trial cited. Id., 368. Cited. Id., 432.
Rights to due process cited; dilution of state’s burden of proof cited; right not to be convicted except on proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and right to fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 449. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Right to due
process cited. Id., 457. Cited. Id., 590. Right to due process and to present a defense cited; unconstitutional dilution of the
state’s burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt cited. Id., 616. Rights to confront accusers cited; right to
cross-examine cited; right to due process of law cited; protection against self-incrimination cited. Id., 647. Charge to jury
cannot be given in the abstract without evidence sufcient to provide guidance to the jury. Id., 743; judgment reversed,
see 233 C. 502. Rights to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 763. Rights to due process and a fair trial cited. Id.; Id., 782.
Right to due process cited; constitutional rights cited. 34 CA 46. Cited. Id., 58. Fundamental element of due process and
right to establish a defense of self-defense cited; right to confrontation or cross-examination cited; privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination cited; right not to testify cited; right to impartial jury cited; rights to be present and partic-
ipate in trial cited. Id. Rights to cross-examination, confrontation and a fair trial cited; improper instruction of jury cited.
Art. XXIX AMENDMENTS TO THE 229
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Id., 96. Cited. Id., 103. Constitutional due process claims alleging prosecutorial misconduct cited; right to adequately
instructed jury cited; right to fair trial cited. Id. Right to due process cited. Id., 191. Cited. Id., 223; Id., 236. Due process
guarantees cited; effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 250. Right not to testify on own behalf cited; right
to remain silent cited. Id. Cited. Id., 261. Right to due process and a fair trial cited; right to remain silent and “Miranda”
warnings cited; right of confrontation cited. Id. Constitutional right to present defense cited. Id., 276. Fundamental ele-
ment of due process, right to present a defense cited. Id., 317. Cited. Id., 368, see also 233 C. 517. Standard of due process
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 411. Right to due process and a fair trial cited. Id. Right to confrontation and to present a defense
cited. Id., 473. Cited. Id., 557. Due process cited; unusual punishment cited. Id. Violation of due process cited; privilege
against self-incrimination cited; right to confront accusers cited. Id., 595. Due process violation cited. Id., 599. Cited. Id.,
610. Constitutional right to present a defense cited. Id. Void for vagueness or unconstitutionally vague cited. Id., 741.
Cited. Id., 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211. Right to remain silent and “Miranda” rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 823.
Right to testify cited; right to present a closing argument and to a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. 35 CA 51. Due process right
to present a defense cited; rights to confront and cross examine cited; right to fair trial cited. Id. Constitutional right to
prepare a defense and due process cited. Id., 173. Due process right cited. Id., 201, 202. Cited. Id., 405. Right to due
process and notice cited. Id. Cited. Id., 527. Ineffective assistance of counsel and violation of due process cited. Id. Right
to present a defense and denial of due process and a fair trial cited; right to adequately instructed jury cited. Id, 541. Right
to present a defense cited; failure to instruct jury and due process rights cited. Id., 609. Cited. Id., 699. Due process rights
and failure to properly instruct jury cited. Id. Violation of due process and fair trial cited; privilege against self incrimi-
nation and right to confront accusers cited. Id., 714. Deprivation of fair trial from instruction diluting state’s burden of
proof cited. Id., 728. Cited. Id., 740. Due process rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 754. Due process rights cited. Id. Ineffective
assistance of counsel cited. Id., 762. Cited. Id., 781; Id., 839; 36 CA 41. Constitutional right not to take witness stand
cited. Id. Due process rights cited. Id., 59. Cited. Id., 76. Due process rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 123; Id., 161. Claim is
due process and fundamental fairness and a fair trial cited. Id. Right to fair trial by impartial jury cited; burden of proof
constitutional in nature cited. Id., 177. Cited. Id., 190. Fair trial and due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 216. Ineffective as-
sistance of counsel cited; fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 228. Right to confrontation and a fair trial cited. Id. Limitation of
cross-examination cited; dilution of state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt cited; right to present witnesses
cited; right to confrontation cited. Id., 250. Cited. Id., 282. Right to public trial by impartial jury cited; deprived of effec-
tive assistance of counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 345. Confrontation rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 401. Due process and fair
trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 417. Right to due process and to present a defense cited; assistance of counsel cited; right to
disclosure of exculpatory evidence cited; right to fair trial cited. Id. Due process rights cited. Id. 440. Cited. Id., 462.
“Miranda” warnings cited; state constitutional issue cited. Id. Cited. Id., 473. Confrontation rights cited; right of cross-
examination cited. Id. Cited. Id., 516. Right to impartial jury and fair trial cited; due process clauses cited. Id. Right to
fair trial cited. Id., 525. Cited. Id., 587. Due process rights cited. Id. Right to fair and impartial jury cited; right to speedy,
public trial cited; right to due process cited. Id., 631. Denial of effective assistance of counsel cited; due process cited.
Id., 641. Right to counsel cited; inadequate counsel cited; constitutional rights to present a defense, to a fair trial and due
process cited. Id., 680. Cited. Id., 695. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Due process right to fair trial and con-
stitutional right to be found guilty only on nding of proof beyond reasonable doubt cited. Id., 718. Cited. Id., 753. Im-
proper prosecutorial conduct and due process claims cited. Id. Right to confrontation cited. Id., 774. Due process rights
and a fair trial cited; right to confrontation cited; rights to an adequately instructed jury cited. Id., 805. Cited. Id., 821.
Due process rights and rights to present a defense cited. Id. Cited. 37 CA 21. Right to confront and cross-examine cited;
unconstitutionally diluted state’s burden of proof cited. Id. Cited. Id., 40. Restricted cross-examination cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 105. Rights to due process cited. Id. Deprivation of fair trial by court’s marshaling of the evidence. Id., 180. Due
process rights cited. Id., 213. Cited. Id., 228. Right to be informed of nature and clause of criminal charge cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 252; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 388. Self-incrimination and right to counsel cited. Id. Due process and personal
liberty guarantees provided by this section and Art. I, Sec. 9 of Connecticut Constitution encompass the protection
against double jeopardy. Id., 276. Due process cited. Id. Due process violation; failure to instruct on essential elements
cited. Id., 338. Due process and suppression by presentation of evidence favorable to accused; right to fair trial cited. Id.,
355. Right to confrontation cited; right to due process and a fair trial cited. Id., 360. Cited. Id., 379. Due process cited;
unconstitutionality of Sec. 31-71b cited. Id. Unconstitutionally vague and void for vagueness cited. Id., 388. Cited. Id.,
404. Right against self-incrimination cited. Id., 437. Cited. Id., 456; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 176. Due process
rights and a fair trial cited; claim of privilege against self-incrimination cited; right of confrontation cited. Id. Court de-
clines to elevate an impermissibly suggestive identication procedure of an inanimate object to one of constitutional
magnitude. Id., 464. Due process cited. Id. Right to counsel cited; right to be informed adequately of nature of charges
cited. Id., 500. Dilution of state’s burden of proof and deprivation of fair trial cited. Id., 509. Right to speedy trial cited.
Id., 574. Cited. Id., 589. Right to due process of law cited; right to confrontation cited; prosecutorial misconduct and
deprivation of fair trial cited; dilution of state’s burden of proof cited. Id. Cited. Id., 619. Right to be informed of nature
and cause of accusation cited. Id. Rights to fair trial or due process cited. Id., 635. Denial of due process cited; right is
effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 672. Cited. Id., 722. Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id. Cited. Id., 733. Ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel cited; right to due process, suppression of out of court identication, prosecutorial misconduct
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 801. Rights to fair cross section jury panel cited; due process cited. Id. Due process and jury instruc-
tion cited. 38 CA 29. Due process and failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence cited; right to present a defense
cited; prosecutorial misconduct cited. Id., 56. Right to present a defense and right not to testify cited. Id., 85. Cited. Id.,
100. Right of confrontation cited. Id. Cited. Id., 125. Rights to fair trial, confrontation and due process cited. Id. Right to
fair trial by impartial jury cited; right to due process cited. Id., 247. Dilution of state’s burden of proof cited. Id., 282.
Cited. Id., 371. Prosecutorial misconduct, deprivation of fair trial, due process, right to present a defense and to confront
adverse witness cited. Id. Rights to due process cited; reduction of state’s burden of proof cited. Id., 434. “... Asherman
balancing test must be used in cases involving a claim of violation of due process because of the loss or destruction of
physical evidence.” Id., 531. Right to due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 581. Due process cited. Id. Right to fair trial cited.
Id., 598. Cited. Id., 643. Double jeopardy cited; due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 661. Double jeopardy provisions cited;
230 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXIX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
due process cited; trial by jury cited; right to fair trial cited; proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt cited. Id. Right of
confrontation cited; due process cited. Id., 731. Due process cited. Id., 762. Cited. Id., 777. Right to notice of charges
cited; due process and duty to disclose exculpatory evidence cited. Id. Due process rights cited. Id., 801. Cited. Id., 815;
Id., 868. Right to speedy trial cited; due process cited. Id. Cited. 39 CA 45. Cited. Id., 63. Due process cited; right to
present a defense cited; dilution of state’s burden of proof cited; burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt cited;
right to be informed of nature of charge cited. Id. Right to counsel of his choice cited. Id., 82; Id., 96; Id., 175. Cited. Id.,
183. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 224. “Miranda” rights cited; right to obtain counsel cited; nature of accusations
against defendant cited. Id. Cited. Id., 267. Lack of nature of changes cited; due process and deprivation of fair trial cited.
Id. Prosecutorial misconduct, due process and a fair trial cited. Id., 333. Right to due process and a fair trial cited. Id., 369.
Due process and prosecutorial misconduct cited; right to fair trial cited; ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 384.
Due process rights cited. Id., 407. Cited. Id., 455. Due process and prosecutorial misconduct cited. Id., 478. Due process
and prosecutorial misconduct cited; “Miranda” warning cited. Id., 579. Cited. Id., 617. Right to due process cited; loss or
destruction of evidence cited. Id. Cited. Id., 645. Due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 657. Unconstitutional enlargement
cited; right to be informed of nature of charges cited; fair trial and due process cited. Id. Cited. Id., 674. Rights to due
process cited. Id. Right of confrontation cited; due process clause of Connecticut Constitution cited. Id., 702. Right to
assistance of counsel cited. Id., 722. Cited. Id., 789. Deprivation of fair and impartial trial cited. Id. Right to present a
defense cited. Id., 800. Right to uncoerced jury cited. Id., 810. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 813. Ineffective
assistance of counsel and deprivation of due process cited. Id., 832. Due process rights cited. Id., 840. Cited. 40 CA 1.
Unconstitutionally vague cited; constitutional right to compel appearance of witnesses for defense cited. Id. Rights of
compulsory process, due process and a fair trial cited. Id., 47. Cited. Id., 60; Id., 75. Impermissibly vague cited. Id. Rights
to due process cited; deprivation of right to confront witness and a fair trial cited. Id., 132. Cited. Id., 151. Due process
right to a fair trial cited; right to notice cited. Id. Cited. Id.; Id., 189. Rights to due process, to present a defense and to a
fair trial cited; right to impartial jury cited. Id. Cited. Id., 233. Due process clause of the Connecticut Constitution cited.
Id. Deprivation of a fair trial and due process right to counsel of choice cited. Id., 374. Cited. Id., 387. Due process and a
fair trial cited; instructions constitutionally defective cited. Id. Cited. Id., 470. Right to confrontation cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
483. Right to speedy trial cited; right to fair trial and effective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 515. Due process
cited. Id. Due process rights cited. Id., 526. Effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 553. Due process and fairness of
trial cited. Id., 601, 603. Right to impartial jury and fair trial cited; denial of due process cited; prosecutorial misconduct
cited; diminished state’s burden of proof cited. Id., 624. Cited. Id., 643. Right to speedy trial and speedy sentencing cited;
due process rights cited. Id. Right to effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 757. Cited. Id., 762. Right to have jury
selected from a fair cross section of the community cited. Id. Cited. Id., 805. Right to due process cited; right to present
a defense and to a fair trial cited; right not to be placed in double jeopardy cited. Id. Cited. 41 CA 7. Rights to due process
and against self incrimination and “Miranda” warnings cited; right to contact attorney cited. Id. Right against self-incrim-
ination; right to counsel; right to cross examination; right to due process cited. Id., 47. Cited. Id., 139. Due process vio-
lation cited. Id. Cited. Id., 147. Due process rights cited. Id. Right to confrontation cited. Id., 204. Cited. Id., 255. Due
process rights cited; right to notice cited. Id. Right to due process, to a fair trial and to present a defense cited. Id., 317.
Due process right to establish a defense cited. Id., 361. Cited. Id., 391. Privilege against self-incrimination and “Miranda”
warnings cited; due process cited. Id. Right to counsel cited. Id., 454. Due process cited. Id., 476. Due process and a fair
trial cited. Id. 495. Cited. Id., 515. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id. Right to due process and a fair trial cited.
Id., 604. Right against self-incrimination and to remain silent cited; right to confront witnesses cited. Id., 695. Cited. Id.,
701. Impermissible cross-examination about post arrest silence cited; right to adequately instructed jury cited; right to
due process cited; “Miranda” rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 751. Right not to be put twice in jeopardy cited; double jeopardy
rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 772. Right against unreasonable seizures, inevitable discovery doctrine cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
809. Right to conict-free representation, due process and a fair trial cited. Id. Right to not have uncharged offenses
presented to the jury. Id., 817. Constitutional right to present a defense cited; right to compulsory process cited. Id. Cited.
Id., 831. “Miranda” warnings and right against self-incrimination cited. Id. Unconstitutionally shifted burden of proof
from state cited. 42 CA 10. “The jury was never instructed that the presumption or inference was mandatory and the
burden of persuasion never shifted.” Id. Cited. Id., 17. Right to effective assistance of counsel cited; denial of fair trial
and due process cited; right to conict-free representation cited. Id. “Miranda” warnings and exercise of right to remain
silent cited; right to confrontation and restriction of cross-examination cited; due process cited. Id., 41. Denial of motion
to dismiss on speedy trial and due process grounds is not nal for the purposes of appeal. Id., 144. Rights to a speedy trial
cited. Id. Denial of presumption of innocence and due process rights cited. Id. Right of confrontation cited. Id., 186;
judgment reversed, see 241 C. 823. Ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsels cited. Id., 304. Constitutionally
guaranteed due process right to establish a defense cited. Id., 348. Constitutional right to counsel cited; waiver of counsel
and right of self-representation cited. Id., 371. Cited. Id., 445. Prosecutorial misconduct and deprivation of right to a fair
trial cited; ineffective assistance of appellate counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 472. Deprivation of constitutional right to fair
trial by improper instruction cited. Id., 555. Unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant cited; claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel cited. Id., 640. Denial of fair trial and due process of law cited; obligation to produce exculpatory
evidence cited. Id., 669. Due process cited; due process right to address court cited; right to counsel cited. Id., 768. Right
to due process and fair trial cited; lowering of state’s burden of proof cited. Id., 810. Deprivation of due process cited;
waivers of right to counsel, to remain silent, to be present at trial, to jury trial, to confrontation and against self-incrimi-
nation cited. 43 CA 142. Cited. Id., 209. Right to assistance of counsel cited; right to remain silent cited; “Miranda” rights
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 252. Confrontation and due process rights cited; right of cross-examination cited. Id. Cited. Id., 339.
Due process cited; state’s satisfaction of burden of proof cited. Id. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 374. Due
process cited. Id., 387. Rights to due process and a fair trial cited. Id., 458. Right to due process and a fair trial cited. Id.,
480. Cited. Id., 488. Right to a speedy trial cited; due process and opportunity afforded to present a defense cited. Id., 488.
Unconstitutionally vague cited. Id., 527. Right to confront witnesses and denial of effective assistance of counsel cited.
Id., 549. “Miranda” rights and denial of effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 552. Right against self-incrimination
and right to due process and to confront accusers cited. Id., 555. Cited. Id., 606. Procedural and substantive due process
Art. XXIX AMENDMENTS TO THE 231
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
claims cited. Id. Right to due process cited; claim of prosecutorial misconduct cited; deprivation of fair trial cited. Id.,
619. Cited. Id., 667. Rights to confrontation and due process cited; fair trial cited. Id. Alleging prosecutorial misconduct
cited; fair trial cited; right of confrontation cited. Id., 680. Cited. Id., 704. Right to present a defense cited; due process
clauses cited; right to assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct cited; right to fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 715.
Right to confront witnesses cited; cross-examination cited; right to present witnesses in own defense cited. Id. Rights to
be informed of charges against him and to due process cited. Id., 785. Cited. 44 CA 6. Due process rights cited; rights to
counsel cited; rights to remain silent cited; reliability of identication cited; privilege against self-incrimination cited. Id.
Due process rights cited. Id., 70. Unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its face cited; due process cited. Id., 84.
Cited. Id., 162. Right to counsel cited. Id. Cited. Id., 187. Fundamental right to a jury trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 198. Right
of confrontation cited. Id. Cited. Id., 231. Due process cited. Id. Due process and a fair trial cited. Id., 280. Due process
rights cited; right against self-incrimination cited. Id., 307. Ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 387. Right to due
process and confrontation cited. Id., 457. Cited. Id., 476. State due process rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 548. Due process
rights cited. Id. Cited. Id., 561. Due process and a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 702. Due process cited. Id. Rights to
confrontation cited; due process rights to inadequately instructed jury cited. Id., 731. Cited. Id., 746; Id., 790. Prosecuto-
rial misconduct claim cited. Id., 818. Due process rights cited. 45 CA 32. Rights to confrontation cited. Id., 66. Right to
confrontation cited; prosecutorial misconduct cited; right to due process, to present a defense and a fair trial cited. Id.,
116. Prosecutorial misconduct and deprivation of a fair trial cited. Id., 142. Violation of due process cited. Id., 187. Cited.
Id., 207. Right to counsel cited. Id. Claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 242. Right to remain silent and
right to counsel cited. Id., 261. Right to due process and to present witnesses and privilege against self-incrimination
cited. Id., 282. Violated rights to fair trial, to present a defense and to due process of law cited. Id., 297. Ineffective assis-
tance of counsel cited. Id., 362. Right to fair trial and present a defense cited. Id., 369. Right to confrontation and to be
represented by counsel cited. Id., 390. Deprivation of fair trial cited. Id., 408. Cited. Id., 476. Due process of law cited.
Id. Level of due process violation cited. Id., 512. Right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to present a defense
cited. Id., 584. Prosecutorial misconduct, denial of due process and a fair trial cited. Id., 591. Due process and unneces-
sarily suggestive identication procedures cited; obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence cited. Id., 658. Federal and
state rights of confrontation and to present a defense cited. Id., 756. Right to due process and to be present at trial cited;
effective assistance of counsel cited. Id., 809. Right to be informed of charges cited. 46 CA 24. Right of confrontation
cited. Id., 118. Right to a fair trial cited. Id., 131. Poisoned fruit of unwarned statement and “Miranda” warnings cited;
due process and right to establish a defense cited. Id., 216. Right to a fair trial and to proper instruction cited. Id., 269.
Cited. Id., 285. Due process rights to a fair trial, to present a defense and to confront witnesses against him cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 414. Right to be informed of nature and cause of the accusations and to a fair trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 486.
Ineffective assistance of counsel and due process cited; unconstitutionally vague cited; self-representation cited. Id.
Cited. Id., 545. Right to remain silent, “Miranda” warnings and due process cited; right to effective assistance of counsel,
confrontation and compulsory process cited. Id. Due process, a fair trial and prosecutorial misconduct cited. Id., 578.
Right to impartial jury and a fair trial cited. Id., 600. Constitutional right to due process and to present a defense and a
fair trial cited; assistance of counsel cited. Id., 640. Cited. Id., 661. Due process, facially and unconstitutionally vague and
a fair trial cited; void for vagueness cited. Id. Right to due process cited. Id., 684. Due process right to proof of an element
cited. Id., 691. Cited. Id., 721; Id., 741. Due process and right to impartial jury cited. Id. Right to due process and a fair
trial; right to confrontation cited. Id., 810. Denial of due process cited; right to fair trial cited. 47 CA 1. Record does not
disclose adequate prosecutorial misconduct for review of unpreserved claim and does not meet the third prong of the
State v. Golding test. Id., 134. Prosecutorial statements that directly linked defendant’s decision to testify on his own
behalf with defendant’s guilt impermissibly burdened defendant’s exercise of constitutional right to testify. Id., 401.
Standard for determining claim of ineffective assistance of counsel discussed. Id., 499. Pretrial identication procedure
did not violate due process rights. Id., 632. Prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument did not violate defendant’s right to
confront witnesses and to testify on his own behalf. Id. Court improperly struck testimony of defendant’s expert witness
regarding behavioral changes caused by drug defendant allegedly used on day of the crimes, but error was harmless. Id.,
678. State constitution does not afford greater double jeopardy protection than federal constitution. 48 CA 71. A jury in-
struction re included offenses is a matter of common law and does not implicate constitutional rights. Id., 677. Claim that
trial court violated defendant’s right of confrontation by unduly restricting his right to engage in cross-examination de-
nied. Id., 755. Factors for determining whether prosecutorial misconduct amounts to a denial of due process. Id., 812.
Accused has fundamental right to be acquitted unless proven guilty of each element of the charged offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. Court disagreed with defendant’s claim that state allowed to ask improper questions on voir dire. 49
CA 41. Fairness of trial and not culpability of prosecutor is the standard for analyzing defendant’s claim of prosecutorial
misconduct. Id., 56. Defendant not deprived of right to fair trial by court’s questioning of a witness since any prejudice
was cured by instructions to jury. Id., 183. Due process requires that a hearing be held whenever the trial court is required
to make a nding concerning a disputed factual issue such as whether the statute of limitations has been tolled. Id., 198.
Evidentiary rulings and prosecutor’s comments did not deprive defendant of right to a fair trial. Id., 252. The offense of
risk of injury to a child and the offense of sexual assault in the fourth degree are not the same offense for double jeopardy
purposes. Id., 409. Re standard of proof in criminal trial, the state need only prove that the cumulative impact of the facts
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant acted intentionally; instruction re reasonable doubt proper. Id., 459.
Jury instruction re consciousness of guilt was proper. Id. Trial court did not marshal the evidence so as to unduly preju-
dice the defendant or deprive him of his right to due process. Id., 486. Fundamental constitutional right that a defendant
charged with the commission of crime of assault be permitted to establish a defense includes proper jury instructions on
the elements of self-defense so that jury may ascertain whether the state has met its burden of proving beyond a reason-
able doubt that the assault was not justied. Id., 738. Effective cross-examination does not include eliciting or presenting
evidence that is immaterial or irrelevant. 50 CA 1. Exclusion of certain videotape evidence of alleged bias against defen-
dant on the part of police ofcer was within trial court’s discretion where a more than ample opportunity had been pro-
vided for cross-examination on issues of hostility or bias and other evidence was allowed to be introduced on that issue.
Id., 51. Failure to give jury instruction regarding efcient intervening cause of victim’s death held not violative of due
232 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXIX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
process where defendant did not present evidence of such cause. Id., 159. On a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, defen-
dant failed to establish a sufcient pattern of misconduct pervading throughout the trial that was so blatantly egregious
that it infringed on his right to a fair trial. Id., 175. Trial court did not improperly bolster credibility of witness where
result of court’s statement to jury was to place certain testimony in proper context. Id. Prosecutor’s remarks commenting
on defendant’s presence in courtroom and alleged opportunity to tailor his testimony held to be improper as infringement
on right to be present during trial and expression of prosecutor’s opinion as to credibility of defendant’s testimony held
to be denial of due process. Id., 242. Jury instructions that reference victim’s right to use reasonable force in defense of
dwelling and defendant’s right to engage in self defense sufcient to mislead jury. Id., 607. Due process of law guarantees
criminal defendant fair trial before impartial judge and jury in neutral atmosphere. 51 CA 328. Standard for analyzing
defendant’s due process claim alleging prosecutorial misconduct. Id., 345. Failure to object at trial to display of knife for
identication without connecting knife to defendant does not violate due process. Id., 489. Mischaracterization of evi-
dence in closing argument did not violate due process because not egregious and damaging so as to deprive defendant of
fair trial. Id. Failure of counsel to address jury to explain rulings of lesser included offenses did not deny defendant
counsel or a fair trial. Id., 505. Jury instructions required to include essential elements of alleged crime. Id., 541. Two-part
analysis for reviewing sufciency of the evidence claims. Id., 563. When defendant claims prosecutor’s improper re-
marks violate right to fair trial, burden is on defendant to show that remarks were prejudicial in light of entire proceeding
and appellate court must give great weight to trial court’s determination as to fairness of the trial. Id., 589. No violations
of constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel and to fair trial resulting from court threats to hold defense
counsel in contempt for improper and gratuitous comments. Id., 604. Defendants who are parties as individuals cannot
assert the due process claims of their partnership. Id., 790. Evidence was sufcient for the trial court to nd probable
cause, and thus did not clearly deprive defendant of a fair trial. Id., 798. Although defendant has constitutionally guaran-
teed due process right to establish a defense, the defense sought must be legally cognizable as a valid defense to the crime
charged. Id. Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s request, raised on the eve of trial, to dismiss
counsel. 52 CA 408. Trial court’s refusal to disclose victim’s psychiatric records and the names of mental health care
providers, and to permit voir dire of the providers, when the records were not probative as to victim’s capacity as a wit-
ness, did not violate defendant’s right to confrontation. Id. Defendant failed to demonstrate that a constitutional violation
clearly existed and clearly deprived him of a fair trial. Id., 466. Police request that defendant submit to a sobriety test was
necessary to a legitimate police procedure and the resulting incriminating statements made by the defendant were admis-
sible under Miranda. Id., 475. Defendant’s conviction of operating motor vehicle while license under suspension re-
versed and case remanded for new trial where trial court’s charge improperly shifted burden of proof to defendant on
issue of whether he operated motor vehicle within scope of work permit. 53 CA 23. Prohibition against double jeopardy
was not implicated where there was only one trial and defendant was convicted of, and sentenced on, only one offense.
54 CA 278. Defendant’s claim that he was denied a speedy trial cannot succeed when the delay resulted rst from defen-
dant’s own failure to appear at trial, and second from necessary competency proceedings and related treatment. Id., 361.
Trial court’s failure to appoint counsel to oppose competency proceedings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt;
procedural due process re competency hearings cited. Id. Where defendant was present when charges against him and
long-form substituted information were presented to the jury, and defendant pleaded not guilty to “this case of sexual
assault that I didn’t do”, defendant cannot successfully claim that he was not informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Id. Improper comments by juror held to be juror misconduct which deprived defendant of fair
trial before impartial jury. 55 CA 60. Defendant could not meet third condition of Golding test in his objection to the jury
charge because it was not reasonably possible that the jury was misled. Id., 412. Despite state’s error in failing to tell
defendant that a witness was paid for his testimony, the testimony was corroborated at trial and defendant’s claim cannot
succeed because there is not a reasonable probability that trial outcome would have been different if the information had
been disclosed. Id., 426. State’s failure to tell defendant that a witness was paid for his testimony did not therefore deprive
the defendant of his constitutional right to confront the paid witness. Id. Defendant was not deprived of effective counsel;
actions of counsel either did not constitute decient performance, or where they may have been decient, defendant
failed to establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have otherwise been different. Id. Jury in-
struction re reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence did not amount to a constitutional violation. Id., 469. Change
from live testimony to videotape testimony of child re her sexual assault did not deprive defendant of the presumption of
innocence. Id., 717. In defendant’s claim of denial of effective assistance of counsel, to withdraw his guilty plea, defen-
dant must prove that counsel’s assistance was ineffective and that it was this ineffectiveness that rendered the guilty plea
involuntary. 57 CA 385. Due process claim not properly preserved; defendant’s failure to le proper pretrial motions
constituted waiver of his claim that charge was too vague as to when alleged offense was committed. Id., 736. Evidence
was sufcient for jury to nd defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Evidence was sufcient to support convic-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt. 58 CA 125. Statements were not subject to suppression under Miranda because there was
no interrogation of defendant. Id., 136. Due process not violated where probation was revoked despite failure to deliver
notice re probation pursuant to Secs. 53a-30 and 54-108. Id., 153. Due process violated when court initially allowed ad-
mission of hearsay evidence for a limited purpose but later reversed itself and allowed statement to be used without
limitation; due process requires that parties be given sufcient time and notice to prepare themselves. Id., 176. Claim is
not valid that Sec. 17a-112(c)(3)(A) is unconstitutionally void for vagueness because it fails to put an incarcerated parent
on notice re how to prevent termination of parental rights; state interest in terminating parental rights sufcient to satisfy
due process requirements. Id., 244. Defendant was not denied right of confrontation or right to a fair trial where child
witness was allowed to hold a stuffed animal while testifying. Id., 501. Photographic array with photographs of other
individuals bearing a description similar to but not exactly the same as descriptions given by witnesses was not unneces-
sarily suggestive and did not violate defendant’s rights to due process and fair trial. 59 CA 112. Defendant not deprived
of rights to due process, fair trial and effective assistance of counsel when court refused to instruct jury that state was not
prosecuting one of three cases that jury had been told it would hear and refused to allow defense counsel to make any
reference in nal argument to such third case. Id. Defendant not deprived of right to fair trial by prosecutor’s questions
during cross-examination and comments during closing arguments and by jury instructions concerning state’s burden of
Art. XXIX AMENDMENTS TO THE 233
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
proof on element of intent and the effect of defendant’s intoxication in determining whether state proved the requisite
intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., 207. Evidence was sufcient to constitute probable cause to arrest defendant and
therefore search of defendant and vehicle incident to that arrest was permissible even though search preceded arrest. Id.,
272. Jury instruction concerning thoroughness of the police investigation did not deprive defendant of a fair trial by un-
dermining the presumption of innocence and diluting state’s burden of proof. Id., 282. Defendant’s right to fair trial and
unanimous verdict not violated when court made it clear that jury had to nd each element of crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and there was ample evidence to support conviction under both alternate theories of liability. Id., 305.
Jury instruction did not dilute the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt standard. Defendant’s right to confront
accusers was not denied when trial court precluded him from asking police ofcer certain questions for which no foun-
dation had been established. Id., 394. Reiterated previous holdings that constancy of accusation does not violate right to
confrontation. Id., 469. Defendant has no right to present evidence that is not admissible according to the rules of evi-
dence and it is trial court’s function to make evidentiary determinations. 60 CA 398. Jury instructions, read as a whole,
adequately informed jury of the standard of proof. Id., 487. After plenary review of record as a whole, court concluded
that habeas court correctly found that petitioner, in claiming that trial counsel failed to adequately explain difference
between consecutive and concurrent sentencing, failed to carry burden of establishing that counsel provided ineffective
assistance under Strickland-Hill test. 61 CA 55. Standard of review re constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel discussed. Id. Trial court charge on presumption of innocence that “the law is made to protect society and persons
whose guilt has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and not to protect persons proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt” did not unconstitutionally deprive defendant of a fair trial. Id., 73. Defendant did not demonstrate that trial court
charge that a reasonable doubt is “a real doubt, an honest doubt” was constitutionally improper. Id. Defendant did not,
under circumstances of case, demonstrate that trial court’s denial of request for a continuance of violation of probation
hearing until thirty days after trial concerning underlying criminal charges violated due process rights under state consti-
tution. Id., 99. Defendant failed to furnish adequate analysis of due process claim re establishment of violation of proba-
tion by proof beyond a reasonable doubt or, in the alternative, proof by clear and convincing evidence in a revocation of
probation hearing since adequate analysis requires more than abstract assertions. Id. Denial of defendant’s request for a
jury charge re consideration of photographs not produced into evidence was not, under circumstances of case, a constitu-
tional violation that clearly deprived defendant of a fair trial. Id., 164. Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to
suppress photographic identication where court determined that photographic display of ve suspects was not unneces-
sarily suggestive and witness’ identication of defendant was reliable. Id., 219. Where court found that defendant was
hearing impaired and, as an accommodation, provided him with a particular transcription system for use during trial,
court’s failure to provide defendant with a different, allegedly better system was within court’s discretion and did not
deprive defendant of his constitutional rights. Id., 275. Failure to instruct jury re elements of Sec. 53-202k was harmless
error, since evidence against defendant was overwhelming and uncontested, and not violative of due process. Id., 417.
Trial court’s removal of alternate juror who made unsupported allegations of racial bias against a juror deemed neither
abuse of discretion nor chilling effect on racial bias reports by jurors. 62 CA 148. Appellate court rejected defendant’s
claim that trial court violated his rights under Art. I, Secs. 8, 19 and 20 of the Connecticut Constitution when it improperly
allowed the state to exercise a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror, who was a member of defendant’s racial
group, without a racially neutral explanation reasonably related to the issues in the case. Appellate court found that evi-
dence supported the prosecutor’s reasons for striking the prospective juror, and defendant failed to establish that the state
gave a pretextual reason for excusing the prospective juror. Id., 182. Jury instruction in which the phrases “reasonable
doubt” and “the benet of the doubt” are included does not suggest that jury could only acquit in a close case if it could
give defendant “the benet of the doubt” and therefore does not impinge on defendant’s right to due process. Id., 625.
Defendant not deprived of fair trial by court’s instruction on what constitutes reasonable doubt. 63 CA 245. Prosecutor’s
comments with respect to defendant’s personal use of drugs, which defendant argued fell into the category of asking for
an explanation that only the defendant can provide, did not encroach on defendant’s right to remain silent and did not
deprive defendant of right to a fair trial. Id., 263. Defendant not deprived of fair trial when testimony concerning his gang
membership was introduced during his trial for possession of drugs since probative value of the testimony outweighed
any prejudicial effect. Id., 284. In order to establish violation of defendant’s right to conict-free representation he must
establish that counsel actively represented conicting interests and that an actual conict of interest adversely affected
his lawyer’s performance. To prevail on ineffective assistance of counsel claim, petitioner must show that counsel’s
performance was decient and that the decient performance prejudiced the defense. Id., 297. Fairness of the trial and
not the culpability of the prosecutor is the standard for analyzing constitutional due process claims of criminal defendants
alleging prosecutorial misconduct. Id., 319. Being shackled did not interfere with defendant’s right to self-representation
since defendant has not shown that shackles denied him actual control over the case he presented to the jury. Id., 386.
Defendant’s right to represent himself was not infringed when he was denied access to a law library and court declines to
hold that standby counsel was required to perform legal research for him. Id. Although court did not hold an evidentiary
hearing before ordering defendant to wear leg shackles, defendant’s right to a fair trial before an impartial jury was not
infringed since court detailed for the record its justication for ordering use of restraints. Id. Because trial court properly
satised its afrmative obligation to explore the alleged conict of interest after being alerted to its possible existence and
because defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s previous brief representation of the state’s witness, defendant was
not deprived of his right to conict free representation. Id., 419. Court’s refusal to disclose complaining witness’ treat-
ment records and exclusion of defense counsel from in camera hearing on such records held not violative of defendant’s
right to confrontation and right to present a defense. 64 CA 312. Court’s omission of word “cocaine” from jury instruc-
tions did not deprive defendant of his right to present a defense where testimony concerning his cocaine use bore no
relevance to his capacity to form the specic intent necessary to commit the crimes. 67 CA 194. Prosecutor’s comments
did not deprive defendant of fair trial. Id., 249. Court did not deny defendant’s due process rights when it denied defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss criminal charges or to exclude certain police testimony that was based on the police’s destruction
of recorded police radio broadcasts made on the evening of his arrest. Id., 299. Defendant could not prevail on her unpre-
served claim that her conviction of two counts of assault in the rst degree pursuant to Subdivs. (1) and (2) of
234 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXIX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Sec. 53a-59(a) constitutes double jeopardy because each Subdiv. contains an element that the other does not. Only Sub-
div. (1) requires that a person intend to cause serious physical injury by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument
and only Subdiv. (2) requires that a person intend to disgure another permanently; legislature’s use of different language
indicated its intention to differentiate between the types of harm a person can cause. Id., 803. Defendant in probation re-
vocation hearing must take afrmative action to invoke the due process right to testify on his behalf. In a probation revo-
cation hearing, court is not required to canvass the parties about whether they want to resent closing arguments. 68 CA 40.
State did not breach duty to specify specic time of alleged events because it did not have such information. Id., 313. Right
to present a defense not violated when testimony of defendant’s prior attorney concerning the atmosphere surrounding an
interview of her by the police was excluded as irrelevant. Id., 351. Court did not improperly exclude evidence of semen
from third party on victim’s clothing. Id., 470. No abuse of discretion in nding defendant competent to stand trial. Id. Trial
court committed plain error and deprived defendant of right to a fair trial when it presided over defendant’s trial and sen-
tencing after having participated actively in pretrial plea negotiations. Id., 884. Statements made by prosecutor in closing
argument violated Art. I, Sec. 8 of Connecticut Constitution. 69 CA 299. Defendant’s plea found to be entered knowingly
and voluntarily where court did not specically state that defendant would not be able to withdraw her plea if she did not
appear but the record indicated that the omission did not create a misunderstanding as to the terms of the plea agreement.
Id., 691. Defendant’s oral and written statements to police while he was in the hospital for gunshot wounds found to be
voluntary where defendant initiated the contact and he was coherent and lucid despite being medicated. Id., 717. Defen-
dant not deprived of constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses when court allowed minor victim to
provide videotaped testimony where victim expressed feelings of intimidation and fear of defendant, and such feelings
were compounded by victim’s developmental delays and precarious emotional state. 70 CA 171. Court did not deprive
defendant of constitutional right to cross-examine victim by denying his motion to recall victim as a witness where record
revealed that defendant was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine victim fully and fairly concerning her credibility
and had an opportunity to explore victim’s credibility through the examination of other witnesses. Id. Defendant could not
prevail on claim that court deprived him of his right to present a defense when it refused to admit into evidence a laboratory
report indicating that certain evidence seized from his apartment by police had tested negative for the presence of cocaine
because report was not relevant to whether defendant had sold cocaine to two police informants prior to the search and the
events described at trial. Id., 255. Defendant’s rights under the confrontation clause were not violated by court’s exclusion
of evidence of witnesses’ prior convictions and specic acts of misconduct on grounds that such prior convictions and acts
of misconduct were “much too remote in time” to be relevant. Id. Defendant’s objections to jury instructions regarding
essential elements of conspiracy discussed and determined not to have violated defendant’s due process rights under state
constitution. Id., 393. Standard for reviewing denial of request for alternate counsel discussed. Id., 515. Most of the chal-
lenged comments made by prosecutor were appropriate and based on evidence presented at trial and any improper com-
ments, taken as a whole, were not sufciently pervasive to have established a pattern of misconduct or so blatantly egre-
gious that they infringed on defendant’s right to a fair trial, cumulative effect of the challenged comments did not clearly
deprive defendant of a fair trial. Id., 594. There is no reasonable possibility, given these circumstances, that in rendering
its verdict the jury was mislead by court’s reading of the entire statute. 71 CA 110. A prosecutor’s remark about not allow-
ing defendant “to escape justice” because of a reluctant witness was severe. Id., 121. Cumulative effect of the misconduct
at issue was not so egregious as to constitute an infringement of defendant’s right to a fair trial. Id. Reiterated previous
holdings that right to cross-examination not denied when counsel precluded from quoting verbatim from defendant’s
medical records during cross-examination of victim. Id., 190. Plaintiff’s right to a fair civil trial was not violated by
defense counsel’s improper remarks because the remarks, although improper, were not grave enough to skew the result
and require a new trial. Id., 537. Although prosecutor made improper comments in his rebuttal argument, those com-
ments alone were not such as to affect the entire proceeding and defendant was not denied his right to a fair trial. 72 CA
380. In the context of the entire trial, certain instances of improper questioning by state did not cause substantial preju-
dice or undermine the fairness of the trial. Id., 545. On claim that prosecutor in closing argument improperly stated the
law, it was held that jury was presumed to have followed court’s instructions that the court alone is responsible for stating
the law and that the role of closing argument is to interpret the evidence. Id. Considered in the entirety of the jury instruc-
tions read as a whole and judged by the total effect rather than by the individual component parts, certain inapplicable or
inaccurate jury instructions were held not to have misled the jury. Id. This article does not create a right for defendant to
testify on his own behalf. Id. Reiterated previous holdings that even if there was no probable cause for arrest, police
ofcer could detain individual based on reasonable suspicion and totality of evidence, even if defendant wore different
clothing than suspect. 74 CA 248. Petitioner failed to establish that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and
failed to rebut strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assis-
tance; court found that petitioner and his counsel conferred on multiple occasions following petitioner’s arrest and dur-
ing pretrial proceedings in court. Id., 489. State’s attorney’s remarks during rebuttal argument that defendant may have
been the person who shot murder victim due to a process of elimination based on multiple inferences were based on facts
properly in evidence and inferences jury could reasonably draw from the facts and argument that defendant used a re-
volver to shoot victim was not so blatantly egregious that it infringed on defendant’s right to fair trial. Id., 511. Trial
court’s determination that defendant waived his Miranda rights voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently was supported
by substantial evidence, i.e. defendant’s conduct in initially agreeing to an interview, placing his initials on rst ve lines
of waiver form but refusing to sign a statement, actively participating in an interview and subsequently ending that in-
terview when he realized he could not negotiate his release in exchange for information demonstrate a valid waiver and
exercise of his Miranda rights. Id., 580. Defendant was not deprived of right to fair trial for violation of Sec. 53a-111
because evidence was sufcient to establish that she possessed requisite intent. Although prosecutor improperly asked
defendant to comment on other witnesses’ veracity, the questioning occurred just once and was not prejudicial; prosecu-
tor’s closing statements, even if found improper, were isolated and not prejudicial. 75 CA 163. Cumulative effect of
improperly admitted constancy of the evidence testimony did not violate defendant’s right to fair trial. Id., 201. Convic-
tion of both possession of at least one-half gram of crack cocaine with intent to sell under Sec. 21a-278 and possession
of powder cocaine with intent to sell under Sec. 21a-277 does not constitute double jeopardy. Id., 223.
Art. XXIX AMENDMENTS TO THE 235
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Court was entitled to nd that defendant was given a “Miranda” warning against self-incrimination because defendant
did not rebut ofcer’s testimony that the warning was given; defendant’s claim that inculpatory remark was made after
request for an attorney was not supported by factual ndings at trial and thus defendant’s Miranda rights were not vio-
lated. Id., 304. Given a record replete with references to defendant’s post-Miranda silence and his request for counsel,
court cannot conclude that jury would have returned guilty verdict without the impermissible questions or comments on
defendant’s silence and request for counsel and therefore cannot conclude that state met its burden of proving guilt. Id.
Taken as a whole, prosecutor’s improper remarks to jury did not undermine defendant’s defense or make a difference in
outcome and did not substantially prejudice defendant’s right to fair trial. Id., 408. Prosecutor’s improper cross-examina-
tion was cured by court’s jury instructions and admonishments and had no bearing on the critical issue of the defendant’s
intent and did not have an adverse effect on defendant’s defense. Id. In action regarding allegedly improper sentence,
defendant’s claims that prosecutor misrepresented certain information and that court improperly relied on inaccurate in-
formation were unavailing where the information was irrelevant and immaterial to the sentence. Id., 423. Upon review of
entire record, it was held that court’s abuse of discretion in failing to disclose additional, cumulative material for defen-
dant’s use in cross-examination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., 447. Where statute concerning termination
of parental rights allowed the court to consider events which took place after ling of petition for termination, it was held
that court had opportunity to do so and that the statute protected the due process rights of the respondent by requiring
clear and convincing evidence in the adjudicatory phase. Id., 485. Where defendant’s request for jury instruction was an
inaccurate statement of applicable law and because jury instructions, taken as a whole were correct in the law, it was held
that court properly refused to give excluded portion of defendant’s requested charge. Id., 578. With regard to potential
plea agreement, defendant cannot make an intelligent and knowing decision with regard to a probation sentence without
knowledge of special conditions attached thereto. Id., 615. In statutory rape case, improper admission of testimony of a
number of “constancy of accusation” witnesses was held to be part of mosaic of improperly admitted evidence that, in
the aggregate, served to deny defendant a fair trial. Id., 671. Where defense counsel subsequently waived client’s right to
a jury instruction that he originally sought, court was found to have properly omitted the instruction. Id., 721. Although
court reiterated statutory denition of intent, one aspect of which was overbroad, throughout jury instructions, it was held
not to have misled jury where other numerous, specic and unambiguous instructions accurately directed jury to a proper
consideration of the evidence. Id. When jury’s vote tally is disclosed to court voluntarily and without solicitation, the fact
that court knew of the split before giving a Chip Smith charge does not constitute error. 76 CA 91. State’s ling of sub-
stitute information alleging burglary in the second degree did not violate defendant’s rights under sixth amendment to
U.S. Constitution and this section to adequate notice of charges against him because state provided sufcient descriptive
facts in the initial information alleging burglary in the rst degree such that it was not possible to commit the greater
offense without also committing the lesser offense; thus, the information was held to have placed defendant on notice of
the lesser offense of burglary in the second degree. Id., 779. Section does not require state to choose a particular moment
as the time of an offense when the best information available to state is imprecise. 77 CA 405. Court did not have respon-
sibility, sua sponte, to investigate further whether remaining jurors were aware of excused juror’s prior knowledge of
witness. Id. Court’s misstatement in its charge did not mislead jury since charge considered as a whole made abundantly
clear that state has burden of disproving the defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 78 CA 513. Court prop-
erly denied defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made while being transported in police car because, regardless
of whether defendant’s right to counsel had attached, defendant failed to invoke that right. Id., 610. Because defendant
was not afforded a timely probable cause hearing after state led a part B information charging assault of victim sixty
years of age or older, which subjected defendant to a possible life sentence, court dismissed that part of the information
that related to such charge. 79 CA 535. Discussion of defendant’s unsuccessful claim that, as there was insufcient evi-
dence in the record to support his conviction of robbery in the rst degree, court improperly charged jury in violation of
his right to due process. 81 CA 367. Since a combination to commit several crimes is a single offense, defendant’s right
to be free of double jeopardy was violated by his separate sentences for conviction of three conspiracy counts. Id., 738.
Since prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by referring to evidence that he properly elicited during adjudicative
phase of probation hearing, defendant was not deprived of his due process right to fair trial. 82 CA 832. Arrest, whether
or not accompanied by a warrant, does not mark the start of adversarial judicial proceedings and therefore defendant’s
right to counsel did not attach at time of his arrest by warrant. 83 CA 28. Statute is not void for vagueness and due process
is not violated because crime of failure to pay wages does not require a mens rea of at least criminal negligence. Id., 67.
Court upheld prior rulings that convictions under both Sec. 29-35(a) and Sec. 53a-217(a)(1) do not constitute double
jeopardy. Id., 377. Defendant’s right not to testify was violated by court’s postcharge, supplemental instruction that ma-
terially and substantially misstated the nature of defendant’s privilege not to testify. Id., 811. Jury instruction that applied
language of Sec. 53a-3(11) re general intent to counts of information requiring nding of specic intent deprived defen-
dant of due process right to fair trial by unconstitutionally reducing state’s burden of proof as to those counts. 84 CA 105.
Where defendant claimed that jury instruction permitted jury to convict on the basis of an uncharged theory, court held
that, since the charging information was adequate to enable defendant to prepare a defense, to avoid surprise and to raise
the disposition as a bar to further prosecution, jury instruction did not prejudice the defense. Id., 263. Where defendant
claimed that charging information was defective, court held that, since the information clearly apprised defendant of
specic statute that he had violated and of nature of the violation, the information was sufcient to put defendant on no-
tice of the charge against him. Id. Appellate court disagreed with defendant’s view that his long history of mental illness,
his conduct during the plea canvass and his counsel’s initial representation to court that defendant was incompetent to
enter a plea established a reasonable doubt about his competence to plead guilty. Accordingly, trial court did not violate
defendant’s due process rights to fair trial by accepting his Alford plea without ordering, on its own motion, another ev-
identiary hearing concerning defendant’s competence. Id., 436. Plaintiff who attempted to limit court’s review under Sec.
12-117a to only one portion of an assessment was not deprived due process when entire assessment was reviewed be-
cause Connecticut law has consistently held that trial court exercises de novo review under Sec. 12-117a. Id., 473. De-
fendant’s right to due process and to confrontation not violated by loss of second page of statement and purported loss of
photograph. 85 CA 329. Trial court’s imposition of enhanced sentence reecting defendant’s failure to fulll a condition
236 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXIX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
of plea agreement deprived defendant of liberty interest without due process of law since fulllment of that condition was
not within defendant’s control. Id., 473. Use of clearly erroneous standard of review on appeal from a termination of
parental rights proceeding does not deny respondent adequate procedural safeguards. Id., 528. Failure of counsel to re-
quest a continuance to have defendant evaluated and to offer testimony of a psychiatrist deprived defendant of opportu-
nity to establish diminished capacity defense and constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Id., 544. Where medical
hearing panel in hearing re revocation of physician’s license did not include a physician, due process rights not violated.
Id., 854. Interfering with ofcer is a lesser offense included in the greater offense of assault of public safety personnel and
thus conviction of both offenses for the same act constituted a double jeopardy violation. 86 CA 607. Prosecutor’s state-
ment that sexual assault cases are often decided on credibility of victim or defendant was not an improper comment on
defendant’s failure to testify. Id., 641. Court did not abuse its discretion and did not violate defendant’s rights to due
process and a fair trial when it denied jury’s request to review certain trial testimony because to do so would require
playing back almost the entire trial testimony. Id., 751. Trial court abused its discretion in excluding medical records
relevant to defendant’s theory of self-defense, thus violating defendant’s right to establish a defense under U.S. and
Connecticut Constitutions. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the case remanded for new trial. 88 CA 495. No right
to counsel at summary contempt proceedings because, although criminal in nature, such proceedings concern offenses
against the court as an organ of public justice and not violations of criminal law. Id., 599. Petitioner’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s decision not to exercise peremptory challenges to excuse two potentially bi-
ased jurors failed because petitioner did not satisfy the decient performance prong enunciated in Strickland v. Washing-
ton; petitioner’s counsel conducted an extensive voir dire examination of jurors on the possibly tainted panel and declined
to exercise a peremptory challenge of either of jurors chosen from such panel because he did not want to exhaust peti-
tioner’s limited peremptory challenges and was convinced that both jurors would be fair and impartial and court con-
cluded that such decision by trial counsel was a reasonable tactical one. 89 CA 371. Defendant could not prevail on claim
that trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense and to notice of the charges against him by instructing
jury on accessorial liability when he had not been charged as an accessory in the information and where state’s evidence
did not show that he had acted as an accessory; defendant had sufcient notice that he risked conviction as an accessory
under the circumstances of this case where state’s evidence as to commission of the crime raised the possibility of acces-
sorial or principal liability for each shooter’s participation, defendant did not submit a request for a bill of particulars and
prosecutor specically asserted that state was proceeding on the principle of accessorial liability before the defense began
its case. Id., 440. Evidence of drug possession, without any evidence of use, may not be introduced in support of claim
that a witness has a compromised sense of perception, and, if cross examination is allowed re drug-related activities, does
not constitute violation of defendant’s right to confrontation. Id., 635. Defendant did not prove ineffective assistance of
counsel where no prejudicial effect from such ineffective assistance is shown due to defendant’s failure to produce any
evidence that witnesses were available to testify or that such testimony would have had an impact on trial’s outcome. Id.,
850. Legislature’s choice of “clear and convincing evidence” standard of proof under Sec. 17a-112(j) does not violate due
process provisions of state constitution; state constitution does not require court or legislature to equate terminations of
parental rights with criminal convictions. 90 CA 565. Trial court did not improperly exclude proffered evidence re defen-
dant’s claim of intoxication at time or murder. 91 CA 169. Habeas court properly found petitioner was not denied effec-
tive assistance of counsel. 92 CA 534. State constitution does not require that photographic identication be conducted
in a double-blind, sequential manner and thus defendant failed to establish that a state constitutional due process violation
deprived him of fair trial. Id., 818. State disclosure of certain police reports and additional witness list at a conference that
occurred the morning that defendant’s trial commenced, but prior to the start of evidence, found not to be a violation of
defendant’s due process rights where defendant’s counsel was provided an additional one to two hours to review the
documents and then made no use of the documents at trial and court. Id., 844. Court’s failure to give defendant’s re-
quested jury instruction that use of a deadly weapon, by itself, does not prove an intent to cause victim’s death and
commit murder did not violate due process by shifting state’s burden of proof on the essential element of intent. Court’s
instruction that dened reasonable doubt as real doubt, honest doubt and something more than a guess or surmise did not
impermissibly dilute the fundamental protection that requires state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 95 CA 263.
Prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors did not improperly discriminate against members
of minority groups and deprive defendant of fair trial because the nondiscriminatory reasons given by the state for each
challenge were legitimate and not pretextual. Prosecutor’s comments on credibility of witness and defendant that re-
ected reasonable inferences from the evidence adduced at trial did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct and deprive
defendant of fair trial. Id., 400. Trial court properly granted motion to suppress evidence that was fruit of the poisonous
tree; police ofcer who conducted investigatory stop did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal ac-
tivity to justify the stop–defendant had not been operating his vehicle in an erratic or illegal manner, police ofcer cited
no facts to indicate that defendant was operating his vehicle while under the inuence of intoxicating liquor or that he
was otherwise engaged in, or about to engage in, criminal behavior, and such ofcer had a suspicion that the defendant
wanted to avoid her but lacked a specic and articulable basis necessary to conclude reasonably that an investigatory stop
was justied. Id., 616. Reafrmed previous holdings that for defendant to prevail in claim that he was not informed of the
nature and cause of charges with sufcient precision to prepare defense, there must be a showing that the information was
insufcient and prejudiced the defense and that substantial injustice resulted from lack of specicity, where state amended
the information after the original charges. 96 CA 42. Trial and appellate counsel did not violate defendant’s constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel by failing to instruct jury on denition of attempt to commit robbery, an element
of felony murder, because jury could have found the state proved the element of attempt by using its ordinary denition.
98 CA 389. Murder is specic intent crime and although court’s instruction improperly referred to general intent to en-
gage in proscribed conduct, the erroneous instruction was not harmful beyond a reasonable doubt and did not deprive
defendant of a fair trial because court also properly instructed jury that it had to nd defendant intended to cause victim’s
death. 99 CA 230. Conviction of sexual assault in the second degree as a lesser offense included within count of sexual
assault in the rst degree, without age of victim being alleged in that count of the charging documents, deprived defen-
dant of opportunity to mount defense to the very crime for which he was ultimately convicted and violated his right to a
Art. XXIX AMENDMENTS TO THE 237
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
fair trial. Id., 251. Although trial court erred when it dened “likely” as “possibly” in the term “likely to impair the health
or morals of a minor child”, it was not reasonably possible that jury was misled and therefore defendant was not clearly
deprived of a fair trial. Id. Defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived right to a jury trial where evidence
established that defendant, who was found competent to stand trial, did not raise any concerns about his competency
until after he was found guilty of all charges, had some familiarity with court system, having a lengthy criminal history
that included robberies, received his general equivalency diploma during a period of incarceration, was represented by
counsel at all times, conferred with counsel before and during the course of court’s canvass re his waiver of a jury trial
and testied at his trial in a coherent and lucid manner. 100 CA 313. Review of transcripts and records showed defen-
dant’s waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary and defendant’s guilty pleas did not have to be precluded from ev-
idence at his violation of probation hearing. 102 CA 154. Defendant could not prevail on claims that court’s failure to
properly instruct jury deprived him of due process and a fair trial where court’s instruction to jury re presumption of in-
nocence eliminated any reasonable likelihood of juror misunderstanding, the charge re reasonable doubt fairly presented
the case to jury and court’s instruction to jury re self-defense was clear and comprehensive. Id., 556. Defense counsel did
not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to pursue additional medical and psychiatric evaluations that were
not likely to produce evidence of petitioner being brain damaged. 103 CA 662. Although trial court improperly imposed
an additional superuous element with respect to the charges of which defendant was acquitted, the judgment of convic-
tion rendered by the court on the charge of attempt to commit murder was not legally or factually inconsistent with the
judgment of acquittal on those other charges and did not deprive defendant of due process. 104 CA 599. Failure of trial
court to admit prior inconsistent statement for substantive use was an evidentiary matter and did not violate right of de-
fendant to present a defense. Id., 710. Defendant was not deprived of right to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt when court in its sentencing remarks referred to uncharged robberies involving defendant because court properly
relied on evidence presented at trial in imposing sentence. 107 CA 441. Habeas petitioner did not sustain burden of es-
tablishing that because of failure of his appellate counsel to raise a sufciency of evidence claim there is reasonable
probability that he remains burdened by an unreliable determination of his guilt. Id., 539. Defendant cannot show unfair
surprise in burglary case re evidence of stolen cash not specically referenced in the information because crime was of
the nature charged in the information and defendant did not object. 111 CA 543. State may fulll constitutional duty to
inform accused of nature and cause of accusation by providing the statutory name of the crime with which the accused is
charged. Id., 752. Sec. 14-149(a), when applied to prohibit knowingly possessing a vehicle with one or more altered
vehicle identication numbers, is not unconstitutionally vague. 113 CA 541. Defendant was not deprived of right to im-
partial jury when presumptively prejudicial extrinsic evidence was submitted to jury because error was harmless due to
nature and purpose of evidence and jury instruction. Id. Due process rights not violated where there was no evidence of
bad faith or negligence on the part of the state for not disclosing and maintaining records of an investigation that had
taken place fourteen years earlier and had exonerated prosecution witness; no due process violation where state failed to
make accurate information available to defendant about pending federal actions against prosecution witness, where state
was not a party to the federal actions, the actions were not in prosecutor’s possession and they were matters of public
record to which the state and defendant had equal access. 115 CA 124. Defendant not denied due process when court
failed to state explicit ndings of fact regarding the rationale underlying its decision to revoke probation since that failure
did not, in and of itself, signify the absence of the dispositional phase of the probation revocation proceeding and the
record supported the reasonableness of the court’s conclusion to revoke probation. 116 CA 76. Although no exact length
of time has been established as sufcient to presume prejudice for purposes of determining a violation of a defendant’s
right to a speedy trial, a delay of approximately seventeen months is sufcient to warrant an investigation by the court
into the factors regarding a speedy trial violation examination. 118 CA 389. Where best information available to state is
imprecise, neither sixth amendment to U.S. Constitution nor this section requires state to choose particular moment as
time of offense charged. Id., 589. Defendant’s exclusion from an in-chambers hearing concerning juror impartiality did
not deprive defendant of the right to presumption of innocence. 119 CA 660. Trial court erred in excluding defendant
from an in-chambers hearing concerning possible juror partiality thereby depriving defendant of the right to be present
during a critical stage of the proceedings; however, the court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Court
did not violate procedural due process rights of incarcerated respondent in termination of parental rights proceeding when
it denied him the opportunity to participate using videoconferencing technology. 120 CA 465. Persistent dangerous fel-
ony offender statute, Sec. 53a-40(h), is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant because a person of ordinary
intelligence would comprehend that defendant’s acts were prohibited and that the public interest would be best served by
defendant’s extended incarceration and lifetime supervision, and is not unconstitutionally vague on its face because
statute may be applied constitutionally to the facts of the case. 121 CA 672. Defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s de-
cient performance re entry of guilty plea because counsel failed to inform defendant that plea could be used at trial and
such fact was material to defendant’s entering of plea. 123 CA 121. In light of circumstances, defendant’s due process
rights were not violated by total consumption of DNA evidence during state’s DNA testing. 128 CA 296. Instruction to
jury that it must unanimously nd defendant not guilty of the greater offense before deliberating on a lesser included
offense did not necessarily lead the jury to believe that a compromise verdict was permissible; court’s refusal to allow
defendant to testify about his victim’s alleged prior violent acts against a third party did not violate defendant’s right to
present a defense or to due process of law. 131 CA 1. Return of evidentiary merchandise to stores before trial did not
deprive defendant of his right to a fair trial due to totality of circumstances and defendant’s ample opportunity to review
evidence and make motions. Id., 510. Convictions for manslaughter in the rst degree and carrying a dangerous weapon
do not violate double jeopardy because manslaughter in the rst degree does not require use of or carrying a dangerous
weapon and carrying a dangerous weapon does not require the intent element that rst degree manslaughter mandates.
Id., 528. Requirement to obtain opinion letter from similar health care provider under Sec. 52-190a in medical malprac-
tice case does not violate due process because requirement is reasonably related to legitimate state interest in preventing
frivolous or meritless medical malpractice claims. 132 CA 68. Where defendant indicated emphatically that he wanted
his lawyer to continue to represent him, and his lawyer made afrmative representations to the court, defendant’s consti-
tutional right to counsel was satised and the court did not know, or have reason to know, that a conict of interest existed
238 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXIX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
and had no duty to inquire further. Id., 414. The failure to retroactively apply legislative amendment to property value
limit re larceny in Sec. 53a-123 was not a constitutional violation because P.A. 09-138 does not apply retroactively to
crimes committed before the act was enacted. 136 CA 427. When considered against a backdrop of extraordinarily over-
bearing manner of the identication procedure, the pretrial identication was not reliable and the subsequent in-court
identication was not sufciently removed from the taint of the earlier out-of-court identication to be independently
reliable and should have been suppressed. Id., 568; judgment reversed, see 314 C. 131. No legal basis exists for argument
that Connecticut Constitution confers any broader protection than U.S. Constitution for defendant to confront witnesses.
140 CA 455. Sec. 31-296 procedural safeguards, postdeprivation remedies and public interest in providing speedy, effec-
tive, inexpensive method for determining workers’ compensation claims are sufcient to satisfy due process require-
ments. 144 CA 413. It is not necessary for adequate assistance of counsel for defense counsel to know the exact testimony
of witnesses as a precondition to making a reasonable professional decision about their involvement. 145 CA 16. Prohi-
bition against being compelled to give evidence against himself only applies to testimonial evidence; handwriting exem-
plar that defendant was ordered to provide was nontestimonial and did not violate prohibition. 152 CA 753; judgment
reversed on alternate grounds, see 320 C. 589. Neither the federal, nor the state constitution’s text expressly deal with an
absolute right to demand substitution of one court appointed counsel for another. 163 CA 155. Habeas court erred in
denying petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s failure to object to inadmissible hear-
say. 166 CA 1; judgment reversed, see 329 C. 584. Parole eligibility hearing under Sec. 54-125a(f) is a constitutionally
adequate remedy for sentences that were imposed in violation of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455; resentencing not
required. 167 CA 744. Defendant’s contention that the court’s failure to grant his motion for a bill of particulars caused
him to lack constitutionally sufcient notice fails as the prosecutor gave defendant sufcient notice by means of oral
statement on the record at pretrial hearing. 172 CA 556. Section does not provide greater protection than the federal
constitution with respect to ambiguous or equivocal references to counsel during a custodial interrogation. 174 CA 401;
judgment reversed, see 331 C. 318. Mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-ve years of incarceration imposed on ju-
venile homicide offender not violative of constitutional requirements because subsequent enactment of Sec. 54-125a(f)
rendered offender eligible for parole. 177 CA 242. Petitioner’s due process right not violated for lack of competence
when entering guilty plea even though he was receiving medication because he denied having taken any drugs, alcohol
or medication that day and his responses to the trial court’s questions during his canvass show that he fully understood
the circumstances. 182 CA 188. Defendant’s right to due process was not infringed when court found that he had violated
the Garvin agreement without rst conducting a hearing in accordance with 278 C. 1. Id., 833. Although state Supreme
Court had previously adopted the burden shifting framework to allocate the burden of proof concerning the admissibility
of an identication that was the product of an unnecessarily suggestive procedure and the trial court did not use that
framework, the error was harmless because it was not reasonably possible the court would have reached a different con-
clusion as to the admissibility of the eyewitness identication under that framework. 191 CA 315. Trial court improperly
denied the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence because his right to be free from double jeopardy was vio-
lated as (1) the offenses of manslaughter in the rst degree under Sec. 53a-55(a)(1) and risk of injury to a child under Sec.
53-21 arose from the same actions and constituted the same offense, (2) the offense of risk of injury to a child, as charged,
is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the rst degree, and (3) there is no authority that would support the con-
clusion that the legislature intended to specically authorize multiple punishments under the statutes in question. 197 CA
302; judgment reversed, see 340 C. 425.
Cited. 5 CS 506; 22 CS 7, 324. Sec. 53-25 declared void. The all inclusive prohibition has no reasonable relationship to
the objects to be accomplished. 23 CS 121. Before enactment of Secs. 54-1b, 54-1c and 54-43 of the 1963 session of the
General Assembly, a court did not have duty to advise defendant accused of a misdemeanor of his right to obtain counsel
before plea was entered. Id., 176. Due process does not require that the state advise the accused of the possible legal effect
of pleading guilty to a noncapital charge nor of the later consequences of such plea and conviction. Id. In cases involving
misdemeanors court as a matter of law is under no duty to advise an accused of his right to counsel. 24 CS 15, 96. Cited.
Id., 187. Constitutional right of accused to demand nature and cause of accusation is satised if bill of particulars he ob-
tains, taken together with the information, states sufcient facts to enable him to prepare his defense or protect his rights
on appeal. Id., 247. Accused who is able to pay for legal assistance and asks for it has constitutional right to secure assis-
tance of his lawyer immediately after being charged. Id., 266. Provision guaranteeing accused a speedy trial held inappli-
cable to delay in commencement of prosecution. Id., 308. Where state’s case rested entirely on defendant’s testimony, held
it was error not to inform defendant of his privilege against self-incrimination. Id., 353. Cited. 25 CS 387. Grand juries are
not prohibited from receiving hearsay evidence. That such evidence may have been considered by the grand jury would
not entitle one who had been indicted to have the indictment quashed. Id., 388. Counsel for the accused may not accom-
pany him before the grand jury. Id. Constitutional right of an accused to counsel does not include representation by coun-
sel before a grand jury. 26 CS 215. Where nolle prosequi is unconditionally entered there is no case pending before court
and second bench warrant and information fteen months later charging defendant with same crimes not denial of right to
speedy trial. 27 CS 209. Appointment of state’s attorneys by superior court not violative of due process rights of defendant
on his theory that prosecutor and judge are in the same department of government. 28 CS 252. Cited. Id., 257. Absence of
counsel at a bench warrant proceeding not denial of due process. Accused person has recourse to relief against excessive
bail immediately on arrest. Id., 315. No denial of due process because the judges appoint the state’s attorney to conduct
prosecutions. Id., 366. Narcotic substances in Secs. 19-480 and 19-481 not void for vagueness. 30 CS 267. Cited. Id.,
584. Physical examination does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. 32 CS 306. Accused in any criminal
case, proceeding or prosecution, may elect, when called upon to plead, to be tried by court instead of by jury. 33 CS 739.
Cited. 34 CS 657. Exclusion of aliens from grand jury service under Sec. 54-45 did not violate defendant’s rights since
citizenship requirement bears rational relation to demands of jury service. 35 CS 98. Failure of state to pay expense of
blood grouping tests for indigent defendant in paternity action does not violate due process. Id., 679. Cited. 37 CS 506; Id.,
515; Id., 678. Right to assistance of counsel held not to include employment of persons as counsel lacking in training and
qualications established for practice of law. Id., 693. By failing to present rebuttal evidence to price tags in evidence as
to market value, defendant’s claim of denial of right to confrontation was defeated. Id., 796. Due process cited. 38 CS 24.
Art. XXIX AMENDMENTS TO THE 239
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Cited. Id., 301. Due process cited. Id., 301; Id., 331. Right to speedy trial and tolling of statute of limitations discussed.
Id., 377. Cited. Id., 426; Id., 472; Id., 521; Id., 581; 39 CS 392; Id., 347; Id., 273. Right to effective assistance of counsel
cited. Id. Cited. Id., 273. Due process cited. Id. Cited. 40 CS 38. Taking of property without due process cited. Id., 226.
Cited. Id., 365; Id., 394. Due process rights cited. Id., 498. Cited. 41 CS 48. Right to trial by jury in criminal case cited. Id.
Due process cited. Id., 229. Procedural due process, due process problems and due process requirements cited. Id., 320.
Rights to due process cited. 42 CS 1. Cited. Id., 10. Due process cited. Id. Right of confrontation cited. Id. Right of due
process cited. Id., 291. “No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself” protects against certain document
production requests. Id., 445. Privilege against self-incrimination cited. Id. Modern notion of due process cited. Id., 534.
Rights to due process, counsel and confrontation cited; right to cross-examination cited. Id., 574. Due process guarantees
cited; whether unconstitutionally vague or over broad cited. 43 CS 46. Cited. Id., 211; Id., 441; 44 CS 223. Denial of right
of confrontation cited. 45 CS 1. Failure of hearing ofcer to subpoena police ofcer in hearing on motor vehicle license
suspension not violative of due process. Id., 489. Retroactive application of statute terminating parental rights (Sec.
17a-112(c)(3)(F)) does not violate parent’s right to due process of law. Id., 586. Defendant’s claim of ineffective counsel
dismissed; defendant failed to show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 46
CS 344. Evidence of environmental contamination should be excluded in eminent domain valuation proceeding; due
process requires value and liability to be determined separately to avoid inadvertent double liability. Id., 355. Failure to
grant defendant’s motion for change of venue did not violate his right to fair trial. 48 CS 82. To ensure that prior felony
conviction based on a constitutionally invalid guilty plea is not used as aggravant in a death penalty case, it is in the in-
terests of justice that court hear evidence on whether the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made, and defendant bears
burden of establishing constitutional invalidity of the prior plea. Id., 279. Cumulative effect of procedural deciencies by
Statewide Grievance Committee denied plaintiff attorney his due process rights–plaintiff did not receive notice of date of
continued hearings and reviewing committee of said committee proceeded in plaintiff’s absence, and despite having prior
knowledge of the conict of interest of one reviewing committee member, failed to obtain an alternate member to hear
grievance on the continued date, in violation of Sec. 51-90g which requires that reviewing committee consist of at least
three members, therefore Statewide Grievance Committee decisions reversed. Id., 420. Civil union legislation does not
deny plaintiffs, eight same sex couples, equal protection, due process, and right of free expression and association because
civil union and marriage in Connecticut now share same benets, protections and responsibilities under law; Connecticut
Constitution requires that there be equal protection and due process of law, not that there be equivalent nomenclature for
such protection and process. 49 CS 644. Due process requires notice and hearing under Sec. 54-76c for court to determine
independently whether transfer from youthful offender docket to regular criminal docket is appropriate. 51 CS 342.
Under-representation of a racial group on juries is not violative of any constitutional requirements. Constitution
requires only a fair jury selected without regard to race. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 202–205. Trial and conviction of defendant
sixty-one days after arrest held not violation of right to speedy trial. Id., 207. Right to “speedy trial” question of fact. Id.
Constitutional provisions guaranteeing a speedy trial do not apply to the commencing of prosecution. Id., 618. Constitu-
tional right to counsel has not been limited to a single attorney. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 104, 105. The publication in a national
magazine of an article based on the defendant’s case, written by the trial judge, and published during the pendency of the
defendant’s appeal did not prejudice his case so his right to a speedy and public trial was not violated. Judges of the ap-
pellate courts consider and decide cases on the basis of facts and law uninuenced by extraneous matters. Id., 538, 546.
Where the crime concerned is a misdemeanor and the case is such that the defendant must prove that he is an indigent
in order to be appointed counsel, and he does not sustain his burden of proof, there is no violation of his constitutional
rights if the court fails to appoint counsel. Id., 624, 636. Dram shop act not in violation of this section. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct.
89. Cited. Id., 95, 358. It would ordinarily appear that a ve-hundred dollar appeal bond for a trafc violation for which
the maximum ne is one hundred dollars would be more than what is required to secure appearance of defendant, but
there must be some nding or matter in the record on which the appellate court can act. Id., 109. Jury trial criteria (Sec.
51-266) not a violation. Id., 493. Sec. 30-100 is constitutional. Regulation of trade in liquor is in police power of state
and means used are reasonable. Lack of scienter by defendant is not deprivation of his rights; many police regulations put
the risk of knowledge on the owner. Id., 565. Defendant charged with crime of keeping a gaming house was sufciently
informed of crime he was accused of and was not entitled to bill of particulars as matter of right. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 78.
Jury array and panel dismissed because of deciencies in preparation of list in unauthorized class exemptions from duty,
advertising for volunteers, etc. Id., 140. Strict interpretation of compliance with Sec. 54-16 is required where defendant
is below average intelligence or has linguistic difculties. Id., 178. No constitutional rights of defendant were abridged
on trial for drunken driving where defendant was represented by counsel, evidence of nancial status considered and
minimum ne under statute imposed. Id., 228. Denial of right of assistance of counsel at preliminary hearing was prej-
udicial and new trial ordered. Id., 242. Sec. 54-33b is constitutional and the search of defendant’s person pursuant to its
provisions was lawful. Id., 637. However forceful and persuasive the arguments may be compelling a determination that
the Connecticut disorderly conduct statute, Sec. 53-175 is unconstitutional as containing no ascertainable standard of
quiet. The circuit court should leave such a decision to higher courts. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 73, 77. Defendant was found guilty
on three counts of possession of policy play on a single day under Sec. 53-298. Since his offense was one continuous
offense, conviction on each of the second and third counts put him in double jeopardy and was in error. Id., 170, 173,
174, 175. Denial of a further continuance to enable the defendant to secure counsel nearly a year after his arrest does not
violate due process where to grant it would be disruptive of the court’s business or unduly delay the trial. Id., 218, 221.
Constitutional protection does not extend to crimes with sentences excluded in Sec. 51-266. Id., 558.
(Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions. What cases bailable. Speedy trial.
Due process. Excessive bail or fines. Probable cause shown at hearing, when nec-
essary. Rights of victims of crime.)
Article seventeen of the amendments to the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
240 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXX
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
a. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself
and by counsel; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
by the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his
behalf; to be released on bail upon sufcient security, except in capital offenses, where
the proof is evident or the presumption great; and in all prosecutions by information, to a
speedy, public trial by an impartial jury. No person shall be compelled to give evidence
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor shall excessive bail be required nor excessive nes imposed. No person shall be held
to answer for any crime, punishable by death or life imprisonment, unless upon probable
cause shown at a hearing in accordance with procedures prescribed by law, except in the
armed forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger.
b. In all criminal prosecutions, a victim, as the general assembly may dene
by law, shall have the following rights: (1) The right to be treated with fairness and
respect throughout the criminal justice process; (2) the right to timely disposition of
the case following arrest of the accused, provided no right of the accused is abridged;
(3) the right to be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the criminal
justice process; (4) the right to notication of court proceedings; (5) the right to attend
the trial and all other court proceedings the accused has the right to attend, unless such
person is to testify and the court determines that such person’s testimony would be
materially affected if such person hears other testimony; (6) the right to communicate
with the prosecution; (7) the right to object to or support any plea agreement entered
into by the accused and the prosecution and to make a statement to the court prior to
the acceptance by the court of the plea of guilty or nolo contendere by the accused;
(8) the right to make a statement to the court at sentencing; (9) the right to restitution
which shall be enforceable in the same manner as any other cause of action or as
otherwise provided by law; and (10) the right to information about the arrest, convic-
tion, sentence, imprisonment and release of the accused. The general assembly shall
provide by law for the enforcement of this subsection. Nothing in this subsection or in
any law enacted pursuant to this subsection shall be construed as creating a basis for
vacating a conviction or ground for appellate relief in any criminal case.
ARTICLE XXX.*
*Adopted November 29, 2000.
(Sheriffs for the several counties.)
Section 1. Section 25 of article fourth of the Constitution is repealed.
(Reapportionment procedure. Reapportionment Committee.)
Sec. 2. Subsection a. of article twenty-sixth of the amendments to the Constitution
is amended to read as follows:
1
a. The assembly and senatorial districts and congressional districts as now estab-
lished by law shall continue until the regular session of the general assembly next after
the completion of the taking of the next census of the United States. On or before the
fteenth day of February next following the year in which the decennial census of the
United States is taken, the general assembly shall appoint a reapportionment com-
mittee consisting of four members of the senate, two who shall be designated by the
president pro tempore of the senate and two who shall be designated by the minority
Art. XXXI AMENDMENTS TO THE 241
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
leader of the senate, and four members of the house of representatives, two who shall
be designated by the speaker of the house of representatives and two who shall be
designated by the minority leader of the house of representatives, provided there are
members of no more than two political parties in either the senate or the house of
representatives. In the event that there are members of more than two political parties
in a house of the general assembly, all members of that house belonging to the parties
other than that of the president pro tempore of the senate or the speaker of the house
of representatives, as the case may be, shall select one of their number, who shall des-
ignate two members of the committee in lieu of the designation by the minority leader
of that house. Such committee shall advise the general assembly on matters of appor-
tionment. Upon the ling of a report of such committee with the clerk of the house of
representatives and the clerk of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives
and the president pro tempore of the senate shall, if the general assembly is not in
regular session, convene the general assembly in special session for the sole purpose
of adopting a plan of districting. Upon the request of the speaker of the house of rep-
resentatives and the president pro tempore of the senate, the secretary of the state shall
give notice of such special session by mailing a true copy of the call of such special
session, by registered or certied mail, return receipt requested, to each member of
the house of representatives and of the senate at his or her address as it appears upon
the records of said secretary not less than ten nor more than fteen days prior to the
date of convening of such special session or by causing a true copy of the call to be
delivered to each member by a constable, state policeman or indifferent person at least
twenty-four hours prior to the time of convening of such special session. Such general
assembly shall, upon roll call, by a yea vote of at least two-thirds of the membership of
each house, adopt such plan of districting as is necessary to preserve a proper appor-
tionment of representation in accordance with the principles recited in this article.
Thereafter the general assembly shall decennially at its next regular session or special
session called for the purpose of adopting a plan of districting following the comple-
tion of the taking of the census of the United States, upon roll call, by a yea vote of at
least two-thirds of the membership of each house, adopt such plan of districting as is
necessary in accordance with the provisions of this article.
1
Under former provisions: Completion of census means the gures broken down into counties, towns and wards and
ofcially released to the public and available for use by the General Assembly. The General Assembly convening next
after the completion of the federal census has the power, but not the duty, to alter senatorial districts and intervening
sessions have no continuing duty to redistrict. 141 C. 1. Sec. 6d, 6e cited. 163 C. 637. Plan used on interim basis by
court order, when. 164 C. 8. Cited. Id. Sec. 6a cited. Id. Sec. 6b cited. Id. The plan of apportionment adopted pursuant
to the provisions of this section does not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal
constitution. 165 C. 316. Cited. 187 C. 721; 222 C. 166. Federal “one person one vote” principle, see Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, cited; federal constitutional requirements for fair voting standards cited; reconciliation of principle and
town integrity principle discussed. Id. Sec. 6c, 6d cited. Id. Cited. 230 C. 441; 231 C. 602.
ARTICLE XXXI.*
*Adopted November 26, 2008.
(Preregistration of seventeen-year-old citizens as electors. When seventeen-
year-old citizens may vote in primary elections.)
Article fourteenth of the amendments to the Constitution is amended to read as
follows:
Any citizen who will have attained the age of eighteen years on or before the day
of a regular election may apply for admission as an elector at such times and in such
242 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXXIII
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
manner as may be prescribed by law, and, if qualied, shall become an elector on the
day of his or her eighteenth birthday. Any citizen who has not yet attained the age
of eighteen years but who will have attained the age of eighteen years on or before
the day of a regular election, who is otherwise qualied to be an elector and who has
applied for admission as an elector in such manner as may be prescribed by law, may
vote in any primary election, in such manner as may be prescribed by law, held for
such regular election.
ARTICLE XXXII.*
*Adopted November 28, 2018.
(Special Transportation Fund. Resources of fund to be expended for transpor-
tation purposes.)
Article third of the Constitution is amended by adding section 19 as follows:
Sec. 19. The Special Transportation Fund shall remain a perpetual fund. The general
assembly shall direct the resources of said fund solely for transportation purposes,
including the payment of debt service on obligations of the state incurred for transpor-
tation purposes. Sources of funds, moneys and receipts of the state credited, deposited
or transferred to said fund by state law on or after the effective date of this amendment
shall be credited, deposited or transferred to the Special Transportation Fund, so long
as such sources are authorized by statute to be collected or received by the state, or any
ofcer thereof, and the general assembly shall enact no law authorizing the resources
of said fund to be expended other than for transportation purposes.
ARTICLE XXXIII.*
*Adopted November 28, 2018.
(Legislation requiring state agency to sell, transfer or dispose of real property
or interest in real property.)
Article third of the Constitution is amended by adding section 19 as follows:
Sec. 19. (a) The general assembly shall not enact any legislation requiring a state
agency to sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of any real property or interest in real
property that is under the custody or control of such agency to any person or entity
other than another state agency unless a committee of the general assembly has held a
public hearing regarding such sale, transfer or disposition of such property or interest
and the act of the general assembly requiring such sale, transfer or disposition of real
property or interest in real property is limited in subject matter to provisions concern-
ing such sale, transfer or disposition.
(b) In the case of real property or an interest in real property that is under the
custody or control of the Department of Agriculture or the Department of Energy and
Environmental Protection, or a successor agency of either department, in addition to
complying with the requirements of subsection (a) of this section, any act requiring
the sale, transfer or disposition of such property or interest shall pass upon roll call by
a yea vote of at least two-thirds of the total membership of each house.
Art. XXXIV AMENDMENTS TO THE 243
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
ARTICLE XXXIV.*
*Adopted November 30, 2022.
(Absentee voting. In-person early voting.)
Section 7 of article sixth of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
Sec. 7. The general assembly may provide by law for voting in the choice of
any officer to be elected or upon any question to be voted on at an election by
qualified voters of the state who are unable to appear at the polling place on the
day of election because of absence from the city or town of which they are inhab-
itants or because of sickness or physical disability or because the tenets of their
religion forbid secular activity. The general assembly may further provide by law
for voting in person prior to the day of election in the choice of any officer to be
elected or upon any question to be voted on at an election by qualified voters of
the state.
(Counting of votes. Return of votes.)
Section 9 of article third of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
Sec. 9. At all elections for members of the general assembly the presiding ofcers
in the several towns shall count and declare the votes of the electors in open meeting.
The presiding ofcers shall make and certify duplicate lists of the persons voted for,
and of the number of votes for each. One list shall be delivered within three days to
the town clerk, and within ten days after such meeting, the other shall be delivered to
the secretary of the state.
(Counting of votes. Return of votes. Canvass and declaration of votes. Choice
by general assembly, when and how made.)
Section 4 of article fourth of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. The votes at the election of state ofcers shall be counted and declared in
open meeting by the presiding ofcers in the several towns. The presiding ofcers
shall make and certify duplicate lists of the persons voted for, and of the number of
votes for each. One list shall be delivered within three days to the town clerk, and
within ten days after such meeting, the other shall be delivered to the secretary of the
state. The votes so delivered shall be counted, canvassed and declared by the treasurer,
secretary, and comptroller, within the month of November. The vote for treasurer shall
be counted, canvassed and declared by the secretary and comptroller only; the vote
for secretary shall be counted, canvassed and declared by the treasurer and comptrol-
ler only; and the vote for comptroller shall be counted, canvassed and declared by
the treasurer and secretary only. A fair list of the persons and number of votes given
for each, together with the returns of the presiding ofcers, shall be, by the treasurer,
secretary and comptroller, made and laid before the general assembly, then next to be
held, on the rst day of the session thereof. In the election of governor, lieutenant-
governor, secretary, treasurer, comptroller and attorney general, the person found upon
the count by the treasurer, secretary and comptroller in the manner herein provided, to
be made and announced before December fteenth of the year of the election, to have
received the greatest number of votes for each of such ofces, respectively, shall be
elected thereto; provided, if the election of any of them shall be contested as provided
by statute, and if such a contest shall proceed to nal judgment, the person found by
the court to have received the greatest number of votes shall be elected. If two or more
persons shall be found upon the count of the treasurer, secretary and comptroller to
244 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XXXIV
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
have received an equal and the greatest number of votes for any of said ofces, and
the election is not contested, the general assembly on the second day of its session
shall hold a joint convention of both houses, at which, without debate, a ballot shall
be taken to choose such ofcer from those persons who received such a vote; and the
balloting shall continue on that or subsequent days until one of such persons is chosen
by a majority vote of those present and voting. The general assembly shall have power
to enact laws regulating and prescribing the order and manner of voting for such of-
cers. The general assembly shall by law prescribe the manner in which all questions
concerning the election of a governor or lieutenant-governor shall be determined.
245
CODIFIED CONSTITUTION
OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT
AMENDMENTS
*This unofcial codied version of the Constitution of the State of Connecticut has been prepared by the Revisors as
a convenience to the users of this publication. It is not intended to supersede the Constitution of the State of Connecticut
and the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut which are printed earlier in this Volume. Users are
advised to refer to these original constitutional documents for the ofcial text, annotations and other pertinent informa-
tion. This unofcial codied version includes the original Constitution of the State of Connecticut adopted in 1965 and
incorporates the amendments thereto which have been adopted since 1965 and which are in effect on January 1, 2023.
Historical notes briey summarize the amendments and additions to the original 1965 Constitution.
All material printed in bold type and enclosed within parentheses did not form part of the original document con-
cerned but has been incorporated in this publication to assist the user.
PREAMBLE.
The People of Connecticut acknowledging with gratitude, the good providence of
God, in having permitted them to enjoy a free government; do, in order more effec-
tually to dene, secure, and perpetuate the liberties, rights and privileges which they
have derived from their ancestors; hereby, after a careful consideration and revision,
ordain and establish the following constitution and form of civil government.
ARTICLE FIRST.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.
That the great and essential principles of liberty and free government may be rec-
ognized and established,
*
246 CODIFIED CONSTITUTION Art. I
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
WE DECLARE:
(Equality of rights.)
Sec. 1. All men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man
or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the
community.
(Source of political power. Right to alter form of government.)
Sec. 2. All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are
founded on their authority, and instituted for their benet; and they have at all times
an undeniable and indefeasible right to alter their form of government in such manner
as they may think expedient.
(Right of religious liberty.)
Sec. 3. The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination, shall forever be free to all persons in the state; provided, that the right
hereby declared and established, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licen-
tiousness, or to justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.
(Liberty of speech and the press.)
Sec. 4. Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all sub-
jects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.
(Prohibiting laws limiting liberty of speech or press.)
Sec. 5. No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of
the press.
(Prosecutions for libel; defenses.)
Sec. 6. In all prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evi-
dence, and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the
direction of the court.
(Security from searches and seizures.)
Sec. 7. The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions
from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize
any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause supported by oath or afrmation.
(Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions. What cases bailable. Speedy trial.
Due process. Excessive bail or fines. Probable cause shown at hearing, when nec-
essary. Rights of victims of crime.)
Sec. 8. a. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard
by himself and by counsel; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted by the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process to obtain
witnesses in his behalf; to be released on bail upon sufcient security, except in capital
offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption great; and in all prosecutions
by information, to a speedy, public trial by an impartial jury. No person shall be com-
pelled to give evidence against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall excessive bail be required nor excessive nes
imposed. No person shall be held to answer for any crime, punishable by death or
life imprisonment, unless upon probable cause shown at a hearing in accordance with
Art. I CODIFIED CONSTITUTION 247
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
procedures prescribed by law, except in the armed forces, or in the militia when in
actual service in time of war or public danger.
b. In all criminal prosecutions, a victim, as the general assembly may dene
by law, shall have the following rights: (1) The right to be treated with fairness and
respect throughout the criminal justice process; (2) the right to timely disposition
of the case following arrest of the accused, provided no right of the accused is
abridged; (3) the right to be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the
criminal justice process; (4) the right to notication of court proceedings; (5) the
right to attend the trial and all other court proceedings the accused has the right to
attend, unless such person is to testify and the court determines that such person’s
testimony would be materially affected if such person hears other testimony; (6) the
right to communicate with the prosecution; (7) the right to object to or support
any plea agreement entered into by the accused and the prosecution and to make
a statement to the court prior to the acceptance by the court of the plea of guilty
or nolo contendere by the accused; (8) the right to make a statement to the court
at sentencing; (9) the right to restitution which shall be enforceable in the same
manner as any other cause of action or as otherwise provided by law; and (10) the
right to information about the arrest, conviction, sentence, imprisonment and release
of the accused. The general assembly shall provide by law for the enforcement of
this subsection. Nothing in this subsection or in any law enacted pursuant to this
subsection shall be construed as creating a basis for vacating a conviction or ground
for appellate relief in any criminal case.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article XVII., of the Amendments to the Constitution of
the State of Connecticut, and Article XXIX., of said Amendments. Said Article XVII., was adopted on November 24,
1982, and deleted reference to prosecutions by “indictment” and replaced provision barring the prosecution of persons
for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment except “on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury” with provi-
sion requiring a nding of “probable cause shown at a hearing in accordance with procedures prescribed by law”. Said
Article XXIX., was adopted on November 27, 1996, and designated existing section as subsection a. and added subsec-
tion b. enumerating rights of victims in all criminal prosecutions, requiring the general assembly to enforce those rights
and prohibiting construction of the subsection and related laws subsequently enacted so as to create a basis for vacating
a conviction or ground for appellate relief in any criminal case.
(Right of personal liberty.)
Sec. 9. No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly
warranted by law.
(Right of redress for injuries.)
Sec. 10. All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial or delay.
(Right of private property.)
Sec. 11. The property of no person shall be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation therefor.
(Writ of habeas corpus.)
Sec. 12. The privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless,
when in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it; nor in any case,
but by the legislature.
(No attainder.)
Sec. 13. No person shall be attainted of treason or felony, by the legislature.
248 CODIFIED CONSTITUTION Art. II
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
(Right to assemble and petition.)
Sec. 14. The citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their
common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for
redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.
(Right to bear arms.)
Sec. 15. Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.
(Military power subordinate to civil.)
Sec. 16. The military shall, in all cases, and at all times, be in strict subordination
to the civil power.
(Quartering of soldiers.)
Sec. 17. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
(No hereditary emoluments.)
Sec. 18. No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or
conferred in this state.
(Trial by jury. Challenging of jurors.)
Sec. 19. The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, the number of such jurors,
which shall not be less than six, to be established by law; but no person shall, for a
capital offense, be tried by a jury of less than twelve jurors without his consent. In all
civil and criminal actions tried by a jury, the parties shall have the right to challenge
jurors peremptorily, the number of such challenges to be established by law. The right
to question each juror individually by counsel shall be inviolate.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article IV., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
State of Connecticut. Said Article IV., was certied as adopted on December 22, 1972, (See Ponsor et al v. Schaffer,
Hartford Superior Court Docket No. 179114), and added provisions re minimum number of jurors, re parties’ rights to
make peremptory challenges and re counsels’ rights to question jurors individually.
(Equal protection. No segregation or discrimination.)
Sec. 20. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected
to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or
political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or phys-
ical or mental disability.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article V., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
State of Connecticut, and Article XXI., of said Amendments. Said Article V., was adopted on November 27, 1974, and
prohibited discrimination based on sex. Said Article XXI., was adopted on November 28, 1984, and prohibited discrim-
ination based on physical or mental disability.
ARTICLE SECOND.
OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS.
(Distribution of powers. Delegation of regulatory authority. Disapproval of
administrative regulations.)
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each
of them conded to a separate magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative, to one;
those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another. The
legislative department may delegate regulatory authority to the executive department;
except that any administrative regulation of any agency of the executive department
Art. III CODIFIED CONSTITUTION 249
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
may be disapproved by the general assembly or a committee thereof in such manner
as shall by law be prescribed.
Historical Note: This Article, as printed here, incorporates Article XVIII., of the Amendments to the Constitution of
the State of Connecticut. Said Article XVIII., was adopted on November 24, 1982, and authorized the legislative de-
partment to delegate regulatory authority to the executive department, reserving to the general assembly or a committee
thereof the authority to disapprove any administrative regulation made by an executive department agency.
ARTICLE THIRD.
OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.
(Legislative power, in whom vested.)
Sec. 1. The legislative power of this state shall be vested in two distinct houses or
branches; the one to be styled the senate, the other the house of representatives, and
both together the general assembly. The style of their laws shall be: Be it enacted by
the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened.
(General assembly, when and where held. Adjournment. Reconvened session
to consider vetoes.)
Sec. 2. There shall be a regular session of the general assembly on the Wednesday
following the rst Monday of January in the odd-numbered years and on the Wednesday
following the rst Monday of February in the even-numbered years, and at such other
times as the general assembly shall judge necessary; but the person administering the
ofce of governor may, on special emergencies, convene the general assembly at any
other time. All regular and special sessions of the general assembly shall be held at
Hartford, but the person administering the ofce of governor may, in case of special
emergency, convene the assembly at any other place in the state. The general assembly
shall adjourn each regular session in the odd-numbered years not later than the rst
Wednesday after the rst Monday in June and in the even-numbered years not later
than the rst Wednesday after the rst Monday in May and shall adjourn each special
session upon completion of its business. If any bill passed by any regular or special
session or any appropriation item described in Section 16 of Article Fourth has been
disapproved by the governor prior to its adjournment, and has not been reconsidered
by the assembly, or is so disapproved after such adjournment, the secretary of the state
shall reconvene the general assembly on the second Monday after the last day on which
the governor is authorized to transmit or has transmitted every bill to the secretary with
his objections pursuant to Section 15 of Article Fourth of this constitution, whichever
occurs rst; provided if such Monday falls on a legal holiday the general assembly shall
be reconvened on the next following day. The reconvened session shall be for the sole
purpose of reconsidering and, if the assembly so desires, repassing such bills. The general
assembly shall adjourn sine die not later than three days following its reconvening.
In the even year session the general assembly shall consider no business other than
budgetary, revenue and nancial matters, bills and resolutions raised by committees of
the general assembly and those matters certied in writing by the speaker of the house
of representatives and president pro tempore of the senate to be of an emergency nature.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article III., of the Amendments to the Constitution of
the State of Connecticut. Said Article III., was adopted on November 25, 1970, and revised existing language concern-
ing dates for convening regular sessions of the general assembly to provide for annual, rather than biennial, sessions,
retaining original date of Wednesday following the rst Monday in January for odd-numbered years and instituting
Wednesday following the rst Monday in February as the commencement date for sessions in even-numbered years, and
specied the business which may be considered during sessions in even-numbered years.
250 CODIFIED CONSTITUTION Art. III
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
(Senate, number, qualifications.)
Sec. 3. The senate shall consist of not less than thirty and not more than fty
members, each of whom shall have attained the age of eighteen and be an elector
residing in the senatorial district from which he is elected. Each senatorial district
shall be contiguous as to territory and shall elect no more than one senator.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article II., Sec. 1, of the Amendments to the Constitution
of the State of Connecticut, and the rst section of Article XV., of said Amendments. Said Article II., Sec. 1, was adopted
on November 25, 1970, and required that senators have attained the age of twenty-one. Said Article XV., was adopted on
November 26, 1980, and reduced the required minimum age to eighteen.
(House of representatives, how constituted.)
Sec. 4. The house of representatives shall consist of not less than one hundred
twenty-ve and not more than two hundred twenty-ve members, each of whom shall
have attained the age of eighteen years and be an elector residing in the assembly
district from which he is elected. Each assembly district shall be contiguous as to
territory and shall elect no more than one representative. For the purpose of forming
assembly districts no town shall be divided except for the purpose of forming assembly
districts wholly within the town.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article II., Sec. 2, of the Amendments to the Constitution
of the State of Connecticut, and the second section of Article XV., of said Amendments. Said Article II., Sec. 2, was
adopted on November 25, 1970, and required that representatives have attained the age of twenty-one. Said Article XV.,
was adopted on November 26, 1980, and reduced the required minimum age to eighteen.
(Congressional and general assembly districts to be consistent with federal
standards.)
Sec. 5. The establishment of congressional districts and of districts in the general
assembly shall be consistent with federal constitutional standards.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article XVI., Sec. 1 of the Amendments to the Consti-
tution of the State of Connecticut. Said Article XVI., Sec. 1 was adopted on November 26, 1980, and required that
congressional districts be established in a manner consistent with federal constitutional standards.
(Reapportionment procedure. Reapportionment Committee. Reapportion-
ment Commission.)
Sec. 6. a. The assembly and senatorial districts and congressional districts as now
established by law shall continue until the regular session of the general assembly next
after the completion of the taking of the next census of the United States. On or before
the fteenth day of February next following the year in which the decennial census
of the United States is taken, the general assembly shall appoint a reapportionment
committee consisting of four members of the senate, two who shall be designated by
the president pro tempore of the senate and two who shall be designated by the minor-
ity leader of the senate, and four members of the house of representatives, two who
shall be designated by the speaker of the house of representatives and two who shall
be designated by the minority leader of the house of representatives, provided there
are members of no more than two political parties in either the senate or the house of
representatives. In the event that there are members of more than two political parties
in a house of the general assembly, all members of that house belonging to the parties
other than that of the president pro tempore of the senate or the speaker of the house
of representatives, as the case may be, shall select one of their number, who shall des-
ignate two members of the committee in lieu of the designation by the minority leader
of that house. Such committee shall advise the general assembly on matters of appor-
tionment. Upon the ling of a report of such committee with the clerk of the house of
representatives and the clerk of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives
Art. III CODIFIED CONSTITUTION 251
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
and the president pro tempore of the senate shall, if the general assembly is not in
regular session, convene the general assembly in special session for the sole purpose
of adopting a plan of districting. Upon the request of the speaker of the house of rep-
resentatives and the president pro tempore of the senate, the secretary of the state shall
give notice of such special session by mailing a true copy of the call of such special
session, by registered or certied mail, return receipt requested, to each member of
the house of representatives and of the senate at his or her address as it appears upon
the records of said secretary not less than ten nor more than fteen days prior to the
date of convening of such special session or by causing a true copy of the call to be
delivered to each member by a constable, state policeman or indifferent person at least
twenty-four hours prior to the time of convening of such special session. Such general
assembly shall, upon roll call, by a yea vote of at least two-thirds of the membership of
each house, adopt such plan of districting as is necessary to preserve a proper appor-
tionment of representation in accordance with the principles recited in this article.
Thereafter the general assembly shall decennially at its next regular session or special
session called for the purpose of adopting a plan of districting following the comple-
tion of the taking of the census of the United States, upon roll call, by a yea vote of at
least two-thirds of the membership of each house, adopt such plan of districting as is
necessary in accordance with the provisions of this article.
b. If the general assembly fails to adopt a plan of districting by the fteenth day
of the September next following the year in which the decennial census of the United
States is taken, the governor shall forthwith appoint a commission designated by the
president pro tempore of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives, the
minority leader of the senate and the minority leader of the house of representatives,
each of whom shall designate two members of the commission, provided that there
are members of no more than two political parties in either the senate or the house of
representatives. In the event that there are members of more than two political parties
in a house of the general assembly, all members of that house belonging to the parties
other than that of the president pro tempore of the senate or the speaker of the house of
representatives, as the case may be, shall select one of their number, who shall desig-
nate two members of the commission in lieu of the designation by the minority leader
of that house. The eight members of the commission so designated shall within thirty
days select an elector of the state as a ninth member.
c. The commission shall proceed to consider the alteration of districts in accor-
dance with the principles recited in this article and it shall submit a plan of districting
to the secretary of the state by the thirtieth day of the November next succeeding the
appointment of its members. No plan shall be submitted to the secretary unless it is
certied by at least ve members of the commission. Upon receiving such plan the
secretary shall publish the same forthwith, and, upon publication, such plan of district-
ing shall have the full force of law. If the commission shall fail to submit such a plan
by the thirtieth day of November, the secretary of the state shall forthwith so notify the
chief justice of the supreme court.
d. Original jurisdiction is vested in the supreme court to be exercised on the peti-
tion of any registered voter whereby said court may compel the commission, by man-
damus or otherwise, to perform its duty or to correct any error made in its plan of
districting, or said court may take such other action to effectuate the purposes of this
article, including the establishing of a plan of districting if the commission fails to
le its plan of districting by the thirtieth day of November as said court may deem
252 CODIFIED CONSTITUTION Art. III
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
appropriate. Any such petition shall be led within thirty days of the date specied
for any duty or within thirty days after the ling of a plan of districting. The supreme
court shall render its decision not later than forty-ve days following the ling of such
petition or shall le its plan with the secretary of the state not later than the fteenth
day of February next following the time for submission of a plan of districting by the
commission. Upon receiving such plan the secretary shall publish the same forthwith,
and, upon publication, such plan of districting shall have the full force of law.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article XII., of the Amendments to the Constitution of
the State of Connecticut, and Article XVI., Sec. 2, Article XXVI., and Article XXX., Sec. 2, of said Amendments. Said
Article XII., was adopted on November 24, 1976, and added provisions in subsection a. requiring the appointment of a
reapportionment committee and set forth the procedures governing the designation of its members, changed the deadline
for enactment of a redistricting plan in subsection b. from the April rst next following the completion of a census to the
May fteenth next following completion and added a ninth commission member, to be selected by the eight appointees
of the speaker, president pro tem and minority leaders, in subsection c., changed the deadline for the submission of the
plan to the secretary of the state from the July rst next succeeding the appointment of commission members to the
September rst next succeeding their appointment, required certication by ve commission members rather than six
and added new provision requiring secretary of the state to notify the chief justice in the event that the commission fails
to submit a plan, and entirely replaced former subsections d. and e. which had authorized empaneling a three-member
board to consist of superior court judges charged with altering districts as need be with a new subsection d. vesting
original jurisdiction in the supreme court to compel the commission to perform its duties or to correct errors in the plan
or to establish a plan itself. Said Article XVI., Sec. 2, was adopted on November 26, 1980, and replaced references to
the “completion” of a census with references to the “taking” of a census throughout this section, amended subsection a.
to include congressional districts and to add provisions governing the calling of a special session to adopt a redistricting
plan, amended subsection b. to change the deadline for adoption of a plan from May fteenth to August rst in the year
next following the census, amended subsection c. to change the deadline from the September rst next succeeding the
appointment of members to the October thirtieth next succeeding their appointment, and amended subsection d. to
change the deadline for ling a petition from “within forty-ve days of the date specied for any duty or within forty-ve
days after the ling of a plan of districting” to “within thirty days” of such date for any duty or ling, to reduce the time
allotted for supreme court action on a petition from sixty to forty-ve days and to change court’s deadline for ling its
own plan from the December fteenth following a census to the January fteenth next following the commission’s dead-
line for submission of a plan. Said Article XXVI., was adopted on November 28, 1990, and amended subsection b. to
change the deadline for adoption of a plan from the August rst next following the year a census is taken to the fteenth
of September next following such year, amended subsection c. to change the deadline from the October thirtieth next
succeeding the appointment of members to the November thirtieth next succeeding their appointment and amended sub-
section d. to change court’s deadline for ling its own plan from the January fteenth next following the commission’s
deadline for submission of a plan to the February fteenth following the commission’s deadline. Said Article XXX., Sec.
2, was adopted on November 29, 2000, and amended subsection a. by deleting reference to sheriff and deputy sheriff.
(Canvass and declaration of votes. Return and result to be submitted to both
houses.)
Sec. 7. The treasurer, secretary of the state, and comptroller shall canvass publicly
the votes for senators and representatives. The person in each senatorial district having
the greatest number of votes for senator shall be declared to be duly elected for such
district, and the person in each assembly district having the greatest number of votes
for representative shall be declared to be duly elected for such district. The general
assembly shall provide by law the manner in which an equal and the greatest number
of votes for two or more persons so voted for for senator or representative shall be
resolved. The return of votes, and the result of the canvass, shall be submitted to the
house of representatives and to the senate on the rst day of the session of the general
assembly. Each house shall be the nal judge of the election returns and qualications
of its own members.
(General assembly, election.)
Sec. 8. A general election for members of the general assembly shall be held on the
Tuesday after the rst Monday of November, biennially, in the even-numbered years.
The general assembly shall have power to enact laws regulating and prescribing the
order and manner of voting for such members, for lling vacancies in either the house
of representatives or the senate, and providing for the election of representatives or
Art. III CODIFIED CONSTITUTION 253
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
senators at some time subsequent to the Tuesday after the rst Monday of November
in all cases when it shall so happen that the electors in any district shall fail on that day
to elect a representative or senator.
(Counting of votes. Return of votes.)
Sec. 9. At all elections for members of the general assembly the presiding ofcers
in the several towns shall count and declare the votes of the electors in open meeting.
The presiding ofcers shall make and certify duplicate lists of the persons voted for,
and of the number of votes for each. One list shall be delivered within three days to
the town clerk, and within ten days after such meeting, the other shall be delivered to
the secretary of the state.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article XXXIV., of the Amendments to the Constitution
of the State of Connecticut. Said Article XXXIV., was adopted on November 30, 2022, and replaced “receive the votes
of the electors, and count and declare them” with “count and declare the votes of the electors” and deleted “under seal”.
(Term of office.)
Sec. 10. The members of the general assembly shall hold their ofces from the
Wednesday following the rst Monday of the January next succeeding their election
until the Wednesday after the rst Monday of the third January next succeeding their
election, and until their successors are duly qualied.
(Dual job ban.)
Sec. 11. No member of the general assembly shall, during the term for which he is
elected, hold or accept any appointive position or ofce in the judicial or executive
department of the state government, or in the courts of the political subdivisions of the
state, or in the government of any county. No member of congress, no person holding
any ofce under the authority of the United States and no person holding any ofce
in the judicial or executive department of the state government or in the government
of any county shall be a member of the general assembly during his continuance in
such ofce.
(Officers. Quorum.)
Sec. 12. The house of representatives, when assembled, shall choose a speaker,
clerk, and other ofcers. The senate shall choose a president pro tempore, clerk and
other ofcers, except the president. A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum
to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the
attendance of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as each house
may prescribe.
(Powers of each house.)
Sec. 13. Each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings, and punish
members for disorderly conduct, and, with the consent of two-thirds, expel a member,
but not a second time for the same cause; and shall have all other powers necessary for
a branch of the legislature of a free and independent state.
(Journal. Yeas and nays.)
Sec. 14. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and publish the same
when required by one-fth of its members, except such parts as in the judgment of a
majority require secrecy. The yeas and nays of the members of either house shall, at
the desire of one-fth of those present, be entered on the journals.
254 CODIFIED CONSTITUTION Art. III
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
(Privilege from arrest. Privilege as to speech or debates.)
Sec. 15. The senators and representatives shall, in all cases of civil process, be
privileged from arrest, during any session of the general assembly, and for four days
before the commencement and after the termination of any session thereof. And for
any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
(Debates to be public.)
Sec. 16. The debates of each house shall be public, except on such occasions as in
the opinion of the house may require secrecy.
(Salary. Transportation.)
Sec. 17. The salary of the members of the general assembly and the transportation
expenses of its members in the performance of their legislative duties shall be deter-
mined by law.
(Limit on state expenditures. Maximum authorized increase; “emergency or extra-
ordinary circumstances”; definitions to be defined by general assembly. Surplus.)
Sec. 18. (a) The amount of general budget expenditures authorized for any scal
year shall not exceed the estimated amount of revenue for such scal year.
(b) The general assembly shall not authorize an increase in general budget expen-
ditures for any scal year above the amount of general budget expenditures autho-
rized for the previous scal year by a percentage which exceeds the greater of the
percentage increase in personal income or the percentage increase in ination, unless
the governor declares an emergency or the existence of extraordinary circumstances
and at least three-fths of the members of each house of the general assembly vote to
exceed such limit for the purposes of such emergency or extraordinary circumstances.
The general assembly shall by law dene “increase in personal income”, “increase
in ination” and “general budget expenditures” for the purposes of this section and
may amend such denitions, from time to time, provided general budget expenditures
shall not include expenditures for the payment of bonds, notes or other evidences of
indebtedness. The enactment or amendment of such denitions shall require the vote
of three-fths of the members of each house of the general assembly.
(c) Any unappropriated surplus shall be used to fund a budget reserve fund or for
the reduction of bonded indebtedness; or for any other purpose authorized by at least
three-fths of the members of each house of the general assembly.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, was added by Article XXVIII., of the Amendments to the Constitution
of the State of Connecticut. Said Article XXVIII., was adopted on November 25, 1992, and limited state expenditures in
any scal year and designated purposes for which unappropriated surpluses may be used.
(Special Transportation Fund. Resources of fund to be expended for transpor-
tation purposes.)
Sec. 19. The Special Transportation Fund shall remain a perpetual fund. The general
assembly shall direct the resources of said fund solely for transportation purposes,
including the payment of debt service on obligations of the state incurred for transpor-
tation purposes. Sources of funds, moneys and receipts of the state credited, deposited
or transferred to said fund by state law on or after the effective date of this amendment
shall be credited, deposited or transferred to the Special Transportation Fund, so long
as such sources are authorized by statute to be collected or received by the state, or any
ofcer thereof, and the general assembly shall enact no law authorizing the resources
of said fund to be expended other than for transportation purposes.
Art. IV CODIFIED CONSTITUTION 255
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INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, was added by Article XXXII., of the Amendments to the Constitution
of the State of Connecticut. Said Article XXXII., was adopted on November 28, 2018.
(Legislation requiring state agency to sell, transfer or dispose of real property
or interest in real property.)
Sec. 20. (a) The general assembly shall not enact any legislation requiring a state
agency to sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of any real property or interest in real
property that is under the custody or control of such agency to any person or entity
other than another state agency unless a committee of the general assembly has held a
public hearing regarding such sale, transfer or disposition of such property or interest
and the act of the general assembly requiring such sale, transfer or disposition of real
property or interest in real property is limited in subject matter to provisions concern-
ing such sale, transfer or disposition.
(b) In the case of real property or an interest in real property that is under the
custody or control of the Department of Agriculture or the Department of Energy and
Environmental Protection, or a successor agency of either department, in addition to
complying with the requirements of subsection (a) of this section, any act requiring
the sale, transfer or disposition of such property or interest shall pass upon roll call by
a yea vote of at least two-thirds of the total membership of each house.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, was added by Article XXXIII., of the Amendments to the Constitution
of the State of Connecticut and designated as “Sec. 20”. Said Article XXXIII., was adopted on November 28, 2018.
ARTICLE FOURTH.
OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.
(State officers, election date.)
Sec. 1. A general election for governor, lieutenant-governor, secretary of the state,
treasurer, comptroller and attorney general shall be held on the Tuesday after the rst
Monday of November, 1974, and quadrennially thereafter.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article I., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
State of Connecticut. Said Article I., was adopted on November 25, 1970, and required election of an attorney general at
the November 1974 election and quadrennially thereafter.
(Terms of officers.)
Sec. 2. Such ofcers shall hold their respective ofces from the Wednesday follow-
ing the rst Monday of the January next succeeding their election until the Wednesday
following the rst Monday of the fth January succeeding their election and until their
successors are duly qualied.
(Governor and lieutenant-governor voted for as unit.)
Sec. 3. In the election of governor and lieutenant-governor, voting for such ofces
shall be as a unit. The name of no candidate for either ofce, nominated by a political
party or by petition, shall appear on the voting machine ballot labels except in con-
junction with the name of the candidate for the other ofce.
(Counting of votes. Return of votes. Canvass and declaration of votes. Choice
by general assembly, when and how made.)
Sec. 4. The votes at the election of state ofcers shall be counted and declared in
open meeting by the presiding ofcers in the several towns. The presiding ofcers
shall make and certify duplicate lists of the persons voted for, and of the number of
256 CODIFIED CONSTITUTION Art. IV
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
votes for each. One list shall be delivered within three days to the town clerk, and
within ten days after such meeting, the other shall be delivered to the secretary of the
state. The votes so delivered shall be counted, canvassed and declared by the treasurer,
secretary, and comptroller, within the month of November. The vote for treasurer shall
be counted, canvassed and declared by the secretary and comptroller only; the vote
for secretary shall be counted, canvassed and declared by the treasurer and comptrol-
ler only; and the vote for comptroller shall be counted, canvassed and declared by
the treasurer and secretary only. A fair list of the persons and number of votes given
for each, together with the returns of the presiding ofcers, shall be, by the treasurer,
secretary and comptroller, made and laid before the general assembly, then next to be
held, on the rst day of the session thereof. In the election of governor, lieutenant-
governor, secretary, treasurer, comptroller and attorney general, the person found upon
the count by the treasurer, secretary and comptroller in the manner herein provided, to
be made and announced before December fteenth of the year of the election, to have
received the greatest number of votes for each of such ofces, respectively, shall be
elected thereto; provided, if the election of any of them shall be contested as provided
by statute, and if such a contest shall proceed to nal judgment, the person found by
the court to have received the greatest number of votes shall be elected. If two or more
persons shall be found upon the count of the treasurer, secretary and comptroller to
have received an equal and the greatest number of votes for any of said ofces, and
the election is not contested, the general assembly on the second day of its session
shall hold a joint convention of both houses, at which, without debate, a ballot shall
be taken to choose such ofcer from those persons who received such a vote; and the
balloting shall continue on that or subsequent days until one of such persons is chosen
by a majority vote of those present and voting. The general assembly shall have power
to enact laws regulating and prescribing the order and manner of voting for such of-
cers. The general assembly shall by law prescribe the manner in which all questions
concerning the election of a governor or lieutenant-governor shall be determined.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article XXXIV., of the Amendments to the Constitution
of the State of Connecticut. Said Article XXXIV., was adopted on November 30, 2022, and replaced “At the meetings of
the electors in the respective towns held quadrennially as herein provided for the election of state ofcers, the presiding
ofcers shall receive the votes and shall count and declare the same in the presence of the electors.” with “The votes at
the election of state ofcers shall be counted and declared in open meeting by the presiding ofcers in the several towns.”
and deleted “under seal”.
(Governor. Qualifications.)
Sec. 5. The supreme executive power of the state shall be vested in the governor. No
person who is not an elector of the state, and who has not arrived at the age of thirty
years, shall be eligible.
(Lieutenant-governor, qualifications.)
Sec. 6. The lieutenant-governor shall possess the same qualications as are herein
prescribed for the governor.
(Compensation of governor and lieutenant-governor.)
Sec. 7. The compensations of the governor and lieutenant-governor shall be estab-
lished by law, and shall not be varied so as to take effect until after an election, which
shall next succeed the passage of the law establishing such compensations.
(Governor to command militia.)
Sec. 8. The governor shall be captain general of the militia of the state, except when
called into the service of the United States.
Art. IV CODIFIED CONSTITUTION 257
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
(Governor may require information.)
Sec. 9. He may require information in writing from the ofcers in the executive
department, on any subject relating to the duties of their respective ofces.
(Power to adjourn general assembly.)
Sec. 10. The governor, in case of a disagreement between the two houses of the
general assembly, respecting the time of adjournment, may adjourn them to such time
as he shall think proper, not beyond the day of the next stated session.
(Information and recommendations to general assembly.)
Sec. 11. He shall, from time to time, give to the general assembly, information of
the state of the government, and recommend to their consideration such measures as
he shall deem expedient.
(Faithful execution of laws.)
Sec. 12. He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
(Reprieves after conviction.)
Sec. 13. The governor shall have power to grant reprieves after conviction, in all
cases except those of impeachment, until the end of the next session of the general
assembly, and no longer.
(Commissions to be in name and by authority of state.)
Sec. 14. All commissions shall be in the name and by authority of the state of Con-
necticut; shall be sealed with the state seal, signed by the governor, and attested by the
secretary of the state.
(Powers and duties of governor in relation to bills. Presentation to governor
after adjournment. Procedure on veto.)
Sec. 15. Each bill which shall have passed both houses of the general assembly
shall be presented to the governor. Bills may be presented to the governor after the
adjournment of the general assembly, and the general assembly may prescribe the time
and method of performing all ministerial acts necessary or incidental to the adminis-
tration of this section. If the governor shall approve a bill, he shall sign and transmit
it to the secretary of the state, but if he shall disapprove, he shall transmit it to the
secretary with his objections, and the secretary shall thereupon return the bill with the
governor’s objections to the house in which it originated. After the objections shall
have been entered on its journal, such house shall proceed to reconsider the bill. If,
after such reconsideration, that house shall again pass it, but by the approval of at least
two-thirds of its members, it shall be sent with the objections to the other house, which
shall also reconsider it. If approved by at least two-thirds of the members of the second
house, it shall be a law and be transmitted to the secretary; but in such case the votes of
each house shall be determined by yeas and nays and the names of the members voting
for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively. In
case the governor shall not transmit the bill to the secretary, either with his approval or
with his objections, within ve calendar days, Sundays and legal holidays excepted,
after the same shall have been presented to him, it shall be a law at the expiration of
that period; except that, if the general assembly shall then have adjourned any regular
or special session, the bill shall be a law unless the governor shall, within fteen cal-
endar days after the same has been presented to him, transmit it to the secretary with
his objections, in which case it shall not be a law unless such bill is reconsidered and
258 CODIFIED CONSTITUTION Art. IV
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
repassed by the general assembly by at least a two-thirds vote of the members of each
house of the general assembly at the time of its reconvening.
(Veto of separate items in appropriation bills.)
Sec. 16. The governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items of any
bill making appropriations of money embracing distinct items while at the same time
approving the remainder of the bill, and the part or parts of the bill so approved shall
become effective and the item or items of appropriations so disapproved shall not
take effect unless the same are separately reconsidered and repassed in accordance
with the rules and limitations prescribed for the passage of bills over the executive
veto. In all cases in which the governor shall exercise the right of disapproval hereby
conferred he shall append to the bill at the time of signing it a statement of the item
or items disapproved, together with his reasons for such disapproval, and transmit the
bill and such appended statement to the secretary of the state. If the general assembly
be then in session he shall forthwith cause a copy of such statement to be delivered
to the house in which the bill originated for reconsideration of the disapproved items
in conformity with the rules prescribed for legislative action in respect to bills which
have received executive disapproval.
(Lieutenant-governor, president of senate.)
Sec. 17. The lieutenant-governor shall by virtue of his ofce, be president of the
senate, and have, when in committee of the whole, a right to debate, and when the
senate is equally divided, to give the casting vote.
(Permanent or temporary transfer of governor’s authority, powers and duties
to lieutenant-governor. Council on gubernatorial incapacity.)
Sec. 18. a. In case of the death, resignation, refusal to serve or removal from ofce
of the governor, the lieutenant-governor shall, upon taking the oath of ofce of gov-
ernor, be governor of the state until another is chosen at the next regular election for
governor and is duly qualied.
b. In case of the impeachment of the governor or of his absence from the state,
the lieutenant-governor shall exercise the powers and authority and perform the duties
appertaining to the ofce of governor until, if the governor has been impeached, he is
acquitted or, if absent, he has returned.
c. Whenever the governor transmits to the lieutenant-governor his written dec-
laration that he is unable to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his ofce,
and until the governor transmits to the lieutenant-governor a written declaration to the
contrary, the lieutenant-governor shall exercise the powers and authority and perform
the duties appertaining to the ofce of governor as acting governor.
d. In the absence of a written declaration of incapacity by the governor, whenever the
lieutenant-governor or a majority of the members of the council on gubernatorial inca-
pacity transmits to the council on gubernatorial incapacity a written declaration that the
governor is unable to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his ofce, the council
shall convene within forty-eight hours after the receipt of such written declaration to deter-
mine if the governor is unable to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his ofce.
If the council, within fourteen days after it is required to convene, determines by two-
thirds vote that the governor is unable to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his
ofce, it shall transmit a written declaration to that effect to the president pro tempore of
the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives and to the lieutenant-governor
Art. IV CODIFIED CONSTITUTION 259
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
and the lieutenant-governor, upon receipt of such declaration, shall exercise the powers
and authority and discharge the duties appertaining to the ofce of the governor as acting
governor; otherwise, the governor shall continue to exercise the powers and discharge
the duties of his ofce. Upon receipt by the president pro tempore of the senate and the
speaker of the house of representatives of such a written declaration from the council,
the general assembly shall, in accordance with its rules, decide the issue, assembling
within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the general assembly, within
twenty-one days after receipt of the written declaration or, if the general assembly is not in
session, within twenty-one days after the general assembly is required to assemble, deter-
mines by two-thirds vote of each house that the governor is unable to exercise the powers
and discharge the duties of his ofce, the lieutenant-governor shall continue to exercise
the powers and authority and perform the duties appertaining to the ofce of governor;
otherwise, the governor shall resume the powers and duties of his ofce.
e. In the absence of a written declaration of incapacity by the governor and in an
emergency, when the governor is unable to exercise the powers and perform the duties
of his ofce and the business of the state requires the immediate exercise of those powers
and performance of those duties, the lieutenant-governor shall transmit to the council on
gubernatorial incapacity a written declaration to that effect and thereupon shall exercise
the powers and authority and discharge the duties appertaining to the ofce of gover-
nor as acting governor. The council shall convene or the members of the council shall
otherwise communicate with each other collectively within twenty-four hours after the
receipt of such written declaration to determine if the governor is unable to exercise the
powers and perform the duties of his ofce. If the council, within fourteen days after
it is required to convene, determines by two-thirds vote that the governor is unable to
exercise the powers and perform the duties of his ofce, it shall transmit a written dec-
laration to that effect to the president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the
house of representatives and to the lieutenant-governor and the lieutenant-governor shall
continue to exercise the powers and authority and perform the duties appertaining to the
ofce of governor as acting governor; otherwise, the governor shall resume the powers
and duties of his ofce. Upon receipt by the president pro tempore of the senate and the
speaker of the house of representatives of such a written declaration from the council,
the general assembly shall, in accordance with its rules, decide the issue, assembling
within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the general assembly, within
twenty-one days after receipt of the written declaration or, if the general assembly is not
in session, within twenty-one days after the general assembly is required to assemble,
determines by two-thirds vote of each house that the governor is unable to exercise the
powers and discharge the duties of his ofce, the lieutenant-governor shall continue to
exercise the powers and authority and perform the duties appertaining to the ofce of
governor; otherwise, the governor shall resume the powers and duties of his ofce.
f. Whenever the governor transmits to the president pro tempore of the senate and
the speaker of the house of representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists he shall resume the powers and duties of his ofce upon the determination by a
majority vote of each house of the general assembly, in accordance with its rules, that
he is able to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his ofce.
g. There shall be a council on gubernatorial incapacity, the membership, proce-
dures and terms of ofce of the members of which the general assembly shall establish
by law.
260 CODIFIED CONSTITUTION Art. IV
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
h. The supreme court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate
disputes or questions arising under this section.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article XXII., of the Amendments to the Constitution of
the State of Connecticut. Said Article XXII., was adopted on November 28, 1984, and designated existing provisions as
subsections a. and b., removing reference to the governor’s inability “to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his
ofce”, which condition is more fully detailed in new provisions designated as subsections c. to f., inclusive, and added
provisions re council on gubernatorial incapacity and supreme court jurisdiction.
(When president pro tempore to become lieutenant-governor or act as
lieutenant-governor.)
Sec. 19. If the lieutenant-governor succeeds to the ofce of governor, or if the lieu-
tenant-governor dies, resigns, refuses to serve or is removed from ofce, the president
pro tempore of the senate shall, upon taking the oath of ofce of lieutenant-governor,
be lieutenant-governor of the state until another is chosen at the next regular election
for lieutenant-governor and is duly qualied. Within fteen days of the administration
of such oath the senate, if the general assembly is in session, shall elect one of its
members president pro tempore. In case of the inability of the lieutenant-governor to
exercise the powers and perform the duties of his ofce or in case of his impeachment
or absence from the state, the president pro tempore of the senate shall exercise the
powers and authority and perform the duties appertaining to the ofce of lieuten-
ant-governor until the disability is removed or, if the lieutenant-governor has been
impeached, he is acquitted or, if absent, he has returned.
(Election of president pro tempore when general assembly in recess.)
Sec. 20. If, while the general assembly is not in session, there is a vacancy in the
ofce of president pro tempore of the senate, the secretary of the state shall within
fteen days convene the senate for the purpose of electing one of its members presi-
dent pro tempore.
(Death or failure to qualify of governor-elect.)
Sec. 21. If, at the time xed for the beginning of the term of the governor, the gover-
nor-elect shall have died or shall have failed to qualify, the lieutenant-governor-elect,
after taking the oath of ofce of lieutenant-governor, may qualify as governor, and,
upon so qualifying, shall become governor. The general assembly may by law provide
for the case in which neither the governor-elect nor the lieutenant-governor-elect shall
have qualied, by declaring who shall, in such event, act as governor or the manner in
which the person who is so to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accord-
ingly until a governor or a lieutenant-governor shall have qualied.
(Treasurer, duties.)
Sec. 22. The treasurer shall receive all moneys belonging to the state, and disburse
the same only as he may be directed by law. He shall pay no warrant, or order for the
disbursement of public money, until the same has been registered in the ofce of the
comptroller.
(Secretary, duties.)
Sec. 23. The secretary of the state shall have the safe keeping and custody of the
public records and documents, and particularly of the acts, resolutions and orders of
the general assembly, and record the same; and perform all such duties as shall be
prescribed by law. He shall be the keeper of the seal of the state, which shall not be
altered.
Art. V CODIFIED CONSTITUTION 261
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
(Comptroller, duties.)
Sec. 24. The comptroller shall adjust and settle all public accounts and demands,
except grants and orders of the general assembly. He shall prescribe the mode of
keeping and rendering all public accounts. He shall, ex ofcio, be one of the auditors
of the accounts of the treasurer. The general assembly may assign to him other duties
in relation to his ofce, and to that of the treasurer, and shall prescribe the manner in
which his duties shall be performed.
(Sheriffs for the several counties.)
Sec. 25. Repealed.
Historical Note: This section was repealed by Article XXX., Sec. 1, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
State of Connecticut. Said Article XXX., Sec. 1, was adopted on November 29, 2000. This section had provided for the
quadrennial election of sheriffs in the several counties, and for their bonding, removal from ofce, and for the lling of
vacancies.
(Accounts of the state to be published.)
Sec. 26. A statement of all receipts, payments, funds, and debts of the state, shall be
published from time to time, in such manner and at such periods, as shall be prescribed
by law.
(Division of criminal justice. Appointment of state’s attorneys by a criminal
justice commission.)
Sec. 27. There shall be established within the executive department a division of
criminal justice which shall be in charge of the investigation and prosecution of all
criminal matters. Said division shall include the chief state’s attorney, who shall be
its administrative head, and the state’s attorneys for each judicial district, which dis-
tricts shall be established by law. The prosecutorial power of the state shall be vested
in a chief state’s attorney and the state’s attorney for each judicial district. The chief
state’s attorney shall be appointed as prescribed by law. There shall be a commission
composed of the chief state’s attorney and six members appointed by the governor
and conrmed by the general assembly, two of whom shall be judges of the superior
court. Said commission shall appoint a state’s attorney for each judicial district and
such other attorneys as prescribed by law.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, was added by Article XXIII., of the Amendments to the Constitution of
the State of Connecticut and designated as “Sec. 27” by the Revisors. Said Article XXIII., was adopted on November 28,
1984, and established a division of criminal justice within the executive department and provided for the appointment of
state’s attorneys by a criminal justice commission.
ARTICLE FIFTH.
OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.
(Courts, powers and jurisdiction.)
Sec. 1. The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, an appel-
late court, a superior court, and such lower courts as the general assembly shall, from
time to time, ordain and establish. The powers and jurisdiction of these courts shall
be dened by law.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article XX., Sec. 1, of the Amendments to the Consti-
tution of the State of Connecticut. Said Article XX., Sec. 1, was adopted on November 24, 1982, and established the
appellate court.
262 CODIFIED CONSTITUTION Art. V
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
(Selection, nomination, appointment and removal of judges. Judicial selection
commission.)
Sec. 2. Judges of all courts, except those courts to which judges are elected, shall
be nominated by the governor exclusively from candidates submitted by the judicial
selection commission. The commission shall seek and recommend qualied candidates
in such numbers as shall by law be prescribed. Judges so nominated shall be appointed
by the general assembly in such manner as shall by law be prescribed. They shall hold
their ofces for the term of eight years, but may be removed by impeachment. The gov-
ernor shall also remove them on the address of two-thirds of each house of the general
assembly and the supreme court may also remove them as is provided by law.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article XX., Sec. 2, of the Amendments to the Consti-
tution of the State of Connecticut, and Article XXV., of said Amendments. Said Article XX., Sec. 2, was adopted on
November 24, 1982, and added references to judges of the appellate court. Said Amendment XXV., was adopted on
November 19, 1986, and specied inapplicability to judges who are elected, specied that governor’s nominees are to
be chosen from candidates submitted by the judicial selection commission, and added provision authorizing the supreme
court to remove judges as provided by law.
(Lower court judges, appointment, terms.)
Sec. 3. Judges of the lower courts shall, upon nomination by the governor, be
appointed by the general assembly in such manner as shall by law be prescribed, for
terms of four years.
(Probate court judges, election, terms.)
Sec. 4. Judges of probate shall be elected by the electors residing in their respective
districts on the Tuesday after the rst Monday of November, 1966, and quadrennially
thereafter, and shall hold ofce for four years from and after the Wednesday after the
rst Monday of the next succeeding January.
(Justices of the peace.)
Sec. 5. Repealed.
Historical Note: This section was repealed by Article VIII., Sec. 1, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State
of Connecticut. Said Article VIII., Sec. 1, was adopted on November 27, 1974. This section had provided for the election
of justices of the peace by each town as prescribed by law.
(Age limitation, exception.)
Sec. 6. No judge shall be eligible to hold his ofce after he shall arrive at the age of
seventy years, except that a chief justice or judge of the supreme court, a judge of the
superior court, or a judge of the court of common pleas, who has attained the age of
seventy years and has become a state referee may exercise, as shall be prescribed by
law, the powers of the superior court or court of common pleas on matters referred to
him as a state referee.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article VIII., Sec. 2, of the Amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the State of Connecticut. Said Article VIII., Sec. 2, was adopted on November 27, 1974, and removed justices of
the peace from purview of section.
(Judicial censure, removal or suspension. Judicial Review Council.)
Sec. 7. In addition to removal by impeachment and removal by the governor on
the address of two-thirds of each house of the general assembly, judges of all courts,
except those courts to which judges are elected, may, in such manner as shall by law
be prescribed, be removed or suspended by the supreme court. The general assembly
may establish a judicial review council which may also, in such manner as shall by
law be prescribed, censure any such judge or suspend any such judge for a denite
period not longer than one year.
Art. VI CODIFIED CONSTITUTION 263
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, was added by Article XI., of the Amendments to the Constitution of
the State of Connecticut and designated as “Sec. 7” by the Revisors. Said Article XI., was adopted on November 24,
1976, and authorized the supreme court to remove or suspend judges of all courts, except those who are elected, and
empowered the general assembly to establish a judicial review council authorized to censure or suspend judges for not
longer than one year.
ARTICLE SIXTH.
OF THE QUALIFICATIONS OF ELECTORS.
(Qualifications of electors.)
Sec. 1. Every citizen of the United States who has attained the age of eighteen years,
who is a bona de resident of the town in which he seeks to be admitted as an elector
and who takes such oath, if any, as may be prescribed by law, shall be qualied to be
an elector.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article IX., of the Amendments to the Constitution of
the State of Connecticut. Said Article IX., was adopted on November 24, 1976, and changed minimum voting age from
twenty-one to eighteen, replaced requirement that applicant have resided in the town where he wishes to be admitted as
an elector for six months with requirement that applicant be a bona de resident of such town, deleted a provision requir-
ing that applicants be able to read passages of the Constitution or general statutes in English as condition of registration
as an elector, and claried that elector’s oath is not mandatory.
(Determination of qualifications.)
Sec. 2. The qualications of electors as set forth in Section 1 of this article shall be
decided at such times and in such manner as may be prescribed by law.
(Forfeiture and restoration of electoral privileges.)
Sec. 3. The general assembly shall by law prescribe the offenses on conviction of
which the right to be an elector and the privileges of an elector shall be forfeited and
the conditions on which and methods by which such rights may be restored.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article VII., of the Amendments to the Constitution of
the State of Connecticut. Said Article VII., was adopted on November 27, 1974, and added language re forfeiture of the
right to be an elector.
(Free suffrage.)
Sec. 4. Laws shall be made to support the privilege of free suffrage, prescribing the
manner of regulating and conducting meetings of the electors, and prohibiting, under
adequate penalties, all undue inuence therein, from power, bribery, tumult and other
improper conduct.
(Prohibiting the use of a party lever in any state or local election.)
Sec. 5. In all elections of ofcers of the state, or members of the general assem-
bly, the votes of the electors shall be by ballot, either written or printed, except that
voting machines or other mechanical devices for voting may be used in all elections
in the state, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. No voting machine
or device used at any state or local election shall be equipped with a straight ticket
device. The right of secret voting shall be preserved.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article XXIV., of the Amendments to the Constitution of
the State of Connecticut. Said Article XXIV., was adopted on November 19, 1986, and replaced provision which had
allowed the use of voting machines equipped with straight ticket voting devices with provision specically prohibiting
the use of such machines and devices.
264 CODIFIED CONSTITUTION Art. VI
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
(Privilege of electors from arrest.)
Sec. 6. At all elections of ofcers of the state, or members of the general assembly,
the electors shall be privileged from arrest, during their attendance upon, and going to,
and returning from the same, on any civil process.
(Absentee voting. In-person early voting.)
Sec. 7. The general assembly may provide by law for voting in the choice of any
ofcer to be elected or upon any question to be voted on at an election by qualied
voters of the state who are unable to appear at the polling place on the day of election
because of absence from the city or town of which they are inhabitants or because of
sickness or physical disability or because the tenets of their religion forbid secular
activity. The general assembly may further provide by law for voting in person prior
to the day of election in the choice of any ofcer to be elected or upon any question to
be voted on at an election by qualied voters of the state.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article XXXIV., of the Amendments to the Constitution
of the State of Connecticut. Said Article XXXIV., was adopted on November 30, 2022, and added language to provide
for in-person early voting.
(Absentee admission of electors.)
Sec. 8. The general assembly may provide by law for the absentee admission of
electors.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article XXVII., of the Amendments to the Constitution
of the State of Connecticut. Said Article XXVII., was adopted on November 25, 1992, and replaced provision limiting
absentee elector privilege to “members of the armed forces, the United States merchant marine, members of religious or
welfare groups or agencies attached to and serving with the armed forces and civilian employees of the United States,
and the spouses and dependents of such persons” with general authority for general assembly to legislate conditions for
absentee admission of electors.
(Removal to another town.)
Sec. 9. Repealed.
Historical Note: This section was repealed by Article XIII., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the State of
Connecticut. Said Article XIII., was adopted on November 26, 1980. This section had governed admission of an elector
in a town to which he had moved after his admission as an elector in a town of prior residence.
(Eligibility to office.)
Sec. 10. Every elector who has attained the age of eighteen years shall be eligible to
any ofce in the state, but no person who has not attained the age of eighteen shall be
eligible therefor, except in cases provided for in this constitution.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article II., Sec. 3, of the Amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the State of Connecticut, and the third section of Article XV., of said Amendments. Said Article II., Sec. 3, was
adopted on November 25, 1970, and imposed minimum age requirement of twenty-one years for eligibility to hold state
ofce. Said Article XV., was adopted on November 26, 1980, and reduced minimum age required for eligibility to hold
state ofce to eighteen.
(Preregistration of seventeen-year-old citizens as electors. When seventeen-
year-old citizens may vote in primary elections.)
Sec. 11. Any citizen who will have attained the age of eighteen years on or before the
day of a regular election may apply for admission as an elector at such times and in such
manner as may be prescribed by law, and, if qualied, shall become an elector on the day
of his or her eighteenth birthday. Any citizen who has not yet attained the age of eighteen
years but who will have attained the age of eighteen years on or before the day of a regular
election, who is otherwise qualied to be an elector and who has applied for admission as
an elector in such manner as may be prescribed by law, may vote in any primary election,
in such manner as may be prescribed by law, held for such regular election.
Art. VIII CODIFIED CONSTITUTION 265
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, was added by Article X., of the Amendments to the Constitution of
the State of Connecticut and designated as “Sec. 11” by the Revisors. It incorporates Article XIV., and Article XXXI.,
of said Amendments. Said Article X., was adopted on November 24, 1976, and allowed seventeen-year-olds to apply
for admission as electors within the four months preceding an election if they will be eighteen on or before the election.
Said Article XIV., was adopted on November 26, 1980, and deleted provision limiting preregistration of seventeen-
year-olds to the four-month period before an election. Said Article XXXI., was adopted on November 26, 2008, and
added provision allowing seventeen-year-olds who will be eighteen on or before a regular election and who have applied
for admission as an elector to vote in any primary election held for such regular election.
ARTICLE SEVENTH.
OF RELIGION.
(No legal compulsion to join or support church. No preference in religion.
Equal rights of all religious denominations.)
It being the right of all men to worship the Supreme Being, the Great Creator and
Preserver of the Universe, and to render that worship in a mode consistent with the
dictates of their consciences, no person shall by law be compelled to join or support,
nor be classed or associated with, any congregation, church or religious association.
No preference shall be given by law to any religious society or denomination in the
state. Each shall have and enjoy the same and equal powers, rights and privileges, and
may support and maintain the ministers or teachers of its society or denomination, and
may build and repair houses for public worship.
ARTICLE EIGHTH.
OF EDUCATION.
(Free public schools.)
Sec. 1. There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the
state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation.
(System of higher education.)
Sec. 2. The state shall maintain a system of higher education, including The Univer-
sity of Connecticut, which shall be dedicated to excellence in higher education. The
general assembly shall determine the size, number, terms and method of appointment
of the governing boards of The University of Connecticut and of such constituent units
or coordinating bodies in the system as from time to time may be established.
(Charter of Yale College.)
Sec. 3. The charter of Yale College, as modied by agreement with the corporation
thereof, in pursuance of an act of the general assembly, passed in May, 1792, is hereby
conrmed.
(School fund.)
Sec. 4. The fund, called the SCHOOL FUND, shall remain a perpetual fund, the
interest of which shall be inviolably appropriated to the support and encouragement
of the public schools throughout the state, and for the equal benet of all the people
thereof. The value and amount of said fund shall be ascertained in such manner as the
general assembly may prescribe, published, and recorded in the comptroller’s ofce;
and no law shall ever be made, authorizing such fund to be diverted to any other use
than the encouragement and support of public schools, among the several school soci-
eties, as justice and equity shall require.
266 CODIFIED CONSTITUTION Art. X
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
ARTICLE NINTH.
OF IMPEACHMENTS.
(Power of impeachment.)
Sec. 1. The house of representatives shall have the sole power of impeaching.
(Trial of impeachments.)
Sec. 2. All impeachments shall be tried by the senate. When sitting for that purpose,
they shall be on oath or afrmation. No person shall be convicted without the concur-
rence of at least two-thirds of the members present. When the governor is impeached,
the chief justice shall preside.
(Liability to impeachments.)
Sec. 3. The governor, and all other executive and judicial ofcers, shall be liable to
impeachment; but judgments in such cases shall not extend further than to removal
from ofce, and disqualication to hold any ofce of honor, trust or prot under the
state. The party convicted, shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial
and punishment according to law.
(Treason against the state.)
Sec. 4. Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against it, or
adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of
treason, unless on the testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act, or on
confession in open court. No conviction of treason, or attainder, shall work corruption
of blood, or forfeiture.
ARTICLE TENTH.
OF HOME RULE.
(Delegation of legislative authority to political subdivisions. Terms of town, city
and borough elective officers. Special legislation.)
Sec. 1. The general assembly shall by general law delegate such legislative author-
ity as from time to time it deems appropriate to towns, cities and boroughs relative
to the powers, organization, and form of government of such political subdivisions.
The general assembly shall from time to time by general law determine the maximum
terms of ofce of the various town, city and borough elective ofces. After July 1,
1969, the general assembly shall enact no special legislation relative to the powers,
organization, terms of elective ofces or form of government of any single town, city
or borough, except as to (a) borrowing power, (b) validating acts, and (c) formation,
consolidation or dissolution of any town, city or borough, unless in the delegation of
legislative authority by general law the general assembly shall have failed to prescribe
the powers necessary to effect the purpose of such special legislation.
(Regional governments and compacts.)
Sec. 2. The general assembly may prescribe the methods by which towns, cities and
boroughs may establish regional governments and the methods by which towns, cities,
boroughs and regional governments may enter into compacts. The general assembly
shall prescribe the powers, organization, form, and method of dissolution of any gov-
ernment so established.
Art. XI CODIFIED CONSTITUTION 267
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
ARTICLE ELEVENTH.
GENERAL PROVISIONS.
(Official oath. Form.)
Sec. 1. Members of the general assembly, and all ofcers, executive and judicial,
shall, before they enter on the duties of their respective ofces, take the following oath
or afrmation, to wit:
You do solemnly swear (or afrm, as the case may be) that you will support the
Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the state of Connecticut, so
long as you continue a citizen thereof; and that you will faithfully discharge, accord-
ing to law, the duties of the ofce of .... to the best of your abilities. So help you God.
(Extra compensation to elected officials and public contractors prohibited;
exception.)
Sec. 2. Except as provided in this section, neither the state nor any political subdi-
vision of the state shall pay or grant to any elected ofcial of the state or any political
subdivision of the state, any compensation greater than the amount of compensation
set at the beginning of such ofcial’s term of ofce for the ofce which such ofcial
holds or increase the pay or compensation of any public contractor above the amount
specied in the contract. The provisions of this section shall not apply to elected of-
cials in towns in which the legislative body is the town meeting. The compensation
of an elected ofcial of a political subdivision of the state whose term of ofce is four
years or more may be increased once after such ofcial has completed two years of
his term by the legislative body of such political subdivision. The term “compensa-
tion” means, with respect to an elected ofcial, such ofcial’s salary, exclusive of
reimbursement for necessary expenses or any other benet to which his ofce would
entitle him.
Historical Note: This section, as printed here, incorporates Article XIX., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
State of Connecticut. Said Article XIX., was adopted on November 24, 1982, and replaced “the general assembly nor any
county, city, borough, town or school district” with “the state nor any political subdivision of the state” and “any public
ofcer, employee, agent or servant” with “any elected ofcial of the state or any political subdivision of the state”, and
added provisions exempting elected ofcials of towns in which the legislative body is the town meeting from terms of
the section, allowing one increase in compensation for ofcials whose term of ofce is four years or more after two years
of a term have been served and dening “compensation”.
(Emergency provision for temporary succession to powers and duties of public
offices.)
Sec. 3. In order to insure continuity in operation of state and local governments in
a period of emergency resulting from disaster caused by enemy attack, the general
assembly shall provide by law for the prompt and temporary succession to the powers
and duties of all public ofces, the incumbents of which may become unavailable for
carrying on their powers and duties.
(Claims against the state.)
Sec. 4. Claims against the state shall be resolved in such manner as may be provided
by law.
(Effect of Constitution on existing corporations, officers, laws.)
Sec. 5. The rights and duties of all corporations shall remain as if this constitution
had not been adopted; with the exception of such regulations and restrictions as are
contained in this constitution. All laws not contrary to, or inconsistent with, the pro-
visions of this constitution shall remain in force, until they shall expire by their own
limitation, or shall be altered or repealed by the general assembly, in pursuance of this
268 CODIFIED CONSTITUTION Art. XIII
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
constitution. The validity of all bonds, debts, contracts, as well of individuals as of
bodies corporate, or the state, of all suits, actions, or rights of action, both in law and
equity, shall continue as if no change had taken place. All ofcers lling any ofce by
election or appointment shall continue to exercise the duties thereof, according to their
respective commissions or appointments, until their ofces shall have been abolished
or their successors selected and qualied in accordance with this constitution or the
laws enacted pursuant thereto.
ARTICLE TWELFTH.
OF AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
(Method of proposing and approving amendments.)
Amendments to this constitution may be proposed by any member of the senate or
house of representatives. An amendment so proposed, approved upon roll call by a yea
vote of at least a majority, but by less than three-fourths, of the total membership of
each house, shall be published with the laws which may have been passed at the same
session and be continued to the regular session of the general assembly elected at the
next general election to be held on the Tuesday after the rst Monday of November in
an even-numbered year. An amendment so proposed, approved upon roll call by a yea
vote of at least three-fourths of the total membership of each house, or any amendment
which, having been continued from the previous general assembly, is again approved
upon roll call by a yea vote of at least a majority of the total membership of each
house, shall, by the secretary of the state, be transmitted to the town clerk in each
town in the state, whose duty it shall be to present the same to the electors thereof for
their consideration at the next general election to be held on the Tuesday after the rst
Monday of November in an even-numbered year. If it shall appear, in a manner to be
provided by law, that a majority of the electors present and voting on such amendment
at such election shall have approved such amendment, the same shall be valid, to all
intents and purposes, as a part of this constitution. Electors voting by absentee ballot
under the provisions of the statutes shall be considered to be present and voting.
Historical Note: This Article, as printed here, incorporates Article VI., of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
State of Connecticut. Said Article VI., was adopted on November 27, 1974, and made minor changes in wording involv-
ing the placement of the word “next”, replacing “the general election to be held on the Tuesday after the rst Monday
of November in the next even-numbered year” with “the next general election to be held on the Tuesday after the rst
Monday of November in an even-numbered year” in two occurrences.
ARTICLE THIRTEENTH.
OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS.
(Method of convening by vote of general assembly.)
Sec. 1. The general assembly may, upon roll call, by a yea vote of at least two-thirds
of the total membership of each house, provide for the convening of a constitutional
convention to amend or revise the constitution of the state not earlier than ten years
from the date of convening any prior convention.
(Method of convening by vote of electors.)
Sec. 2. The question “Shall there be a Constitutional Convention to amend or revise
the Constitution of the State?” shall be submitted to all the electors of the state at
the general election held on the Tuesday after the rst Monday in November in the
even-numbered year next succeeding the expiration of a period of twenty years from
Art. XIV CODIFIED CONSTITUTION 269
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
INCORPORATING ALL EXTANT AMENDMENTS
the date of convening of the last convention called to revise or amend the constitution
of the state, including the Constitutional Convention of 1965, or next succeeding the
expiration of a period of twenty years from the date of submission of such a question
to all electors of the state, whichever date shall last occur. If a majority of the electors
voting on the question shall signify “yes”, the general assembly shall provide for such
convention as provided in Section 3 of this article.
(Selection of membership, date of convening.)
Sec. 3. In providing for the convening of a constitutional convention to amend or
revise the constitution of the state the general assembly shall, upon roll call, by a yea
vote of at least two-thirds of the total membership of each house, prescribe by law the
manner of selection of the membership of such convention, the date of convening of
such convention, which shall be not later than one year from the date of the roll call
vote under Section 1 of this article or one year from the date of the election under
Section 2 of this article, as the case may be, and the date for nal adjournment of such
convention.
(Submission of proposals to electors, approval, effective date.)
Sec. 4. Proposals of any constitutional convention to amend or revise the consti-
tution of the state shall be submitted to all the electors of the state not later than two
months after nal adjournment of the convention, either as a whole or in such parts
and with such alternatives as the convention may determine. Any proposal of the con-
vention to amend or revise the constitution of the state submitted to such electors in
accordance with this section and approved by a majority of such electors voting on
the question shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of this constitution.
Such proposals when so approved shall take effect thirty days after the date of the vote
thereon unless otherwise provided in the proposal.
ARTICLE FOURTEENTH.
OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS CONSTITUTION.
(Approval of Constitution by the people.)
This proposed constitution, submitted by the Constitutional Convention of 1965,
shall become the constitution of the state of Connecticut upon approval by the people
and proclamation by the governor as provided by law.
Historical Note: The 1965 Constitution of the State of Connecticut was adopted by referendum on December 14,
1965, and proclaimed by the governor as adopted on December 30, 1965.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
GENERAL STATUTES
REVISED TO
JANUARY 1, 2023
Cite as General Statutes, Revision of 1958, Revised to 2023.
